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China’s contentious relation to Taiwan began when the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was founded in October 1949 and the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) set up 
an exile regime on the island two months later. Without now delving into the rich 
legal and historical complexities, suffice it to say that the island’s autonomous sov-
ereignty has been in contention ever since, initially because of the KMT’s stubborn 
insistence that it continued to represent not just Taiwan but all of China, and later, 
when the tables had turned, because Taiwan refused to cede sovereignty to the 
now dominant power that had arisen on the other side of the Strait. At this writ-
ing, the election of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government under Tsai 
Ing-wen in January 2016 brings the island to a new inflection point. For, like the 
Chen Shui-bian administration in 2000–2008, the incoming DPP regime would 
really prefer to drop all claim to be part of the Chinese mainland and to embrace 
political independence. Of course they dare not say this in so many words because 
it would infuriate Beijing, which continues to insist that there is one China, that 
Taiwan is a part of it, and that any assertion otherwise by Taiwan constitutes an il-
legal attempt at secession that Beijing has the legal right to prevent by force. China 
would prefer that contingency not to arise. Its use of force against Taiwan would 
result in great damage to the lives and property of people with whom mainland-
ers share a Chinese ancestry (compatriots in an ethnic or cultural sense, tongbao) 
whom the PRC aims to return to the motherland’s embrace and possibly to the 
mainland as well. Chinese military forces still respect the striking power of Tai-
wan’s armed forces and wish to avoid the possibility of US intervention to defend 
the island’s sovereignty (even though the United States no longer formally recog-
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Taiwan, and indeed to the United States. In other words, the Taiwan Strait remains 
an international flash point, one of the few places in the world that could unleash 
war between two great powers, both of which are nuclear weapon states.
But one of the things that makes Taiwan so politically difficult and so intellectu-
ally fascinating is that it poses not merely a security problem but a nexus of interre-
lated puzzles. The following chapters focus in turn on three of its aspects. The first is 
“national identity.” This is a problem that Taiwan should not be permitted to have, 
according to mainland critics, because it is not even a nation. Yet Taiwanese do 
share a sense of collective identity that is widely perceived there as distinct, which 
they seek to preserve and profess to be willing to fight for. This has greatly compli-
cated Beijing’s quest to promote reunification, particularly after the post-1979 shift 
from a focus on “armed liberation” to a focus on peaceful reunion, for to be peace-
ful it must also be voluntary. The second aspect of the problem is socioeconomic. 
The post-1979 shift to peaceful reunification was premised on the assumption that 
through “three direct links”—postal, transportation, and trade—the embittered 
gulf dividing the two peoples at the Strait could eventually be bridged. While the 
“three links” met with an immediate “three nos” (no contact, no compromise, no 
negotiation) from the Chiang Ching-kuo regime, Beijing nevertheless persevered 
by accommodating “three indirect links” (mainly via Hong Kong), and these infor-
mal connections, unsuccessfully repressed but ultimately tolerated by the Taiwan 
authorities, have proved surprisingly robust, paving the way for their formalization 
in 2008. Yet communication has not exactly blossomed into fraternal love. The 
third dimension of the problem is political-strategic. This has both national and 
international aspects. Nationally, what do China and Taiwan expect of their future 
relationship—what adjustments will each demand of the other in terms of structur-
al political changes, or what nonchanges will each tolerate—and how do they plan 
to effect such changes? Internationally, how will reunification be achieved—or, how 
can Taiwan’s autonomy be preserved—in the prevailing balance of power, and what 
impact will either outcome have on that balance?
NATIONAL IDENTIT Y
A sense of national identity has long been conceived by political scientists to be 
a vital part of nation building, as it instills loyalty and participatory zeal in an 
ethnoreligiously heterogeneous citizenry and a sense of collective coherence and 
international affiliation or direction in the nation-state. At the same time, in ex-
treme cases it can drive blind and ultimately self-destructive international ambi-
tions. The Chinese sense of identity with regard to Taiwan and other peripheral 
regions has been fairly stable, even spanning both Nationalist and communist 
revolutionary eras: the understanding is that all of these areas should be assim-
ilated into the motherland as soon and as fully as possible, making minimal 
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allowance for ethnolinguistic differences.1 In contrast, the sense of national 
identity in Taiwan has varied greatly over time, recurrently tending to destabi-
lize the relationship. Taiwan attained provincial status in the Qing Empire only 
ten years before being forfeited to Japan as part of the Shimonoseki peace settle-
ment at the end of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, thenceforth remaining a 
Japanese colony for the next fifty years. Upon occupying the island after 1945, the 
Nationalist forces reintroduced a Chinese identity for it, initially as a backward 
outpost of the lost republic but after loss of the civil war as temporary capital of a 
government in exile. While there had been resistance to the Japanese occupation 
regime, it seems to have been less than in the contemporaneous Korean colony, 
and postcolonial Taiwan has also remained friendlier to Japan than either South 
or North Korea, affiliating Taiwan during the Cold War into a US-Japan-Taiwan 
security network. All these identity adjustments were superimposed from the 
top down on a relatively passive populace.
With the introduction of democracy in the twilight years of the Chiangs’ reign 
at the end of the 1980s, the evolution of national identity on the island was stimu-
lated by diverse impulses, including a scrambled international scene at the end of 
the Cold War, an attractive offer for peaceful reunification from the mainland, and 
the aspirations of the newly enfranchised Taiwanese electorate. As Yi-huah Jiang, 
former premier of the Republic of China and professor of political science at Tai-
wan University, indicates in chapter 2 of this volume, the overall thrust of Taiwan’s 
evolving identity tended to be “modernist.” Drawing on the pattern-variable dis-
tinction between ascribed and achieved identities, he shows how the primordial 
division, a “subethnic” split between original inhabitants of the island (benshen-
gren) and the wave of Chinese who fled the mainland at the end of the civil war 
(waishengren), has gradually faded over time. This is evinced not only in the grow-
ing number of citizens who answer the survey question “I am” with “Taiwanese” 
(as opposed to “Chinese” or “both”) but in more refined survey instruments of his 
own devising that measure identity in terms of various constructed variables. And 
this corresponds with a “future nation preference” shifting ever more toward inde-
pendence and away from any interest in reunification. All this is quite contrary to 
the preferences of the mainland, of course, which is thereby incentivized to recon-
sider its option to resort to force if Taiwan moves toward formal independence. 
Yet ironically Jiang finds that while majority preferences have shifted toward in-
dependence they are not strongly held: only a small percentage would still pursue 
independence in the face of a credible threat of force. The Taiwanese electorate is 
pragmatic, willing to subordinate ideal preferences to political survival. Hence the 
consistent majority preference for “no independence, no reunification” (bu du bu 
tong). In view of the fairly invariant attachment to a cross-Strait status quo, Jiang 
argues that the more relevant issue is not identity but the interpretation of “one 
China.” If the PRC and ROC agree that, despite the existence of two governments 
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that claim to be “China,” there is only one China in the world, who is its legitimate 
representative, and what repercussions do differing interpretations of “one China” 
have for policy and diplomacy? In other words, the essential question is one of 
sovereignty: Who rules?
In chapter 3, one of the few extant studies of the evolution of national identity 
in Taiwan during the Ma Ying-jeou era, Jean-Pierre Cabestan arrives at the rath-
er startling finding that despite a landslide victory for this Nationalist president 
in 2008, followed by rapid and successful moves toward reconciliation with the 
mainland, the Taiwan electorate’s interest in reunification has only waned. And 
this, he argues, is not because the “Blue” camp (a coalition of parties, most pre-
dominantly the KMT and the People First Party, that takes a softer position toward 
the PRC, supporting a reunification that is often envisioned as long-deferred and 
as dependent on the PRC’s fulfillment of many conditions, as well as an increase 
in ties with the mainland) simply avoided an unpopular issue. To the contrary, the 
Nationalists made a concerted drive during their eight-year control of both execu-
tive and legislative branches to reverse the DPP’s foregoing “de-Sinification” move-
ment and restore faith in “one China,” interpreted as the Republic of China (ROC) 
on Taiwan. Cross-Strait trade and investment increased, regular discussions were 
resumed between the Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s As-
sociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), resulting in some two 
dozen agreements, most prominently the “three direct links” and the 2010 Eco-
nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), and mainland tourism and 
investment in the island was for the first time permitted. Having already passed 
a law against “secession,” Beijing downplayed its invasion threats and agreed and 
adhered to a diplomatic truce, permitting Taiwan to make trade agreements with 
New Zealand and Singapore that it could have blocked and to participate infor-
mally in the World Health Association. The mainland authorities even agreed to 
negotiate cultural exchanges and some form of peace treaty with the island. But 
after initially expressing interest the Ma leadership opted not to pursue these. And 
the attempt to move ahead toward further economic integration in a Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (CSTA), after being bilaterally agreed on, was blocked in 
the Legislative Yuan, where the KMT held a commanding majority.
The PRC authorities must have been quite perplexed that a relationship they 
had so carefully nurtured and that seemed to be making excellent economic prog-
ress could so swiftly unravel. How could this be? Cabestan points to a number of 
unnoticed flaws with cross-Strait détente. First and foremost, increasing economic 
linkages with the mainland did not prove to be quite the panacea that had been 
advertised. Exports constitute about 70 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, some 40 percent 
of which go to China or Hong Kong. But PRC growth has been decelerating since 
2010 for a number of reasons, none of which have much to do with Taiwan, nor 
have the island’s other trade partners made a very impressive recovery from the 
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global financial crisis, so export growth stalled. There is a perception (only weakly 
supported by available evidence) that the growth that has occurred has been more 
unequally distributed (to businesses with mainland investments) than before. The 
economic “gifts” bestowed by the PRC, such as “early harvest” post-ECFA trade ar-
rangements, tend to be discounted in Taiwan for having ulterior political motives 
(which China has never denied). The student-led, anti-CSTA “Sunflower Move-
ment” that occupied the legislature several weeks in the spring of 2014 seems to 
have been surprisingly successful in mobilizing mass support, especially among 
the young people ironically most likely to seek jobs on the mainland. It seems 
that the more economic integration succeeds, the greater the tendency to mobilize 
national identity as a counterweight.
Chapter 4, by Shu Keng and Emmy Ruihua Lin of the Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics, takes on one of the key pieces of this puzzle, namely the 
political opinions of the growing number (currently estimated at over a million) 
of Taiwanese businesspeople or taishang who move to the mainland on a more or 
less permanent basis to pursue their livelihoods. On the basis of an extensive (452 
respondents) survey of Taiwan sojourners in Dongguan and the Shanghai region, 
Keng and Lin indeed find many changes: these Taiwanese are happy to assimilate 
to mainland culture, to marry Chinese spouses and have children, and to set up 
their own business associations, even schools. Their attitudes toward the main-
land do change as well: they are more likely to vote “Blue,” less likely to endorse 
Taiwan independence (the percentage sinks drastically, from 25.8 percent to 3.5 
percent), and more likely to be open to future reunification (the percentage more 
than doubles, from 9.9 percent to 21.4 percent). The puzzle is that despite all these 
adaptations they are not inclined to give up their Taiwanese identity. They even 
continue to prefer independence to reunification, by a wide (if reduced) margin. 
Why? Keng and Lin attribute the resilience of Taiwan identities to taishang mobil-
ity: because they can quickly and easily return, they continue to view Taiwan as 
“home.” There may be other answers as well to this underresearched and method-
ologically elusive question. Class may be a factor—living standards remain much 
higher in Taiwan than on the mainland (even though sojourners typically still 
draw Taiwanese salaries). And sojourners tend to limit their assimilation, form-
ing their own clubs, social networks, schools, and communities on the mainland. 
Finally, politics—though ideology is played down, and Taiwan’s democracy is often 
derided in China as chaotic and corrupt—may play a role. It may take generations 
(e.g., children of Taiwan-Chinese marriages) for full identity convergence to occur.
The Chinese insist that the mainland population should also have a voice in 
the future of Taiwan, and although this is often disputed on the island, in view of 
the PRC’s looming economic and military power it seems inevitable that it will. In 
chapter 5, Gang Lin of Shanghai Jiaotong University and Weixu Wu of Tsinghua 
University bring a perceptive Chinese perspective to the issue. Understandably, 
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while Taiwanese intellectuals tend to focus on national identity as “constructed,” 
the mainland preference is to view it as primordial—as Chinese president Xi Jin-
ping put it in his 2015 Singapore meeting with Ma Ying-jeou, “No force can pull 
us apart because we are brothers who are still connected by our flesh even if our 
bones are broken, we are a family in which blood is thicker than water.” Mainland-
ers invoke a shared culture, again viewed not as malleable but as primordial: the 
path-dependent culture laid down by Confucianism, which the People’s Republic 
now honors along with Taiwan. The future is also evoked as a sentimental basis for 
togetherness: the two peoples constitute a “community of cross-Strait shared des-
tinies.” The complex issue of institutional integration (i.e., mutual structural ad-
justments) is postponed with the “one country, two systems” formula that assures 
Taiwan even more latitude than Hong Kong’s Special Administrative Region for 
the next fifty years. Successful integration of taishang into mainland society sup-
posedly illustrates the potential for integration without institutional convergence. 
At the same time Chinese tacitly concede the weakness of their approach, noting 
that civil identity has fallen behind ethnic identity as a force for reunification. The 
possibility that the People’s Democracy might at some future point usefully emu-
late Taiwan-style structural reforms is rarely entertained (and never officially).
Mainland views of the Taiwan issue are difficult to research because public 
opinion polling on that sensitive topic is not permitted, no doubt because Beijing’s 
hopes for peaceful reunification could well be derailed by an outburst of Chinese 
nationalism. In chapter 6, Rou-lan Chen thus tackles the even more volatile but 
still uncensored issue of the Senkaku Islands, known in Taiwan (to which they are 
closest, some 43.5 miles away) as Diaoyu Tai and on the mainland as Diaoyu Dao. 
Japan surveyed the eight tiny uninhabited islets, declared them terra nullius, and 
annexed them under the jurisdiction of Okinawa prefecture in 1895; ever since 
their occupation by the United States from 1945 to 1971 they have been under Japa-
nese control. Since the discovery of potential subsurface hydrocarbon deposits in 
the area in 1968, Japanese sovereignty has been disputed by both Taiwan and the 
PRC. Beijing’s claim to the islets is subsidiary to its claim to Taiwan, as it contends 
(despite Tokyo’s claims to the contrary) that they were part of the “unequal” Shi-
monoseki treaty ceding Taiwan to Japan. Although the islets are also claimed by 
Taiwan (much to China’s satisfaction), their parallel provenance and proximity 
make them a politically accessible synecdoche for China’s claim to Taiwan, and 
as such a polemical target of China’s nationalistic “raging youth” (fen qing). Chen 
analyzes this politically articulate subsection of Chinese civil society through a 
sample of over a thousand contributions to a quasi-official Internet bulletin board 
called the Strong Nation Forum. In a fascinating psycho-political analysis of 
these data, she finds that the outraged nationalism provoked by the issue symp-
tomizes deep ambivalence in China’s younger generation. Their rage is directed 
partly against Japan, for claiming property that rightfully belongs to China, but 
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also against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership for responding with 
such weakness and timidity to this violation of national sovereignty. This sense of 
nationalist outrage, which has upon occasion taken the form of mass demonstra-
tions and even collective vandalism, may be traced to the massive expansion of 
the education system since 1999, the decay of established institutions of collec-
tive identity (e.g., the Communist Youth League), rising expectations after several 
decades of double-digit growth, and limited job opportunities for young people. 
Whatever the socioeconomic reagents, it seems to be a recurrent pattern of explo-
sive youthful activism.
POLITICAL EC ONOMY
In chapter 7, Chih-shian Liou begins our discussion of political economic con-
nections with a comparative analysis of state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China 
and Taiwan. As an isomorphic component of Leninist “commanding heights” 
state-led developmentalism on both sides of the Strait, the SOE provides a use-
ful point of departure. Though SOEs in China and Taiwan have the same origin, 
they have since undergone diverging trajectories. In the PRC they have been 
ideologically identified with socialism and thus favored with subsidies, preferred 
bank loan terms, merger and acquisition opportunities, initial public offerings, 
and stock market listings, and, in a number of “pillar” or strategic industries, 
they have been protected from market competition. Though subject to a series of 
reforms since the 1990s, SOEs continue to enjoy de facto soft budget constraints, 
while the directors are appointed by the Organization Department of the CCP 
Central Committee and have ministerial rank. The state has tried to make SOEs 
“national champions” able to compete with multinational corporations globally, 
thanks to which the second- and third-largest corporations in the world (Sino-
pec and China National Petroleum Corporation, respectively) are both SOEs. 
Though SOEs in 1978 made up three-quarters of China’s GDP and have shriveled 
to only about one-quarter of that today, they are likely to remain in a privileged 
upstream industrial position under CCP control. In Taiwan, on the other hand, 
while SOEs played a key role in the early industrialization stage, privatization 
policy was introduced in the late 1980s. Thus, while SOEs accounted for 35.2 
percent of capital formation in 1961, by 2001 they accounted for only about 9 
percent. In contradistinction to Japan, South Korea, and China, Taiwan’s growth 
has been led by small and medium enterprises (SMEs), usually family controlled. 
The pioneering dimension of Liou’s analysis relates this comparative analysis to 
the dynamics of cross-Strait economic relations. Depending on the ideological 
emphasis at the time, SOEs are politically preferred to foreign-invested enter-
prises (FIEs), and this will tend to crowd out Taiwan-invested capital on the 
mainland. Growing cross-Strait economic interdependence, Liou points out, 
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also raises the issue of trade externality: “In general trade among allies generates 
a positive security externality while trade among nonallies generates a negative 
security externality.” Finally, there is the issue of economic asymmetry: the pro-
portion of Chinese trade with Taiwan is much smaller than the proportion of 
Taiwan’s trade with China (over 30 percent), meaning Taiwan is more dependent 
on China than vice versa. To deepen bilateral economic integration the mainland 
has consistently permitted an imbalance of payments very much in Taiwan’s fa-
vor, also making the China-Taiwan trade relations more valuable to Taiwan than 
to the PRC.
Chapter 8, by Chung-min Tsai of National Cheng Chi University, focuses 
squarely on cross-Strait trade and investment and its impact on politics. Trade and 
investment, he finds, have increased inexorably over time, giving rise to Chinese 
confidence that economic integration must eventually lead, in accordance with 
neofunctional (and Marxist) logic, to political integration. In Taiwan’s case, trade 
was soon followed by investment, and as investment increased it pulled in related 
trade. There were four big waves of Taiwan investment in China: (1) in the late 
1980s, after the appreciation of Taiwan’s currency priced Taiwan out of American 
markets and the government removed constraints on capital outflow; (2) 1992–94, 
after Deng’s “southern voyage” inaugurating a new wave of liberal economic re-
form and coinciding with the Singapore talks; (3) in the early 2000s, during the 
world high-tech recession, when Taiwan’s computer industry moved to the main-
land to remain price competitive; and (4) post-2010, following the signing of the 
ECFA with its “early harvest” enticements. As the connection thrived, Taiwan 
capital has moved from labor-intensive assembly to high-tech production, from 
south to north and from east to west, from a more general export orientation to 
a focus on the China market. What is perhaps surprising is that the nexus be-
tween economics and politics has certainly not gone unnoticed in Taiwan, and 
politicians opposed to unification, such as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, have 
taken steps to arrest its development.
And what has been the impact of politics on economic integration? Attempts 
under Lee Teng-hui’s presidency to “go slow” (jieji yongren) on investment in the 
mainland and divert it to Southeast Asia may have had some temporary impact 
in the wake of the 1995–96 missile crisis. But the Asian financial crisis (1997–98) 
then scared taishang out of Southeast Asia, and in the early 2000s the mainland 
eased foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations. For their part, Chinese attempts 
to co-opt taishang seem to have had some effect on voting patterns (most vote 
“Blue”), but not on policy making in Taiwan. Though the evidence is not entirely 
clear, Tsai concludes that the impact of political pressure (by either side) on trade 
and investment has been negligible. Economic transactions actually increased fol-
lowing the 2000 election of DPP leader Chen Shui-bian (because of the high-tech 
crash) and decreased following the 2008 election of KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou 
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(because of the global financial crisis)—in each case, economic considerations 
trumped political.
Still, the prospects for the economic relationship going forward are decidedly 
mixed: election of a DPP leadership will not incentivize PRC political cooperation, 
mainland wages have been escalating, Beijing has been trying to upgrade its own 
national champions at the expense of competing foreign enterprises, and of course 
there has been an overall slowdown of GDP growth. Taiwan faces the contradic-
tory pull of mainland jobs and opportunities departing the island while leaving 
an antimainland political backlash behind. In 2015 the United States was Taiwan’s 
largest export destination by country, as trade with China slumped because their 
expanding domestic supply chain decreased demand for Taiwanese components.2 
Meanwhile, encouraged by the PRC leadership to “go out” (zuo chuqu) and acquire 
brands and expertise abroad, mainland enterprises have invested some $1.3 billion 
in the Taiwan market, where they received a mixed popular reception. Recent at-
tempts by the state-owned chip maker and IT giant Tsinghua Unigroup to shell out 
$2 billion for substantial stakes in two Taiwan chip-packaging companies, Silicon 
Precision Industries Co. (SPIL) and ChipMOS Technologies Inc., have raised eye-
brows in business and political circles on the island, for example.
In chapter 9, Tse-Kang Leng of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan focuses specifi-
cally on information technology (IT), the Silicon Island’s leading strategic sector 
since the 1990s, constituting 30 percent of its exports. According to the original 
conception of the cross-Strait division of labor in Taiwan’s industrial policy, the 
technology-intensive crown jewels were to be kept at home while labor-intensive 
assembly work was downloaded to the mainland. But that plan went overboard in 
the high-tech crash of the early 2000s, when Taiwan’s laptop industry relocated 
to keep prices competitive—if one left, the rest had to follow or see their prices 
undercut by the one that left. Despite its ever growing importance, the cross-Strait 
nexus is only part of Taiwan’s globalization. Taiwan is part of a tangle of value-
added chains in which the upstream is largely in the United States and Japan while 
the downstream (assembly and export) is located on the mainland. Taiwan has 
found its niche in the middle, in ODM (original design manufacture) and OEM 
(original equipment manufacture) production. This niche is, however, endangered 
by competition from Japanese and Korean firms like Samsung upstream, while the 
Chinese plan is to move up from downstream by co-opting or buying or otherwise 
displacing Taiwanese OEM producers and semiconductor fabrication plants and 
forming a “red supply chain.” To avoid being squeezed out, Taiwan firms have 
been attempting to move upstream from OEM to OBM (original brand manufac-
ture), that is, to control the entire chain including the brand, as in Acer laptops or 
HTM smart phones. But this is a challenge amid stiff international competition, 
and it remains to be seen whether Taiwan firms can master the logistic and net-
work requirements. Taiwan must simultaneously “handle the two situations” of 
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international commercial competition and domestic security (in which industrial 
leadership and technological innovation have also become securitized).
In chapter 10, by You-tien Hsing, professor of geography and chair of the Cen-
ter for China Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, we shift focus from 
the economic to the social dimension of cross-Strait relations. Hsing focuses on 
the proliferation and political organization of social media, which has emerged as 
a functional complement and sometime nemesis to industrial expansion on the is-
land. Taiwanese businesspeople have sometimes tended to charge ahead oblivious 
of negative externalities such as high-tech or petrochemical pollution (in which 
they are hardly unique), creating fertile ground for social entrepreneurs and in-
formal media networks such as PeoPo to harness “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) 
sentiments. And these have sometimes had major impact. Indeed, this has been 
one of the factors facilitating the wholesale exodus of externality-freighted pro-
duction facilities such as Foxconn to the mainland, where environmental activism 
is less problematic. In this sense, Taiwan’s democratic social entrepreneurialism 
might be said to make an ironic contribution to cross-Strait economic integra-
tion. China for its part, with the largest number of netizens and social media users 
on the planet, has also experienced electronically enhanced political involvement. 
Netizens have been active in fighting unfair land expropriations, pollution, cor-
ruption, health care abuses, and foreign investors. They have, for example, en-
gaged in spontaneously assembled “human flesh searches” that use the Internet 
to identify and harass demonstrably corrupt officials, and in some cases (e.g., the 
1986 anti-Japan demonstrations) have used social media to organize public pro-
test. The widespread political use of social media has been particularly impressive 
in view of the state’s various efforts to steer or suppress it, making the public con-
text quite different from Taiwan’s in that standing networks such as PeoPo cannot 
be established without state links. But Taiwan also has developed more politically 
acceptable contributions to cross-Strait civil society. The Tzu Chi organization, a 
Buddhist charity and one of the largest philanthropic organizations in the world, 
is based in Taiwan but is also fully functional on the mainland, where it propagates 
quasi-socialist values, does not endorse electoral democracy or market capitalism, 
and constitutes no threat to the state in either Taiwan or the PRC.
POLITICAL STR ATEGY
Taiwan is in an unusual position in that its number one threat to national security 
is also its leading trade partner and investment recipient. In chapter 11, Yu-Shan 
Wu of Taiwan National University and Academia Sinica places Taiwan’s unusual 
but not unique position in a strategic theoretical framework for comparative anal-
ysis, focusing on the recent security dilemma of Ukraine. Ukraine also has close 
historical, cultural and economic ties with a much larger neighbor, the Russian 
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Federation, which under Putin has moved to strengthen those ties. Ukraine at-
tempted to resist Russian encroachments by balancing them against the European 
Union’s expansionist ambitions. Ukrainian resistance was however complicated 
by a precarious domestic balance of power between one leadership faction (i.e., 
Yulia Tymoshenko) tilting toward affiliation with the EU and another (i.e., Viktor 
Yanukovich) tilting toward Russia’s rival Eurasian Union. When this delicate bal-
ance collapsed in the Euromaidan demonstrations (and their suppression) and the 
flight of Yanukovich, Russia employed thinly disguised military force to reassert its 
predemocratic hegemony. Taiwan’s strategic position is in many relevant respects 
analogous. True, Taiwan has had a much longer period of effective independence 
from China (over a century), and, like England, it is a maritime state facing a 
continental power across a defensible body of water (the Taiwan Strait). But like 
Ukraine, Taiwan has close historical, cultural, and economic ties to a much more 
powerful neighbor, which has asserted even more explicitly than Russia its claim 
to sovereignty over the island and its legal right to take it by force. Like Ukraine, 
Taiwan seeks to balance China’s claims against an American informal and am-
biguous pledge of security support without denying its historical, cultural, and 
economic ties to the mainland—that is, to “hedge.” Was Ukraine’s failure one of 
refusing to commit or of trying to commit to both sides at once? Is Ukraine’s cur-
rent embattled situation Taiwan’s future? Of course no one knows the future, but 
the thrust of the Ukraine experience suggests that the position of a relatively weak 
“pivot” balancing two great powers becomes highly tenuous if relations between 
the wings polarize, leading each to pressure the pivot to “choose sides.”
Chapters 12 and 13 focus on the other two angles of Taiwan’s strategic triangle. 
With regard to American policy, we see an awkward gap between formal diplo-
matic ties and informal security commitments. In accordance with a “one-China 
policy” that required states to officially recognize only the ROC or the PRC, Wash-
ington recognizes the PRC as the one and only China; it dropped both its former 
defense alliance and its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in January 1979. The 
United States and China have built their relationship upon recognition supple-
mented by three communiqués (1972, 1979, and 1982), reinforced by a booming 
bilateral trade and investment relationship, and the relationship has resulted in 
important strategic agreements on specific issues such as nuclear proliferation and 
climate control. Yet the United States has hedged by inserting into its recognition 
documents a provision for continued sale of weaponry to a Taiwan it no longer 
formally recognizes and by a law (the Taiwan Relations Act) implying continu-
ing (if ambiguous) security protection and upgrading the informal relationship. 
In chapter 12, Ping-Kuei Chen, Scott L. Kastner, and William L. Reed debate the 
proposition put forth by some critics of American China policy that this is not 
only ambiguous but inconsistent and surely detrimental to closer Sino-American 
cooperation, that the United States should hence rescind its informal security 
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commitment to Taiwan, and that, since it has already withdrawn from its defense 
alliance and diplomatic relationship with Taiwan it should withdraw as well the 
last symbol of support, weapons sales. In this exercise in rational futurology that 
conceives of “independence” and “reunification” as the authors do, it may indeed 
be correct that if the United States stopped selling weapons morale in Taiwan 
could collapse and the leaders would become more willing to reunite with the 
mainland on Beijing’s terms—a result that would damage the US regional strategic 
position and its reputation for honoring security commitments. But Chen, Kast-
ner, and Reed argue that inasmuch as this is only one possible scenario and not 
necessarily the most likely one, it would be risky for the United States to rescind 
weapon sales and for China to apply sanctions to force it to do so. Why? First, ces-
sation of weapons sales would not necessarily make Taiwan more willing to submit 
to the mainland or make the United States more willing to allow the island to be 
overrun by force—after all, the United States had no formal security commitment 
to Korea when it intervened to resist a North Korean attack in the summer of 1950 
(an alliance was agreed in 1953), or to South Vietnam in 1964. For the United States 
to halt weapon sales would make Taiwan a weaker and a more vulnerable target 
for PRC coercion, but it would also make Taiwan a more sympathetic victim for 
the Americans to rescue in the face of an unprovoked attack, as the futility of self-
defense against an overwhelmingly superior adversary would be immediately 
apparent. Taiwan’s reactions are not necessarily based on rational calculation of the 
power balance, and American reactions are not entirely predictable on the basis of 
paper commitments.
Whereas American defense of the cross-Strait status quo is aimed at avoid-
ing destabilizing uncertainties, China is betting on statistical probabilities: it is 
growing faster and stronger and is confident that time is on its side. Yet China is 
also wary of destabilizing collateral damage (let alone war with the United States) 
and would very much prefer peaceful reunification. According to Jing Huang of 
the Lee Kuan Yew Institute at the National University of Singapore, the Chinese 
have relied upon both carrots (socioeconomic integration) and sticks (the ultimate 
threat of overwhelming force). But since carrots have thus far proved inconclusive 
and the use of threats of force has had negative side effects in terms of mobilizing 
an antimainland backlash in Taiwan and degrading Chinese soft power abroad, 
Beijing has shifted from demanding reunification within a defined time span to 
proscribing movement toward independence. Under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, 
Beijing’s prime emphasis has not been sticks or new carrots but a gradual constric-
tion of diplomatic and political space: “boxing Taiwan in,” as Huang puts it, so 
that Taiwan eventually realizes that it has no rational way out but through Beijing. 
This gradual attrition strategy must be delicately nuanced, giving Taiwan enough 
space to avoid a negative backlash and encourage pro-China sentiment but not 
enough to set back the isolation strategy or give the island the illusion it could 
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break out from it. Under Xi Jinping this subtle balance has tended to shift, like 
Chinese foreign policy generally, to a slightly more assertive stance, for example 
in his reaffirmation of “one country, two systems,” or his emphasis on “one China” 
over “differing interpretations.” This harder line may become still harder during 
the forthcoming Tsai Ing-wen era. Yet overall the strategy might be said to have 
been at least a quasi-success in that it has won the limited approval of the “Blue” 
camp and the industrial interests with a stake in the mainland economy, the toler-
ance of the United States, and an overwhelming diplomatic united front in inter-
national diplomacy. But as the Sunflower Movement and the results of the January 
2016 election illustrate, just because Taiwan is trapped does not necessarily mean 
they love their trapper.
Taiwan in the 1990s looked to Southeast Asia as a possible way out, as 
chapter  14, by Samuel Ku of National Kaohsiung University, notes in his inter-
esting account, partly because the revaluation of the currency (under American 
pressure) squeezed exports and partly because it wanted to lessen its excessive 
economic dependency on the mainland. Although the island lost its last battles 
for diplomatic recognition against the PRC in Indonesia and Singapore in 1990 
and Brunei in 1991, Lee Teng-hui’s “vacation diplomacy” helped maintain infor-
mal friends and business contacts there, and Taiwan has established Taiwan affairs 
offices in all Southeast Asian countries to facilitate trade, investment, and travel. 
As of 2010, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was Taiwan’s 
second-largest trade partner after the PRC, with US$93.64 billion in trade by 2014 
(15.9 percent of Taiwan’s total trade). While China’s involvement in the Indochina 
wars and a number of other Southeast Asian “national liberation struggles” alien-
ated Southeast Asian governments during the Maoist period, China announced a 
“good neighbor policy” in 1990, and in the early 1990s it signed the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC) and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), then at-
tended ASEAN Plus Three meetings promoting north-south collaboration and the 
East Asian Summit. The real breakthrough for China came during the Asian finan-
cial crisis (1997–98), when it made generous loans to Thailand and Indonesia while 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed strict austerity conditions on its 
bailout packages. In 2001 the Boao Asia Forum was established to facilitate infor-
mal pan-Asian “track two” diplomacy, and in 2010 the China-ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) came into effect, the largest such free trade agreement in 
the world, quickly catapulting China to the leading position among most ASEAN 
trade partners. With its launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 
2014 and its proposal, in 2013, of the boldly visionary “One Silk Road Economic 
Belt and one Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road,” an initiative to establish 
economic corridors connecting China with other countries in Central Asia, West 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe, China appears to be moving not only to further 
expand its influence in the region but to claim entrepreneurial leadership. Yet at 
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the same time China’s maritime territorial claims over the South China Sea and 
its increasingly forcible efforts to enforce them have not been welcomed by any 
Southeast Asian nation. In the face of China’s economic and diplomatic initiatives, 
Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou abandoned Chen Shui-bian’s vigorous but ultimately 
failing “scorched-earth” competition with the mainland in favor of a nonconfron-
tational survival strategy that tacked somewhat closer to PRC positions. While 
Taiwan might have expected to benefit from the backlash against China’s over-
bearing regional presence, Taiwan’s position is compromised by the fact that its 
maritime territorial claims are identical to those of the PRC (indeed, based on 
the same “eleven-dash-line” 1947 map). Taiwan under Ma adopted an ambiguous 
policy, attempting to differentiate its gentler enforcement policy from the main-
land’s without relinquishing its sovereignty claims. At the same time the taishang, 
as ethnic Chinese alongside an economically influential ethnic minority in South-
east Asia, seek to ride the coattails of the mainland in private business ventures 
as well as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Maritime Silk Road.
C ONCLUSION
Taiwan, just when it seemed to have put the endlessly nettlesome cross-Strait 
problem to rest after a decade of cordial and constructive relations, appears to 
have resurrected it with the landslide defeat of its political sponsors. President 
Tsai Ing-wen has made clear her preference for no trouble with the mainland, and 
perhaps she will have none. But even on the off chance that this turns out to be 
true, the election itself says a great deal. While the results still need to be sorted 
out thematically in terms of the distribution of voter dissatisfaction with the Ma 
regime (clearly leadership failure must play a large part: e.g., Wang Jin-pyng), a 
portion of that discontent must be attributed to cross-Strait policy, if only because 
that took such a central place in the Ma agenda. Tsai’s presidency must logically 
be seen to mark a deliberate departure from Ma’s cross-Strait policy: otherwise 
she would not have so steadfastly refused to sign on to the status quo of the “1992 
Consensus”— one China Constitution; one China, differing interpretations; no 
immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. Thus we stand at 
the threshold of a brave new era.
If Tsai maintains her current position of refusing to endorse the 1992 Con-
sensus but “promoting communication, no provocations and no accidents,” and 
holds to her statement that “we will not be provocative, and hope the two sides 
can sit down and talk in a rational manner,” Beijing may not resort to the various 
economic and diplomatic weapons in its armory, which it cannot easily impose 
without damage to its own interests.3 That would allow the relationship to glide 
down to a more stagnant phase in which high-level cross-Strait communications 
are faute de mieux limited to the CCP-KMT Forum. But the relationship even in 
the best case is apt to be fragile and suspicious.
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The situation of the Taiwan Strait has remained one of the most worrisome flash 
points on the globe since the Second World War. Even in the aftermath of the col-
lapse of the Soviet bloc, the possibility of a military confrontation between com-
munist China and the United States still remains. The 1995–96 missile-test crisis 
following former president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States was a testi-
mony to how sensitive cross-Strait relations were and how flammable the political 
situation could become overnight.
In the past eight years (2008–16), cross-Strait relations were relatively peaceful 
compared to how they had been under former president Chen Shui-bian (2000–
2008). This peaceful coexistence was primarily a result of President Ma Ying-jeou’s 
mainland policy, which replaced “confrontation” with “engagement,” implement-
ed the “three direct links” (postal, transportation, and trade) between mainland 
China and Taiwan, and successfully procured the Economic Cooperation Frame-
work Agreement (ECFA) and another twenty bilateral agreements with mainland 
China, covering areas that ranged from trade promotion to crime prevention, food 
safety, environmental protection, and transportation cooperation.
Nevertheless, Ma’s mainland policy was fiercely criticized by the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) and was frequently denigrated as a betrayal of Taiwan’s 
real interests. The critics accused Ma’s government and the Nationalist Party (the 
Kuomintang, KMT) of “selling Taiwan to China” on the grounds that the KMT was 
a prounification party, and Ma himself never identified with Taiwan. The accusa-
tion, though emotional and exaggerated, had its political effect among those who 
did not benefit from his mainland policy. The general discontent with that poli-
cy, together with the poor performance of the government and nasty intraparty 
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cleavages (first between Ma and Wang Jin-pyng, then between Eric Chu and Hung 
Shiu-chu), resulted in the unprecedented defeat of the KMT in the 2014 local elec-
tions and the 2016 presidential election.
The DPP’s landslide victory in the 2016 election may become a turning point 
in the long-term development of cross-Strait relations. The DPP has tradition-
ally favored a de jure Taiwan independence policy, and the newly elected presi-
dent, Ms. Tsai Ing-wen, is generally regarded as a careful but uncompromising 
advocate of the independence cause. She was the drafter of former Republic of 
China (ROC) president Lee Teng-hui’s “two states” concept (liang guo lun) and 
was a strong supporter of Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side [of the 
Taiwan Strait]” (yi bian yi guo) concept, both of which describe Taiwan and China 
as two different countries and counter the notion of a single China. During the 
presidential election, Tsai asserted that most Taiwanese do not identify themselves 
with China and that “most youths are naturally inclined to Taiwan independence.” 
Whether Tsai’s policy toward mainland China will change Ma’s legacy and what 
the consequences will be for cross-Strait relations (and East Asian security) de-
serve a thorough examination.
Issues of national identity and unification/independence are always conceived 
as critical in Taiwanese politics and cross-Strait relations. This chapter first ex-
plains the meaning of national identity in the context of Taiwanese politics, ex-
amines the different ways of measuring national identity in Taiwan, and shows 
that no matter which measurement is adopted, Taiwanese identification has risen 
precipitately in the past two decades. I then focus on the “one-China principle,” 
an issue that I think more important and worthy of attention than the issue of 
national identity or the unification/independence choice. Finally I analyze what 
the scenarios of cross-Strait relations will be after the 2016 election, keeping in 
mind that cross-Strait relations are not merely bilateral, since they involve Taiwan, 
mainland China, and the United States in a strategic triangle relationship, and 
conclude with suggestions for improving cross-Strait relations.
CHANGING NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN TAIWAN
Theories of nationalism and national identity have been extensively discussed in 
Taiwan in recent decades.1 Roughly speaking, there are two major schools con-
cerning the meaning of a nation: the modernist and the primordial. The modern-
ist school argues that the nation is a modern political construction arising in the 
process of state building. Since the global system of nation-states was formed no 
earlier than the seventeenth century, the modernists argue that the concepts of 
nation, nationalism, and national identity are all very novel socially construct-
ed forms. On the other hand, the primordial school maintains that although the 
nation-state system is a modern phenomenon the nation has an antecedent objective 
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existence that summons people’s loyalty and identity, mostly on the bases of shared 
history, myth, genealogical relations, or religious belief, long before the modern 
state learns how to mobilize its citizens in the name of a fatherland.2
Most Taiwanese scholars tend to buy the modernist argument and see the “Tai-
wanese people” as a modern social construction emerging in the process of de-
colonization and democratization. They tend to agree on the following points: (1) 
A nation is an aggregate of persons who associate with each other by common 
descent, language, religion, or history, although the sense of communion may be 
imagined rather than actual. (2) National identity is a feeling that one has toward 
one’s imagined community, the fundamental features of which include a home-
land, a people, a common historical memory, and a common public culture. (3) 
Taiwanese identity is the source of Taiwanese nationalism and the Taiwanese na-
tionalist movement, which pursues the political goal of Taiwanese independence.3 
As the building of a nation-state is usually described as the highest accomplish-
ment of nationalism, Taiwanese nationalist scholars have little hesitation in ac-
cepting nationalism as a doctrine that holds that “the political and the national 
unit should be congruent,” as Ernest Gellner succinctly puts it.4
Three different methods of measuring Taiwanese national identity are designed 
and widely employed in Taiwan. The first targets the consciousness of being Tai-
wanese as a distinct concept from that of being Chinese. The second addresses Tai-
wanese people’s attitude toward unification with mainland China or a de jure inde-
pendence of the island state. The third examines the extent to which respondents 
consider themselves to be Taiwanese nationalists or Chinese nationalists. I will 
analyze all the three methods in order and will argue that none proves a perfect 
measurement, though each serves a specific function in understanding Taiwanese 
people’s collective consciousness.
Let us begin with the most popular method of understanding Taiwan’s national 
identity—considering oneself Taiwanese versus Chinese. It is assumed that those 
who declare themselves to be Taiwanese only are identified with a political com-
munity called Taiwan; those who declare themselves to be Chinese only have a 
Chinese national identity; and those who say they are both Taiwanese and Chinese 
have a dual national identity.
According to a systematic survey conducted by the Election Study Center at 
National Chengchi University, the self-identity of Taiwan’s residents has shifted 
spectacularly from a predominantly Chinese identity in the early years of democ-
ratization to a prevailing Taiwanese identity in Ma’s second term of presidency. 
As figure 1 indicates, in the early 1990s nearly 25.5 percent of those polled by this 
survey answered that they perceived themselves as exclusively Chinese. The per-
centage dropped to 10.6 percent in 2001 at the beginning of Chen Shui-bian’s ad-
ministration and stood at only 3 percent in 2016. On the other hand, those who 
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in 1992 to 41.6 percent in 2001, and to 59.3 percent in 2016. That is to say, nearly 
two-thirds of Taiwan’s population identify themselves exclusively Taiwanese now, 
and a great portion of this increase occurred during Ma Ying-jeou’s administra-
tion. The proportion who regarded themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese 
also dropped steadily from 46.4 percent to 33.6 percent in the same period.5
I have pointed out elsewhere that the classification of Taiwanese/Chinese/both 
is not an effective measurement of Taiwan’s national identity, although it reveals 
some important information about the shift of the collective self-consciousness of 
Taiwanese. One major reason is that the term Chinese (Zhongguoren) is ambigu-
ous in Mandarin. It can be used to designate a person who identifies with Chinese 
culture without referring to any specific body politic, or it can be understood to 
designate a person who identifies with either the ROC or the PRC. When a person 
responds to the question “Are you a Chinese or a Taiwanese?” with the answer 
“I am a Chinese,” there is no way to determine whether he or she is referring to 
cultural identity or political identity. People living in mainland China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, or even oversea Chinese communities will have no difficulty regard-
ing themselves as “Chinese” if they are thinking in cultural or ethnical terms. If 
we understand Chinese identity in cultural terms, as many scholars did when they 
cited the poll, then the category of “being Chinese” cannot be understood to be the 
people who identify with the PRC, and the category of being “both Chinese and 
Taiwanese” cannot be described as dual national identity or confusion of national 
identity. The latter may be simply an expression of one’s multiple cultural affinities 
rather than one’s political identity.6
The second approach to understand Taiwanese people’s identity is to survey 
their attitude toward unification and independence. It is assumed that if a person 
prefers unification with mainland China to Taiwanese independence, he or she 
should be regarded a person with Chinese national identity. The opposite would 
describe a person with a Taiwanese national identity. The research team of the 
Election Study Center further divided the binary unification/independence option 
into a six-option classification. The result is shown in figure 2.
If we put the “independence as soon as possible” and “maintain status quo, 
move toward independence” together, put the “unification as soon as possible” and 
“maintain status quo, move toward unification” together, and put the “maintain 
status quo indefinitely” and “maintain status quo, decide at later date” together, 
we find that people in favor of independence rose from over 11 in 1994 to almost 
23 percent in 2016. Those in favor of unification declined steadily from 20 percent 
in 1994 to slightly over 10 percent in 2016. Those favoring the status quo also rose 
from around 48 percent in 1994 to almost 60 percent in 2016, remaining the great-
est share of the population in the past two decades.7
The survey is important for our understanding of Taiwanese’s preferences on 
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choice of the future than an expression of their national identity. These two ques-
tions are closely related but different. Especially when more than 60 percent of the 
respondents answer that they prefer the status quo, it is difficult to say what kind 
of national identity “the status quo” means.8 I will come back to the diverse inter-
pretations of “the status quo” later.
The problem with the previous two methods has been noticed by many scholars. 
Wu Naiteh argues that national identity as conceived in the unification/indepen-
dence choice can be influenced by unfavorable, external political circumstances, 
and people will accordingly modify their attitude to a more pragmatic standpoint 
for the short term. To explore the hidden, long-term view of national identity, he 
designed a questionnaire with two key questions: (1) If a Taiwanese independence 
would not precipitate a war, then would you agree that Taiwan should become an 
independent country? (2) If Taiwan and China were to become comparably devel-
oped economically, socially, and politically, would you agree that the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait should be united into one country?9
Wu classifies those who say “yes” to the first question but “no” to the second as 
“Taiwanese nationalists” (those who pursue independence under favorable condi-
tions and refuse to unify with China even if the latter becomes as well developed 
as Taiwan). The respondents who say “no” to the first question but “yes” to the 
second are classified as “Chinese nationalists” (those who expect unification under 
a favorable situation but oppose Taiwanese independence even if no war will hap-
pen). Those who say “yes” to both questions are described by Wu as “pragmatists,” 
while those who say “no” to both questions are termed “conservatives” (table 1).
From their survey, Shen and Wu discovered that the proportion of Taiwanese 
nationalists rose considerably from 9.3 percent in 1992 to 27.7 percent in 2005 but 
seemed to stop short of a 30 percent ceiling. On the other hand, the proportion 
of Chinese nationalists declined steadily from 38 percent in 1992 to 13 percent in 
2005. The trend of a rising Taiwanese identity and a declining Chinese identity 
is consistent with the findings of the other two methods discussed above. What 
bothered Shen and Wu, however, was that there has always been a significantly 
large group of pragmatists who “are willing to accept an independent Taiwan if 
their security is not endangered, and they are likewise willing to accept unification 
with China if there are no negative economic or political repercussions.” Their 
proportion was 25 percent in 1992 and 30 percent in 2005, with a peak of nearly 
40 percent in 1996, when cross-Strait relations reached the most dangerous point 
since the 1950s. Shen and Wu could not tell whether these pragmatists had a dual 
national identity or no particular national identity at all, so they decided to leave 
this puzzle for further study.10
I think Wu’s questionnaire is helpful in trying to identify those who clearly and 
strongly wish to pursue their nationalist cause, either independence or unification. 
Yet it would be more convincing if Wu could add two more questions to it: (3) If a 
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Taiwanese independence would precipitate a war, then would you agree that Tai-
wan should become an independent country? (4) If Taiwan and China were not to 
become comparably developed economically, socially, and politically, would you 
agree that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be united into one country? It 
is only with a combination of (1) and (4) can we identify the real Chinese national-
ists (those who reject independence even if no war happens and who want to unify 
with China even if the political, social, and economic conditions across the Strait 
cannot be compatible), and only with a combination of (2) and (3) can we identify 
the real Taiwanese nationalists (those who reject unification even if conditions 
across the Strait are similar and who are determined to pursue independence even 
if it will cause a war).11
The real problem, however, is that Shen and Wu’s survey still cannot explain the 
existence of a substantial number of “pragmatic” respondents and instead beats 
around the bush by looking for the principled “nationalists.” If the so-called prag-
matists have stayed the greatest portion of the whole population for decades, isn’t 
it a clear indication that the questionnaire itself may be misleading in the inquiry 
concerning national identity? It is a good questionnaire to detect the degree of a 
respondent’s determination to seek independence or unification but not a satis-
factory measurement of one’s national identity. For instance, one might have no 
doubt about one’s political identity with the ROC but refuse to fight for Taiwanese 
independence or refuse to unify with mainland China under unfavorable condi-
tions, and we could not say that this person did not have a political identity. After 
all, “having an identity” is different from “having a strong identity.”
For this reason, I have suggested another method of investigating Taiwan’s 
national identity. Liu I-chou suggested many years ago that we should try to un-
derstand people’s national identity according to their perception of the territory 
of their country and who their compatriots are. The questions based on this line 
of thinking would be: (1) Do you think that the territory of your country includes 
Table 1 Taiwanese national identities (a simplified version of Wu and Shen’s original classification 
of national identities in Taiwan, 1992–2005)
Accept unification if no 
disparity between Taiwan 
and China
Reject unification even if no 
disparity between Taiwan and 
China
Accept Taiwanese independence 
if no war happens
Pragmatists Taiwanese Nationalists
Reject Taiwanese independence 
even if no war happens
Chinese Nationalists Conservatives
Sources: Shiau-chi Shen and Nai-teh Wu, “Ethnic and Civic Nationalisms: Two Roads to the Formation of a Taiwan-
ese Nation,” in The “One China” Dilemma, ed. Peter C. Y. Chow (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 122.
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mainland China or only Taiwan? (2) Do you think that your compatriots include 
those living in mainland China or only those living in Taiwan? Those who recog-
nize only Taiwanese territory and compatriots as their own have a Taiwanese (or 
ROC) national identity. By contrast, those who include mainland China in their 
territory and mainland Chinese as their compatriots have a Greater Chinese na-
tional identity.12
When Liu administered this questionnaire to Taiwan residents in 1998, about 
77 percent of respondents had a Taiwanese identity, and about 9 percent had a 
Greater Chinese identity. The rest were of mixed identity or did not answer. Un-
fortunately, the questionnaire was not readministered in ensuing years.13 My con-
jecture is that, after more than a decade of increasing Taiwanese consciousness, 
the proportion of those with a Taiwanese national identity has grown even greater 
and now probably makes up more than 85 percent of the population, while the 
proportion of those with a Greater Chinese national identity may now be less than 
5 percent. Liu’s measure is the most appropriate way to describe the national iden-
tity of Taiwanese people. The large majority of Taiwanese who identify themselves 
with the country existing on the island may differ among themselves in their cul-
tural and ethnic identity (their sense of being Taiwanese or Chinese or both), or 
in their ideas as to whether Taiwan should pursue de jure independence or unify 
with mainland China in the future), or in the degree of their patriotism regarding 
the ROC (or Taiwan), but they identify with the ROC (or Taiwan) in the strictly 
political sense. The few who identify with mainland China (or a greater China) 
should be respected, as long as they abide by the constitution and laws of the ROC.
In other words, national identity in Taiwan is not as divisive an issue as many 
scholars imagine or describe if we understand the concept correctly. Taiwanese 
may differ in their sense of cultural belonging, ethnic origins, political choices, 
or determination to pursue their ideals, just as they differ on public policy issues, 
taste of food and clothes, style of entertainment, obsession with sport, philosophy 
of life, and so on. But as a popular Taiwanese writer once remarked, “Taiwan is 
one hundred percent a country. If it is not a country, what is a country?”14 Most 
controversies arise not from the question of whether Taiwan is a country but from 
the question of whether it should be called “the Republic of China” or simply “Tai-
wan.” In other words, what makes the issue of Taiwan’s national identity complicat-
ed is not its boundary, population, or sovereignty but dispute over the “one-China” 
principle, to which we now turn.
THE “ONE-CHINA” PROBLEM
As noted in the previous section, some measures of national identity in Taiwan 
do not exactly reflect what they are purported to measure. The classification of 
“Taiwanese/Chinese/both” helps us realize how two different and overlapping 
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cultures affect Taiwanese’s self-perception, but it cannot be translated into a politi-
cal identity that corresponds to a specific territory and sovereignty. The classifica-
tion of unification/independence/status quo tells us what kind of political future 
Taiwanese want, but that wish makes sense only under the precondition that Tai-
wan is a political entity that can make the choice. The questionnaire combining 
“independence if no war” and “unification if China well developed” explores the 
factors that Taiwanese might consider when they face the choice of independence 
or unification. It may help us distinguish moderate nationalists from unyielding 
nationalists, but it is not a measurement of national identity per se.
If we stick to the core meaning of national identity (namely, a sense of belong-
ing to a specific sovereign territory and a group of people with common life expe-
rience), it becomes clear that Taiwanese do know where their country is and who 
their compatriots are. A few do not agree with the overwhelming majority on this 
issue, but this is not a big problem. Taiwanese people may be divided on the issue 
of independence or unification, yet they are fully aware of their national identity. 
In other words, national identity is not a real issue in Taiwan. It is, unfortunately, 
many politicians’ favorite means of political mobilization during elections.
Unification/independence is not a real issue either. The KMT is frequently 
described as prounification and the DPP as proindependence. That is true if we 
assume that they are faithful to their party platforms and that their candidates 
are arguing against each other for no other reason but the cause of unification 
or independence. Nevertheless, as all opinion polls show, more than 60 percent 
of Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo; and only about 24 percent favor 
an independence policy, and only 9 percent of them favor a unification policy. 
Aware of public opinion, neither the KMT nor the DPP has declared that it would 
implement a clear policy of unification or independence. On the contrary, both 
parties are busy persuading the people that they will do better than the other in 
maintaining the status quo. Politicians who do not adhere to the status quo but 
promote independence or unification are either targeting a specific electorate out 
of political calculation or committing political suicide.
If national identity is not a serious problem, and unification/independence is 
not an urgent choice, then what makes Taiwanese politics so turbulent and antago-
nistic? The answer has to do with the challenge of the “one-China policy” coming 
from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in mainland China.
Ever since 1949, when the CCP crushed the KMT in the civil war and forced 
the Nationalist government retreat to Taiwan, the communist government has de-
clared that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only legitimate representa-
tive of China in the world; at the same time the defeated Nationalist government 
has maintained that it is the only legal representative of China. In the following 
decades, Beijing has consistently insisted on a “one-China principle,” based on the 
premises that (1) there is only one China in the world; (2) Taiwan is part of China; 
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and (3) the PRC is the only legitimate government to represent China. Springing 
from this principle, is an insistence on the policy that all countries seeking to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the PRC must terminate official relations with the 
ROC. These countries must recognize the PRC as the only legitimate representa-
tive of mainland China and Taiwan, or at least acknowledge its claim on the issue.
The “one-China policy” is a zero-sum game between the PRC and the ROC. 
Whenever a country recognizes the legal status of the PRC, the ROC immedi-
ately cuts its diplomatic relations with that country, and vice versa. The policy also 
forces Taiwan gradually to adopt a defensive position in the international arena 
because it cannot afford to compete with China politically or economically.
Taiwan is fully aware of its difficult international situation under the isolation 
strategy of China. Particularly after the ban on cross-Strait tours was lifted in the 
late 1980s, the ROC found that there was no way of avoiding negotiation with 
the PRC with regard to administrative affairs. But when the PRC faced severe 
inter national sanctions as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident and saw pro-
independence forces gaining strength in Taiwan, it felt a need to adjust its Taiwan 
policy. That was the background for the “1992 Consensus” reached between the 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, representing Taiwan) and the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS, representing mainland China).
The most important point of the 1992 Consensus is that the ROC and the PRC 
agree that there is only one China but also agree that each side can have its own 
interpretation of what “one China” means, so that they can go on to do functional 
work without being influenced by controversy about sovereignty. The announce-
ment of the SEF on November 3, 1992, read as follows: “In the Hong Kong talks, 
the ARATS insisted that both parties should make ‘public statements’ on the is-
sue of ‘one China.’ With the authorization from the Mainland Affairs Council, 
the SEF is agreeable to an oral statement of their respective interpretations. As to 
the content of this oral statement, we will express it in line with the Guidelines 
for National Unification and the resolution on the meaning of ‘one China’ ad-
opted by the National Unification Council on August 1, 1992.”15 This is the famous 
“one China, differing interpretations” (yizong gebiao) formula for dealing with 
the “one-China principle” asserted by Beijing: the ROC is willing to accept the 
principle that there is only one China in order to process cross-Strait affairs, but it 
reserves the right to interpret what “one China” means and, not surprisingly, sees 
itself rather than the PRC as the “one China.”
The SEF’s announcement was soon echoed by the ARATS, which declared: 
“The SEF officially has notified the ARATS that it received consent from the au-
thorities concerned in Taiwan to ‘an oral statement of their respective interpreta-
tions.’ The ARATS fully respects and accepts the SEF’s suggestion.  .  .  . Now the 
ARATS wishes to inform the SEF of the salient points of its oral statement: Both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the one China principle and strive for national 
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unification; however, the meaning of ‘one China’ shall not be involved in cross-
Strait talks of a functional nature.”16 For reasons that we cannot elaborate here, the 
1992 Consensus was not honored from 1993 to 2008.17 When Chen Shui-bian came 
to power in 2000, he even denied the existence of such a consensus. However, Ma 
Ying-jeou decided to resume the talks between the SEF and the ARATS on the 
basis of the 1992 Consensus after he was elected as the president in 2008. From 
then on, the new principle of “one China, differing interpretations” played a very 
important role in stabilizing cross-Strait relations and made possible the signing 
of twenty-one agreements between the two sides.
The 1992 Consensus was celebrated by the KMT as a milestone in the develop-
ment of cross-Strait relations. It was also acknowledged in Assistant Secretary of 
State James Kelly’s testimony before the US Congress and in Chairman Hu Jintao’s 
telephone conversation with President George W. Bush.18 However, DPP leaders 
have either refused to recognize the existence of the consensus, refused to concede 
its legitimacy, or refused to agree that the consensus is good for Taiwan.
Those who claim that there is no 1992 Consensus say that the concept is a fic-
tion made up by the former deputy minister of mainland affairs Su Qi. And if they 
do acknowledge something like a consensus reached by the two sides, they say it 
is not legitimate because it refers to a “one-China principle,” which can only mean 
that Taiwan is part of China. They understand very well that the Nationalist gov-
ernment insists on the ROC being the “one China,” but they do not believe that the 
consensus leaves any room for Taiwan to interpret “one China” differently. They 
think mainland China will monopolize the interpretation because it is much more 
powerful and resourceful than Taiwan in the international community.19
The official statement of Tsai Ing-wen in 2000, who served as the minister of 
the Mainland Affairs Council during Chen Shui-bian’s administration, was very 
typical of the DPP’s position on this issue: “The so-called ‘one China, differing 
interpretations’ is only a usage by our side to describe the process of the meeting. 
It is a way of description that the new government can accept, but it does not mean 
that we have accepted Beijing’s ‘one-China principle.’ ”20 In 2003, she reinforced her 
stand on the issue by emphasizing that the ROC and the PRC did not belong to 
each other. “One side, one country,” she emphasized, “is a statement of fact.”
When Tsai ran for president in 2012, she tried to eliminate Taiwanese people’s 
Chinese identity by promoting Taiwanese identity as its substitute. She main-
tained: “The Republic of China is an exile (alien) government, which rules Taiwan 
at the moment. The Chineseness of the ROC must be relocated from a subjective 
status to an objective status, and yields to Taiwaneseness.” She also tried to per-
suade the general public to think of the cross-Strait relation in a novel way: “There 
is no 1992 Consensus. What I propose is to create a Taiwan consensus to replace 
the 1992 Consensus, which would be ratified by legislation and a referendum. This 
new consensus should then form the basis for negotiations with the PRC.”
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Tsai lost the 2012 presidential election. Many political analysts believe that her 
failure to prove the feasibility of the Taiwanese Consensus was a salient, if not the 
most important, reason. It explains why she decided not to employ the terminolo-
gy again during the 2016 presidential campaign. Yet she has been as unwavering as 
before on the issue of the 1992 Consensus. With the prospect that the DPP might 
win both the 2014 local elections and the 2016 general election, she was confident 
enough to believe that even the PRC would yield to her view about the 1992 Con-
sensus afterwards. She said in an interview: “Whoever has power, different parties 
will shift their direction toward those with power. The DPP’s biggest challenge is 
to do well in this year’s local elections. If we do well, even China will shift in the 
direction of the DPP. If they feel that the DPP has the best chance of winning in 
2016, they will automatically create the conditions for that.”21
With this confidence, Tsai was ready to appeal to the majority who favored the 
status quo without endorsing the 1992 Consensus. Her successful strategy in the 
2016 presidential election was to replace the unwelcome “Taiwan Consensus” with 
the popular “maintaining the status quo” but not to discuss what “the status quo” 
actually meant. In her speech at the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies on June 3, 2016, she repeated that maintaining the status quo “serves the best 
interest of all parties concerned,” and she vowed to be “committed to a consistent, 
predictable, and sustainable relationship with China.” She also emphasized that, if 
elected, she would “push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait 
relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing ROC 
constitutional order” (my italics). Nevertheless, when asked by the audience to 
elaborate her views on the issue and explain how her thesis could be reconciled 
with the DPP’s independence platform, she refused to explain further and only 
asked them to carefully read her speech again.22
Maintaining the status quo, as we point out in the previous section, has re-
mained the favorite option of the majority in Taiwan. However, “the status quo” 
can mean different things to different people. Some think the status quo is a coun-
try called the Republic of China, which agrees with mainland China that both sides 
can interpret their concept of China respectively. Some think the status quo is a 
separate country called Taiwan, which has never agreed with China regarding the 
idea that there is only “one China” under which they should be subsumed. As Ma 
Ying-jeou reiterated several times, the status quo for most Taiwanese is a peace-
ful cross-Strait relationship created by his policy of three nos—“no unification, 
no independence, and no use of military force” under the framework of the ROC 
constitution. It is also a result of cross-Strait dialogues based on the 1992 Consen-
sus (namely, “one China, differing interpretations”). If Tsai Ing-wen’s “status quo” 
was similar to the status quo that Ma created, he would be very glad to have the 
leader of the opposition party follow his own mainland policy.23 Unfortunately, 
Tsai is clear that she will not accept the 1992 Consensus or agree that Taiwan and 
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the mainland belong to the same China, even though that is the frame of the ROC 
constitution. She is going to change the status quo and pretend that she does not.
Tsai now acknowledges that there was a talk between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Straits in 1992, but she still does not acknowledge that a consensus was 
reached by the two sides. This minor revision of her original position on the 1992 
Consensus appeared shortly before Election Day and reappeared in her inaugural 
address on May 20, 2016. She asserted, “There was a bilateral summit in 1992 as a 
matter of historical fact and there was a mutual cognizance of ‘seeking common 
ground while shelving differences.’ ” Nevertheless, she refused to concede that the 
“common ground” was the 1992 Consensus or “one China, different interpreta-
tions,” let alone the idea that Taiwan is or will be part of China, no matter what 
“China” means. Beijing responded immediately that this was not the answer “to 
the examination” (i.e., not the right answer), but apparently the CCP is willing to 
wait until Tsai changes her mind in the near future.
Before we end this section, it may be helpful to illuminate different players’ 
position regarding the “one-China” question (table 2): From this table, we can see 
how that four concerned actors (China, USA, KMT, DPP) can agree on the un-
specified statement that “there is only one China in the world,” while still differ-
ing dramatically on the related components of the “one-China” question. It also 
explains why the simple statement “There is only one China in the world” cannot 
be easily developed into either a “one-China policy,” a “one-China principle,” a 
“one-China framework,” or any terminology that includes “one China.” In Taiwan, 
the really divisive issue is not national identity nor the choice of unification or 
independence but the meaning and implications of “one China.”
PROSPECT S OF CROSS-STR AIT REL ATIONS
The problem of cross-Strait relations is never restricted to Taiwan and mainland 
China alone. It involves the PRC, the ROC, and the United States, and within the 
Table 2 Different players’ conception of the “one-China principle”
China KMT USA DPP
There is only one China in the world. X X X X
Taiwan is part of China. X X X
“China” can be interpreted differently. ? X
China is represented by the PRC. X X X
China is represented by the ROC. X
Taiwan is not part of China. X
China and Taiwan are two countries. X
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ROC it is an issue of contention between the KMT and the DPP. Therefore, it can 
be described as a strategic triangular relationship concerning four key players. Un-
derstanding this complex issue requires considering the position of each player, as 
well as players’ interactions and chains of reaction.
In international relations theory, the interaction between the PRC, the Soviet 
Union (later, Russia) and the United States is regarded as a typical “great strategic 
triangle,” while the interaction between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington can be 
conceived as a small strategic triangle. It is a triangular relation because the ROC 
needs the United States to resist the political and military pressure of the PRC, the 
PRC needs the United States’ tacit support to prevent the ROC from seeking de 
jure independence, and the United States wants the PRC and the ROC to constrain 
their hostility24 Furthermore, the small strategic triangle is unbalanced in that the 
power and influence of the PRC and the United States are disproportionally supe-
rior to the ROC’s. As Yu-shan Wu points out, when the power between two actors 
is asymmetrical, the interpretation and prediction of the two actors’ moves should 
also be adjusted correspondingly. Power asymmetry also affects other variables, 
such as motivation for economic integration, probability of military confronta-
tion, shifts in national identity, strategy of electoral campaigns, and so forth.25
With this framework in mind, we may now begin to analyze what the four 
actors pursue and avoid with regard to cross-Strait relations. The PRC wishes to 
complete its unification enterprise in the twenty-first century, especially under the 
guideline of Chairman Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” of attaining wealth, power, 
and modernization for China as a whole. The PRC realizes that more and more 
Taiwanese are embracing a Taiwanese consciousness and favoring independence, 
even though maintaining the status quo still remains the majority’s priority for 
the moment. To keep Taiwan from moving forward to de jure independence, the 
PRC is keen to reach a political agreement between the two sides that formally 
acknowledges the principle that there is only one China in the world and that 
both the mainland and Taiwan are parts of China. But when Ma’s government was 
politically challenged after the intraparty conflict with Speaker Wang in 2013 and 
the turbulence of the Sunflower Movement in 2014, it virtually lost the momentum 
to negotiate any political agreement with mainland China, whether a “framework 
of peace agreement” or a “mechanism for military mutual trust.” With the DPP’s 
overwhelming victory in the 2016 election, the best result the PRC can expect is to 
secure the 1992 Consensus and assent to the principle of “one China” in no more 
than a vague sense. If this minimum expectation cannot be fulfilled, Xi Jinping 
may have to consider other options. It is not to the PRC’s advantage to confront 
the United States when China has many more important goals to achieve, but 
the Taiwan independence issue is too serious to be neglected. Xi definitely does 
not want to become the leader in Chinese history who loses Taiwan: this would 
be a devastating blow to his own political life and the legitimacy of the CCP. 
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The challenge, therefore, is to secure US cooperation in preventing the DPP from 
nullifying the 1992 Consensus.
In the KMT, former president Ma and his political allies believe that the 1992 
Consensus (in the sense of “one China, differing interpretations”) is the best policy 
for cross-Strait relations. However, the current chair, Ms. Hung Hsiu-chu, obvi-
ously has a quite different conception of cross-Strait relations. Hung accuses the 
DPP of pushing for Taiwanese independence in the name of democracy and pre-
dicts that this will “bring threats to national security, make Taiwan even more 
isolated, cause economic stagnation, and fuel hatred in society.” Yet she was not 
satisfied with the current “one China, differing interpretations” policy either. She 
asserted that the best policy for cross-Strait relations should be “one China, same 
interpretation” (yizhong tongbiao) and said Taiwan should sign a peace agreement 
with mainland China on the precondition that the ROC constitution be upheld 
and the will of the people respected.26 Hung’s statement is generally viewed as sup-
portive of unification and immediately causes suspicion and criticism among the 
KMT politicians who feel more comfortable with Ma’s “three nos.” To ease in-
traparty opposition, Hung argues that her policy is merely “enhancing” the 1992 
Consensus rather than “replacing” it. Nevertheless, it is becoming more and more 
clear that she is not going to continue Ma’s policy. Her move toward unification 
will help the DPP appear more like an advocate of the status quo. How Beijing will 
react to Hung’s proposal is yet to be seen.
As for the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen’s major challenge is to persuade the Taiwanese 
people, the PRC, and the United States that she will not pursue de jure Taiwan 
independence during her presidential term. What she needs to accomplish on 
this tough question is to find a subtle balance between the DPP’s “Taiwanese 
Independence Platform” (which proposes the drafting of a new constitution and 
the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan) and the general public’s concern about 
the risk of war if the DPP pursues Taiwanese independence or amends some criti-
cal articles of the current constitution. Tsai’s repeated announcement of “maintain-
ing the status quo” is an attempt to assure the people that she will neither pursue 
outright independence nor try to amend the ROC constitution in favor of inde-
pendence. Nonetheless, her DPP supporters (especially the “fundamentalists,” or 
hard-liners on the independence issue) will complain that there is no difference 
between her position and Ma’s. Ever since her inauguration, she has been careful 
not to challenge mainland China directly, but her consistent denial of the 1992 
Consensus, her shifting position on the South China Sea controversy, her apathy 
toward the Chinese victims who died in a mysterious bus accident in Taiwan, her 
appointment of several proindependence grand justices to the Supreme Court, 
and her tacit support of the Hong Kong independence movement all make the 
CCP suspect her sincerity about maintaining the status quo. As many cross-Strait 
relation experts observe, Tsai is pursuing Taiwanese independence under the 
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(temporary) cover of the ROC, a strategy that may satisfy the United States but 
cannot win the trust of China.
Finally, the role of the United States is always essential. In the small strate-
gic triangle of Beijing-Taipei-Washington, the United States seems more like a 
pivot than merely a partner. The US stake in this issue is to maintain peaceful 
and stable cross-Strait relations, without any unexpected unilateral political or 
military moves. The missile-test crisis of 1996 was solved by the deployment of 
American aircraft carrier battle groups in this region. The “one country on each 
side” controversy and independence referendum initiated by Chen Shui-bian 
was rebuked by the US government. From the way Washington has interfered 
and managed various crises in the past, it is clear that the United States prefers a 
no-surprise, low-risk status quo in this region. To date, the United States seems 
to welcome Taiwan and the mainland to continue dialogue on the basis of Bei-
jing’s assertion that there is only one China and that only one government can 
legitimately represent it, and to insist that the solution to cross-Strait antagonism 
must be peaceful. It does not support any unilateral action to seek Taiwanese 
independence; neither does it publicly endorse the 1992 Consensus or the “one 
China, differing interpretations” policy. However, as the rise of a powerful China 
becomes more and more threatening, many observers begin to wonder if the 
United States will change its position and encourage Taiwan to keep a greater 
distance from China. Some DPP leaders actually think that even if Taiwan moves 
toward independence, the US response may change from that of 2002–4 simply 
because the United States and the PRC have so many conflicts of interest in the 
East China Sea and the South China Sea. Yet for the very same reason the PRC 
may urge the United States to clarify its position on “one China” in the years 
to come. As Huang Jing indicates, Xi Jinping has consistently maintained that 
Taiwan is a core interest of China, and he will not allow Taiwan to be the bargain-
ing chip in negotiations over the PRC’s new relationship with the United States.27 
After so many years’ experience of interaction, Beijing has become increasingly 
convinced that the United States is reliable about “not supporting Taiwanese 
independence.”28 What remains to be seen is the extent to which the PRC will 
tolerate the United States’ taking advantage of anti-China sentiment among the 
Taiwanese and tacitly endorsing the DPP’s assertion that Taiwan is not part of 
China. From Washington’s perspective, continuing its support of cross-Strait 
dialogue on the basis of the 1992 Consensus means stability in the East Asia, 
but Taiwan may become more tied to mainland China. On the other hand, en-
couraging a new cross-Strait policy without the 1992 Consensus opens up some 
novel strategic possibilities for relations between the United States and its East 
Asian associates, but it also involves the risk of Beijing’s retaliation. Washington’s 
judgment and decision on this issue will be of great significance for the future 
development in this region.
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Cross-Strait relations are very complicated and unpredictable. When Ma Ying-
jeou was elected as Taiwan’s president, he was determined to improve relations 
with mainland China and successfully reached dozens of agreements between 
the two sides. The scenario during his first term of presidency was so rosy that 
some scholars even speculated about the possibility of drafting a peace agreement 
between the PRC and the ROC.29 Yet only a couple of years later the Taiwanese 
people expressed their deep worry and suspicion about the pace of cross-Strait 
rapprochement.30
In the past eight years, cross-Strait relations stayed relatively peaceful and sta-
ble compared with the period of 2000–2008 because the two sides could carry out 
constructive dialogues and cooperation under the 1992 Consensus. But now that 
the DPP has regained political power, commentators have begun to consider the 
unpleasant possibility of military confrontation. As Scott L. Kastner reminds us, 
“It is possible to imagine a number of future events—ranging from a return of the 
DPP to power in Taiwan, to continued growth in Taiwan-centric identity despite 
deepening cross-Strait economic integration, to a period of economic malaise in 
the PRC—that could lead to renewed pessimism in Beijing about long-term trends 
in the Taiwan Strait.” If any of these scenarios comes true, a “preventive war fought 
to alter unfavorable long-term trends” cannot be excluded.31 Although Kastner 
thinks there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of cross-Strait relations 
in the short to medium term, he admits that the current détente requires continual 
careful management.32
What will happen if the Tsai administration continues to reject the 1992 Con-
sensus? This is a difficult question to answer. The PRC has many tools to compel 
the DPP back to the “one-China” track, including diplomatic, economic, political, 
and military measures. Diplomatically, the PRC can carry out a surprise attack 
on Taiwan by asking several countries to immediately cut official relations with 
Taiwan or by withdrawing its support of Taiwan’s participation in international or-
ganizations.33 Economically, the PRC can tighten the financial supply of Taiwanese 
enterprises doing business with China, restrict importation of Taiwanese goods 
and services to China, or trim down the quota of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan. 
Politically, it can cancel all cross-Strait negotiations, meetings, academic coopera-
tion, sporting events, and cultural exchanges. Militarily, it can fire missiles again 
over the island, perform military operations around Taiwan’s harbors, intrude into 
the Air Defense Identification Zone, or send aircraft carriers and naval vessels 
to patrol in the Taiwan Strait. These measures may prove counterproductive and 
arouse more anger and resentment than fear among Taiwanese people, but it could 
be hard for the PRC to act differently.
Some of the measures will hurt Taiwan only, others may make the United States 
nervous and give it no choice but to respond with similar measures. The situa-
tion may not deteriorate into a comprehensive war between China and the United 
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States (and its East Asia allies), but a certain kind of political deadlock or military 
confrontation is not altogether impossible. Since Tsai’s inauguration, China seems 
to be exercising a gradual escalation strategy of putting pressure on Taiwan, rather 
than employing all its tools at hand. It is unlikely that China will use its military 
power against Taiwan as long as Tsai avoids any explicit policy of Taiwan inde-
pendence, yet there is no sign of China’s concession to Tsai’s rejection of the 1992 
Consensus either. A new détente may be the best description of cross-Strait rela-
tions in years to come.
C ONCLUSION
The national identity of Taiwan and its impact on cross-Strait relations might seem 
to be a “domestic” issue of Taiwan, or at most a bilateral issue between Taiwan and 
China. But as I have shown, this problem has a much more far-reaching effect than 
is apparent at first glance. It not only reflects the positions of different parties in 
Taiwan on the unification/independence question but also concerns the realiza-
tion of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream.” It does not merely involve the United States 
in the sense of consolidating a maritime alliance against China but also bears on 
the structural transformation of superpowers in the twenty-first century.34 If we do 
not pay enough attention to the political consequences of a seemingly “domestic” 
issue of a small island country, we will not be able to cope with one of the most 
difficult challenges East Asia faces now.
National identity is an equivocal concept in political theory. Sometimes it means 
one’s sense of belonging to a specific ethnic or cultural community; sometimes it 
means one’s self-identity as a member of a particular state. Nationalist scholarship 
tends to combine the two elements in order to portray or predict the formation 
of a nation-state, but such a move is not warranted because consciousness of a 
cultural group is not always consistent with identity of a political community. To 
presuppose that the political unit and the cultural unit should be congruent is a 
misleading starting point in the study of national identity.
All three of the popular methods of measuring national identity in Taiwan—
the Chinese/Taiwanese/both identity measure, the unification/independence 
measure, and the “Chinese Nationalist versus Taiwanese Nationalist” measure—
reveal important information about the collective consciousness of Taiwanese, but 
none of these adequately describe the political identity of the people living on the 
island. I therefore recommend a fourth method that is frequently ignored in Tai-
wan studies: the method of assessing how respondents delineate their compatriots 
and homeland. Measuring in this way, we find that Taiwan’s national identity is not 
as divisive an issue as many scholars or politicians describe. The people of Taiwan 
may differ at being Chinese or Taiwanese, and they may disagree about their po-
litical future (to unify with China or seek independence), but most of them favor 
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the status quo (neither unification nor independence), and perhaps more than 
85 percent of them have a clear identity as to which country they belong to.
But although national identity per se is not a real or pressing issue in Taiwan, 
the question of how to deal with the one-China principle embedded in the 1992 
Consensus is a real problem. Ma’s government successfully signed twenty-one 
agreements with mainland China on the basis of the 1992 Consensus during his 
administration. The DPP endorses the signed agreements but refuses to negotiate 
with the PRC any more on the precondition of the 1992 Consensus. The DPP’s 
new mainland policy and the CCP’s reaction will affect stability in East Asia and 
destabilize further the already edgy PRC-US relationship.
There are several possible ways to ease tensions across the Taiwan Strait. One 
would be to convince Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP that it would be good for Taiwan 
to maintain cross-Strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, but Xi Jin-
ping or the PRC would need to acknowledge the “differing interpretations” part of 
the consensus in addition to its favorite “one-China” part. In this case, Tsai might 
be able to maintain the status quo by adhering to the name of ROC. Another pos-
sibility would be for the United States and the PRC to finally agree that the 1992 
Consensus is not the only formula for securing peace and stability in the Taiwan 
Strait, and for Tsai to provide an innovative, practicable, and convincing new pol-
icy. This would mean the end of the era of the 1992 Consensus and the beginning 
of a new age whose direction no one can predict at the moment. The third solution 
would be to invite all concerned parties to deliberate on the changing meaning of 
“one China” and to figure out if any better definition or interpretation could satisfy 
the purposes of all parties. It is difficult to say which solution would produce the 
best possible outcome. But all concerned parties should do their best to prevent 
the escalation of political tension and to secure sustainable peace among peoples.
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Since the beginning of Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s, identities on 
the island have fundamentally changed. Then, most citizens of the Republic of 
China (ROC), Taiwan’s official name, considered themselves as Chinese, and only 
a minority considered themselves as Taiwanese. The latter segment of the society 
was concentrated in and around the newly formed and legalized opposition group, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Today, the situation has reversed: fewer 
than 5 percent of ROC citizens regard themselves as Chinese, between 60 and 70 
percent see themselves as Taiwanese, and the rest claim a double identity, both Tai-
wanese and Chinese. In other words, all political forces, including the Kuomintang 
(KMT), which for a long time enjoyed a dominant and in reality one-party sta-
tus and dreamed of reunifying China under its rule, have “Taiwanized.” However, 
many ROC citizens would readily admit that they are politically Taiwanese but 
culturally Chinese, suggesting that, as in many modern societies, multiple identi-
ties are getting more common and do not necessarily generate social or political 
tensions. Only the most militant of the proindependence, or “Green,” Taiwanese 
would try to draw a clear line between Chinese and Taiwanese cultures, emphasiz-
ing the distinctiveness and specificity of the latter.
At the same time, after Ma Ying-jeou’s election as Taiwan president and the 
KMT’s return to power in 2008, Ma, the KMT, and what is called in Taiwan the 
“Blue camp” (fanlanjun, a coalition of the KMT, the People First Party [PFP], the 
New Party [CNP], and the Minkuotang [MKT]) embarked on an attempt to re-
store a more traditional Chinese and ROC political and cultural identity, both 
as a way to facilitate the rapprochement that they had initiated with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and as a strategy to weaken their political opponents, the 
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independence-leaning forces called the “Green camp” (fanlüjun) in general and 
the DPP in particular. Simultaneously, economic and social relations across the 
Taiwan Strait have rapidly developed, multiplying interactions between ROC and 
PRC citizens.
These two trends can nurture opposite consequences: they can help bridge the 
gap between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese and persuade the latter that, after 
all, not much separates them from the former; but, they can also help expose or 
underscore differences between both societies, and, in a protective reaction ob-
served elsewhere, convince most Taiwanese that while they may share with PRC 
citizens some cultural features, such as the (written) language, they belong to a 
very different socioeconomic environment and polity.
My hypothesis is that the Taiwanese political or civic identity, closely linked to 
the island’s democratization and democratic life, will continue to consolidate. The 
Spring 2014 Sunflower Movement, the KMT’s landslide defeat in the late November 
2014 local elections, and, more importantly, Tsai Ing-wen’s victory and the DPP’s 
return to power (and for the first time control of the Legislative Yuan) since 2016 
have all illustrated this trend. Simultaneously, we are witnessing a diversification of 
ways to be Taiwanese, leading some to associate their identity with the local culture, 
the building of a new Taiwanese nation, and even the quest for formal indepen-
dence from China and others to accommodate Taiwanese people’s identity with a 
democratized, sovereign, and de facto independent ROC on Taiwan.
CHANGING POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN TAIWAN 
BEFORE 2008 :  A BRIEF OVERVIEW
We start this section with some broad and well-known trends: National Chengchi 
University’s Election Study Center, one of the most respected and reliable opinion 
poll organizations on the island, tells us that in June 2016 59.3 percent of the inter-
viewees considered themselves Taiwanese, as opposed to 17.6 percent in 1992 and 
43.7 percent in 2008; 3.4 percent of them see themselves as Chinese (25.5 percent 
in 1992 and 4.1 percent in 2008); and 33.6 percent of them view themselves as both 
Taiwanese and Chinese (46.4 percent in 1992 and 44.7 percent in 2008).1
The first, most obvious conclusion from this survey is that Taiwanese iden-
tity now dominates the society, completely sidelining Chinese identity. The sec-
ond is that, stable and dominant until 2008, the group of Taiwanese claiming a 
double identity has started to decrease since Ma Ying-jeou was elected, raising 
some doubts about the efficacy of the KMT’s attempt to “resinicize” the island. But 
the third conclusion—often overlooked—is that in 1992, at the beginning of Tai-
wan’s democratization, people claiming a Chinese identity were already a minority 
that would weaken rather rapidly in the middle of the same decade, becoming the 
smallest group, behind the people who saw themselves as only Taiwanese, as early 
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as 1995 (20.7 percent against 25.0 percent). In other words, when Taiwan was still 
at the dawn of democracy, nearly half of the island population had a double iden-
tity and almost two-thirds saw themselves either as both Taiwanese and Chinese 
or as simply Taiwanese.
It is true that, while informative, this kind of survey has a major weakness: it 
does not make any distinction between cultural and political identities.2 However, 
from the beginning the emergence of Taiwanese identity has been both a political 
or civic and a cultural phenomenon. It originated as a response to the February 
28 Massacre (an uprising against the KMT-led government in Taiwan in 1947 that 
was violently suppressed by the ROC military and resulted in an estimated ten 
thousand deaths) as well as the KMT’s policy forbidding and punishing Taiwanese 
students’ use of their native language at school (mainly Hokkien or Minnan, 
known in Taiwanese as Tâi-oân-oê or Tâi-gi)3 and more broadly to the discon-
nect, imposed by the civil war in 1949, between the ROC’s “one-China” principle 
or legal fiction and the Taiwanese geocultural reality. While political activists like 
Peng Ming-min claimed as early as the 1960s a Taiwanese identity closely linked to 
their democratization demands, in the 1970s the rise of this identity was also a cul-
tural phenomenon of “nativization” (bentuhua), particularly in literature and arts, 
that took shape in reaction to the KMT-inspired dominant traditional Chinese 
culture and cultural production. In the political realm, in spite of martial law, the 
KMT itself had no other choice but to get “Taiwanized” (66 percent of its members 
were Taiwanese in 1986), a process that would reach its leadership in 1986 (when 
mainlander domination of its powerful Central Standing Committee dropped 
to 55 percent, then two years later dropped to 48 percent), just before President 
Chiang Ching-kuo legalized the DPP and lifted martial law (1987), initiating 
Taiwan’s democratic transition. In the local and (partial) national elections that 
have been allowed to take place since the early 1950s (with an increase of the seats 
for national elections starting in 1969), opposition (or dangwai) candidates were 
more and more often inclined to use Taiwanese as opposed to Mandarin during 
their campaigns, contributing to promoting a politico-cultural identity that the 
KMT then continued, if not to ignore, to actively downplay. And since the 1970s, 
in Taiwan’s scholarly and intellectual community and later in the general public, 
there has been a growing awareness of the ethnic diversity of the island, leading to 
the construction of the concept of “subethnic” groups (zuqun) to characterize its 
major components: the Hoklo (fulao) or South Fujian immigrants (70 percent of 
the population), the Hakka (kejiaren, 15 percent), the mainlanders (waishengren, 
13 percent), and the aborigines (shandiren and after democratization the various 
groups of yuanzhumin, 2 percent).4 Over the same period, more Taiwanese have 
given themselves another definition of their Chineseness, accepting the epithet 
huaren or ethnic Chinese but not zhongguoren (Chinese), which has become clear-
ly associated with PRC citizenship. In other words, cultural identity and cultural 
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identity debates in Taiwan are closely linked to democratization and have always 
been highly politicized. As a result, for a long time Taiwanese surveys on identity 
have been understood by both the interviewees and the public to have a dominant 
political or, to be more accurate, civic dimension: in other words, they have been 
indicative of the emergence of a new Taiwanese national “civic identity.”5
Another issue, more contentious, is whether there is a direct relationship be-
tween identity and nation, between political identity and national identity, and 
between Taiwanese identity and the quest for Taiwan’s de jure or de facto inde-
pendence. This relationship is obvious: as Christopher Hughes has argued, a “civic 
nationalism” has taken shape in Taiwan.6 But the nature and content of the nation 
that has been under construction since democratization and even since 1949 and 
the split of China into two separate states can still be understood differently.7 Tai-
wanese civic and national identities sometimes converge, notably for those who 
favor formal independence or a permanent separation from China, but sometimes 
diverge, for those who prefer to keep the ROC constitutional envelope or “order,” 
to use an expression proposed by President Tsai Ing-wen in her inauguration 
speech in May 2016, or even the “one-China” (ROC) principle as defined in the 
KMT’s inspired formula “one China, differing interpretations.”8 And as we shall 
see below, the gap between the aspiration to build a distinct and new Taiwanese 
nation and the geopolitical reality and political options that can be contemplated 
is widening. Hence the constant ambiguities and limitations of Taiwan national-
ism.9 Said differently, in Taiwan more than in any other place and because of well-
known international constraints, the relationship between identity and national-
ism has remained complicated.10
Identity politics have been widely studied in Taiwan. This chapter is not the 
place to present or review this rich literature. Suffice it to say that, because of Tai-
wan’s unusual history, diverse subethnic composition, ill-recognized statehood 
and international status, and long domination by the 1.5 million mainlanders or 
“outsiders” (waishengren, who arrived in 1945–50, as opposed to Taiwan’s “natives” 
or benshengren), democratization has had a direct impact both on the central role 
played by identity politics and on the rapid consolidation of Taiwanese civic—and 
to a large extent national—identity. Consequently, since the early 1990s, identity 
politics has influenced all parties. For the KMT, it has induced a painful meta-
morphosis, playing a role in the new internal fractures that took shape under Lee 
Teng-hui (1988–2000) between the then “mainstream faction” (zhuliupai), which 
supported the president’s Taiwanization process, and the “nonmainstream faction” 
(feizhuliupai), which included leaders as General Hau Pei-tsun, prime minister 
from 1990 to 1993. The latter wished to keep the party’s strong Chinese identity 
and mainland traditions (such as the “Huangpu spirit,” a spirit of unity and coop-
eration among parties and factions for the good of the country as a whole).11 One 
of the disputes of this period concerned the revision of history textbooks and the 
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publication of the series “Get to Know Taiwan” (Renshi Taiwan).12 In his first term 
as KMT chair, Lee Teng-hui kept a balance between his desire to promote Taiwan’s 
identity, uniqueness, and statehood and the need to compromise with the more 
conservative leaders of his party.13 Launched in 1993, Taiwan’s United Nations bid 
was a good example of the middle road then adopted: Taiwan proposed to return 
to the UN under the name of ROC rather than Taiwan, as the DPP would have 
preferred. And in its 1994 white paper on cross-Strait relations, the Taiwanese gov-
ernment stuck to the idea that there was only one Chinese nation (guojia) while 
asking Beijing to recognize that it was divided into two “political entities” (zheng-
zhi shiti).
But after his reelection by the whole Taiwanese electorate in 1996, Lee gradually 
moved away from this path: in 1999, he advocated a (quasi) two-state approach 
to cross-Strait relations that clearly indicated a priority given to the building of a 
Taiwanese nation distinct not only from the PRC but also in reality from China. 
In doing so, he was trying both to rein in the DPP’s growing popularity by co-
opting its issue and to move the KMT in the direction he wished. This change 
affected many KMT leaders, including Ma Ying-jeou, who declared in 1998 as he 
was running for Taipei mayor that, in spite of his mainland origin, he was a “new 
Taiwanese” (xin Taiwanren). In any event, it is interesting to note that the propor-
tion of ROC citizens who defined themselves as only Taiwanese increased from 
25 percent in 1995 to 39.6 percent in 1999, while Chinese identity dropped even 
lower (from 20.7 percent in 1995 to 12.1 percent) and dual identity remained rather 
stable (42.5 percent in 1995 versus 47 percent in 1999).14
The DPP underwent an easier but no less ambiguous evolution. As we know, 
since its establishment in 1986, the main opposition party was united around the 
goal to democratize Taiwan but was divided about its quest for formal indepen-
dence. Then the Formosa faction (meilidao) was seen as more moderate and ready 
to operate within the ROC framework than the New Tide faction (xin chaoliu), 
which wanted to create a new nation, the Republic of Taiwan. Eventually, all DPP 
factions agreed in 1999 to adopt a self-determination platform that clearly denied 
that Taiwan was part of China but at the same time accepted faute de mieux the 
ROC institutions and the formula “ROC = Taiwan.” In other words, by the end of 
the 1990s, the consolidation of Taiwanese identity favored the emergence of a new 
Taiwanese national identity and even nationalism that would pave the way for 
DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the 2000 presidential election.15
The KMT defeat in the 2000 election constituted a turning point in Taiwan’s 
identity politics. Once in power, Chen Shui-bian pushed the ROC’s Taiwanization 
further: he added “Taiwan” to the ROC passport, insisted after 2002 on the is-
land’s separate statehood (“one country on each side of the Strait,” or yibian yiguo) 
and promoted a new historical narrative and all sorts of cultural activities that 
underscored Taiwan’s distinct identity, particularly its non-Chinese or aboriginal 
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dimensions. For instance, he tried to propagate Shi Ming (Su Beng)’s interpretation 
of Taiwan’s history as a four-hundred-year fight for freedom and independence,16 
showcasing on the government website (GIO) the figure of Zheng Chenggong (or 
Koxinga), the Ming general who actually “sinicized” Taiwan in the seventeenth 
century to better resist the Qing conquest, as the forefather of this movement. He 
emphasized the Taiwanese character of many cultural customs or traditions that 
can also be found on the Chinese mainland, especially in southern Fujian, the 
place of origin of the Taiwanese language. And he presented Taiwan as a cultural 
melting pot in which each outside ingredient (Chinese, Taiwanese, aboriginal, Jap-
anese, American) had the same level of influence.17 Made in continuity with Lee’s 
own changes, many of these initiatives were aimed at bolstering Taiwan’s sense of 
community and national security.18 But in retrospect, the most radical manifesta-
tions of this new Taiwanese nationalism appear to be convenient substitutes for 
the independence-leaning policies that Chen wanted but was unable to introduce, 
not only because of China’s opposition and intimidation, but also because of the 
US government’s, and particularly President George W. Bush’s, growing irritation 
after 2003. These symbolic exaggerations triggered KMT and Blue camp accusa-
tions that Chen was “desinicizing” (qu Zhongguohua) Taiwan, precisely at the time 
(April 2005) of KMT chair Lien Chan’s historic trip to China and resumption of 
party-to-party relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In a sense, it 
can be argued that in promoting a dark Green narrative, the Chen Shui-bian ad-
ministration contributed to moving the KMT narrative to a darker Blue position. 
Political polarization in those years (2004–8) also played a role in the promotion 
of two radically opposite narratives and identities on the island. However, it is 
appropriate to explore the connection between the KMT’s promotion of Taiwan’s 
Chinese identity and its rapprochement policy with the PRC, and probably to look 
there for the main explanation of the Nationalist Party’s attempt to return to its 
mainland roots and initial values. In any event, this short overview of Taiwan iden-
tity politics before 2008 constitutes the background of Ma Ying-jeou’s attempt to 
restore what can be called a more traditional “ROC Chinese” identity as well as the 
negative reactions it has provoked in Taiwanese society, in spite of, or because of, 
increasing interaction between China and Taiwan.
THE KMT ’S  NEW CHINESE NATIONALISM
After Ma came to power in 2008, the KMT revived, to some extent, its traditional 
and somewhat old-fashioned Chinese nationalism, a nationalism that once again 
placed the unity and the future unification of the Chinese nation/race (zhonghua 
minzu) at the heart of its ideological discourse. This new/reborn narrative was 
aimed not only at denouncing and reining in what the KMT and Beijing described 
as Chen Shui-bian’s “desinicization” policy but also at negating Lee Teng-hui’s 
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earlier attempted localization—Taiwanization or nativization—of the KMT and 
the ROC. In doing so, Ma reactivated a narrative and a discourse that had been 
dominant at the time of the martial law and could only revive bad memories, as-
sociated with the authoritarian period and the nondemocratic inclinations of the 
KMT, in the minds of older-generation Taiwanese. Although Ma did not endorse 
the dark Blue view, according to which Taipei, since 1949, has merely been the 
provisional capital of the ROC and unification should take place rapidly, he and 
the KMT tried to restore the centrality of Chinese culture and identity and con-
tributed to creating tensions between their brand of Chinese nationalism and the 
need to cultivate local Taiwanese identity and voters.19 In other words, instead of 
reuniting the Taiwanese, their official objective, Ma and the KMT’s new discourse 
created new fault lines in society.
Before his first election in 2008, Ma had published a book titled Native Spirit: 
The Model Story of Taiwan that challenged the “four hundred years of tragedy” 
narrative and emphasized the contributions of Qing administrators such as Liu 
Minchuan and ROC leaders such as Chiang Ching-kuo to Taiwan’s moderniza-
tion.20 In this book, he minimized the role of the Japanese and exaggerated the 
number of native Taiwanese who joined the Chinese resistance against Japan (the 
majority of the Taiwanese who fought in the war did it on the Japanese side). He 
also criticized the DPP’s version of nativization as a chauvinistic and divisive at-
tempt at desinicizing Taiwan. And after he came to power, Ma introduced a num-
ber of changes that highlighted his real intentions: in his inaugural address, he 
described the people on both sides of the Strait as parts of a zhonghua minzu 
(Chinese nation), where the concept of minzu referred to a common racial and 
cultural identity; he renamed Taiwan Post (Taiwan’s mail service) China Post, its 
original name before the Chen Shui-bian presidency; while promoting democrat-
ic values, he also revived the traditional KMT discourse on the need to enhance 
Confucian ethics; he restored Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall’s original name 
(Chen had renamed it National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall and hung large 
butterflies in it during the last year of his presidency), giving the impression of 
politically rehabilitating the old dictator, much to the pleasure of Chinese tourists. 
More importantly, he emphasized the continuity between today’s Taiwan and the 
old ROC in terms of institutions and territories, insisting on the legal definition 
of the ROC as the mainland plus Taiwan. He also asserted the existence of solely 
“one China,” according to the PRC and ROC’s approved 1992 Consensus that the 
phrase “one China” could have differing interpretations as to which government 
was the legitimate representative of that China) and even, later in 2012, accord-
ing to the formula “one country, two areas” (yiguo liangqu). Finally, he adopted a 
very assertive discourse on his country’s territorial claims in both the East and the 
South China Sea (Diaoyutai, Spratlys), flirting with the idea of cooperating with 
the PRC against other claimants on these issues.21 In other words, as Stéphane 
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Corcuff has indicated, Ma, a mainlander born in Hong Kong, embarked on a pol-
icy of de-Taiwanization and, as Chris Hughes has pointed out, tried in doing so to 
“resinicize” Taiwan in order to “justify his own legitimacy as a leader.”22
The KMT’s new or revived Chinese nationalism was also clearly aimed at an-
choring Taiwan in the Chinese nation, bridging the gap with the PRC, oppos-
ing Taiwan independence, favoring reconciliation and eventually unification be-
tween the two sides of the Strait (with steep conditions), and legitimizing its own 
rapprochement policy toward Beijing. It is true that Ma Ying-jeou and his party 
declared in 2008 that they opposed reunification in the foreseeable future. And 
it is true that their strategy’s objectives also included mainland China’s gradual 
democratization, but they did not do much to that end, and they showed extreme 
prudence toward PRC dissidents: for instance, Ma refused to see the Dalai Lama 
or blind activist Chen Guangcheng when they visited the island or to issue a visa to 
Uighur World Congress president Rebiya Kadeer. In any event, for the Ma admin-
istration, what mattered was Taiwan’s economic integration with the PRC, which 
they saw as the best way to boost the economy, avoid marginalization, and embrace 
regionalization and globalization. The coziness of KMT-CCP relations prompted 
increasing suspicion among Taiwanese about Ma’s rapprochement policy, and not 
only among DPP voters.23
As we know, between 2008 and 2016, unprecedented developments took place 
across the Strait, including the establishment of direct air and sea links, the con-
clusion of twenty-three agreements, and an increasing number of Chinese tourist 
visits to the island (over 4.3 million in 2015). These developments clearly deepened 
interactions between not only both governments but also both societies. However, 
have they affected the Taiwanese’s identity?
IMPACT AND BACKL ASH OF MA’S  CHINESE 
NATIONALISM
The answer is no, or to be more accurate yes, but not in the ways expected. If 
anything, as we alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, political rapproche-
ment and growing economic integration between Taiwan and China under Ma 
have paradoxically strengthened the predominance of the Taiwanese identity. 
And this predominance is even stronger among youth. According to the Tai-
wan Brain Trust, a “Green” think tank that does produce balanced surveys and 
opinion polls, in August 2014, 78 percent of interviewees between ages twenty 
and twenty-nine see themselves as Taiwanese, as opposed to 52 percent for ages 
fifty to fifty-nine and 48 percent for those over seventy. Women tend feel more 
Taiwanese than men (67 percent compared to 54 percent for men). Educated 
people (with a bachelor’s degree or above) also feel more Taiwanese (63 percent 
compared to 57–59 percent). Likewise, the support among young Taiwanese for 
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independence in a three-option survey (independence, reunification, and status 
quo) is much higher: 44 percent for ages twenty to twenty-nine, as opposed to 
18 percent for ages fifty to fifty-nine and 19 percent for over age seventy; the 
respective figures for status quo supporters are 45 percent, 64 percent, and 54 
percent, and the figures for unification supporters are 2 percent, 8 percent, and 
8 percent.24
It is easy to understand the reasons for this trend. Although most Taiwanese 
supported Ma’s mainland policy after he was elected in 2008, gradually a large 
segment of them started to criticize it for going too far in accommodating Beijing 
without yielding the fruits that he had promised. In the public sphere and espe-
cially on the Internet, ethnic representations continued to be debated and pro-
moted.25 A first indicator of a backlash to the KMT’s resinicization plan occurred 
in late 2011. Then Ma had to drop his idea of starting political negotiations with 
the PRC after his reelection in 2012 because of the strong opposition of a majority 
of Taiwanese. KMT leader Wu Bo-hsiung’s announcement of the “one country, 
two areas” formula in March 2012 in China, perceived as too close to the now in-
famous “one country, two systems” concept, was supported by only 33 percent of 
Taiwanese (and opposed by 55 percent).26 But it was in Ma’s second term that ten-
sions started to intensify, reaching their peak when some KMT legislators tried 
in March 2014 (without, in the view of the DPP, enough parliamentary discussion 
of its content) to ratify the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSTA), which 
Taipei and Beijing negotiators had signed in June 2013. This calamitous decision 
precipitated one of the largest civil disobedience mobilizations in democratic 
Taiwan’s history: the twenty-three-day Sunflower Movement protest. While its 
causes were both multiple and complex, political and socioeconomic, this move-
ment was a clear manifestation of Taiwan’s civic identity. Between March and 
June 2014, the proportion of Taiwanese claiming a Taiwanese identity climbed 
from 58.2 percent to 60.5 percent.27 In other words, Ma’s Chinese nationalism was 
clearly out of sync with the trends at play in Taiwanese society and contributed 
to weakening the KMT’s discourse and policy toward the mainland as well as 
strengthening the island’s Taiwaneseness.28 More importantly, Ma’s discourse and 
policies intensified the frustrations of the Taiwanese, who had already been badly 
affected by their stagnating standard of living as well as the island’s economic 
slowdown and growing social inequalities. More generally, Ma’s Chinese nation-
alism reduced the chances of the KMT to stay in power after 2016. Turning into 
a blatant defeat for the KMT and a landslide victory for the DPP, the November 
2014 local elections confirmed, among other things, the unpopularity of Ma’s 
Chinese nationalism. So did Tsai’s clear victory (56 percent of the vote) against 
KMT candidate Eric Chu Li-luan (31 percent) and People’s First Party’s James 
Soong Chu-yu (13 percent) in the January 2016 presidential election, and the 
emergence from the Sunflower Movement of the New Power Party (shidai liliang) 
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on the “Greener” and more proindependence side of the political spectrum (five 
legislators, 6 percent of the vote).
The consolidation of Taiwan’s distinct identity can also be interpreted as part of 
a reaction against globalization that has taken place around the world, including in 
Europe. It that sense, it is much less paradoxical than it may appear. Nevertheless, 
in the case of Taiwan, it also demonstrates that national identity is not shaped by 
the state (the ROC) but by broader political and social trends such as “the practice 
of sovereignty through the ballot box and the evolution of multi-party politics in 
the context of a thriving, pluralistic civil society in which identities shift, interact 
and compete.”29 In the Taiwan case, the consolidation of a distinct identity is also 
a reaction to the PRC’s increasing military threat and ability to influence Taiwan’s 
society, business people, media, and elites: in other words, it is a response to as 
well as an attempt at compensating for and rebalancing the growing asymmetry of 
cross-Strait relations.30
The next question is of course whether Taiwan’s assertion of a distinct iden-
tity is not due to eventually fail. The asymmetrical integration process between 
Taiwan and China may already be affecting identity politics and, perhaps more 
importantly, gradually delinking the existing close relationship between identity 
and mainland policies.
A D OMINANT BUT CHANGING TAIWANESE IDENTIT Y
It is clear that Taiwan is not Hong Kong and that, unlike the former British colony, 
which has agreed to reintegration in the PRC as long as this occurs within the “one 
country, two systems” framework, the ROC is a de facto sovereign state whose 
future cannot be decided without its consent. However, there are some similarities 
between the two civil societies with regard to their identity politics: both societies 
are asserting the local versus the global, the protection of their interests in the face 
of an overwhelming force—the rise of China.31 Many young Hong Kong activists 
went to Taiwan in the summer of 2014 to study from the Taiwanese involved in the 
occupation of the Legislative Yuan, and some of the latter went to Hong Kong to 
support the Occupy Central movement. Since the Sunflower Movement in spring 
2014 and the subsequent seventy-nine-day Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong in 
autumn 2014, these similarities between the two movements have become even 
more striking: both highlight a will to resist and a sense of crisis.32 At the same 
time, another dimension of this crisis is that Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s stronger 
local identities have become more and more disconnected from the options that 
political parties can offer to their citizens and that individuals, especially young 
people, can contemplate in terms of life and career.
As far as Taiwan is concerned, since she came into office in May 2016, Ms. 
Tsai Ing-wen has tried very hard to preserve the status quo in the Strait, and 
52    Chapter Three
this despite Beijing’s obvious lack of cooperation and insistence that she en-
dorse the so-called 1992 Consensus. In the run-up to her electoral campaign 
and during her trip to the United States in June 2015, she had already made clear 
that, if elected, she would preserve the “status quo,” preserve the “ROC consti-
tutional order,” and, contrary to Chen Shui-bian, not give any bad “surprises” 
to Washington or Beijing.33 If the DPP has become much more cautious, it is 
also because Taiwan’s society, mind-set, and elites have gradually changed. For 
instance, it is clear that today an increasing number of young Taiwanese are 
tempted to start or continue their professional development in China, a place 
that is much more attractive in terms of both salary and job opportunities than 
the island, even if a majority of them would prefer staying in Taiwan (40 percent 
versus 32 percent, according to a recent survey).34 Moreover, before 2008, those 
Taiwanese keen to develop a closer political and functional relationship with 
the mainland were usually associated with big enterprises or KMT-leaning com-
panies. This is no longer the case: today, a growing number of Taiwanese small 
businesses, including those in the “Green” South (Kaohsiung, Tainan, Chiayi), 
have a vested interest in maintaining stable relations with China. For example, 
their economic reliance on Chinese tourists has become more obvious, particu-
larly since 2012, and the drop in Chinese tourists since early 2016 has led some 
of them to protest against the new ROC government and even ask it to endorse 
the 1992 Consensus. As a result, although since Tsai took office she has actively 
promoted a “New Southbound Policy” aimed at reducing Taiwan’s dependence 
upon China’s economy and developing closer links with ASEAN, South Asia, 
and Australia, Tsai has also clearly indicated that she will not scrap any of the 
agreements concluded by the Ma administration with Beijing or stop the flow 
of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan. And in any event, despite this new policy 
priority, the level of Taiwan’s economic dependency upon China is likely to re-
main high.
Consequently, Taiwan’s identity, while getting stronger, is being increasingly 
constrained by these realities and gradually disconnected from Taiwan’s quest for 
full statehood, let alone formal independence. While still contributing to protect-
ing Taiwan’s political autonomy, Taiwanese identity can no longer protect against 
the island’s asymmetrical dependence upon China. While trying to reduce it, Tai-
wan must accept and manage this dependence: in other words, Taiwanese identity 
is becoming more and more “Hongkongized” or constrained by Beijing’s “one-
China” principle and request.
To be sure, there are still major differences in identity between Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, since the latter is a de facto state and a democracy and the former is 
neither a city-state (despite this new aspiration among a minority of young Hong 
Kong activists) nor a full democracy. However, it appears that more Taiwanese, 
particularly youth, have adopted a more relaxed and realistic approach to their 
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own identity; it appears also that identity politics is losing steam and may become 
less of an electoral issue in the future.
Identities and Political Options
As Taiwanese society is getting more globalized, it is also becoming more diverse. 
And new forms of postmodern political and cultural expression have contributed 
to deemphasizing the importance of identity as a whole. For one thing, several 
studies have shown that young Taiwanese have a more flexible and pragmatic ap-
proach to the PRC35: as already mentioned, their professional careers often include 
at least a temporary relocation to the mainland, since the local employment mar-
ket remains sluggish and offers less well-paid jobs. In case of war, most would 
rather flee than face conscription and fight for the survival of the ROC, and they 
are becoming increasingly open-minded about long-term solutions to the cross-
Strait conflict, including the prospect of unification.36
There is another irony, more cultural, in the rise of Taiwanese identity: the slow 
erosion of the Minnan language in Taiwan, particularly in the north and the cen-
ter of the island. While it is still widely used in the electoral campaigns, it tends 
to be less often spoken or even mastered by young citizens. For instance, Sun-
flower Movement activists mainly used Mandarin or guoyu among themselves or 
when negotiating with the authorities. And rather than fighting in the name of 
Taiwanese identity, this movement was fighting for Taiwan’s interests as a whole, 
as a political community and more particularly for the social strata that have not 
taken advantage of or have been excluded from the benefits of the emerging cross-
Strait economic integration. In other words, new social and economic cleavages 
have to some extent replaced identity differences and clashes.37 While some of the 
social movements that have developed since 2008 have an identity component, 
they more and more focus on very specific issues, such as the environment (the 
anti–Fourth Nuclear Plant protest), farmers’ protection, human rights (such as the 
abolition of the death penalty), and gender inequalities.38
In this context, it has become harder and less convincing to promote a fully 
Taiwanese cultural identity. Members of postmodern and globalized societies ac-
tually do not see themselves through a unique identity. Today, the features shared 
by Taiwanese and Chinese cultures are still well recognized and accepted by most 
Taiwanese as is the dominant influence of Chinese culture in Taiwan, if that cul-
ture is understood differently from the official and neoconservative Chinese cul-
ture propagated by the communist authorities of the PRC. As a result, only a few 
militants are still trying to Taiwanize all aspects of the local culture, and an even 
smaller minority recognize the existence of a Taiwanese race distinct from the 
Chinese race, on the basis of the large number of intermarriages between Hokkien 
or Hakka migrants and local aborigines in the past four centuries. In any event, 
the culture and linguistic diversity of the Native Taiwanese themselves (Hoklo, 
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Hakka, and the fourteen recognized aboriginal tribes), a diversity also fed by the 
presence on the island of around six hundred thousand Southeast Asian workers 
mainly from the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, prevents the construction of 
a Taiwanese culture, let alone a Taiwanese nationalism around the still dominant 
Hoklo subethnic group and its language.
The growing numbers of PRC spouses and other residents in Taiwan and tais-
hang (Taiwanese business people) on the mainland are also having an influence on 
the Taiwanese people’s identity that is not always easy to assess, for there is still a 
dearth of thorough research on them.39 While around 350,000 mainland Chinese 
spouses have married Taiwanese citizens in the last twenty years or so (roughly 
320,000 of them reside in Taiwan, the others mainly in the PRC), it is by definition 
impossible to estimate the total number of PRC nationals living on the island.40 
The number of illegal PRC nationals is also increasing and difficult to track. Con-
versely, between one and two million Taiwanese people are living on the mainland, 
and some of them have married local spouses. In any event, these two distinct 
but growing communities and their offspring have already started to influence 
and alter Taiwan’s view of the PRC (and China’s view of Taiwan), much as mixed 
marriages and the growing number of mainlanders residing in Hong Kong (10 
to 15 percent of the population) have been slowly changing the local social fabric 
there. The sheer magnitude of these interactions cannot be discounted as mar-
ginal, especially in a society whose fertility rate has continuously decreased during 
the last twenty years (1.12 births per woman in 2016, down from 1.76 in 2000).41 
While this phenomenon may not have immediate consequences yet—Taiwan’s and 
Hong Kong’s local civic identity has so far continued to consolidate—it is likely to 
facilitate Beijing’s promotion of unification under the formula “one country, two 
systems” and eventually to modify both places’ sense of identity vis-à-vis China.
Studies on the taishang tend to conclude that most Taiwanese people working 
in China have kept a strong Taiwanese identity. One simple reason is that the bulk 
of them are native Taiwanese, as opposed to mainlanders, and have tended to stay 
together, live in the same areas, and speak Hokkien rather than Mandarin among 
themselves. It can also be argued that the PRC administrative category in which 
they have been put from the very beginning of the reform era (1979)—“Taiwanese 
compatriots” equipped with a special identification and travel document, the 
taibaozheng—has not made them more Chinese but has instead kept them outside 
local Chinese society, much in the way that Hong Kong business people (who 
have been equipped since the beginning of the reform era with a “hometown re-
turn permit,” huixiangzheng) have remained outsiders. While according to esti-
mates around two-thirds of them are inclined to vote for the KMT or Blue camp 
candidates, the majority still claim a Taiwanese identity (50 percent, compared to 
62 percent of those who do not work in China). Though a higher proportion of 
them claim a dual identity (40 percent compared to 32 percent for those who do 
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not work in China), few see themselves as only Chinese (6 percent compared to 
4 percent). Moreover, most taishang continue to identify with the ROC, not the 
PRC; they believe nearly as much as the rest of the Taiwanese population that 
Taiwan is a “sovereign, independent country” (59 percent vs. 65 percent for those 
who do not work in China); they remain massively in favor of the status quo in 
the Taiwan Strait (56 percent vs. 59 percent); and they even continue to prefer 
independence (25 percent against 26 percent) to reunification (11 percent vs. 6 
percent).42 All in all, although the taishang have become what I would call “agents 
of accommodation,” they are not yet, and probably will not become, “agents of 
unification.”43
The Decline of Identity Politics
It is somewhat paradoxical to propose that while a Taiwanese identity has consoli-
dated on the island, identity politics is declining. But there is some logic in this 
paradox. As most ROC voters were born and have been socialized in Taiwan, the 
distinction between mainlanders and natives has been gradually losing its perti-
nence. For a large majority of islanders, Taiwanese identity is now a given.
It is true that in promoting to government and various state agencies a large 
number of mainlanders Ma, himself a mainlander, was partly responsible for reac-
tivating the debate. But in so doing he also contributed to dividing his own party 
and alienating Taiwanese KMT leaders. The rift between Ma and Legislative Yuan 
speaker Wang Jin-pyng, a local Taiwanese and a key mediator in the peaceful end 
of the Sunflower Movement and the occupation of the Legislative Yuan by some 
activists, can be seen through that lens. But in the latest elections identity poli-
tics has been less of an issue, being sidelined in favor of bread-and-butter, public 
policy, and social issues. For instance, in the campaign preceding the January 2016 
election, while promoting Taiwan’s aboriginal roots and multiculturalism, Tsai 
Ing-wen and the DPP have been keen to avoid reviving identity politics, knowing 
full well that it is both a risky weapon and an argument that may not appeal to 
most of the electorate, particularly young voters.
The Ko Wen-je phenomenon also illustrates the receding importance of iden-
tity politics in Taiwan. Elected Taipei mayor in November 2014 against KMT can-
didate Sean Lien Sheng-wen, Lien Chan’s son, this surgeon is new to politics and 
ran as an independent. Although supported by the DPP, he embodies the emer-
gence of a new political force that many Taiwanese, including in the Sunflower 
Movement, have been hoping for, in order to break the debilitating KMT-DPP and 
mainlander-native polarization.44
This development has forced both the DPP and the KMT to adjust and also if 
not sideline at least downgrade identity politics. On the DPP side, Tsai Ing-wen 
has been keener to reassure the electorate about her party’s ability to revive the 
economy and adopt a workable China policy than to emphasize its Taiwaneseness. 
56    Chapter Three
And even independence-leaning politicians and think tanks now recognize the 
special nature of Taiwan’s relation to China. For instance, although critical of Tsai’s 
moderation, dark Green leader Ku Kuan-min proposed in 2013 that both sides of 
the Strait become “brotherly states” (xiongdi zhi bang), or, more accurately, broth-
erly entities within the same confederation.45
On the KMT side, we perceive a gradual deemphasizing of Chinese identity 
as a new generation of leaders has taken over, even if Hung Hsiu-chu, the daugh-
ter of a mainlander from Zhejiang and a dark Blue leader, became party chair in 
March 2016. The fact that the KMT replaced Hung as its presidential candidate 
in October 2015 because of her pro-PRC leanings, just three months after having 
handpicked her, with New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu, a more popular figure (and 
KMT chair from January 2015 to January 2016), highlights a willingness to bet-
ter connect with the electorate and re-Taiwanize the party. Eric Chu has a mixed 
family background, and the strong Taiwanese identity that he acquired through 
his father-in-law, his wife, and his mother has helped him: he speaks excellent 
Hokkien, and Kao Yu-jen, his father-in-law, a local Taiwanese who was promoted 
in the 1970s and 1980s by Chiang Ching-kuo (he was the speaker of Taiwan’s Pro-
vincial Assembly from 1981 to 1989) has close connections both with local KMT 
and DPP elites. But more importantly, distancing himself from the KMT “unifica-
tionists” like Wu Poh-hsiung and “Chinese nationalists” like Ma Ying-jeou or Ms. 
Hung, Eric Chu has been aware of the need for his party to refocus on social and 
economic rather than identity issues. For these reasons, it is unlikely that Hung 
will be able to reunite the Nationalist Party around a credible policy platform and 
allow it to come back to power.
This decline of identity politics reflects a diversification of the ways to be Tai-
wanese, the strengthening of local identities in different parts of the island, and to 
some extent the resilience of multiple identities, an attribute of most postmodern 
and free societies. As noted above, it also indicates that Taiwanese identity is now 
taken for granted. In other words, the decline of identity politics is a sign of the 
maturation and perhaps consolidation of Taiwanese democracy.
C ONCLUSION
Closely linked to the island’s democratization and democratic life, Taiwanese iden-
tity will probably continue to consolidate while Chinese and even dual identities 
weaken on this island. The spring 2014 Sunflower Movement and KMT’s landslide 
defeats in both the November 2014 local elections and the January 2016 national 
elections have to a certain extent illustrated this trend. But at the same time, we 
are witnessing a diversification of the ways to be Taiwanese. It has led some to 
associate their identity with the local culture and language and with the building 
of a new Taiwanese nation de facto if not de jure and forever independent from 
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China, while it has led others to accommodate their identity to a democratized, 
sovereign, and de facto independent ROC on Taiwan, and still others, though a 
small minority, to envisage a future in which Taiwan is eventually reunified with 
the mainland (probably after the PRC democratizes) but keeping their Taiwanese 
cultural identity.46 The disconnect between identities and political options for the 
future of Taiwan will probably continue to widen, as most Taiwanese, while at-
tached to their distinct identity, are very much aware that the only viable solution 
for their country is the ROC institutional envelope, the status quo in the Strait, 
US informal but reliable protection, and growing communication and coopera-
tion with the PRC. With that said, most Taiwanese now, contrary to the 1990s or 
the early 2000s, identify the ROC with Taiwan and do not countenance any legal 
inclusion of the mainland in their own polity:47 even if they feel partly Chinese, 
in their eyes, the PRC is another country. In other words, the distinction between 
state and national identity has clearly disappeared. The Taiwanese civic identity 
that has emerged today identifies only with the ROC or Taiwan, or with what Lee 
Teng-hui liked to call in the late 1990s the Republic of China on Taiwan: it is there-
fore, for most Taiwanese, a form of national identity.
For some Taiwanese, their identity will remain holistic, both political and cul-
tural, and will influence all aspects of their life. But this group will probably get 
smaller as Taiwan is more and more integrated with China but also globalized and 
divided by deepening social and economic inequalities. As a result, identities and 
identity politics will lose some of their importance in Taiwan. However, as Taiwan 
continues to be militarily threatened by the PRC, a power that denies its existence 
even under its official name, the ROC, and wants to annex it, Taiwanese identity, 
understood as a political or civic identity, is likely to survive and remain, with 
democracy, one of the most natural ramparts against Beijing’s imperial dream of 
reunification.
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WHY IS  THE IDENTIT Y OF THE TAIWANESE ON THE 
MAINL AND AN ISSUE?
In the past two decades, identity has been the key issue in Taiwanese politics.1 
Internally, identity issues are central to social cleavages and political competition. 
Some have used Taiwan’s political transition as a way to refute its Chinese origins. 
Externally, almost everything Taiwan has been doing is related to efforts to defend 
its national identity. Identity politics has also been at the heart of Taiwan’s efforts 
to determine its foreign policy with China, the United States, and other countries. 
But “the Taiwanese identity project” may have an Achilles’ heel: the identity of the 
Taiwanese living on the mainland. Since the post-Mao reforms in China, the rap-
prochement of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party, and 
the rise of global production/outsourcing networks, the mainland has become the 
number one destination for Taiwanese foreign investments (and Taiwan is defi-
nitely one of the primary sources of China’s FDI). Close economic ties triggered 
several waves of migration from Taiwan to the mainland. According to some es-
timates, there are between three hundred and four hundred thousand Taiwanese 
residing in China.2
This is a relatively large portion of the small island’s population. They and their 
immediate/direct families amount to about two million people, which is about 
one-tenth of Taiwan’s population. An important question arises as to how these 
Taiwanese identify themselves. Are they adapting to a Chinese identity or do they 
still uphold their Taiwanese identity? If the former is the case, they may be a strong 
and expanding “fifth column” in Taiwanese politics3— but most taishang would be 
heartbroken to feel that their compatriots viewed them in such a light. Therefore, 
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the identity of Taiwanese in mainland China has always been a controversial issue 
in Taiwan. Some scholars consider these Taiwanese as immigrants and look for 
signs of assimilation, while others consider them as expatriates and stress their 
mobility (their travels back and forth between the mainland and Taiwan) and their 
psychological steadfastness. But the empirical research, after rejecting the earlier 
“melting-pot” expectations of assimilation (such as Fong Xiaoqian’s), has also not 
fully supported expectations of assimilation that draw on theories of migration 
(such as Shu Keng’s), stressing migrants’ difficulties in maintaining ties to their 
original culture and in withstanding pressures to adopt a new identity.4 More than 
a decade of research has been conducted on this particular subject, but scholars 
have not reached any agreement on it.
Our own research on this topic started in 2002 and has since been extended via 
both interview and survey data. In this chapter, we would like to provide a con-
cluding statement on the subject to clarify the current status of Taiwanese identity 
in China and then to provide some explanation for it. The chapter is divided into 
five sections. The next one describes the identity of the Taiwanese and raises a 
puzzle: Why do Taiwanese settle down and blend in, yet refuse to identify them-
selves as Chinese? The third section tries to explain why Taiwanese maintain their 
identity. We argue that this has to do with the mobility factor. Being able to travel 
allows Taiwanese to maintain their strong ties with Taiwan and therefore reduces 
the impact of living in mainland China. The fourth section deals with the question 
of why Taiwanese have been reluctant to assume a less “exclusive Taiwanese identi-
ty.” In this section, we explore the differences and conflicts between Taiwanese and 
Chinese political and social cultures. In the last part we conclude that the identity 
of Taiwanese residing on the mainland is typical of identity in the globalizing era. 
Globalization brought Taiwanese to the mainland, and the resulting changes and 
continuities illustrate phenomena of transnationalism, cultural conflicts, and the 
mosaic of national identity.
TAIWANESE ON THE MAINL AND:  SET TLING AND 
ASSIMIL ATION BUT NO IDENTIT Y CHANGE
As mentioned earlier, scholars have made different assertions about the identity 
of Taiwanese residing on the mainland. This could be explained by looking at the 
political background of the scholars, but it may have more to do with the different 
dimensions these scholars are focusing upon. In other words, different foci lead 
to different conclusions. The problem arises as a result of the concept “identity.” 
Identity in this chapter refers to “social identity” or “identity of the related person,” 
especially his or her identification with a social category or group and the degree 
to which the person considers him- or herself a member of the social category or 
group. In the context of cross-Strait relations, the identity of Taiwanese people 
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could be represented as a choice between Chinese and Taiwanese. But the distinc-
tion of “Chinese” versus “Taiwanese” may be confusing in the differing contexts 
where the concept might apply. Chinese identity could mean “Chinese in a cultural 
sense” or “Chinese in a nationalistic sense.” The survey question commonly used 
in Taiwan specifies a three-option answer: being Chinese, being Taiwanese, or be-
ing both. This could help clarify the issue. On the basis of these types of questions, 
we can distinguish two types of identities among Taiwanese: an “inclusive Tai-
wanese identity” (i.e., identifying oneself as “Chinese” or “both”) or an “exclusive 
Taiwanese identity” (i.e., identifying oneself as Taiwanese only).
There are some preliminary qualifications to the issue of identity among Tai-
wanese residing in mainland China. First, in terms of career planning, only those 
who would like to settle down and stay on will face the question of identity. Sec-
ond, regarding social life, only those who would like to reach out and make friends 
outside their ethnic boundaries confront the question of identity. We can, then, 
distinguish three aspects of the identity issue: (1) psychological settling, captured 
by questions about “bringing over the whole family” and “having a long-term plan 
to stay on”; (2) social assimilation, captured by questions about “who are your 
close friends” and “who can you and your children marry”; and (3) attitudinal 
identity: imagined membership in a social group and especially the claiming of an 
inclusive or exclusive Taiwanese identity.
The study uses data from a collaborative project between the University of 
Hong Kong and National Chengchi University named “Lives and Attitudes of the 
Taiwanese in Mainland China,” carried out between the summer of 2009 and the 
winter of 2012. In that survey, the twelve researchers or six research teams spent 
a total of six weeks interviewing Taiwanese who were settling in both the greater 
Shanghai area and cities surrounding Dongguan. During the interview, we first 
asked the interviewees the questions on our semi-structured questionnaire. We 
then asked further questions regarding previous questions and started more casual 
talks on related issues. The dialogues were recorded and turned into transcripts 
for the researcher to keep track of the attitudes and thoughts of the Taiwanese 
sojourners being interviewed.
Since we have little information about Taiwanese communities in China, the 
population of our sample, it was difficult for us to design any forms of random 
sampling on the basis of preexisting information. Instead, we applied the method 
of snowballing for interviewees and followed the rule of “maximum variation” to 
diversify our sources of information. As a result, our interviewees include both 
Taiwanese businessmen and their families and Taiwanese students; both first- and 
second-generation Taiwanese; employees from both labor-intensive and high-tech 
manufacturers; employees of Taiwanese firms, joint ventures, foreign firms, and 
Chinese firms; Taiwanese sojourners of different educational statuses, ranging 
from primary school to PhD; Taiwanese affiliated with different political factions; 
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and Taiwanese of different ethnic origins. In the end, a total of 452 Taiwanese in 
China were interviewed and their attitudes were documented in a project that 
proved to be the largest systematic survey of the Taiwanese in China. This allows 
us to better understand the identity of the Taiwanese in China.
On the basis of the findings summarized in table 3, we can easily see a trend in 
the identity of the Taiwanese in mainland China: Taiwanese are for the most part 
settled and can easily blend in, but they refuse to identify themselves as “Chinese.”
We find that, first, in terms of physical settling, more than half of the Taiwanese 
surveyed (52.3 percent) had already brought over their family and settled down 
in the mainland or had plans to do so. This often is related to long-term career 
planning, family planning, and a sense of “home” in the locality. As one Taiwanese 
settled in Shanghai stated, “I have no problem referring to myself as a new Shang-
hainese.” This lays the foundation for the next step, assimilation.
The social assimilation of the Taiwanese can be gauged in two different ways. 
The first is behavioral and is measured by a question about close friends: even 
constrained by factors such as arrival time and contacting opportunities, about 
one-fourth of the Taiwanese (26.3 percent) already considered mainland Chinese 
as their best friends. The second is attitudinal and is measured by a question about 
the person they would marry: only about 5 percent (5.2 percent) exclude mar-
riage with mainlander Chinese, while most (58.9 percent) feel very agreeable to 
marrying them. In other words, Taiwanese have no problem at all with crossing 
the ethnic border to make friendships and establish trust. According to one local 
Shanghainese, “Compared with the migrants from Jiangsu and Anhui, Taiwanese 
are nothing special for me, and I would never keep away from them.”
Even though Taiwanese plan to settle down and have no problem blending in, 
they do not want to give up their original identity or adapt to a more lenient and 
less inclusive identity. As table 3 shows, at least 62 percent of the Taiwanese uphold 
the “exclusive Taiwan identity.” As one young Taiwanese said, “I do come from 
Shanghai, but if I am mistakenly identified as a Chinese, of course I will correct 
them immediately. I would never accept the identity of local Chinese.” This trend 
can be better observed by comparing the identity of the Taiwanese in Taiwan to 
that of the Taiwanese in mainland China, summarized in table 4.
From table 4, we can see that with regard to political positions, especially those 
related to party identification, there are huge difference between the Taiwanese in 
Taiwan and those who have moved to China. The percentage of those in the pan-Blue 
camp (KMT, People First Party [PFP], New Party [CNP], or Minkuotang [MKT]) 
is almost doubled (26.4 percent vs. 45.1 percent), while the percentage of those 
in the pan-Green camp (Democratic Progressive Party [DPP], Taiwan Solidarity 
Union [TSU], Taiwan Independence Party [TAIP], or Taiwan Constitution Asso-
ciation [TCA]) significantly decreases (dropping from 28.6 percent to 15.7 percent). 
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even larger gaps between the Taiwanese in Taiwan and China. The proportion who 
support independence drops from 25.8 percent to 5.5 percent while the proportion 
who support pro-unification rises from 9.9 percent to 21.4 percent. If this is the 
case, then how have attitudes regarding personal identity changed, given that these 
are often tied to the two above-mentioned positions? As we can see in table 4, there 
is almost no difference between the Taiwanese in Taiwan and in China: in terms 
of the “exclusive Taiwan identity,” the former proportion is 62.7 percent while the 
latter is 60.2 percent. In other words, partly because of self-selection and partly be-
cause of environmental influences, with respect to party identification and position 
on the unification/independence issue, the Taiwanese in China are very different 
from those staying in Taiwan. But the two groups do not significantly differ on the 
dimension of identity. What explains this puzzling fact? Why are Taiwanese will-
ing to live in China and blend in but at the same time unwilling to change their 
attitudes toward their identity?
MOBILIT Y,  ASSIMIL ATION,  AND IDENTIT Y:  WHY 
TAIWANESE HOLD ON TO THEIR IDENTIT Y
What is wrong with earlier propositions, which expect a gradual fading away of 
the Taiwanese identity? And how do Taiwanese uphold their exclusive Taiwanese 
identity while residing in a new environment? The key here is a tug-of-war be-
tween “environmental pressures” and “personal will.” In the scenario of conven-
tional immigration, migration is strongly impelled and one-way, and it is difficult 
for migrants to maintain ties with the sending country/hometown. Therefore, the 
“environmental pressures” are formidable and most migrants are unable to resist, 
especially those who are not protected by ethnic communities. In the end, they 
have to gradually give up their old identity and assume the new identity in a pro-
cess similar to that envisioned by the “melting pot” model of social assimilation.
This scenario applies to some extent to earlier waves of immigration, such as 
those of migrants who arrived in New York in the earlier twentieth century. But 
even historically it has not always applied, and it applies even less in the global era. 
Often borders can be frequently crossed and recrossed, and, because of innova-
tions in transportation and communication, migrants can easily maintain their 
ties with their motherland. As a result, we assume that it is easier for them to resist 
environmental pressures and adhere to their desired identity.
Changing global production networks have brought Taiwanese to an economi-
cally and socially less favorable environment in mainland China. Their choice 
to travel or stay there is to some extent voluntary. Taiwanese are free to come 
and go. In addition, because of revolutions in transportation and communication 
technology, cross-border travel and communication are easier and more conve-
nient. Therefore, the pressure to assimilate is not so formidable and irresistible. In 
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addition, it is not difficult for Taiwanese to maintain their social and psychologi-
cal ties with their hometowns. Most Taiwanese that we surveyed had traveled four 
to six times a year (not for business purposes) back and forth across the Taiwan 
Strait. As one Taiwanese entrepreneur from Dongguan described, “Many of us 
still have business in Taiwan. . . . At least, we have parents, brothers and sisters, 
and friends in Taiwan. Of course we have to go and visit them from time to time.” 
And another Taiwanese settled in Shanghai says, “Most of the Taiwanese here 
subscribe to satellite TV so that they can watch Taiwanese programs, especially 
Taiwanese news. Of course, some others do not subscribe. But this is because they 
do not watch TV. I have never heard that any Taiwanese watch Chinese programs 
all day.”
Moreover, in order to promote economic and cultural exchanges international-
ly, most nation-states manage to facilitate and expedite the process of transferring 
personnel across national borders. This is also true for travel across the Taiwan 
Strait, given the unique political situation between China and Taiwan. Both gov-
ernments accept some replacements for passports and allow some degree of “flex-
ible citizenship” with respect to permanent residence, property ownership, and 
welfare programs.5 This is an arrangement that Tomas Hammar has called deni-
zenship: a status of permanent residency without citizenship, allowing migrants 
to work and reside permanently in a country but not to have political rights.6 
Therefore, as one Taiwanese entrepreneur from Kunshan observes, “I have never 
heard of any Taiwanese giving up their medical insurance program [jianbao], let 
alone their Taiwanese identity card [shenfenzheng]. No matter how long you stay 
in China, you would never give up those things.”
In other words, all these factors—convenient travel, everyday communications, 
and the residency arrangements—make it possible for the Taiwanese to easily re-
sist assimilation pressures on the mainland. But mobility does not just “enable” 
them to hold onto their Taiwanese identity; it also “constrains” them from not 
doing so. Many of these Taiwanese are uncertain about whether they will settle in 
China, Taiwan, or perhaps even other places. In this regard, China is just a place 
to stay. One Taiwanese uses jet lag as a metaphor to describe the mentality: “If you 
know that you are going to leave in a week, you probably have little incentive to 
adjust your biological clock.” In a sense, the lifestyle of mobility that has developed 
in an era of globalization has greatly decreased the pressures and incentives to 
localize, let alone to revise one’s personal identity.
From this perspective, the resistance of the Taiwanese to revising their identity 
has a lot to do with globalization. Therefore this trend does not just apply to the 
case of Taiwanese in mainland China. It is applicable to most skilled workers and 
business entrepreneurs traveling across the world. The case of the Taiwanese is 
unique in the sense that they have traveled to a place with which they share cul-
tural origins. In sum, the ability of the Taiwanese to resist assimilation into local 
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Chinese society fully illustrates the significant impact of globalization on the state 
and its citizens.
C ONTACT S,  IMAGES,  AND IDENTIT Y:  WHY 
TAIWANESE NEVER GIVE UP THEIR IDENTIT Y
Even though Taiwanese can stick to their old identity, they do not necessarily have 
to. Since most Taiwanese will settle down on the mainland and since few of them 
have problems blending in there, why do they still refuse to revise their Taiwanese 
identity to make it more open and inclusive?
Identity refers to a confirmation of one’s distinctiveness from others (the con-
trast of “us” against “them”). The sense of distinctiveness normally comes from the 
experience of intergroup contacts. If the experiences are negative, so that people 
create a negative (hostile or derogatory) image of the other, the group boundary 
will be strengthened and it will be more difficult to relax or break the boundary. 
This is probably the case with Taiwanese in mainland China. It is very common to 
find that Taiwanese who hold a positive attitude about China (da zhongguo zhuyi) 
while living in Taiwan become cynical and negative about China once they when 
they actually visit or move there. But if so, another thesis (the “contact hypoth-
esis”) suggests that frequent and constant contacts may still revise their identity 
and gradually adjust their relation to Chinese society. And if this is the case, is it be 
possible that the Taiwanese currently living on the mainland are halfway through 
a process that will culminate in the replacement of the old Taiwan identity with a 
new Chinese identity? In other words, is it possible that the assimilation process is 
just not finished yet and that our conclusion is too hasty?
We believe, on the basis of our fieldwork, that this hypothesis is not true. Inter-
group contact does influence migrants and can in the end change one’s identity, 
but it also has its limitations. Migrants do not need to meet everyone; they just 
deal with those they want to deal with. So identity based on past experiences also 
directs who one makes contact with and screens some people out. Once people 
develop a prejudice or stereotype, they avoid some contacts, with the result that 
they never have experiences that would enable them to revise that prejudice/
stereotype and, ultimately, their identity. As one member of our research team 
concludes, “Once these Taiwanese believe in the stereotype, they keep minimal 
contacts with local Chinese. And those superficial contacts cannot challenge the 
stereotype. More often than not, the stereotypes are confirmed and reconfirmed by 
their ‘selected’ contacts. The stereotypes thus reproduce themselves and perpetu-
ate themselves.”7 This generalization especially holds for migrants in a higher or 
superior position: they can choose to meet with whomever they want. And ordi-
narily Taiwanese on the mainland hold such higher positions. As a result, unless 
there are some unusual events, it is likely that most Taiwanese will not revise their 
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identity no matter how long they stay. Settling down, even permanently, thus has 
little impact on identity change.
What kinds of experiences, then, play a key role in shaping the image of the 
Chinese and Chinese society among Taiwanese residing on the mainland? Ac-
cording to our field research, the most influential experiences are those that high-
light the differences between Taiwanese and Chinese cultures, which in turn are 
deeply rooted in economic and political differences between the two countries. 
Such experiences strengthened respondents’ sense of a group boundary between 
the Chinese and the Taiwanese. In the private sphere, such differences concern 
how Chinese people show “class” or “civilization” in everyday life (shenghuo shuiz-
hun). If you ask Taiwanese about their impressions of local Chinese, they normally 
give you examples of spitting, littering, talking loudly, and never observing traffic 
rules. All these constitute the basis of the belief that Chinese people “have no class” 
(mei shuizhun) and cause most Taiwanese on the mainland to “feel ashamed if they 
are misidentified as Chinese.” As one young man coming to China for a couple of 
months commented, “I did not know about this before coming to China. Once I 
am here, I have a strong feeling: Why should I be a Chinese?” In the public sphere, 
such differences concern how civilized the Chinese government is perceived to 
be; respondents describe it as “so backward, so uncivilized, falling behind the gov-
ernment of Taiwan almost a century.” In a nutshell, Taiwanese residents’ experi-
ences of encountering local Chinese and the local government create a “ladder of 
class between ethnic groups,” and most Taiwanese feel that “we” are superior and 
“they” are inferior. Therefore, even though they have already physically settled in 
China and had few problems mixing with Chinese, these Taiwanese simply do not 
want to “become Chinese.” And when they get together with Taiwanese, they often 
make fun of local Chinese (a-lar-a).
There is variation: for example, Taiwanese settling in metropolitan areas like 
Shanghai or Beijing tend not to mock local Chinese, whereas those residing in 
isolated rural factory locales, who encounter local Chinese that are mostly peas-
ants or migrant workers, tend to have negative impressions of local Chinese and 
to hold an “exclusive Taiwanese identity.” Younger Taiwanese are in general more 
sensitive to the despotism and corruption of local Chinese governments and thus 
more likely to hold an “exclusive Taiwanese identity.” In contrast, those who have 
had the experience of running a business under the authoritarian government of 
Taiwan are much less likely to disparage the Chinese government. From these ob-
servations we can confirm our field findings that experiences matter: perceived 
“class” or “civilization” of the Chinese people and government is an important fac-
tor that contributes to the variation in negative impressions Taiwanese hold about 
“China” and explains why they wish to distinguish themselves from the Chinese. 
We used the data to test the hypotheses drawn from our field research. The results 
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Let us first focus on the background of the interviewees. As we can see in table 5, 
education does not have a significant effect on identity status—a finding quite dif-
ferent from findings of surveys conducted in Taiwan. Also, gender is significant 
in shaping the sociability and identity of the mainland-dwelling Taiwanese: men 
(most businesspeople are male) more easily become close friends with mainland-
ers and are more conscious and outspoken about their identity. But our research 
found no evidence of a difference in identity between men and women. As for 
whether Taiwanese are “natives” (benshengren) or originally migrants to Taiwan 
from the mainland after the Chinese Civil War (waishengren) does not seem to 
have any significant effect on their identity. This suggests that the distinction be-
tween Taiwanese who came from the mainland and native Taiwanese loses its 
function as a demarcation line of social cleavage once Taiwanese come to China. 
Finally, the “generation” factor also fails to demonstrate significant effects on shap-
ing the identity of the Taiwanese, although we found differences between different 
generations. The general pattern was that younger respondents were more likely to 
assume an exclusively Taiwanese identity.
In the “contacts and experiences” category, the only category that exerted a 
significant effect on the identity of the Taiwanese was employment in the service 
sector, which contributed to cultivation of friendships with local Chinese). None 
of the factors such as (1) time of arrival, (2) residential area, (2) geographical loca-
tion, and (4) past life experiences exerted a significant effect. This suggests that 
earlier expectations about Taiwanese assimilation to Chinese society—based on 
immigration theories predicting that longer stays in the host country, residence in 
locations with greater likelihood of intergroup contacts, and more positive experi-
ences of contacts will result in migrants’ rapid assimilation—are not supported by 
empirical evidence.
Finally, one other factor demonstrated significant influence and led to a more 
open and inclusive position on Taiwanese identity: the person’s political position. 
This may have to do with the above-mentioned factor of the person’s impressions 
of the Chinese government.
IMMIGR ATION AND IDENTIT Y IN THE GLOBAL 
ER A:  WILLINGNESS,  RESISTANCE,  AND A MOSAIC 
L ANDSCAPE OF NATIONAL IDENTIT Y
The purpose of the study is to explore the puzzle of why Taiwanese who have 
settled on the mainland and could easily blend in persistently refuse to concede 
on the aspect of identity. In our opinion, a study like this can help enrich and il-
luminate the theory of migration. Of course, the first controversy we have to face 
is whether Taiwanese on the mainland can be considered as migrants or whether 
they are just expatriates. Many, if not most, of the Taiwanese in our study who 
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settled down in China would never go back to Taiwan. From this point of view, 
they are not expatriates. Even though they moved to China without any intention 
of migration, they finally settled anyway and have had few problems mixing with 
local Chinese.
But there is another reason that many Taiwanese scholars do not consider these 
people to be migrants: they still cling to their Taiwanese identity. And that con-
tradicts conventional theories of migrants’ assimilation. But in our view, this may 
have to do with the limitations of the conventional theories. In the common sce-
narios of those theories, most migrants move in order to migrate and are travel-
ing from worse to better places. In the era of globalization, however, migrants are 
also traveling around the world and may not plan to permanently reside; also, a 
significant proportion settle in places with a lower living standard. As a result, 
many migrants have little incentive to assimilate into the local society, and at the 
same time they have the ability to keep traveling or to maintain close ties with their 
motherland. These migrants are thus not migrants in the traditional sense. Some 
scholars refer to them as “transnational communities.”
Our study shows that the Taiwanese in mainland China do not fit the classi-
cal definition of “immigrants” and actually exemplify “immigration in the global 
era.” Because Taiwanese share many cultural traits with mainland Chinese, have 
the ability to blend in with them, yet are reluctant to revise their identity, they 
perfectly illustrate the new migration process triggered by globalization. Conse-
quently they can give us a better understanding of such concepts as borderlessness, 
transnationalism, and mosaic-like national identity. They can also help us better 
understand how cultural gaps and the ability to travel produce changes and conti-
nuities in identities in the era of globalization.
Another finding from the research is that the issue of identity for Taiwanese in 
mainland China is significantly affected by cultural differences across the Taiwan 
Strait. These have gradually developed over the past six decades of separation, to 
the point that people on the two sides of the Strait lack many common experi-
ences, thoughts, and feelings. It will take time to narrow this cultural gap. Before 
China and Taiwan do so, Chinese unification will never occur from the bottom 
up. These findings help explain why Taiwanese prefer the cross-Strait status quo 
to either unification or independence. From this perspective, given similar atti-
tudes among the public in Taiwan, it doesn’t matter that much whether the KMT’s 
president Ma or the DPP’s president Tsai is in power: their China policy would be 
much the same.
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Soon after Mao Zedong declared on the stage of Tiananmen that the Chinese 
people had stood up, it seemed that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had 
almost finished the process of nation building, which had been stimulated by 
one hundred years of national humiliation and periodic foreign invasions; the 
only exception then was Taiwan, which had been under the control of Chinese 
Nationalists (Kuomintang, KMT) since 1945. Over the past seven decades, there 
have been two Chinese societies governed by different political regimes across 
the Taiwan Strait. From the perspective of the Chinese mainland, people living in 
Taiwan, or the so-called Taiwanese, are of course part of “the Chinese,” including 
the overwhelming majority of Han Chinese and the tiny percentage of Taiwanese 
aboriginals, who are regarded as one of the fifty-five minority ethnicities within 
the Chinese nation.
The growing sense of Taiwanese identity on the island despite peaceful develop-
ment of cross-Strait relations over the past eight years, however, has highlighted 
the marginal existence of Chinese national identity (guojia rentong) on the island. 
As more people on Taiwan nowadays identify themselves as Taiwanese, rather 
than as Chinese or both, people on the mainland have worked hard to reconstruct 
the concept of one China through political communication, economic integration, 
social exchange, and cultural assimilation across the Taiwan Strait. New slogans 
such as “two shores, one close family” (liangan yijiaqin) and “both sides [of the 
Strait] realizing the Chinese Dream” (gongyuan zhongguomeng) have been created 
and added into the existing political phraseology of “a community of cross-Strait 
shared destiny” (liangan mingyun gongtongti) and “the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” (zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing).
5
Chinese National Identity under 
Reconstruction
Gang Lin and Weixu Wu
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This chapter discusses Beijing’s efforts to reconstruct Chinese national identity 
in relation to Taiwan. Theoretically, Chinese national identity is both indigenous 
and reconstructive. The ancient concept of the Middle Kingdom has been enriched 
continuously, thanks to political expansion and cultural assimilation throughout 
history. From 1949 to 1979, amid political confrontation and military tension, the 
Chinese people on the mainland were educated to liberate miserable people on 
Taiwan and bring the island back to its motherland. From 1979 on, Taiwan’s devel-
opmental experience and increasing cross-Strait civic exchanges have expanded 
mainlanders’ imagination of modernization and increased their understanding 
of national identity. Past experience suggests that reconstruction of a Chinese 
national identity that spans the Taiwan Strait is contingent not only on economic 
modernization and integration, mutual cultural exchange and assimilation, and 
reinterpretation of contemporary Chinese history and political relations between 
the two entities prior to China’s reunification, but also on improvement of public 
governance and political engineering on the mainland.
THE FACTOR OF TAIWAN IN CHINA’S 
REC ONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTIT Y
The mainland Chinese government is obviously worried that if most people in 
Taiwan identify as Taiwanese and prefer independence this could seriously 
undermine the prospect of unification in the future. Since the return of Hong 
Kong and Macau to the motherland, Taiwan’s final unification with the mainland 
has become even more important for China’s rejuvenation. This does not mean 
Taiwan is the last lost territory to be recovered by the motherland, thus ending 
China’s century-old national humiliation by foreign powers. Rather, from Beijing’s 
perspective, the issue of territory recovery has been resolved since the end of 
World War II. As the Chinese leader Hu Jintao once claimed:
Although the mainland and Taiwan have not been reunited since 1949, the circum-
stances per se do not denote a state of partition of Chinese territory and sovereignty. 
Rather, it is merely a state of political antagonism that is a legacy—albeit a lingering 
one—of the Chinese civil war waged in the mid- to late-1940s. Nevertheless, this 
does not alter the fact that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. For 
the two sides of the Strait, to return to unity is not a recreation of sovereignty or ter-
ritory but an end to political antagonism.1
From this perspective, separatists in Taiwan are similar to those in Tibet and 
Xinjiang, even though Tibet and Xinjiang are already under the PRC’s control and 
Taiwan is yet to be unified. To maintain national sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity, Beijing has pragmatically combined these three regions together in its agenda 
of enhancing national identity. In recent years, Chinese academics have proposed 
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to reshape their country’s national identity in the new era by strengthening of 
institutions, good governance, and democratic progress. He Donghang and Xie 
Weimin point out the problem in the process of China’s national identity building: 
the development of civic identity has fallen behind that of ethnic identity.2 Ac-
cording to Yao Dali, it is important to speed up political democratization in order 
to cultivate and consolidate national identity in a multiethnic country like China. 
For Yao, the ideas of sovereignty and equality among people of different strata are 
the spirit of the modern nation-state and also the basic principle of democracy.3 
Jin Taijun and Mi Jing argue that political ideas such as democracy, freedom, and 
human rights, as well as institutions based on them, are most important to na-
tional identity, particularly to a country where individuals have diverse identities 
and multiple affiliations, a result of globalization.4 Lin Shangli agrees that the most 
fundamental dimension of national identity is identification with state institu-
tions, which have decisive significance for building modern countries. Democracy 
is the political foundation of national identity in modern society.5
In the case of Taiwan, however, political discourse on the mainland has focused 
more on cultural similarities, ethnic equivalence, and common economic inter-
ests of people between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and less on so-called 
institutional identity (zhidu rentong)—accepting the identity of the economic and 
political system on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Obviously, this is because 
the Taiwanese population is predominantly Han Chinese (except for a tiny por-
tion of aboriginals), and Beijing’s unification formula of “one country, two sys-
tems” excludes the likelihood of institutional convergence of the two sides of the 
Strait. It is also because, as Jean-Pierre Cabestan says in chapter 4, many people in 
Taiwan would easily admit that they are politically Taiwanese but culturally Chi-
nese. Assuming that “blood is thinker than water” (xue nong yu shui), the Chinese 
mainland government proposed people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan as early 
as 1979, when the political and symbolically military confrontation with Taiwan 
was ended by Beijing’s unilateral announcement. Since then, rather than voicing a 
goal of “liberating miserable Taiwanese compatriots” from the despotic rule of the 
KMT, Beijing appealed to the island for peaceful unification, pinning its hope not 
only on the Taiwanese people but also on KMT authorities under the leadership 
of Chiang Ching-kuo. Blood ties, hometown connections, and ethnic attachment 
were all employed to reconstruct a linkage between the two long-separated societ-
ies. The most dramatic example was a July 1982 open letter to Chiang Ching-kuo 
written by Liao Chengzhi, minister of the United Front of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) Central Committee. In the letter, Liao appealed to Chiang Ching-
kuo that “brothers are still brothers even after painful fighting experience between 
them, and they can easily forget their mutual hatred with a smile when they meet 
again” (dujin jiebo xiongdi zai, xiangfeng yixiao min enchou). The story behind this 
sentimental letter was that Liao’s father, Liao Zhongkai, had been a senior leader 
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of the KMT back in the 1920s, supporting the KMT-CCP United Front to fight 
against the Northern Warlords government. Following this open letter, some cor-
respondence by mail continued under the table between leaders of the two sides, 
and former PRC president Yang Shangkun openly proclaimed in 1987 that the Tai-
wanese authorities should respect the Chinese “overall national interest” (minzu 
dayi) and have peace talks with Beijing on unification. On the other side of the 
Strait, Chiang Ching-kuo even considered sending his formal representative to 
Beijing for a preliminary political dialogue just before he passed away in January 
1988.6 Although peace talks on China’s reunification between the two ruling par-
ties on each side of the Taiwan Strait did not occur in the 1980s, Chiang Ching-kuo 
did make a decision in November 1987 to allow cross-Strait family reunions for old 
soldiers who had followed Chiang to Taiwan in the late 1940s. Beijing’s open-door 
policy and peaceful unification appeal to the island, plus Taipei’s 1987 decision, 
have encouraged more people-to-people exchanges between the two sides based 
on their family ties, hometown connections, and ethnic feelings, as well as for 
business reasons. From the mainland perspective, in the absence of meaningful 
political dialogue between the two sides, cultural and economic factors can serve 
as antidotes against separatist tendencies on the island that have been beyond PRC 
control since 1949. Both Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Points” (1995) and Hu Jintao’s “Six 
Points” (December 2008) have highlighted the functions of Chinese culture and 
economic cooperation in linking the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, despite the ups 
and downs of cross-Strait relations over the past three decades.
“ T WO SHORES,  ONE CLOSE FAMILY ”
To narrow the gap between the two sides on the issue of national identity and to 
reconstruct an inclusive Chinese identity across the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese 
leader Xi Jinping most recently promoted the idea that “compatriots from the two 
shores of the Taiwan Strait are one close family” when he met the honorary chair of 
the KMT, Lien Chan, on February 18, 2014. According to Xi Jinping, the blood ties 
between people on the Chinese mainland and in Taiwan would never be severed. 
This idea is rooted in the two countries’ common ancestry, history, and culture.7 
Cross-Strait ties are not relations between neighbors or friends (let alone enemies) 
but relations between family members.8 By using sentimentally appealing phrase-
ology, such as “both sides fulfilling the Chinese Dream,” Xi Jinping attempts to 
convey the similar ideas that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China 
and that both can “strive for China’s reunification.” He has emphasized that the 
unification is a common project of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and 
that unification can be achieved only through China’s rejuvenation. Thus peaceful 
unification is contingent upon peaceful development of the two sides, as well as 
the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
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While the appeal to a common culture has long been employed by Chinese 
mainland leaders in dealing with Taiwan, it has been increasingly used since the 
mainland’s economic takeoff and cultural reconstruction in the 1990s. When for-
mer Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui recognized Chinese culture as the foundation 
of cross-Strait exchanges in 1995, he was more confident about Taiwan’s role in pre-
serving and reconstructing Chinese culture than mainland China’s role. Indeed, 
cultural sinicization (wenhua zhongguo hua) was one of the four preconditions for 
national unification according to Taipei’s guidelines for it in 1991—with the other 
three preconditions being economic liberalization, political democratization, and 
social pluralism. Many people in Taiwan, including some supporters of the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have claimed that Chinese 
culture is better preserved on the island than on the mainland, since Taiwan has 
been free of the iconoclastic May Fourth movement and the Cultural Revolution 
on the other side of the Strait. Cultural reconstruction on the mainland, however, 
has achieved great progress since the 1990s. Some Confucian ethics and manners 
have been well adapted to the modernizing Chinese society, and cultural indus-
tries have developed quickly. A good example is the architecture of the China Art 
Museum at Shanghai Expo 2010, which mixed a traditional outlook with mod-
ern design. Taipei’s desinicization activities under the DPP administration only 
reminded the mainland of the importance of Chinese culture as the spiritual tie 
between the two sides.
Cultural exchanges have made great progress since the KMT came back to 
power in 2008, thanks to Ma Ying-jeou’s strong affection for traditional Chinese 
culture and the Chinese nation. The Cross-Strait Cultural Industries Fair started in 
2008 and continued in the following years. The fifth CCP-KMT forum convened 
in Changsha, Hunan, in 2009 and selected culture and education as the main 
theme, focusing on (1) preserving the continuity of Chinese culture and foster-
ing innovation; (2) promoting cross-Strait cooperation in cultural industries; and 
(3) expanding cross-Strait exchange and cooperation on education. In the same 
year, Fujian initiated the first Strait Forum (haixia luntan) and has convened it 
every year, focusing on civil and cultural exchanges between the two sides. For 
example, the 2010 Strait Forum hosted a cultural week focused on Mazu (a sea 
goddess worshipped by ancient people living in southern Fujian and Taiwan); a 
cultural festival for Zhu Xi, a famous Confucian scholar in the Song dynasty who 
was born and spent his life in Fujian; and a forum on Hakka culture. All these 
activities were aimed at highlighting aspects of Chinese culture that have been 
shared by people on both sides of the Strait. Meanwhile, other cultural activities 
with Taiwanese participation, including ancestor worship of the Yellow Emperor 
in Shanxi and Henan Provinces and an arts festival for Chinese calligraphy in Bei-
jing, occurred on the mainland.9 Although the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were 
unable to sign an agreement on cultural exchanges in Ma Ying-jeou’s first term as 
80    Chapter Five
expected, cultural exchanges continued in his second term. The topics of cultural 
exchanges have ranged over education, publishing, libraries, exhibitions, media 
communications, religions, music, dance, drama, secular customs and arts, and lo-
cal culture. The year 2012 witnessed the Cross-Strait Intangible Cultural Heritage 
Month and the Cross-Strait City Arts Festival in Taiwan, as well as Cross-Strait 
Cultural Friendship Weeks and the Cultural Exhibition on the mainland. To make 
books published on the mainland readable by Taiwanese youth, they were convert-
ed from simplified Chinese into traditional Chinese and reprinted on the island. 
In the same year, 1,858 young Taiwanese came to the mainland to study, while 951 
mainlanders went to Taiwan as full-time students. According to the statistics of 
the Department of Culture under the PRC State Council, 324 cross-Strait cultural 
exchange programs were held in 2013, with 10,802 participants from the two sides. 
The figures for 2014 were 500 programs and 12,593 participants.10 As Liu Xiangping 
observes, cultural identity is one of the basic elements in national identity, fol-
lowed by ethnic identity (minzhu rentong) and state identity (guojia rentong). In 
terms of cultural identity, the two sides are more alike than different, but in terms 
of national identity, the gap between the two sides has widened.11
As Lowell Dittmer points out, one of several objects of national identification 
is the historical legacy, including consensual interpretations of certain problem-
atic phases in a nation’s development when the basic issues of national purpose 
were raised and decisively resolved in some way.12 The mainland government un-
derstands very well that differing historical memories may affect national iden-
tity negatively. As Xi Jinping said to Lien Chan on February 18, 2014, Chinese 
mainlanders share the painful feelings that Taiwanese people hold on account of 
political events in the past, and this is a tragedy for the whole Chinese nation. 
According to Xi, a strong nation can ensure good fortune for all Chinese compa-
triots, and a weak and chaotic nation simply means disaster for them.13 Because 
common historical memory is an important factor in shaping civic national iden-
tity, mainland media and academic discourse have in recent years highlighted 
how the CCP and the KMT joined forces to fight the Japanese invasion back in 
the 1930s and 1940s, as recapped in various movies, newspapers, and journals. In 
particular, Tengchong, a frontier city in southwestern China and a famous battle-
ground between Japanese troops and the KMT military with US aid, has become a 
popular location for holding academic conferences that involve scholars from Tai-
wan, including some from the Green (pro-independence) camp. The mainland’s 
intention is clearly to build up common historical memories with Taiwan, even 
though young Taiwanese without connection to the old KMT regime may feel 
that historical events in Tengchong are irrelevant to them. For the same reason, 
the mainland has retold the story of the famous aboriginal Wushe uprising (also 
referred as the Wushe incident) against Japanese colonial rule during the 1930s to 
highlight the common fate of the two sides during a miserable period of Chinese 
National Identity under Reconstruction    81
history. Indeed, Japan’s brutal crackdown on the Wushe uprising and its massacre 
of the inhabitants of Nanjing occurred in the same decade across the Taiwan Strait. 
The uprising occurred in October 27, 1930, in a place called Wushe, located in 
Nantou County, and its participants were the inhabitants described as Seediq, who 
at that time were considered a subgroup of the Atayal tribe but in April 2008 were 
recognized as the fourteenth tribe of aboriginals in Taiwan.14 The trigger for the 
uprising was colonial officials’ mistreatment of the Seediqs. Under the leadership 
of Mona Rudao, the Seediqs rose up against the Japanese occupiers in an armed 
rebellion lasting fifty days and killing well over one hundred Japanese before they 
themselves were slaughtered in retaliation—about one thousand Seediqs died dur-
ing the uprising. About eighty years later the Taiwanese film director Wei Te-sheng 
planned to make a film titled Warriors of the Rainbow: Seediq Bale in September 
2008 and finished the film three years later.15 The film awoke historical memories 
of the incident, raising differing views of the incident on the two sides of the Tai-
wan Strait as well as abroad, particularly on the Internet. The mainstream opinion 
on the mainland, however, was to link this incident to Chinese resistance against 
Japanese rule or invasion on both sides of the Strait.16
As 2015 was the seventieth anniversary of the Chinese victory in the Chinese 
People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression as well as the Second 
World War, many activities occurred on the mainland in memory of this victory, 
aimed at enhancing national identity across the Taiwan Strait. On September 2, 
the eve of Victory Day in China, Chinese president Xi Jinping awarded medals to 
veterans who fought in the resistance, including representatives for “eight hundred 
brave soldiers” (babai zhuangshi) of a KMT troop. In his speech, Xi emphasized 
that both frontline (zhengmian zhanchang) soldiers led by the KMT and rearguard 
(dihou zhanchang) soldiers led by the CCP contributed to the final victory and 
that people fighting on different battlefields were all national heroes.17 On Sep-
tember 3, a series of commemorative events—including a rally, a military parade, 
a reception, and an evening gala—were held in Beijing as planned. Thirty country 
leaders, as well as representatives from nineteen countries and ten organizations, 
took part in the events.18 Some retired soldiers originally from the KMT troops 
took part in the military parade, and former KMT chair Lien Chan, New Party 
chair Yu Mu-min, People First Party general secretary Chin Chin-sheng, and some 
other dignitaries from Taiwan also attended the commemorative events. In his 
speech on the rally, Xi said that the Chinese people had fought tenaciously for 
fourteen years before winning a great victory in their War of Resistance against 
Japanese Aggression without mentioning specifically who led that war, the KMT 
or the CCP, though he did mention, in the reception following the parade, that the 
war had proceeded under the banner of the “United Front of Resistance against 
Japanese Aggression Initiated by the CCP.”19 When Xi met Lien Chan and other 
Taiwanese representatives on September 1, he highlighted the role of the United 
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Front established cooperatively by the CCP and the KMT and expressed apprecia-
tion for the cooperation between frontline and rearguard soldiers during the war. 
Further, Xi intentionally included Taiwanese people’s struggle against the Japanese 
occupation over fifty years as an important part of the whole Chinese nation’s war 
of resistance.20 Yu Zhengsheng, chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, mentioned one day earlier when he met Lien Chan that during the 
1930s and 1940s more than fifty thousand Taiwanese came to the mainland and 
joined the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.21 Lien Chan made simi-
lar statements during his meetings with Xi and Yu, respectively.
However, few people in Taiwan, including KMT leaders, endorsed Lien’s ac-
tivities in Beijing. Both Ma Ying-jeou and Hau Pai-tsun, a senior general and the 
father of former Taipei mayor Hao Lung-pin, criticized Lien for participating in 
Beijing’s commemorative event. For them, the War of Resistance against Japanese 
Aggression had been conducted under the leadership of the Republic of China 
(ROC), which deserved the honor. From the KMT’s perspective, the war was part 
of ROC history. From the perspective of the DPP, however, Taiwan had had noth-
ing to do with the War of Resistance. In fact, during the war more Taiwanese had 
been recruited by Japanese troops, and toward the end of the war native Taiwanese 
had suffered from US aircraft bombing.22 The typical example of such views is Lee 
Teng-hui, who openly declared himself as a Japanese before 1945 and who claimed 
that Diaoyu Island belonged to Japan. It is interesting to note that Lee and Lien 
were running mates in the 1996 presidential elections and were elected president 
and vice-president. Lee’s remarks reflect a certain nostalgia for Japanese colonial 
rule, particularly in its late period, among some native Taiwanese. Such feelings, 
through political socialization, were passed on to some youths, who were uneasy 
about calling that period between 1895 and 1945 the Japanese “occupation” (ri ju), 
as the new teaching outline (kegang) endorsed by the Ma administration did. This 
resulted in anti-kegang demonstrations in August 2015. Retrospectively, the migra-
tion of mainlanders to Taiwan after the war ended in 1945 have has created dif-
ferent “ascriptive categories” in national identification in Taiwan,23 an important 
social feature to be taken into account in political construction and reconstruction 
of historical memories of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression on 
the island. For the mainland, reconstructing a common memory of the war among 
people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is crucial for building national inclu-
sion. Therefore, Beijing has employed historical memories, in addition to cultural 
similarities and ethnic equivalence, to retrospectively consolidate the ideational 
framework of “a community of cross-Strait shared destinies.”
Another typical example of historical reconstruction has been the raising of 
a public memorial in December 2014 for both soldiers of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) and Nationalist troops who died in battle with each other on Jinmen 
Island in October 1949. The PLA troops, numbered at nine thousand or so, attacked 
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Jinmen and held the island for three days but were finally defeated by the Nationalist 
military with troop reinforcements and an advanced air force. The casualties for 
each side were several thousand. The political purpose of the memorial is to as-
suage the lingering historical grievances of people on both sides of the Chinese 
Civil War and to cherish cross-Strait peace from the perspective of “two shores, 
one close family.” As one retired soldier from Shanghai said during the event, he 
came to Jinmen in memory of his old colleagues who died on the battleground but 
ended up with a feeling of respect for all who had died there, regardless of which 
army—the PLA or the KMT—they had belonged to. Interestingly, at the end of the 
event, all participants made a military salute to PLA and Nationalist soldiers who 
had died during the anti-Japanese war.24 By doing so, they converted the memory 
of the tragic civil war into another memory, the glorious cause of all Chinese sol-
diers fighting against the brutal Japanese invasion prior to 1945. Retrospectively, as 
a military frontier between Taiwan and the mainland in the 1950s, Jinmen served 
as a symbolic link between the two sides under the “one-China” framework, simply 
because both the Nationalist regime on the island and the PRC government on the 
mainland claimed sovereignty over it, suggesting that China’s civil war was not 
yet over. In recent years, however, Jinmen has served as a peace frontier, starting 
with the three minilinkages (xiao santong) between it and the PRC-administered 
island of Xiamen during the Chen Shui-bian administration and followed by an 
increasing number of visits by mainland tourists. The story of kitchen knives made 
in Jinmen, using artillery shells left over from the history of bombing Jinmen be-
tween the late 1950s and 1970s, when more than one million shells were fired on the 
small island, is well framed by the public media to encourage the peaceful develop-
ment of cross-Strait relations. Both Jinmen kitchen knives and Jinmen Gaoliang 
(a strong liquor) are big sellers for mainlanders traveling there. The role of Jinmen 
in narrowing the gap between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has been high-
lighted by an official meeting there in May 2015 between Zhang Zhijun, director 
of the Beijing-based Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council, and Xia 
Liyan, chair of the Taipei-based Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). Because Jinmen 
is much closer to the mainland than to Taiwan, the two parties have agreed to ex-
pedite a contract signed by relevant departments in Fujian and Jinmen to supply 
water to the island. Other cooperative projects between Jinmen and Xiamen have 
been discussed in recent years, including a proposed bridge and the supplying of 
an electrical grid that would cross the two islands.
A C OMMUNIT Y FOR T WO SHORES’  SHARED FORTUNE
Economic exchanges and integration are also considered important for forging 
community between the two sides of the Strait. According to neoliberal or neo-
functional assumptions, economic integration will eventually lead to political 
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accommodation and even political integration, as the experience of the European 
Union has suggested. At least, growing functional interdependency, according to 
Karl Wolfgang Deutsch’s concept of a “security community,” will make war too 
mutually costly to be feasible. Business exchanges between the two sides have 
evolved from an indirect format in the 1980s to a direct and comprehensive mode 
nowadays, particularly since 2008. For example, cross-Strait trade increased from 
$129  billion in 2008 to $188 billion in 2015, accounting for about 30 percent of 
Taiwan’s total foreign trade. Taiwanese direct investment on the mainland that 
has been approved by the island’s authorities increased from $1.9 billion in 2008 
to $2.8 billion in 2012, though it decreased to $1.5 billion in 2015. Tourists from 
Taiwan to the mainland increased from 4.37 million person-visits in 2008 to 
5.5 million in 2015, while tourists from the mainland to Taiwan jumped from less 
than 0.28 million person-visits to 4.14 million during the same period.25 This in-
creasing economic interdependency has created “linkage communities” (liansuo 
shequn) between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as Yung Wei pointed out one 
decade ago.26 During the 2012 elections in Taiwan, a number of big entrepreneurs 
publicly supported the KMT idea of “one China, differing interpretations,” which 
is close to Beijing’s principle that there is only one China and that only one gov-
ernment (the PRC’s) can legitimately represent it but significantly different from 
the DPP’s position that the PRC and the ROC should have “state-to-state” rela-
tions. On the other hand, most Taiwanese people have arguably not received direct 
benefits from increasing economic integration. Despite Beijing’s “benefit-offering” 
(rangli) policy in Strait negotiations on economic affairs, including the signing of 
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement, ordinary people in Taiwan have not experienced much eco-
nomic revival, for the island in general or their daily life, as a result of cross-Strait 
exchange. Social cleavages in Taiwan between the rich and poor and between up-
per strata and lower strata have partly contributed to the strong reaction against 
the progress of cross-Strait economic and social exchanges, as was vividly revealed 
by students’ Sunflower Movement protesting the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agree-
ment in March 2014. In view of social cleavages in Taiwan, Beijing has paid more 
attention to the voice of Taiwan’s grassroots and youth, who have felt frustrated 
and relatively exploited amid the process of regional economic integration.
To rebuild a shared Chinese national identity across the Taiwan Strait, Bei-
jing’s Taiwan policy makers, in the spirit of neofunctionalism, propose to resolve 
“economic and easier issues first, and political and difficult issues later.” The CCP-
KMT forums on cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges after 2006 largely 
focused on the issue of economic cooperation, except for the 2009 forum, which 
took cross-Strait cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation as the main 
theme. Beijing’s immediate political goal during the Ma administration was to sign 
a peace agreement with Taipei and reach a common understanding on the nature 
National Identity under Reconstruction    85
of political relations between the two sides prior to China’s reunification. The years 
2013 and 2014 witnessed Beijing’s increasing efforts to push political dialogue with 
Taipei on these issues within a “one China” framework. From Beijing’s perspective, 
if the two sides can have political talks within the framework and can appropri-
ately resolve the issue of Taiwan’s participation in the international arena, political 
relations between the two sides will improve and Taiwanese political identification 
with the mainland will increase. When Xi Jinping met with KMT chair Chu Li-lun 
in May 2015, he proposed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait work together to 
construct a community with a shared destiny. Xi made five suggestions about how 
to do this. First, the political foundation of peaceful development of cross-Strait 
relations would be insistence on the 1992 Consensus (the idea that Taiwan and the 
mainland constitute one China, though the two sides disagree regarding which of 
them is its legitimate representative) and opposition to Taiwanese independence. 
Second, the purpose of promoting peaceful development of cross-Strait relations 
would be to encourage a convergence of interests of the mainland and Taiwan, 
reach creatively mutual benefits and win-win outcomes, and increase happiness 
of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Third, fundamentally speaking, 
cross-Strait exchanges would be people-to-people exchanges, and heart-to-heart 
exchanges would be the most important. The two sides would need to enhance 
ethnic identity, cultural identity, and national identity. Fourth, the CCP and KMT 
as well as both sides of the Taiwan Strait would need to grasp the general situation 
and have respect for each other. They would need not only to seek convergence 
while keeping different views but also to work hard to reduce divergence while in-
creasing common views and political mutual trust. Fifth, the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation would presuppose the cooperation of both sides. Responding 
to Xi Jinping’s call, the PRC’s TAO made it clear that Taiwan was welcome to join 
the infrastructure development of the so-called “One Belt and One Road” (a net-
work of railways, roads, pipelines, and utility grids linking China to West Asia, 
Central Asia, parts of South Asia, and Europe) and to participate in the Beijing-
initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in an appropriate capacity.
Beijing’s efforts to build a cross-Strait community with a shared destiny have been 
interrupted by political changes in Taiwan. As the Sunflower Movement protests on 
March 18 and the outcome of Taiwan’s local elections in November 2014 suggested, 
the January 2016 presidential elections led to another power turnover from the pro–
status quo KMT back to the proindependence DPP. Because the ruling DPP does not 
want to accept the 1992 Consensus, the official and semiofficial relations between the 
two sides have been broken off, and new agreements for economic and cultural ex-
changes between the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait on the main-
land and the Straits Exchange Foundation in Taiwan cannot be reached. Just as Xi 
Jinping predicted one year earlier, if the foundation of 1992 Consensus was damaged, 
cross-Strait relations would return to the earlier situation of chaos and instability.27
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This does not mean that Beijing will necessarily employ military means against 
Taiwan. Reflecting a fundamental change in China’s international standing, Bei-
jing’s grand strategy of “peaceful development through reform and opening” has 
led to the mainland’s interdependence with the outside world, especially the Asia-
Pacific region.28 The mainland’s growing national capacity has increased its lever-
age to use either hard or soft tactics, making hard tactics harder and soft tactics 
softer. Without political consensus between Beijing and the new leadership in 
post-Ma Taiwan, it is possible that small diplomatic allies of Taiwan will switch 
their diplomatic ties to the mainland. From the mainland perspective, the issue of 
Taiwan’s international participation can be resolved only within the “one-China” 
framework. As long as Taipei does not attempt to change the status quo of cross-
Strait relations in general and to increase its diplomatic allies in particular, Beijing 
does not need to cut off all of Taiwan’s external ties during the transitory period 
prior to China’s reunification. While the maintenance of twenty or so diplomatic 
allies has only symbolic meaning for Taiwan’s foreign relations, their reduction 
would become a hot issue on an island torn by acute confrontation between the 
two main parties. Should this happen, Taipei might react strongly against Beijing 
in one way or another, thus bringing previous tensions back to the Taiwan Strait.
In this situation, Beijing is maintaining its strategy of asymmetric engagement 
with the two main parties in Taiwan, preferring the KMT to the DPP. The main en-
gines for cross-Strait relations, therefore, are city-to-city and people-to-people ex-
changes, in addition to the present CCP-KMT platform. However, the September 
2016 mainland trip of local executives from one city and seven counties that are 
under the control of the “Blue” camp (parties more amenable to rapprochement or 
eventual unification with China, such as the KMT), suggests Beijing’s reluctance 
to have city-to-city exchanges with Green (more proindependence parties such as 
the DPP) mayors and magistrates unless they accept the “one-China” framework. 
At a lower level, city districts and neighborhoods, towns and townships, and social 
groups may become important units for exchange and cooperation. By fostering 
such connections, the mainland government hopes that its beneficial measures of 
economic exchange with Taiwan will be felt as much by ordinary Taiwanese peo-
ple, particularly youth, as by big businesspeople. As TAO director Zhang Zhijun 
remarked in September 19, 2016, Beijing will insist on the 1992 Consensus, op-
pose Taiwanese independence, promote peaceful development of cross-Strait rela-
tions, and encourage common feelings and benefits of people on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait.29
RESPECTING EACH OTHER’S  SO CIAL SYSTEM
Another issue regarding national political identity is the two sides’ different politi-
cal institutions. Beijing has tried to resolve this structural problem by increasing 
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the attractiveness of the unification model to Taiwan. According to the formula 
of “one country, two systems,” Taiwan could maintain its own economic, politi-
cal, and social systems unchanged after unification. Although a postunification 
China would remain a unitary state, the executive, legislative, and judicial powers 
enjoyed by Taiwan would surely strain the institutional boundaries of a unitary 
government and make the relation between mainland and Taiwanese administra-
tions more like that of a federal authority to a state authority. In Taiwan, unlike 
Hong Kong, political autonomy is rooted in the legal system, rather than being 
delegated by the central government in the form of basic laws. After unification, 
Taiwan would retain the right to exercise some sovereign-related powers while 
giving up other jurisdictions such as national defense and diplomacy, resulting in 
a quasi-federal relationship between Beijing and Taipei.30
The desirability and feasibility of “one country, two systems” are related to two 
issues facing a rising China: nation building and institution building. Most Chi-
nese studies of “one country, two systems” have focused on the first issue while 
marginalizing the second. Will the two different economic, social, and political 
systems coexist forever? How can they work without any conflicts? Will the two 
systems reduce institutional gaps between them through long coexistence and 
mutual learning?
In the long process of China’s modernization, the PRC has experienced sev-
eral stages of institution building. In the first three decades from 1949 to 1978, 
the regime believed that the socialist system was vastly superior to the capitalist 
system and would inevitably replace it. Since reform and opening started in 1979, 
Beijing has relied more on the uniqueness of Chinese circumstances to justify 
socialism in general and socialist democracy in particular for the Chinese main-
land. According to a white paper, entitled Building Political Democracy in China, 
that was issued by the Chinese government in 2005, there is no single, absolute, 
and universally applicable democratic model in the world.31 In the revised party 
charter, eliminating class exploitation and social polarization is no longer con-
sidered a basic feature of socialism. Moreover, socialist and communist ideals are 
regarded as suitable to Chinese circumstances and not the only path for other 
peoples in the world. Although the party at its Eighteenth National Congress 
in 2012 called for people to retain their confidence in socialism and its theories 
and institutions, it still defined socialism as suitable to the Chinese situation, 
rather than as the universal truth for all human beings. Beijing’s “one country, 
two systems” formula, a product of the reform era, seems to match nicely with 
its outlook on institutional development in the contemporary world, assuming 
different social systems can coexist and learn from each other, as Jiang Zemin 
recognized one decade ago.32
Whereas “one country, two systems” has been the standard model chosen 
by Deng Xiaoping and followed by successive Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping has 
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attempted to make it acceptable to Taiwan by repeating that the Taiwanese model 
of “one country, two systems” is different from the Hong Kong model, which is 
particularly important in the wake of social protests in Hong Kong against the 
2017 electoral formula approved by Beijing. When meeting with Lien Chan in 
February 2014, Xi expressed his understanding that the Taiwanese people cher-
ish (zhenshi) the social system and living style they have chosen for themselves. 
While social system here obviously includes both economic and political systems, 
the word cherish suggested that these systems were good for Taiwan and therefore 
should be appreciated. According to Xi, the mainland not only respects the so-
cial system and living style in Taiwan but also wants to share the developmental 
opportunities on the mainland with the Taiwanese people.33 When Yu Zhengsheng, 
chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference, made opening 
remarks at the Sixth Strait Forum, he reiterated Beijing’s respect for the Taiwanese 
social system and lifestyle and added values and ideas to the list.34 TAO director 
Zhang Zhijun repeated what Xi had told Lien Chan while meeting with Kaohsiung 
mayor Chen Chu in June 2014. Xi’s September 2014 remarks on “one country, two 
systems” when he met with several prounification or prointegration delegations 
from Taiwan could be interpreted from the same perspective.
Many politicians in Taiwan have argued that the lack of collective identity be-
tween the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is primarily due to different social systems, 
a democratized Taiwan as opposed to an undemocratic mainland, and have insisted 
on the importance of Taiwanese democracy as a defense tactic against unification 
pressure from the mainland.35 According to Lin Xinhua from Taiwan, however, the 
fact that about one million Taiwanese businesspeople live on the mainland with 
a social system different from that of Taiwan is quite unusual, suggesting that in-
stitutional disparity per se cannot prevent people of the two sides from coming 
together.36 For Li Peng of Xiamen University, institutional differences between the 
two societies should not become problematic as long as each side can humbly and 
sincerely consider these differences.37
This does not mean that the issue of institutional difference, let alone conflict, 
can be totally neglected. As mentioned above, institutional identification is one 
of the important elements in national identity. Since the two sides have differ-
ent political, economic, and social systems, they need to find more commonali-
ties in their institutions, particular in terms of governance. As a matter of fact, 
the economic system on the mainland has changed dramatically from a planned 
economy to a market economy over the past thirty-five years, making theoretic 
differences between capitalism and socialism in the Chinese context increasingly 
insignificant and Taiwanese businesspeople on the mainland less and less uncom-
fortable. With the growth of civil society, social organizations, and human rights 
on the mainland, the institutional gap between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
has been greatly reduced. As the mainland has striven to enhance state governance 
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capacities in recent years, Taiwan’s experience in governance and public policies 
can provide useful guidance. While the spirit of “one country, two systems” sug-
gests that different societies can have their respective institutions, accommodating 
two systems in one country requires overlapping institutional linkages to some 
degree. As a first step, Taiwanese neighborhood officials (lizhang) and mainland 
officials at the equivalent level in Shanghai have paid mutual visits and shared 
their worksite experience. This practice may help to reduce the institutional gap 
between the two sides at the local level. City-to-city exchanges have also helped 
to improve government performance and the quality of municipal services on the 
mainland through learning experience.
C ONCLUSION
The growing sense of a national identity in Taiwan, both on cultural/ethnical 
dimensions and on political/civic dimensions, has presented a challenge to the 
mainland’s efforts to reconstruct Chinese national identity in modern times. 
Most people in Taiwan identify themselves as Taiwanese from a civic and political 
perspective, and a significant portion, though less than one-quarter, would like 
Taiwan to be independent sooner or later. The gap between Taiwanese conscious-
ness (Taiwan yishi) and the idea of Taiwanese independence is well perceived by 
Beijing, which has tried its best to accommodate Taiwanese culture under the big 
umbrella of Chinese culture. That the overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan 
also recognize they are part of the Chinese nation seems like a good message for a 
confident Beijing. However, more people in Taiwan prefer independence to unifi-
cation, and the majority of them would not accept unification with the mainland 
even if the latter had democratic institutions as Taiwan does.
Despite Beijing’s efforts to lay economic, cultural, social, and political founda-
tions for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations as a step toward its final 
goal of unification, it has a long way to go. Taiwanese feelings toward economic 
benefits offered by the mainland are neutralized by social dislocation on the island; 
similar historical and cultural backgrounds of the two sides were interrupted by 
Japanese colonial rule and long-existing separate governments thereafter; and pe-
riods of political détente have been interrupted by crises. All these obstacles have 
suggested to the mainland that the reconstruction of a shared Chinese national 
identity across the Taiwan Strait requires not only economic modernization and 
integration, mutual cultural exchange and assimilation, and reinterpretation of 
contemporary Chinese history and political relations between the two entities 
prior to China’s reunification but also improvement of public governance and po-
litical engineering on the mainland. In other words, the reconstruction of Chinese 
national identity is a long-term project involving all people on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait.
90    Chapter Five
NOTES
1. Hu Jintao, “Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations 
and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” speech presented 
at the Forum Marking the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Issuance of a Message to Compatriots in Tai-
wan, December 31, 2008, transcript, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, www.gwytb.gov.
cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/t20110322_1794707.htm.
2. He Donghang and Xie Weimin, “Zhongguo guojia rentong de licheng yu zhiyue yinsu” [Process 
of Chinese national identity formation and its constraining factors], Makesi zhuyi yu xianshi, no. 4 
(2012): 16.
3. Yao Dali, “Bianhuazhong de guojia rentong” [National identity in transition], Yuanda, no. 1 
(2010): 147.
4. Jin Taijun and Mi Jing, “Cong lingtu fenzhen kan quanqiuhua Beijingxia guojia rentong chong-
gou” [Reconstruction of national identity under the background of globalization: From the perspective 
of territory disputes], Jianghai Xuekan, no. 4 (2013): 113–14.
5. Lin Shangli, “Xiandai guojia rentong jiangou de zhengzhi luoji” [The political logic of identity 
construction in the modern state]” Zhongguo shehui kexue, no. 8 (2013): 27–28.
6. Wu Yuenong, “Qikai haixia liangan heping jiechu lianxi zhimen: Liao Chengzhi gei Chiang 
Ching-kuo gongkaixin de muhou gushi” [Open the door of peaceful contact between the two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait: Stories behind Liao Chengzhi’s open letter to Chiang Ching-kuo], Zhongshan 
Fengyu, no. 3 (2004): 8–12.
7. Xi Jinping, “Gongyuan zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de zhongguo meng” [Work together to 
realize the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation], Xinhua Net, February 18, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014–02/19c_119394028.htm.
8. Zhang Nianchi, “Xi Jinping de yijiaqin lunshuo yu dangqian liangan guanxi” [Xi Jinping’s ‘one 
family’ remarks and current cross-Strait relations], China Review (Hong Kong), no. 8 (August 2014): 18.
9. Peng Fuzhi, “Liangan wenhua jiaoliu zhong de zhonghua wenhua rentong yanjiu” [A study on 
Chinese cultural identity amid cross-Strait cultural exchanges], in Liangan guanxi: Gongtong liyi yu 
hexie fazhan [Cross-Strait relations: Common interests and harmonious development], ed. Zhou Zhi-
huai et al. (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2010), 309.
10. Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China, 2013 nian wenhua fazhan tongji gong-
bao [Statistical bulletin on cultural development in 2013], May 20, 2014, www.mcprc.gov.cn/whzx/
whyw/201405/t20140520_433223.html, and 2014 nian wenhua fazhan tongji gongbao [Statistical bul-
letin on cultural development in 2014], May 19, 2015, www.cssn.cn/zx/yw/201505/t20150519_1939724.
shtml.
11. Liu Xiangping, “Laingan rentong zhi jiben yaosu jiqi dacheng lujing tanxi” [A study on basic el-
ements of cross-Strait identification and approaches to reach the goal], Taiwan yanjiu, no. 1 (2011): 1–6.
12. Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan as a Factor in China’s Quest for National Identity,” Journal of Contem-
porary China 15, no. 49 (November 2006): 675.
13. Xi Jinping, “Gongyuan zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de zhongguo meng.”
14. “Sediq Recognized as 14th Tribe,” Taipei Times, April 24, 2008, www.taipeitimes.com/News/
taiwan/archives/2008/04/24/2003410107.
15. Roy Berman, “Wushe Then and Now,” Mutantfrog Travelogue, September 13, 2008, www.mu-
tantfrog.com/2008/09/13/wushe-then-and-now/; Bruce Foreman, “ ‘Seediq Bale’: Taiwan’s Biggest 
Movie Sparks Indigenous Tourism,” CNN News, November 23, 2011, http://travel.cnn.com/hong-kong/
visit/seediq-bale-401232.
16. “Taiwan wushe shijian: Seediq beihou de gushi” [Wushe incident in Taiwan: The Story behind 
the Seediq Bale], November 29, 2012, www.360doc.com/content/12/1119/15/2068001_248784403.shtml; 
“Huanyuan zuren yanzhong de wushe shijian” [Recovering the Wushe incident in the eyes of people in 
National Identity under Reconstruction    91
the tribe], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang, November 5, 2012, www.chinanews.com/tw/2012/11–05/4302994.
shtml.
17. Xi Jinping, “Zai banfa zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzheng shengli 70 zhounian jinianzhang 
yishi shang de jianghua” [Address at the ceremony of issuing medals of commemoration of the sev-
entieth anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggres-
sion], Zhongguo gongchandang xinwenwang [Chinese Communist Party News Net], September 2, 2015, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0902/c64094–27542514.html.
18. “China to Hold Commemorative Events on September 3,” Xinhua Net News, August 26, 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2015–08/26/c_134555451.htm.
19. See Xi Jinping, “Zai jinian zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzheng ji shiji fan fascist zhanzheng 
qishi zhounian zhaodaihui shang de jianghua” [Address at a reception commemorating the 70th an-
niversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the 
World Anti-Fascist War], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, September 4, 2015, 1–2, 4.
20. “Xi Jinping huijian taiwan gejie renshi” [Xi Jinping meets with representatives of all walks of 
life in Taiwan], Xinhua Daily Telegraph, September 2, 2015, 1.
21. United Daily, September 1, 2015, A4.
22. Author’s interviews, September 2, 2015, Taipei.
23. Dittmer, “Taiwan as a Factor,” 675.
24. “Liangan minjian jin shouci gongji Jinmen zhanyi zhenwang jiangshi” [First public memorial 
of casualties of two fighting troops in Jinmen battle by people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait], 
Xiamen Net, December 4, 2014, http://news.xmnn.cn/a/xmxw/201412/t20141204_4230944.htm.
25. Su Chi, “Ma zhengfu shiqi liangan guanxi de gaikuang he zhanwang” [The general situation 
and prospects of cross-Strait relations during the Ma administration, in Liangan guanxi de jiyu yu 
tiaozhan [Opportunities and challenges for cross-Strait relations], ed. Su Chi and Tung Chen-yuan 
(Taipei: Wunan Press, 2013), 8; Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan), “Trade between Taiwan and Main-
land China,” www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/275_1.pdf, “Transit Trade between Taiwan and 
Mainland China,” www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/275_2.pdf, “Taiwan Investment in Mainland 
China,” www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/275_7.pdf, “Number of Taiwan Tourists to Mainland 
China,” www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/275_14.pdf, and “Number of Mainland China Tourists 
to Taiwan,” www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/275_15.pdf.
26. Yung Wei, “Toward ‘Intra-national Union’: Theoretical Models on Cross-Taiwan Strait Interac-
tions,” Mainland China Studies 45, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 23.
27. Xi Jinping’s speech at meeting with Lien Chan, reported by New Chinese News Agency, Febru-
ary 18, 2014.
28. Jing Huang, “Hu Jintao’s Pro-Status Quo Approach in Cross-Strait Relations: Building Up a 
One-China Framework for Eventual Reunification,” in The Changing Dynamics of the Relations among 
China, Taiwan, and the United States, ed. Cal Clark (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011), 
149.
29. Zhang Zhijun, “Jiang caiqu cuoshi tuidong yu Taiwan ba xianshi jiaoliu” [Measures will be 
taken to promote exchanges with eight counties and cities in Taiwan], People’s Daily (Overseas edition) 
September 19, 2016, 3.
30. Wang Yingjin, “Guanyu yiguo liangzhi Taiwan moshi de xin gouxiang” [New thinking on the 
Taiwan model of “one country, two systems”], Taiwan yanjiu jikan, no. 6 (2009): 4.
31. State Council Information Office, PRC, Building of Political Democracy in China, 2005, www.
china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/145718.htm.
32. Jiang Zemin, speech at the Central Party School, May 31, 2002, New Chinese News Agency, 
www.xinhuanet.com.
33. Xi Jinping, speech at meeting with Lien Chan, reported by New Chinese News Agency, 
February 18, 2014.
92    Chapter Five
34. Yu Zhengsheng, Opening remarks at the Sixth Strait Forum, Zhongguo Taiwan wang [China 
Taiwan Web], June 15, 2014.
35. Zhang Yachung, Liangan tonghe lun [On integrating the two sides of the Taiwan Strait] (Taipei: 
Shengzhi Cultural Publishing, 2000), 130.
36. Lin Xinhua, Chaoguojia shehuixue: Liangan guanxi zhong de xin Taiwan shehui [Transnational 
sociology: A new Taiwanese society in cross-Strait relations] (Taipei: Weber Culture International Pub-
lishing, 2003), 199.
37. Li Peng, “Liangan yijiaqin linian xia de jiangxinbixin siwei qianxi” [An analysis on the think-
ing of ‘put oneself in somebody else’s position’ under the idea that compatriots from both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits are of one family], Taiwan yanjiu jikan, no. 1 (2015): 7.
93
The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed an explosion of anger among 
Chinese youth.1 In contrast to the peasants and workers who erupted in anger over 
their marginalization from China’s economic boom, the flame of the raging youth 
(fenqing) burned in the name of patriotism. In the wake of the 1999 bombing of 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 China-US aircraft collision, the 2008 
Beijing Olympics, and the 2012 disputes over the Diaoyu Islands (referred to as 
the Senkaku Islands by Japan), the power of spontaneous mass protest spread like 
a raging fire to include an enormous number of students, particularly in Septem-
ber 2012, when the Japanese government purchased the Diaoyu Islands, trigger-
ing indignant protests in as many as one hundred cities in China. Hundreds of 
thousands of young people participated in massive rallies and took to the streets 
with violence, vandalism, and arson. In fact, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands 
was not new. It had been recurring over the previous three decades. In 1972, at the 
end of the American occupation of Okinawa, the Japanese government resumed 
its administration of the Diaoyu Islands, sparking the dispute, which never burnt 
out. For the first time, the Republic of China (ROC) officially claimed the Diaoyu 
Islands as a part of Taiwan, which presumably should have been returned to Chinese 
jurisdiction in 1972. To dispute the original Japanese claim of sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu Islands, massive student national movements erupted in Taiwan through 
the 1970s. In 1996, when Japanese right-wingers erected a lighthouse on the main 
island, protesters in Taiwan and Hong Kong again marched through the streets 
and attempted to land on the Diaoyu Islands.
It was the first time as well that the Kuomintang (KMT) government allowed 
a large-scale student movement in Taiwan. The dilemma was that nationalism 
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inevitably triggered social mobilization, which, if uncontrolled, could easily be 
turned against the authoritarian KMT regime. In a sense, the youth nationalism 
of the 1970s was revived by the KMT as a displacement of affect over the dimin-
ishing legitimacy of Chinese identity in Taiwan. The 1970s saw a switch in diplo-
matic recognitions from the ROC to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). At the 
same time, Taiwan’s economic growth was accompanied by rising pressure for far-
reaching changes in governance. However, with the KMT government tightly re-
stricting political participation, young people had nowhere to voice their anxieties 
and to reassert their identity. To reclaim the legitimacy of the KMT and maintain 
political stability, the KMT instigated nationalism with a clear enemy (Japan) as 
an efficient strategy to divert youth’s attention from the legitimacy problem and to 
elicit political support. Hence, the Diaoyu Islands functioned as a condensation 
symbol for irredentist nationalism, on the basis of a discourse of Chinese terri-
tory being taken away from the self by Japan. Through new editions of geographic 
maps and historical textbooks in 1972, the Diaoyu Islands were constructed as 
China’s lost land. In short, the 1972 Diaoyu Islands movement arose from Taiwan’s 
international isolation coupled with its fast-growing economy, which led to a state 
of anomie in which young people suffered from identity crisis and powerlessness 
in the market economy.2 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that in the 2000s the 
weakening hold of Chinese identity in Taiwan and the Taiwan-centered peda-
gogy found in school curricula tended to deflate enthusiasm for the movement 
to protect the Diaoyu Islands (Baodiao), which the younger generation in Taiwan 
associated with support for cross-Strait reunification.3 We hardly see online anti-
Japan protests among Taiwan’s youth before Japan’s 2012 nationalization of the 
Diaoyu Islands.
Before 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remained at a distance from 
the dispute. When the first two waves of protests over the Diaoyu Islands flared in 
1972 and 1996, major anti-Japanese demonstrations were held in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong but not in Beijing. The authorities in China suppressed xenophobia and de-
cided to “shelve the dispute” to be resolved in the future.4 Why was Chinese youth 
nationalism regarding the Diaoyu Islands disputes revived in 2012? Some observ-
ers attributed the rise of Chinese nationalism to the state’s construction. They re-
garded the new nationalism of the post-1980 generation as “official nationalism” 
or “pragmatic nationalism,” anchored in a patriotic ethos that looked to the CCP 
as a guardian of the national interest.5 Specifically, they saw it as the creation of the 
CCP’s “Patriotic Education Campaign” of the 1990s and 2000s, which attempted 
to shore up the party’s declining legitimacy by focusing on China’s historic glory 
and the subsequent “hundred years of humiliation,” through repeated submission 
to foreign powers, that began with the First Opium War in the nineteenth century.6 
They also noted that, by using the United States as a reference group, the authori-
ties aroused xenophobia to consolidate the communist regime.7 Other scholars 
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believed that the 1990s witnessed as well the emergence of a popular national-
ism that should not be conflated with official nationalism. Unable to suppress the 
protesters, the CPP was losing control over nationalist discourse and was forced 
to plead with protesters.8 Increasingly scholars also related grassroots nationalism 
to the rise of the Internet, which unified the Chinese cyber community against 
foreign pressure. Chinese cyber nationalists have been utilizing the Internet as a 
communication center, organizational platform, and implementation channel for 
their cause.9
However, without knowing the mind-set of Chinese youth, we cannot explain 
why in 2012 the once unimportant Diaoyu Islands became an indivisible part 
of China for the younger generation. Why did protests over the Diaoyu Islands 
spread so rapidly and then turn violent? To explore these questions, this chapter is 
divided into two parts. The first part aims at investigating the process by which the 
Diaoyu Islands made their way into the imagination of the younger generation. In 
the process of identity construction, Taiwan and Japan served as important refer-
ence groups for Chinese youths. The second part hinges on why Chinese youth 
movements took a nationalist turn and galvanized millions in the disputes over 
the Diaoyu Islands in 2012. In many ways China’s situation was analogous to the 
crisis over the Diaoyu Islands in Taiwan in 1972. Specifically, I posit that the “raging 
youth” phenomenon derives from ambivalence between national pride and disap-
pointment in the CCP. What made the post-1980 generation proud yet ashamed? 
This chapter brings to light the structural factors that facilitated the youth move-
ments in 2012. After three decades of economic reform, the CCP still has a tight 
grip on the political system and legitimates itself by maintaining high economic 
growth. I will show how China’s youth, given a limited organizational life, sanc-
tioned or monitored by the state, found in the Internet a public space in which to 
vent their anger, circulate ideas, and engage in civil actions, all of which aided their 
collective pursuit of national identity. Finally, we show how interactions between 
the Internet and globalization precipitated the resurgence of an outraged national-
ism in contemporary China. Globalization unavoidably brings people together, 
and this paper investigates why, in an age boasting an upsurge in Internet access, 
Chinese identity is always affirmed against a foreign enemy.
WHY THE DIAOYU ISL ANDS?
Before we begin the analysis of the “raging youth” phenomenon in 2012, it is cru-
cial to know when and how Chinese youth expanded their imagination of China’s 
boundaries to the Diaoyu Islands. As in Taiwan in the 1970s, the authorities made 
the Diaoyu Islands a part of the imagined community for Chinese youth to en-
sure their own legitimacy and adjust to the changing international and domestic 
conditions.
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Shelving the Dispute
In 1968, the discovery of massive oil deposits near the East China Sea for the first 
time put the Diaoyu Islands in the spotlight. Before then, neither China nor Taiwan 
had shown any interest in these uninhabited and barren islands. The dispute over 
the Diaoyu Islands was sparked in 1972, when the United States turned over ad-
ministrative rights of the islands to Japan, as stipulated by the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty. The core of the controversy lay in whether the Diaoyu Islands had belonged 
to Taiwan in April 1895, at which time, under the Shimonoseki Treaty, the Chinese 
(Qing) government had ceded Taiwan and “all islands pertaining to it” to Japan. 
With the end of the Second World War, all Chinese-ceded territory had to be re-
turned to China, according to the provisions of the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the 
Potsdam Proclamation of 1945, and the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1952. Both the 
PRC and the ROC claimed the Diaoyu Islands as a part of Taiwan, which presum-
ably should have been returned to Chinese jurisdiction in 1972.
Japan originally claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 on the 
basis of the principle of terra nullius and incorporated them into Japan in January 
1895. In protest, massive student national movements erupted in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong through the 1970s but, surprisingly, not in Beijing. Between 1966 and 1976, 
Chinese young people were embroiled in the Cultural Revolution, with a large 
number of urban youth being transferred to rural regions through the Down to 
the Countryside Movement. Even though schools resumed regular schedules in 
1978, the curriculum in the 1980s was dominated by revolutionary views with the 
purpose of restoring the CCP’s legitimacy.10 Hence, the Chinese Cultural Revolu-
tion and Reform generations were not concerned with the Diaoyu Islands. More 
importantly, in the 1970s, both Japan and the United States were in the midst of 
approaching China to normalize diplomatic relations. Given his keen interest in 
having the PRC replace the ROC as the only legitimate representative of China in 
the international arena, Deng Xiaoping decided to downplay the sovereignty dis-
pute with Japan and leave the issue to future generations in 1972 and 1978.
The Shadow of Taiwan and Japanese Actions
After three decades of silence, the CCP started to voice its concern over the Di-
aoyu Islands. From the 1970s until the mid-1990s, what had kept the territorial dis-
pute between Tokyo and Beijing under control was a tacit agreement to “shelve the 
dispute.”11 Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s Japanese politics has grown increas-
ingly nationalistic and has resulted in flaring tensions in Asia. In 1996, soon after 
the Japanese government announced the two hundred nautical miles centering on 
the Senkaku Islands as the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a Japanese 
nationalist group rebuilt a lighthouse on one of the disputed islands, outraging 
Chinese nationalists in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The rise of Japanese right-wing 
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nationalism became obvious when Shintaro Ishihara, who wrote a patriotic book 
entitled A Japan That Can Say No in 1989 and announced a plan by the Tokyo Met-
ropolitan Government to purchase the Senkaku Islands in April 2012 and fortify 
them, was elected mayor of Tokyo in 1999. Since 2000, the Japanese government 
has increased police patrols of the disputed Senkaku Islands to give evidence of 
Japan’s effective control. As a result of Japan’s 2005 textbook screening, the number 
of references to the Senkaku Islands increased in the textbooks of primary and 
secondary schools to support an official statement about there being “no territo-
rial problem” over the Senkaku Islands with Taiwan and China.12 For the CCP 
leadership, losing the tug-of-war over sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands to Japan 
not only would undermine its legitimacy but also could jeopardize its economic 
interest in the massive oil deposits near the islands.
Meanwhile, the trajectory of Taiwan’s future shifted closer toward independence 
following the victories of Lee Teng-hui in the 1996 presidential election and of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the two subsequent ones. During this pe-
riod, the Taiwan government made only lukewarm statements to claim the ROC’s 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. As Taiwanese nationalism became the top 
issue of the political platform, the enthusiasm for the movement to protect the 
Diaoyu Islands ran low. The issue of the Diaoyu Islands, which the younger genera-
tion in Taiwan associated with support for cross-Strait reunification, was labeled 
“politically incorrect.” In 1996, the Japanese claim on the EEZ around the Diaoyu 
Islands led Lee Teng-hui to reiterate the ROC’s sovereignty over the disputed is-
lands, but he also set aside sovereignty disputes to enable fisheries negotiations 
with Japan. During the DPP period (2000–2008) as well, the Taiwanese govern-
ment was more concerned to negotiate the historic fishing rights of Taiwanese 
fishermen around the disputed waters with Japan. In February 2005, a lighthouse 
that had been erected on the largest of the Diaoyu Islands by Japanese activists in 
1978 came under Japanese government control. In June, Japan Coast Guard vessels 
chased away Taiwanese fishing boats, arousing protests among Taiwanese fisher-
men and Diaoyu Islands activists. In response to the anger of the fishermen, Chen 
Shui-bian sent out patrol ships to protect Taiwanese fishing boats and even set foot 
on the Pengjia Islet to claim Taiwan’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. At the 
same time, he stated that the Taiwan government should handle the fishing rights 
issue separately from the sovereignty issue to avoid complicating the situation and 
escalating tensions. KMT legislators criticized Chen Shui-bian’s response as merely 
“making a show,” and Taipei’s mayor, Ma Ying-jeou, said it showed a lack of courage.
After years of playing down the sovereignty issue, Taiwan and Japan finally made 
a diplomatic breakthrough in late August 2005. The Japanese Diet passed legisla-
tion to give Taiwanese a visa waiver but made no conciliatory offer to China. Hence, 
this move was seen as a break from Japan’s balancing act on the cross-Strait issue. 
The sovereignty issue in Taiwan touched a raw nerve in China, particularly after 
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Lee Teng-hui declared “special state-to-state relations” to define the relationship 
between Taiwan and China in 1999 and then declared—in a 2002 interview carried 
in a local daily in Okinawa Prefecture—that the Diaoyu Islands actually belonged 
to Japan.13 For China, reassertion of its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands became 
essential, as the islands were directly related to China’s claim to Taiwan, and vice 
versa. National unity was essential to reinforce the CCP’s legitimacy, which was in 
decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, various political changes in 
Japan and in Taiwan had eroded China’s longtime policy of “shelving the dispute.”
The Construction of an Imagined Community through 
Linkages with Taiwan
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the CCP embarked on a deliberate 
publicity campaign to instill in Chinese youth the vision of the Diaoyu Islands 
as an inseparable Chinese territory. As in Japan, textbooks are in the front line of 
China’s propaganda to stir up patriotism. In 2001, the PRC’s Ministry of Educa-
tion issued the Basic Education Curriculum Reform Outline (Trial), which put a 
central focus on the two dominant themes of Chinese patriotic education: Chi-
nese tradition and history, and national unity and territorial integrity.14 Moreover, 
new teaching manuals published by the People’s Education Press were changed 
to reflect the CCP’s new stance on its territorial claims. For example, on the topic 
“Taiwan: Part of the Sacred Territory of China” in year 8’s Geography I, teach-
ers are encouraged to guide students through maps to identify places in Taiwan 
and islands affiliated with it, including the Diaoyu Islands. In “Geography of the 
Ocean” in the high school curriculum, the learning goal is to foster sovereignty 
consciousness by outlining China’s natural ocean resources. To achieve that goal, 
the suggested teaching instruction is to discuss the illegal seizure of islands in the 
East and South China Seas and show how that poses a threat to China’s interest 
and to its freedom of navigation.15 China is also embroiled in a map battle with 
Japan to support its historical claims and legal right over the Diaoyu Islands. Like 
all scholars on the subject, CCP officials cite a collection of historical maps dat-
ing back to the sixteenth century, which include the map Coastal Defense Stretch-
ing Thousands of Miles, showing that the Diaoyu Islands were incorporated into 
China’s maritime defense in 1561.16 Several other maps show the Diaoyu Islands 
serving as navigational aids for tributary missions between China and the Ryukyu 
Kingdom. The Great Universal Geographic Map drawn in 1767 shows that the 
Diaoyu Islands, as part of Taiwan’s fishing grounds, were included in the territory of 
the Qing Empire. The Map of East China Sea Littoral States created by the French 
cartographer Pierre M. Lapie in 1809 colored Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Yu, and Chi-
wei Yu the same color as Taiwan. Those maps are considered to have been created 
on the premise that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Chinese territory prior to 
the sixteenth century and were not terra nullius before 1885, as claimed by Japan. 
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Through discourses of mapping, the Diaoyu Islands as part of Chinese national 
community have made their way into the imagination of the young generation.
China also reinforced the concept of the Diaoyu Islands as an inherent part of 
the territory of the PRC through several practical actions designed to strengthen 
the PRC’s claims over the disputed islands. In 2008, soon after Ma Ying-jeou took 
the oath of office as the president of the ROC, a Taiwanese fishing ship, the Lien Ho, 
sank following a collision with a Japan Coast Guard vessel near the Diaoyu Islands. 
The Ma administration immediately demanded a public apology and compensa-
tion for the Lien Ho, suspended fisheries negotiations, and recalled Hsu Shih-kai, 
Taiwan’s envoy to Japan, who had handled bilateral ties between Taiwan and Japan 
in absence of an official diplomatic relationship, for a decade. The KMT legislators 
went further to organize a voyage to the disputed waters aboard a navy La Fayette 
frigate. DPP legislators saw these moves as paving the way to forging closer ties 
with Beijing because the first Chen-Chiang summit of cross-Strait meetings, after 
a decade-long stalemate between Taiwan and China, was to take place in a week 
in Beijing. For China, it was the beginning of an attempt to create a community 
of interest on the issue with Taipei. Four days after the cross-Strait summit, China 
sent two patrol boats to the East China Sea to challenge Japan’s effective control for 
the first time. This act, covered to the saturation point by China’s state-controlled 
media, marked a new phase in the troubled relationship between China and Japan, 
signifying the end of “shelving the dispute.” Since 2010, when a Chinese fishing 
trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard boats, China began to dispatch patrol 
ships to the disputed waters on a regular basis.
China has since gained more momentum on disputes over the Diaoyu Islands 
and has marginalized Taiwan’s response on this issue. In August 2012, to affirm 
Taiwan’s position on disputed waters, the Ma administration proposed the East 
China Sea Peace Initiative—a plan that aims at shelving disputes and peacefully 
resolving disputes in the East China Sea by reciprocal negotiation and cooperative 
development. The DPP regarded this initiative as supporting the one-China prin-
ciple because it allowed the PRC to form a community of interest with Taiwan on 
the sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands. However, the response from Bei-
jing was less than enthusiastic. The director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang 
Yi, commented—in a underwhelming way—that China was aware of the initiative 
but that China’s standpoint on the East China Sea had always been crystal clear. 
To underline China’s dominance on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese state 
media and online censors downplayed coverage of the initiative.
RESEARCH METHODS
On September 11, 2012, a week before the eighty-first anniversary of the Manchu-
rian incident, the Japanese government purchased three of the five Diaoyu Islands, 
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causing uproar in as many as one hundred cities in China and sparking street 
protests of one million young people. Why did a piece of land on a map emerge as 
a powerful and attractive vision of Chinese youth nationalism in 2012? Why did 
national sentiments turn into a “rage” among Chinese youth?
Conceptualization
Answering these questions first requires defining Chinese nationalism, youth, and 
outrage. Consideration of the full range of scholarship on Chinese nationalism, 
which takes on different meanings at different junctures in Chinese history and 
for various scholars, is beyond this chapter’s scope. In this study Chinese national-
ism denotes patriotism, love, loyalty, and devotion to China. Youth refers to the 
post-1980 generation, or “millennials” who grew up witnessing China’s reform and 
opening and who experienced the Tiananmen incident and the Patriotic Educa-
tion Campaign. In theory, a group that shares “common historical memories due 
to the fact that they were born in the same period and lived through the same 
political and economic development” during adolescence is regarded as a “politi-
cal generation.”17 On the basis of this definition, the people in China can be di-
vided into five political generations: the war generation (before 1943), the Cultural 
Revolution generation (1944–61), the Reform generation (1962–80), the post-1980 
generation (1981–90), and the post-1990 generation (1991 to the present). Outrage 
in this study is defined as a feeling of righteous anger in defense of China’s survival 
and prosperity.
Data
To explore its research questions, this chapter relies on three complementary forms 
of data. First, the Strong Nation Forum plays an integral part in this chapter’s pri-
mary research. It is a Chinese bulletin board on the website of the People’s Daily 
and was created in 1999 to serve as an outlet for Chinese anger over the US bomb-
ing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Soon after the Strong Nation Forum 
appeared online, it became the most important online forum for nationalist sen-
timents. As shown in the online survey conducted by the Liao wang dong fang 
zhou kan (Oriental outlook) in 2008, 68 percent of Internet users on the Strong 
Nation Forum belonged to the youth cohort aged twenty to forty.18 In this regard, 
the Strong Nation Forum can serve as a valid unit of observation on Chinese 
youth nationalism. This study reviews and analyzes comments and discussions 
on the Strong Nation Forum during the 2008–15 period to understand Chinese 
youth nationalism, its emergence, and its evolution into anti-Japan nationalism in 
2012. The data for the analysis were collected via a keyword search on the Strong 
Nation Forum for posts containing the term Diaoyu Islands. Repeated postings and 
similar posts by the same Internet users were deleted to limit the amount of spam-
ming on the site or to avoid the attempt of prominent users to multiply their own 
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opinions. In total, 1,355 valid posts regarding the Diaoyu Islands were collected for 
analysis. Content analysis was further used to analyze this text-based data set. To 
avoid the disadvantages of automated (fully computerized) content analysis that 
tends to make arbitrary associations between words and phrases and to overlook 
the context of each post, posts in this study were read and coded manually.19 We 
pulled as much information out of each post in a way that linked each of them to 
major themes and categorized them into cause, resolution, attitudes toward the 
CCP, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, and so on (see table 6). Since content 
analysis is prone to coder bias, two coders coded and cross-checked the same data 
to ascertain the results’ reliability. This study was complemented by two other data 
sources. First, it explored the online survey on patriotic and nationalistic attitudes 
that was conducted by the People’s Daily in 2012 and 2013. Several characteristics 
of this data type were well suited for this research. Most obviously, the survey asked 
questions concerning individual autonomy and independent thinking for the post-
1980 generation. The final data source consisted of face-to-face interviews in China, 
conducted in 2012 by the World Values Survey, which tracks values and cultural 
change over time. The target population consisted of Chinese citizens over eighteen 
years old. Analyzing these three data sets enabled us to investigate the nature of 
Chinese nationalism and why Chinese youth nationalism erupted in 2012.
Limitations of the Data
Using the Strong Nation Forum as our unit of observation met with some skepticism 
regarding selection bias. Two factors contribute to possible bias. The first is that rural 
Internet penetration in China remained roughly 27.5 percent compared to 62 percent 
in urban areas in 2013. This led to the underrepresentation of rural youth in our 
sample. Although just over half of the rural population uses the Internet, a relatively 
larger percentage (55.3 percent) of them belong to the 20–40 age bracket, almost 
two-thirds of the people in rural areas in 2013, similar to the ratio in the cities.20 In 
this regard, we can rule out the first concern about selection bias. The second se-
lection bias involves the Strong Nation Forum’s management by the People’s Daily, 
an organ of the CCP’s Central Committee. The general guidelines of the Strong 
Nation Forum involve prohibitions and censorship of inciting subversion of state 
power, separatist movements, and illegal activities.21 Messages on sensitive topics 
such as Tiananmen and Falun Gong certainly cannot appear. If discussions are 
beyond the CCP’s tolerance limits, webmasters will delete all postings and block 
the IP addresses and registered names. To some extent, freedom of speech on the 
Web is constrained, leading to a bias in public opinion. However, the government 
has been relatively tolerant toward online discussions that are critical of its poli-
cies but appeal to nationalist sentiments. The estimated deletion rate is about 1 
to 1.5 percent.22 Furthermore, as online political forums hosted by SINA, Tianya, 
and many other privately operated media have multiplied, is the CCP has become 
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less likely to turn against Internet users with a zealous crackdown on the Strong 
Nation Forum. In general, the Strong Nation Forum is probably a good venue for 
observing Chinese youth nationalism because that is where it appears in great 
profusion. Using the online survey as research data might also encounter a self-se-
lection bias. The problem is that since respondents are allowed to decide whether 
they want to participate in a survey, specific groups turn out to be overrepresented, 
such as youth cohorts, the middle class, and people with higher education. As a 
result, the respondents participating in online surveys will not represent the entire 
population. However, we can mitigate this concern about self-selection bias, since 
this study aims to study youth, not the general population.
THE 2012 DIAOYU ISL ANDS INCIDENT:  A “R AGING 
YOUTH” PHENOMENON
Why did Chinese youth nationalism revive and escalate in 2012? Despite the Chi-
nese government’s prohibition, Chinese Internet users launched a widespread 
campaign on the Web to boycott Japanese products, leading to a plunge in the sales 
of Japanese automobiles and consequently forcing Toyota and Honda to temporar-
ily halt production in China. Did the movement simply reflect an imagined com-
munity or historical hatred revived in textbooks, or did it reflect national pride in 
China’s exceptional economic growth, eager to transcend conditions of oppression?
Driven by Ambivalence toward the CCP
The empirical analysis shows the “raging youth” phenomenon to derive from 
ambivalence between national pride and disappointment in the CCP. As evident 
in the Strong Nation Forum (table 6), about 8.5 of the Internet posts mentioned 
that since ancient times China had had indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu 
Islands, now illegally occupied by Japan. As seen in the World Values Survey in 
2012 (table 7), 91.4 percent of the post-1980 generation were proud of China, and 
84.1 percent were willing to fight for China in the event of a war, with an aver-
age 15 percent higher than the previous two generations. However, regarding the 
2012 Diaoyu Islands incident, the Strong Nation Forum (table 6) was flooded 
with messages expressing shame and disappointment in the CCP. Approximately 
16.6 percent of the posts criticized the CCP for being “too soft” on Japan, specifi-
cally accusing the government officials and experts of failing to reassert sovereign-
ty over the islands. Around 3.8 percent of the posts recognized the government’s 
efforts of dispatching patrol ships to a disputed area but were concerned that the 
intention was to shift people’s attention away from the economic slowdown. One 
user stated, “Sending patrol ships is just tiptoeing around the issue.” What made 
the post-1980 generation proud yet ashamed?
In the early 1990s, the weakening hold of Chinese socialism due to China’s mar-
ket transition and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to the search 
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for a new ideology. Announced in 1991 and fully functioning by 1994, patriotic ed-
ucation was initiated by Jiang Zemin in the hope of filling the ideological vacuum. 
The content of Chinese patriotic education, reviving patriotism as a replacement 
for diminishing socialism, had two dominant themes: Chinese tradition and his-
tory, and national unity and territorial integrity. Through patriotic education and 
educational reforms since 2001, the post-1980 Chinese have grown up embrac-
ing a commitment to safeguarding Chinese sovereignty and to defending territo-
rial integrity. National identity for the Chinese youth was not simply evoked by 
a “nationalism of despair” that evoked memories of a former glory dashed by a 
Table 6 Opinions and attitudes on the Diaoyu Islands dispute
Theme Percentage Subcategory Percentage
Sarcastic messages 19.2
Controversial figures 4.1
Mockery of the CCP 5.0




Disappointment with CCP 16.6
Awareness of patrol vessels 3.8
Diaoyu Islands as inseparable 
from China
8.5
Resolution by force 12.3
Declaration of war 6.9
Retrieve at any cost 2.8
Inevitable war 2.6
Resolution by talk 4.3
Taiwan factor 
Unification as crucial 4.3
Taiwan must act to signal control 






Obama’s foreign policy pivot 
toward Asia
6.1




Criticizing attitudes of Chinese 
netizens toward Japan and US
5.9
Calling pro-Japan and pro-US 
attitudes unpatriotic
2.1




Source: Strong Nation Forum, bbs1.people.com.cn/.
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subsequent “century of humiliation.”23 Built on thirty years of economic reforms 
and opening to the world, China’s remarkable economic growth boosted national 
confidence to an unprecedented level to underpin a new era of Chinese nation-
alism. Michel Oksenberg described it as a “confident nationalism,” patient and 
moderate, rooted in the assurance that China could eventually regain its greatness 
through economic growth.24 By and large, post-1980 Chinese have believed in a 
strong China and the idea that “China can say no” to US hegemony and assert 
itself against other countries attempting to dominate it. Hence, seeing the Diaoyu 
Islands as a vital part of the motherland, many of the Internet users demanded 
tougher actions to defend them. Although 4.3 percent of the posts on the Strong 
Nation Forum voiced concern for a peaceful resolution through negotiations or 
economic sanctions, approximately 6.9 percent urged a declaration of war against 
Japan (table 6). “It is a piece of cake because we have nuclear weapons.” Around 
2.8 percent of the posts claimed that China should retrieve the islands at any cost, 
and 2.6 percent believed that war was inevitable. Some posts (4.3 percent) pointed 



















Very proud N 41 124 212 123 500
% 33.9 24.2 24.9 23.2 24.8
Quite proud N 68 313 557 362 1300
% 56.2 61.1 65.3 68.2 64.5
Not very proud N 11 72 75 41 199
% 9.1 14.1 8.8 7.7 9.9
Not at all proud N 1 3 9 5 18
% 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9
Total N 121 512 853 531 2017
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Willingness 
to fight for 
your country
Yes N 88 392 740 470 1690
% 70.4 70.8 81.6 84.1 78.8
No N 37 162 167 89 455
% 29.6 29.2 18.4 15.9 21.2
Total N 125 554 907 559 2145
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: World Values Survey in China (2012). WVS [World Values Survey],Wave 6 (2010–2014), China 2012, con-
ducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University in 2012. Data can be retrieved 
from www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.
Note: % in the parentheses is the row percentage.
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out that the fundamental cause of the territorial dispute between China and Japan 
was Taiwan’s status as an inalienable part of China. “To facilitate cross-Strait uni-
fication would make things easier.” Taken together, 12.3 percent of the messages 
approved of using force to resolve the issue. In conclusion, as a consequence of 
patriotic education and China’s exceptional growth, Chinese youth increasingly 
took pride in China’s growing status and felt a strong obligation to defend China 
from hostile external forces.
Nevertheless, with China’s integration into the world economy, it is not easy for 
China to say no. It is widely acknowledged that China’s rapid integration into the 
global economy has heightened interstate conflicts. Simultaneously maintaining 
patriotism and prioritizing economic development has become especially difficult 
for the authorities in Beijing.25 In December 2003, Chinese premier Wen Jiabo 
used the term peaceful rise in his speech at Harvard University.26 Since then, a 
peaceful rise to power, backed up by economic development, has been the main 
priority of CCP leaders. The party has demonstrated its peaceful attitude by active-
ly participating in international organizations, hosting the Olympic Games, and 
being involved in multilateral trade negotiations with as many as twelve countries. 
In 2012, at the eighteenth conference of the CCP, market pressures simultaneous 
with mainstream public demand for tough responses to Japan created a dilemma 
for Xi Jinping, the new general secretary of the CCP. As ongoing territorial dis-
putes over the Diaoyu Islands have hampered the progress of the China-Japan-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, the return of the United 
States to the Asia-Pacific region has posed a critical challenge to China’s political 
and economic clout. Specifically, negotiations have been under way since 2010 to 
create the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will be the world’s larg-
est free trade zone, in an attempt to contain China’s rise. These efforts make more 
urgent the need for China to aggressively seek barrier-lowering FTAs with Japan 
and South Korea to harness the huge trade potential within ASEAN and across the 
Pacific Rim. China knows very well the cost of pushing Japan toward a military re-
sponse. Although Chinese authorities have dispatched a marine surveillance plane 
and patrol vessels to enter the disputed waters to prove that Japan had no exclusive 
control over the islands, the CCP has since then made no attempt to land on the 
islands or to impose any economic sanctions against Japan. Many Chinese youth 
perceive the CCP’s patrols and diplomatic gestures as “making shows of defiance,” 
in Christopher Hughes’s words.27 As a result, ambivalence toward the CCP has 
galvanized the post-1980 generation into action.
Facilitated by the Rise of Network Society
How can this proud generation minimize the anxieties associated with emotional 
conflicts between national pride and disappointment in the CPP’s failure to live up 
to its nationalist rhetoric? As psychoanalysts point out, ontological uncertainties 
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and existential anxiety have intensified the search for stable identities. Aggression 
and radical movements often develop as a consequence of anxieties and uncer-
tainties.28 China’s youth protest movements also show these dynamics. After three 
decades of economic reforms, the CCP still keeps a tight grip on political control. 
With a limited organizational life, sanctioned or monitored by the state, young 
people have been deprived of channels to vent their anger. While direct elections 
and party turnover are not allowed in the foreseeable future, young people also 
lack a public arena to express their dissatisfaction. To reach a stable state of co-
herent attitudes on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese youth can shift from 
virtual reality to collective action.
To overcome the barriers to collective action in a large group, such as a nation, 
two kinds of tools are required—effective institutions to mobilize people toward 
collective ends and unifying ideas to convince people that they share a common 
fate.29 For the first tool, the advent of the Internet in China exerts a mobilizing 
influence by opening channels for civic engagement and the circulation of ideas. 
In the twenty-first century, Chinese modernization has led to a communications 
revolution. The rise of Internet-based communication heralds the emergence of a 
new form of communication: mass self-communication, which is “self-generated 
in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that 
communicate with many.”30 Individuals construct their own system of mass com-
munication and asynchronous discussion through BBS, blogs, Weibo, Tencent 
QQ, and other social media—a development that has facilitated civic engagement 
and opened new channels for the circulation of ideas. The past decade has seen a 
tremendous increase in Internet use in China, with over six hundred million users 
in 2014. The Internet has become a virtual community for China’s post-1980 gen-
eration, who account for nearly two-thirds of Internet users.31 Thus the Internet 
serves as a vehicle for Chinese youth to express and discuss national sentiments, 
as a means of fusing atomized individuals into a collectivity, and as a promoter 
pushing them toward protest activities.
With regard to the second tool, unifying ideas, the fast-growing educational 
system in China goes further to create unified fields of communication by using 
standardized languages and homogenized contexts with which to promote a com-
mon discourse of nationalism. As the statistics in 2014 show, higher education 
in China is continuously growing, with over two thousand universities and more 
than 7.27 million college graduates.32 Education does more than cultivate loyalty to 
the state and the ruling party, or construct an imagined community to incorporate 
the Diaoyu Islands: it also produces a better-informed and more open-minded 
generation, increasing their ability to scrutinize the authenticity of information, 
engage in skepticism, and question authorities. Empirical evidence from the 
People’s Daily online survey confirmed that 70 percent of the post-1980 genera-
tion perceived themselves as more independent thinking than older generations. 
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In terms of action, in an online opinion poll on populism, also conducted by the 
People’s Daily from October 21 to 31 in 2012, 42.8 percent of the post-1980 genera-
tion approved of radical movements for the sake of patriotism compared to 32.4 
percent from earlier generations.33 These findings explain why vehement protests 
were sparked by Japan’s purchase of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012, even though the 
government asked for calm and restraint.34 In other words, the effects of educa-
tion are Janus-faced, for education does not simply stimulated patriotism in young 
people, it also creates mechanisms for them to correct the state when they feel that 
the government has strayed onto the wrong path. On the streets, young protesters 
shouted, “Never forget national humiliation” and “Protect China’s inseparable ter-
ritory,” even venting their anger at the Chinese government, blaming it for being 
“shamefully weak,” and urging it to “take Japan down.”
Reinforced by a Sense of Crisis
Finally, why did protests over Diaoyu Islands turn violent? The resurgence of an 
outraged Chinese nationalism in 2012 can be explained by a strong sense of crisis. 
Many Strong Nation Forum posters believed that the United States was an even 
larger threat than Japan (“Of first importance now is the necessity to check the 
United States”) and that it had been behind Japan’s national resurgence. On the 
forum (table 6), 6.5 percent of posts expressed the belief that Japan should be held 
responsible for the dispute, whereas 12.3 percent held the United States responsible. 
About half of the posts that held the United States responsible (6.1 percent of the 
total sample) expressed the belief that Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands 
was a conspiracy of the United States to escalate tensions between Japan and China 
so as to advance itself across the Asia-Pacific. They pointed to the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, as well as US-
Japan joint military drills, to validate the posters’ worries. They stated that Japan 
would not dare go to war without US endorsement. The other half (6.2 percent of 
total posts) looked to historical reasons for why the United States was to blame. 
For these Internet users, China’s claims to the disputed Diaoyu Islands rested pri-
marily on international contracts dating back to the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 
1945 Potsdam Proclamation, and the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. However, the 
islands had never been returned to China because the Ryukyu Islands were under 
US administration at the end of the Second World War. “The Diaoyu Islands were 
used for US bombing practice to fulfill US greed,” posted many Internet users. 
Many also believed that in the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty the United States 
deliberately left the question of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands unresolved 
and ambiguous to this day, thereby opening a window for the United States to 
plant itself in Asia.
China’s immediate concerns about the US threat may have been partly driven 
by  new US foreign policies toward Asia. In 2011, the Obama administration 
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declared that the United States would pivot back to Asia, a move that posed a criti-
cal challenge to China’s political and economic clout. In economic terms, Obama 
came to the 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to promote 
the TPP, which would forge a pathway to free trade across the Asia-Pacific and en-
compass 40 percent of the global GDP. The standards to join the TPP conformed 
to American conceptions of labor rights, intellectual property rights, and envi-
ronmental protections that would strategically exclude China from the world’s 
largest free trade zone. Not surprisingly, among hundreds of comments on the 
Strong Nation Forum, online posters unanimously regarded the TPP as an instru-
ment for containing China’s rise. Many Internet users perceived it as a “revival of 
US imperialism” and “US hegemony over the world.” Power rivalry between the 
United States and China was further complicated in 2012, when the United States 
persuaded Japan to join TPP negotiations amid rising tensions with China over 
the Diaoyu Islands. At the same time, the United States clarified in a statement 
that the bilateral Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covered the Diaoyu 
Islands and obliged the United States to defend them in the event of an armed 
attack. Later that same year, the United States and Japan began joint military ex-
ercises. The US expansion of its military involvement in Japan’s conflict against 
China escalated concerns about an unstated US aim to block China, especially 
after Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party won the House of Representatives elections 
by a landslide in December 2012, encouraging the new Japanese prime minister 
Shinzo Abe to more stridently push issues concerning the Diaoyu Islands. In 2013, 
the Abe government declared that joining the TPP would strengthen Japan’s secu-
rity. He continued to push ahead in reinterpreting Japan’s constitution to authorize 
the right to collective self-defense.
China’s youth perceive an immediate threat to China’s existence in policies of 
economic and military containment by Japan and the United States, and their 
sense of crisis is grounded in the shared memory of China’s century of humili-
ation and its isolation during the Cold War. From this sense of threat and cri-
sis arise two mechanisms that reinforce their national identity and radicalize 
their actions. The first one is a clear enemy to target. Identity is about belong-
ing, what you have in common with your own group, and what differentiates 
you from others.35 Hence, in forming identity, the first and foremost need is 
to define “others.” It requires the establishment of a boundary between “us” 
and “them,” and across this boundary differences between the groups are sig-
naled.36 However, for young Chinese, it is difficult to form a clear sense of “us.” 
During the Cultural Revolution an enormous number of cultural treasures and 
traditional values were eradicated. As stated by Lucian Pye, the building blocks 
for a coherent identity in China are missing because the symbols and ideals of 
the culture have been so severely damaged. The content of Chinese contem-
porary nationalism appears to be exceedingly thin, without shared ideas and 
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worthy principles that can inspire people.37 Moreover, China’s transition from 
communism to capitalism has led to a state of anomie in which young people 
suffer from a disbelief in socialism and a sense of powerlessness in the market 
economy. Accordingly, the new generation holds an insular attitude and loses 
meaningful connections to others. Hence, Chinese identity for the post-1980 
generation had been unstable in and of itself, inasmuch as it was a result of state 
construction through patriotic education and state propaganda. Nevertheless, 
as international conflicts increase, Chinese youth become more aware of their 
membership in the Chinese nation in a sense of perceiving it as threatened and 
uniting against enemies. They begin to strengthen their Chinese identities in 
contrast to clear rivals—Japan and the United States.
The second mechanism that a sense of threat and crisis provides is the motiva-
tion for collective resistance. The Chinese have been fighting against deep-seated 
doubts about their ethnic dignity for a century. In spite of China’s economic suc-
cesses, the narrative of the “century of humiliation” has been reiterated in histori-
cal textbooks and official documents to remind people of the agonies and shame of 
foreign aggression. The Japan-US alliance, which young Chinese see as intended to 
contain the rise of China, threatens not only China’s rise but its national dignity. In 
Gordon Allport’s analysis, an enemy who threatens people’s positive values stiffens 
their resistance and makes them exaggerate the merits of their cause.38 In the same 
vein, Chinese youth nationalism is found in unity against shared enemies—Japan 
and the United States—especially in a time of rapidly increasing Internet access. 
Verbal aggression on the Internet is the most convenient way to boost self-esteem 
by stigmatizing others. On the Strong Nation Forum (table 6), a handful of posts 
(5.8 percent) attacked the United States and Japan with derogatory words. They 
called Americans yang gui-zi (foreign devils) and added the new term mi-guo, 
insinuating a “rotten country.” They also called the Japanese “dogs,” “little Japan,” 
gui-zi, and mostly wo kou (dwarf bandits), all of which are extremely pejorative 
ethnic slurs. Although the movement started with peaceful demonstrations, na-
tionalist movements on a large scale aim at venting xenophobic sentiments easily 
go out of control. Despite the calls for peaceful protests and a prohibition of the 
boycott, Chinese Internet users launched a widespread campaign on the Web to 
boycott Japanese products, leading to a plunge in the sales of Japanese automobiles 
and consequently forcing Toyota and Honda to temporarily halt production in 
China. Why did Chinese youth nationalism turn into a hazard? From many transi-
tional states, it is observed that the motivations behind ethnic violence are fear and 
insecurity, not hatred.39 The more insecure a person feels, the more violently he or 
she reacts. As a consequence of the immediate threat and the need to contain the 
US-Japan alliance advancing across the Pacific, China’s xenophobic nationalism in 
2012 spread more swiftly and epidemically than ever, and youth movements have 
shockingly caused near riots in large Chinese cities.
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C ONCLUSION
In 2012, before the eighty-first anniversary of the Manchurian incident, tensions 
between China and Japan escalated sharply amid fiercely anti-Japan protests 
against Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands. This phenomenon attracted 
worldwide attention and rekindled the debate on the causes of Chinese nation-
alism. This study has gone beyond the hotly debated issue of whether Chinese 
nationalism has been instigated from the top down or has developed from the bot-
tom up. It has investigated the psychological mechanisms that encourage Chinese 
youth nationalism. Through content analysis of the data gathered from the Strong 
Nation Forum, it has found three major reasons why Chinese youth nationalism 
in 2012 had taken on a violent character.
In 1972, the US transfer of administrative rights to Japan spawned disputes over 
the Diaoyu Islands. Both China and Taiwan held tenacious views about ownership 
of the Diaoyu Islands, considering them part of Taiwan. Hence, with the end of the 
Second World War, the Diaoyu Islands along with Taiwan should have been re-
turned to Chinese jurisdiction. In the meantime, after the PRC replaced the ROC 
as China’s representative in the United Nations, the weakening hold of Chinese 
identity gave rise to a search for a set of new policies to maintain the KMT’s legiti-
macy. During periods of low public mobilization, one strategy of the KMT gov-
ernment was to use the Diaoyu Islands disputes to galvanize young Taiwanese into 
participating in nationalist movements. Meanwhile, Japan and China were in the 
midst of normalizing diplomatic relations. Although disputes ignited anger and 
indignant protests in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the CCP leadership avoided con-
troversy over the issue throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and the 1990s. However, since 
the mid-1990s, the resurgence of Japanese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism 
has changed China’s longtime policy of “shelving the dispute.” In the face of new 
threats in international relations, Chinese youth nationalism was revived by the 
CCP as a replacement for diminishing socialism. At the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, the CCP initiated a program of patriotic education to assert its claim over 
Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands. Through geography and history lessons at schools, 
Chinese young generations have been infused with the ideal of safeguarding terri-
tory unity. Through a propaganda war against Japan, Chinese young generations 
are visualizing Taiwan and its annexed islands—the Diaoyu Islands—as an in-
alienable part of China.
We then ask why protests to dispute Japanese claim to the Diaoyu Islands in 
2012 turned violent. The first reason is rooted in ambivalence between nation-
al pride and disappointment in the CCP. Through patriotic education and on 
the basis of China’s remarkable economic growth, the post-1980 generation has 
grown up believing in a strong China and in a mission of defending national 
unity. As evident in the World Values Survey in 2012, the post-1980 generation 
is more proud of being Chinese than other generations and is more willing to 
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be dedicated to the country. However, in 2012, as the imbroglio of the Diaoyu 
Islands was ongoing, negotiations over a China-Japan-South Korea FTA were 
about to begin. In the meantime, the CCP was torn in different directions in 
the battles between economic interests and national sentiments. Many Chinese 
youth regarded the CCP’s rhetorical protests as merely for show and believed that 
the CCP was actually putting economic interests ahead of national dignity. The 
Strong Nation Forum was overwhelmed with posts expressing disappointment 
in the CCP and demanding tough responses to Japan. Without elections to vent 
their anger, Chinese youth went out in the streets to express themselves and to 
mitigate their anxieties associated with emotions in conflict. With the advent of 
the Internet and enlightenment by education, rampant protests were widespread, 
despite the pressure of government suppression. Finally, Chinese “raging youth” 
nationalism is reinforced by its resistance to shared enemies. In 2012, youth pro-
tests were a reaction to Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands, whereas 
on the Strong Nation Forum many people believed that the United States had 
triggered Japan’s aggressive nationalism and should be responsible for the 2012 
Diaoyu Islands incident. China’s concern about the US threat is highly related 
to US policies of containing China through the TPP and a military alliance with 
Japan. The conflict between China and the United States peaked in 2012, as the 
United States persuaded Japan to join the TPP amid simmering tensions over 
the disputed islands. A shared memory of China’s century of humiliation and 
isolation during the Cold War has enhanced the sense of crisis with the sense of 
an immediate threat to China’s existence. Chinese youth tend to strengthen their 
Chinese identities in contrast to clear enemies—Japan and the United States. 
The crisis of threat is the motivation for collective resistance as well. A shared 
enemy provides common cause for national unity. As a consequence of the im-
mediate threat and the need to contain the US-Japan alliance advancing across 
the Pacific, China’s xenophobic nationalism in 2012 spread swiftly. In the end, 
Chinese youth’s identity was affirmed against the alien.
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The past few years have seen an upsurge in interest, both practically and academi-
cally, in state capitalism.1 While state capitalism is not a new phenomenon, the 
2008 global financial crisis sweeping through a large part of liberal capitalist sys-
tem made it a viable alternative approach to economic development. A number 
of developing economies with a relatively large state sector, such as Brazil, China, 
India, and Russia, outperformed their liberal developed counterparts.2 These 
economies had the state’s heavy hand involved and relied on their state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to stand against and buffer the impact of the crisis. Yet if we 
take a closer look at these economies, the SOE sector is not the only player in the 
game. Different from the old model of state capitalism in the 1970s, new varieties 
of state capitalist economies sprouted in the late 1990s and flourished in the late 
2000s. These new varieties have witnessed more strategic cooperation between 
their SOE and non-SOE sectors.3
Most scholars, policy makers, and journalists pay attention only to how such 
strategic cooperation associated with the new species of state capitalism effec-
tively challenges Western capitalist systems. There has been little investigation of 
the variations in domestic market structures within the group of state capital-
ist regimes—as if they were all the same. However, as the cases of China’s state 
capitalism in the post-1990s period and Taiwan’s state capitalism from the 1960s 
to the 2000s show, there is obvious heterogeneity in their ownership structures. 
Under China’s state capitalist regime there is a political pecking order where SOEs 
occupy the top of the hierarchy and private firms are relatively small, numerous, 
and weak.4 On the other hand, Taiwan’s state capitalist regime is characterized by 
small and medium-size private firms holding equal footing in the governmental 
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industrial policy.5 What explains this variation? In particular, given that state capi-
talism is a political-economic regime for the sake of national development, it is 
reasonable to expect that the economies under state capitalism will share similari-
ties in their domestic ownership structure, specifically an emphasis on the SOE 
sector. While China’s state capitalism conforms to such an expectation, Taiwan’s 
state capitalism does not. These variations in domestic ownership structures are 
puzzling. This chapter aims to analyze the rationale behind the variations in do-
mestic market structure across the Taiwan Strait and its implications for under-
standing cross-Strait economic interaction.
This chapter uses Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini’s work to define 
state capitalism. Musacchio and Lazzarini define state capitalism as “the wide-
spread influence of the government in the economy, either by owning majority 
or minority equity positions in companies or by providing subsidized credit and/
or other privileges to private companies.” On the basis of this definition, there are 
three subtypes of state capitalism: “leviathan as an entrepreneur”; “leviathan as a 
majority investor”; and “leviathan as a minority investor.”6 The first model refers 
to the old model of state capitalism existing primarily in the 1970s, and the sec-
ond and third models refer to the latest wave of state capitalism that we observe 
today. According to their definition, Musacchio and Lazzarini put China’s state 
capitalism in the category of “leviathan as a majority investor” and Taiwan’s state 
capitalism in the category of “leviathan as a minority investor.” To be specific, 
Taiwan’s state capitalism has experienced a transformation from “leviathan as en-
trepreneur” in the pre-1989 period to “leviathan as a minority investor” with the 
agenda of democratization in the late 1980s.7
One justification makes China’s and Taiwan’s state capitalism models a compa-
rable fit. That is, both China’s and Taiwan’s industries have experienced a Leninist 
model of control.8 Compared to the prereform era, when Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) control penetrated every work unit in China, the Chinese party-state 
of the reform period has loosened its grip over industry through various SOE re-
form agendas.9 Industrial policy still favors the SOE sector over other types of 
ownership, however, and China is a “commanding-heights economy,” in which the 
CCP’s Leninist model of control still has its place in the Chinese political econom-
ic system.10 Leninism was also once an essential part of the Kuomintang’s (KMT)’s 
governance of Taiwan’s political-economic system during its nearly four decades 
of authoritarian rule.11 A decade after Taiwan made its democratic transition, the 
KMT’s Leninist control model has yet to fade from the decision-making process.12 
In short, both China’s and Taiwan’s state capitalism have their roots in the Leninist 
legacy.
My central argument regarding the rationale behind the variations in domes-
tic market structure between China’s and Taiwan’s state capitalist regimes and its 
implications has three parts. First, the similar institutional foundations of the 
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Leninist legacy do not necessarily determine the evolution of state capitalism in 
authoritarian China and Taiwan. Second, the evolution of state capitalism in both 
authoritarian regimes hinges on the resources that the leaders have at their dispos-
al in the pursuit of national development. During the time when leaders in Taiwan 
cultivated the state capitalist system, the authoritarian KMT regime had just been 
defeated in the civil war and could rely only on assistance from the United States to 
build its economy. The ideology of market liberalism associated with US assistance 
supported private ownership rather than public ownership. Private ownership was 
thus not discriminated against under Taiwan’s state capitalism in the first place. 
In contrast, during the time when leaders in China cultivated their state capitalist 
system in the post-1990s period, China had tense relations with other major pow-
ers in the global community. Backed by a gigantic state-owned banking system, 
various state actors, including state firms, a diverse array of bureaucratic agencies, 
and state research institutes, provided reliable and efficient assistance to develop 
the state capitalist system. Public ownership functioned as the bedrock of China’s 
state capitalism. Third, China’s preference for state ownership over private owner-
ship has caused concerns about unfair competition and security issues in Taiwan, 
making economic interaction in the region more complicated and unstable.
This chapter is structured as follows. I begin by examining how state capitalism 
evolved in Taiwan from the 1960s to the 2000s. I then look in detail at the devel-
opment of China’s state capitalism since 2003. I end by discussing implications of 
variations in domestic market structure across state capitalist systems in Taiwan 
and China for understanding cross-Strait relations.
STATE CAPITALISM IN TAIWAN
Before studying the case of Taiwan, I need to clarify that the state capitalist re-
gime in Taiwan lasted nearly four decades, from the 1960s to the beginning of the 
2000s. Before the privatization agenda was initiated in 1989, Taiwan’s state capital-
ism fell into the category of “leviathan as an entrepreneur,” the primitive type of 
state capitalism under Musacchio and Lazzarini’s definition.13 As the agendas of 
democratization and its consolidation proceeded throughout the second half of 
the 1980s and the 1990s, the Taiwanese government revamped its own role in the 
marketplace and started to privatize state firms, resulting in what Musacchio and 
Lazzarini label “leviathan as a minority investor.”14
The democratic impetus continued to grow, and the state’s penetration into so-
ciety and intervention into the marketplace finally ended with the first party turn-
over from the KMT to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000,15 signify-
ing the breakdown of the state capitalist regime in Taiwan. The continuous efforts 
put forth by the Taiwanese government on the privatization agenda finally margin-
alized the importance of state ownership in Taiwan’s domestic market. Although 
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the Taiwanese state capitalist regime experienced a transformation from “leviathan 
as an entrepreneur” to “leviathan as a minority investor” during four decades, it is 
worth pointing out that the private sector had always been significant throughout 
this time (see table 8). Below I tackle the reason why the private sector was the 
dominant component under Taiwan’s state capitalism by looking at the interna-
tional and domestic environments in which the authoritarian KMT leaders oper-
ated and from which they could extract resources to engage in economic buildup.
Once Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the 
United States became the most important ally of the Taiwanese government. For 
the KMT authoritarian regime in Taiwan, China’s potential invasion has always 
been the biggest threat to its survival, especially because China has never aban-
doned its ambition to liberate the island. Nonetheless, ties with the United States 
have lessened such pressures. Keeping Taiwan from being taken over by the com-
munist camp was one of the most important agendas in American grand strategy 
during the first half of the Cold War period.16 Even when the American domes-
tic political atmosphere played down the strategic importance of Taiwan after the 
Sino-US rapprochement in the 1970s, the United States continued to provide Tai-
wan security assurance on an unofficial basis.17 American development assistance, 
security assurance, and access to the US market gave the authoritarian Taiwanese 
government more leverage at its disposal to build up its economy during the 1950s 
and 1960s, when the Taiwanese state capitalist regime began to take root. Put-
ting it differently, during Taiwan’s early stage of state capitalism the authoritarian 
Taiwanese government was brought into the American security orbit and was un-
der no pressure to rely on its own security. Thus, constructing a team of national 
champions to play catch-up was desirable but not imperative.
Influence from the United States was also translated into Taiwan’s domestic 
economic agenda. As discussed, Taiwan’s authoritarian regime relied heavily on 
assistance from the United States, both economically and militarily. This gave the 
United States leverage to influence Taiwan’s political-economic system by impos-
ing its liberal market ideology. During most of the aid period from 1950 to 1965, 
the SOE sector as part of the KMT regime was under constant pressure from the 
United States to reduce state shares in public firms.18 In the meantime, the US 
government also pushed the KMT government to carry out land reform, which 
transformed a large number of landowners into private entrepreneurs who were 
later sponsored by the KMT government to engage in export-led development.19 
Specifically, because the KMT authoritarian government was a non-native regime, 
it needed to cultivate local networks to consolidate its rule. In this respect, private 
entrepreneurs, mostly native Taiwanese, were good candidates for becoming part 
of KMT’s patron-client system. Advised by the United States, the KMT authoritar-
ian government gave private entrepreneurs numerous privileges in doing busi-
nesses in exchange for their political support.
Varieties of State Capitalism    121
Moreover, their failure during the civil war shaped KMT leaders’ percep-
tion of the market. Before retreating to Taiwan, the KMT regime had suffered 
from hyperinflation during the second half of 1940s. Learning from the financial 
disaster, decision makers in the KMT government in Taiwan respected market 
mechanisms in managing its economy.20 Hence, while adopting Leninist control 
over its economy, Taiwan’s authoritarian regime had no ideological commitment 
to state ownership and never used bureaucratic coordination to replace market 
mechanisms as communist regimes did. As a result, the KMT regime did not dis-
criminate against private ownership, one of the core elements of a liberal market 
economy, in its development programs.
Admittedly, compared to other newly industrialized economies in East Asia 
such as South Korea, bonding between the KMT regime and private capitalists was 
relatively loose because of mistrust between the former, a non-native regime domi-
nated by mainlanders, and the latter, composed of local Taiwanese.21 The distrust, 
however, was mediated by two factors: the above-mentioned US pressure and the 
fragmentation of local elites following the February 28 incident of 1947 (an upris-
ing in Taiwan that was violently suppressed by the KMT-led ROC government).22 
Table 8 The privatization agenda in Taiwan




China Petrochemical Development Corporation 6/20/1994 170.95
BES Engineering Corporation 6/22/1994 113.69
China Steel Corporation 4/12/1995 1195.08
Taiwan Machinery Manufacturing Corporation (Steel  
Production Plant)
5/20/1996 48.24
Taiwan Machinery Manufacturing Corporation  
(Shipbuilding Plant)
1/10/1997 22.75
Taiwan Machinery Manufacturing Corporation (Alloy Steel 
Production Plant)
6/30/1997 3.54
Taiwan Fertilizer Co., Ltd. 9/1/1999 170.29
Taiwan Hsing Chung Paper Co., Ltd. 10/16/2001 0.05
Taiwan Machinery Manufacturing Corporation (Head Office 
& Manufacturing Plant)
11/19/2001 35.09
Tang Eng Iron Works Co., Ltd. (Transportation division) 8/1/2002 0.2
Tang Eng Iron Works Co., Ltd.  
(Steel Plan, Machinery Plant)
9/1/2002 0.198
Taiwan Agricultural and Industrial Development  
Corporation (Chiayi Machinery Plant)
12/31/2002 0.078
Taiwan Salt Industrial Corporation 11/14/2003 28.36
Source: State-Owned Enterprise Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, Jingjibu suoshu shiye minyin-
ghua [Privatization of state-owned enterprises in Taiwan] (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, 1996), 179.
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Within this context the private sector was picked by the KMT authoritarian govern-
ment to play an essential role in the transformation of Taiwan’s development pattern 
from an import substitution strategy to a strategy of export-led economic growth.23
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the activism of the private sec-
tor would not be possible without a meritocratic and Weberian bureaucracy 
in Taiwan. As Peter Evans has demonstrated, bureaucracy in Taiwan enjoyed 
“embedded autonomy” that enabled it to formulate and implement policy goals 
independent of any special interests while remaining connected to those inter-
ests by various social ties.24 Such bureaucratic capability kept the authoritarian 
KMT regime from overprotecting its SOEs at the expense of the private sector 
in its industrial policy. The high-tech industry is a good example. With a variety 
of policy preferences such as tax breaks and financial and infrastructure support, 
the Taiwanese government started to engage in industrial upgrading in the 1970s. 
It then established the Hsinchu Science Park in 1980 to assist high-tech firms, 
mostly composed of private capital, to operate businesses. Numerous economic 
technocrats such as Kwoh-ting Li played an essential role during the whole pro-
cess. It is not an exaggeration to say that private firms have an equal footing in 
Taiwan’s industrial policy, as is not the case of China.
STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA
State capitalism in China is a different story. Given that China is a transitional 
economy, it is useful to specify when state capitalism became the major feature 
of China’s political-economic system. While Chinese reformers have repeatedly 
initiated policies to separate SOEs from the state since the early stage of econom-
ic reform, it was not until the second half of the 1990s that the reform program 
of “grasping the large, releasing the small” paved the way for corporatization of 
the remaining state firms. Instead of managing the corporatized SOEs by itself, 
the Chinese state delegated the authority to managers of the corporatized firms, 
who were ministerial-level cadres selected by the central organization department 
of the CCP. At the same time Chinese reformers further diversified these firms’ 
ownerships through public listing and transformed them into shareholding enti-
ties. Parallel to the corporatization agenda in the SOE sector, in 2003 the Chinese 
state created the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion (SASAC) to supervise the operations of the SOEs. It is fair to claim that the 
engineering of China’s state capitalist regime was initiated in the late 1990s and 
completed in 2003 upon the creation of the SASAC (see table 9). Since 2003 the 
Chinese political economy has been a good example of state capitalism with the 
feature of “leviathan as a majority investor.”25
Like Taiwan, the Chinese state created the state capitalist regime in its pur-
suit of national development. Yet rather than relying on a large number of private 
Table 9 Distribution of industrial production by ownership in China (%)
Year
State-owned and state-holding 
enterprises Collective enterprises Private enterprises Others


















1980 75.97 23.54 0.02 0.47
1981 74.76 24.62 0.04 0.58
1982 74.44 24.82 0.06 0.68
1983 73.36 25.47 0.12 0.78
1984 69.09 29.71 0.19 1.01
1985 64.86 32.08 1.85 1.21
1986 62.27 33.51 2.76 1.46
1987 59.73 34.62 3.64 2.02
1988 56.80 36.15 4.34 2.72
1989 54.06 35.69 4.80 3.44
1990 54.60 35.62 5.39 4.38
1991 56.16 33.00 4.83 6.01
1992 51.52 35.07 5.80 7.61
1993 46.95 34.02 7.98 11.05
1994 37.34 37.72 10.09 14.85
1995 33.97 36.59 12.86 16.58
1996 36.32 39.39 15.48 16.65
1997 31.62 38.11 17.92 18.45
1998 28.24 38.41 17.11 22.91
1999 28.21 35.37 18.18 26.14
2000 47.33 13.90 64.07
2001 44.41 10.53 71.46
2002 40.78 8.68 75.73
2003 37.54 6.65 80.36
2004 34.81 3.90 84.49
2005 33.28 3.42 85.67
Continued
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Year
State-owned and state-holding 
enterprises Collective enterprises Private enterprises Others
2006 31.24 2.90 87.40
2007 29.54 2.51 88.51
2008 28.34 1.77 89.03
2009 26.74 1.75 89.93
2010 26.61 1.49 90.35
2011 26.81 1.31 90.79
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statis-
tics Press, 2012), 19.
Note: The total percentage figures for several years exceeded 100 percent, which challenges the accuracy of the data. 
Yet the data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China can still convey useful information on the general 
trend of changes in the SOE sector.
firms, China chose to restructure its ailing state firms into national champions. 
This choice reflected Chinese decision makers’ calculations of resources available 
from both international and domestic environments. In terms of international 
resources, during the reform era China received development assistance from in-
ternational organizations such as the World Bank, yet the Chinese leadership had 
no confidence in the aid regimes that were dominated by major Western powers, 
mainly the United States and other major powers that had tense relations with 
China. For example, the Tiananmen incident in 1989 and the corresponding sanc-
tions from the West made the creation of a strong SOE sector high on Chinese 
leaders’ agenda.26 In the decade following the incident, China’s relationship with 
the United States, the only superpower by that time, was entangled with American 
domestic issues such as the bipartisan debate over extending most-favored-nation 
trade status to China.27
At the turn of the new century, China’s entrance into the World Trade Organi-
zation put Chinese firms in direct competition with firms that had been cultivated 
in developed economies. Making all these pressures more severe was a persisting 
distrust regarding China’s economic rise in the international community, mani-
fested by the debate over whether the PRC was a revisionist or a status quo state.28 
Compared to Taiwan’s state capitalism, which was fostered when the United States 
provided a stable alliance, China’s state capitalism was engineered in the midst of 
a security dilemma in which only SOEs at the Chinese state’s disposal provided 
reliable and effective support for national development.
Given that only state ownership provides the CCP regime with a source of le-
gitimacy, its distrust of the growing class of private entrepreneurs also influences 
leaders’ decisions about building the state capitalist system. In the early years of 
China’s economic reform, the continued influence of ideological battles against 
Table 9 Continued
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the exploitation of the class of workers made Chinese leaders limit the actors in 
the nonstate sector to individually owned enterprises with a maximum of only 
eight employees.29 In the meantime, insecure property rights led to the widespread 
phenomenon of “wearing a red hat,” whereby private capitalists registered their 
enterprises as collective ones as a cover for their trade.30 Although Deng’s 1992 
Southern Tour of China to stress the importance of his agenda of economic re-
forms reinvigorated private capitalists’ confidence in running businesses, it was 
not until 2002, when Jiang Zemin asserted the “three represents” that the PRC 
stood for (advanced economic production, cultural development, and political 
consensus), that they were entitled to legal protection.
Official discrimination against the private sector in China still exists even as pri-
vate entrepreneurs and their property rights have gained legal status. As a regime 
that resorts to socialist ideology for its legitimacy, China’s party-state continues to 
privilege state ownership at the expense of other types of property rights. A good 
example is China’s stimulus package of US $586 billion in response to the global fi-
nancial crisis in 2008. The investment plan mostly went to infrastructure projects in 
which state firms were the main operators. Private firms, in contrast, had difficulty 
securing stable funding sources such as bank loans and government subsidies. As 
a result, the saying that “the state advances, the private sector retreats” (guo jin min 
tui) became a reality.31 Even today several industries that are critical for national 
development still shut the door to private firms and remain monopolized by the 
state.32 Given that the class of private capitalists is the main agent of democratization 
in a number of countries, it is not surprising that the CCP’s leaders keep a vigilant 
eye on the private sector and adopt the preceding ownership discrimination strat-
egy. On the basis of the above elaboration of China’s international and domestic 
concerns, it is obvious that leaders in Beijing, wary of the political implications of 
the private sector, can rely only on SOEs to play economic catch-up.
In sum, both Taiwan’s and China’s state capitalist regimes are characterized 
by strong states and have similar industrial policies; however, the effect of state 
intervention in the two political-economic systems is far from the same. Indus-
trial policies under Taiwan’s state capitalism have emphasized social performance 
indicators such as social equality, whereas industrial policies under China’s state 
capitalism have focused on the resilience of the authoritarian political system.33 
These different concerns have led to divergent ownership structures in the domes-
tic markets under the two varieties of state capitalism.
C ONCLUSION:  RETHINKING EC ONOMIC 
INTEGR ATION ACROSS THE TAIWAN STR AIT
An increasing body of research focuses on the development of state capitalism 
across different parts of the globe as a response to the new economic environment 
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brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. The scholarship has done an excellent 
job of presenting how states adopting the state capitalist system employ flexible 
strategies to interfere in markets and succeed in achieving growth. Although the 
literature has identified various forms of state capitalist regimes, it has yet to offer 
an explanation of why the variations exist. Using state capitalism in Taiwan and 
China, this chapter finds that resources available to leaders when they engage in 
the cultivation of state capitalist regimes condition the main agent of economic 
development and thus the ownership structures in the domestic markets. Assis-
tance from the United States and the commitment to a liberal market explain the 
prevalence of small and medium-sized private firms under Taiwan’s model of state 
capitalism, while tensions with major powers and the CCP’s reliance on state own-
ership as one of its sources of legitimacy account for the dominance of the SOE 
sector under China’s state capitalism.
This finding corresponds to the latest development of historical institution-
alism, in which researchers are paying renewed attention to human agency in 
an effort to avoid determinism brought about by the analytical concept of path 
dependence.34 In other words, even though both Taiwan and China had a history 
of using Leninist control models in their markets, their similar starting points 
did not mean they followed the same evolutionary path for domestic market 
structures. Their differences, however, cannot be explained away by the posi-
tive effects of increasing returns associated with the process of path dependence. 
Rather, as the cases of Taiwan and China demonstrate, the evolution of state 
capitalist regimes hinges on the choices of political leaders.
It is useful to close my argument by discussing how my research findings would 
affect the development of cross-Strait relations. As of this writing in the second 
half of 2016, relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been fac-
ing a downturn since Tsai Ing-wen of DPP was sworn in as the new president of 
Taiwan in May 2016. Tsai’s rejection of the so-called 1992 Consensus (the previous 
agreement that there is only one Chinese nation but that the PRC and the ROC 
can differ as to which of them is its legitimate representative), which served as the 
foundation for détente between the two sides from 2008 to early 2016, was inter-
preted as a defiant assertion of Taiwanese separateness and independence. While 
it remains to be seen how both sides adapt to this new situation, it is fair to say that 
Tsai’s stance toward China has generated distrust in China-Taiwan interactions. 
Below I focus only on the implications of these research findings for cross-Strait 
relations during the 2008–16 period.
Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT, Tsai’s predecessor, adopted a policy of engagement 
with China and cultivated extensive economic ties with the Chinese market. Ma’s 
approach totally reversed the hostile policy stance toward China under DPP 
president Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. Despite being charged with selling 
Taiwan out to China, Ma’s effort has been fruitful. China and Taiwan signed the 
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Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and cross-Strait trade has 
risen by more than 50 percent, reaching US$198 billion in 2014. At the same time, 
the Ma administration gradually relaxed restrictions on foreign direct investment 
from China.35 This growing economic integration developed in tandem with more 
social exchanges between Taiwan and China. Ma’s first term was the first time that 
Chinese students could register for and get degrees from Taiwanese universities. 
In the meantime, the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, with a daily quota of 
five thousand visitor groups and four thousand individual travelers, is said to be 
an economic boon for Taiwan’s domestic market. All of the preceding exchanges 
created the foundation for peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait and thus 
the prospect of détente between Taiwan and China.36
Without a doubt the argument for cross-Strait détente has its theoretical un-
derpinnings, namely the commercial peace research agenda. Revised from the 
democratic peace research program, which emphasizes that democratic countries 
have the ability to promote peace among themselves, the commercial peace lit-
erature argues that economic institutions associated with these democracies and 
frequent commercial exchanges among them create the space for political stabili-
zation among these countries.37 If we apply the logic of commercial peace studies 
to cross-Strait relations under Ma’s presidency, there are reasons for optimism. As 
noted above, cross-Strait exchanges with regard to trade, capital, and personnel 
have been boosted to an unprecedented level. At the same time, the economic 
system in China has been transformed into a capitalist economy and the market 
mechanism has been the major institution to coordinate domestic economic ac-
tivities.38 Together, these two trends have further integrated economic activities 
across the Taiwan Strait to the degree that neither side would escalate political 
tension in cross-Strait relations. Yet the findings of this chapter suggest that cau-
tion is warranted in interpreting the effect of economic integration on cross-Strait 
peaceful development during Ma’s presidency.
While international trade is said to promote the welfare of the country as a 
whole, individuals within the country experience different impacts, depending 
on whether they work for sectors with comparative advantages. In other words, 
international trade generates a distributional issue that creates winners and los-
ers within a country. As a result, political rivalry associated with the trade issue 
is heightened when both groups try to lobby and influence decision makers.39 In 
this respect trade politics in Taiwan is no exception, especially when the Chinese 
political-economic system is dominated by a strong SOE sector, as mentioned in 
the previous section. As deepening economic ties with China were the hallmark 
of Ma’s presidency, his party, the KMT, experienced a difficult situation during the 
Sunflower Movement protests and suffered an overwhelming election defeat in 
2014 and again in January 2016.40 Three key aspects derived from this study help 
us understand the public backlash against Ma’s economic engagement with China.
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First, the visible hand of the Chinese state causes concerns about fair market 
competition in Taiwan. As noted earlier, China’s state capitalist regime favors 
the SOE sector at the expense of the private sector. State interference and state 
subsidies have facilitated the expansion of Chinese state firms not only in the 
domestic market but also in the global market.41 The two trends in China’s do-
mestic market described by the saying “The state advances and the private sec-
tor retreats” and China’s “going out policy” in the global market where SOEs 
have played the dominant role manifest such a discriminatory industrial policy. 
Certainly the Taiwanese government has also wielded power in the market and 
adopted industrial policy to pursue national development under state capital-
ism. Yet as noted above, the Taiwanese government interfered in the market 
without incurring ownership discrimination against private property rights. 
Rather, private ownership played an essential role in the course of economic de-
velopment in Taiwan. As a result, whenever the Ma administration took actions 
to further open Taiwan’s domestic market to Chinese capital, there were con-
cerns that Chinese firms supported by state subsidies would drive out Taiwanese 
local private businesses.
Second, and relatedly, the distributional issue in Taiwan brought about by trade 
with China has worsened with the progress of economic integration across the 
Taiwan Strait. Although Ma’s engagement policy is said to boost Taiwan’s econ-
omy, the benefits of economic exchanges are not shared evenly within Taiwanese 
society. Income and wealth inequality has been one of the top issues in public dis-
cussions since Ma’s second term started in 2012. While there is no evidence show-
ing that widening domestic income inequality is a result of increasing cross-Strait 
economic integration, public sentiment toward the lack of transparency in China’s 
political economic system is becoming even more complicated. This is largely 
because the new pattern of economic growth is different from what Taiwanese 
people ever experienced under Taiwan’s state capitalism, which emphasized both 
high economic growth and low income inequality.
That is, the seemingly similar state capitalist regimes on both sides of the Tai-
wan Strait actually have divergent experiences in development. As the illustration 
of “the domestic version of commercial liberalism” argued by Patrick McDon-
ald, international trade per se does not necessarily lead to peace between coun-
tries; only international trade among economies in which private ownership plays 
the predominant role can pacify potential military conflicts.42 Seen in this light, 
although the Chinese government has engaged in economic liberalization for de-
cades and although internationalist economic interests in China’s domestic politics 
have had pacific effects on its foreign policy agenda, a preponderance of state own-
ership in its economy still makes economic actors in Taiwan skeptical about China’s 
political goals in promoting cross-Strait economic exchanges. This leads us to the 
next point.
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Last but not the least, extensive economic integration with China stimulates 
popular awareness of Taiwan’s sovereign status. International trade leads to 
interdependence between/among economies and entails the issue of security 
externality.43 Numerous studies show that in general trade among allies gen-
erates a positive security externality while trade among nonallies generates a 
negative security externality.44 Given that China has the claim of sovereign-
ty over Taiwan, according to a new national security law that China passed 
in July 2015, political rivalries between the two parties remain as intense as 
ever. Consequently, security concerns about growing economic dependence 
on China have never disappeared from Taiwan’s trade politics, even under the 
presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.45 Ma’s engagement policy 
and China’s increasingly active and aggressive stance on the world stage have 
deepened Taiwanese people’s concerns about further integration. In particular, 
a certain percentage of Chinese investment in Taiwan comes from the state sec-
tor,46 making the public in Taiwan suspect that their operations may have goals 
other than economic profits.
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In January 1990, the Taiwanese government announced the “Measures on Indirect 
Investment and Technical Cooperation with the Mainland” (Dui dalu diqu jianjie 
touzi huo jishu hezuo guanli banfa) and officially lifted the ban on investing in 
China. Simultaneously in this era of change, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour pro-
moting economic reforms, and the adoption of a socialist market economic system 
in the Fourteenth National Party Congress, both in 1992, ensured a more busi-
ness-friendly investment climate in China. Regardless, cross-Strait relations would 
continue to stumble over the next few years along with industrial restructuring 
in Taiwan and changing economic development in China respectively. In 1994, 
former president Lee Teng-hui (hereafter Lee) promoted a “southward policy” to 
redirect Taiwanese investment from China to Southeast Asia, and in 1996 he issued 
his motto, “Don’t rush, be patient” (jieji yongren), advocating a more gradual and 
careful approach to Taiwanese investment in China (TIC), accompanied by new 
regulations on such investment. In 2000, Lee’s successor Chen Shui-bian (hereafter 
Chen) won the election and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the 
ruling party. Chen’s hostile attitude toward China and the DPP’s proindependence 
stance made cross-Strait relations very difficult, and political exchanges were sus-
pended. But after incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou (hereafter Ma) took power in 
2008 the Taiwanese government reinitiated interaction with China and cross-Strait 
relations made great progress.
Against this background, this chapter aims to explore the following questions: 
Has the change of political authority affected the patterns and amount of Taiwan-
ese investment in China (TIC)? How have Taiwanese businesspeople (taishang) re-
sponded to the changing political landscape? What has changed and what has not 
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about TIC since the 1990s? In general, what is the trend of TIC in the past two de-
cades? Concerning data availability and the shifts of political power in Taiwan, this 
chapter focuses on TIC between 1991 and 2014 (under three Taiwanese presidents). 
Drawing on data from both Taiwan and China, this chapter argues that TIC has 
been driven mainly by economic motivations and is barely affected by tumultuous 
political situations. The depoliticization of business characterizes TIC. Taishang have 
continued to prosper despite political turbulence but have been excluded from the 
domestic policy-making process. In recent years, TIC has been gradually declining 
because of a deteriorating investment environment on the mainland.
This chapter demonstrates that while the amount of TIC has been generally 
increasing over the past twenty-five years, its composition has radically changed 
because of both endogenous constraints and exogenous factors. In terms of en-
dogenous constraints, rising labor costs and shifting local preferential policies 
have degraded the benefits and forced taishang either to look for new sites with 
lower production costs or to devote themselves to technological and industrial 
upgrades. Regarding exogenous factors, volatile global markets and growing com-
petitiveness from domestic enterprises have prompted Taiwanese companies to 
integrate themselves into China’s local markets. These trends show that TIC has 
been heavily influenced by the macroeconomic environment in China and that 
political struggles between Taiwan and China have not led to changes in TIC.
The next section of this chapter begins by elaborating on Taiwanese investment in 
China over the past two decades and demonstrates how little impact unstable poli-
cies and power fluctuation across the Strait have had on it. The third section describes 
the role of Taiwanese entrepreneurs across the Strait. Taishang are neither political 
agents nor economic hostages. They are businesspeople who look for greater oppor-
tunities and higher returns and are no different from their counterparts conducting 
business in other countries. The fourth section examines the “go south” strategy as 
an alternative for taishang and TIC to diversify the risk of relying too heavily on 
China. The evidence shows that after having been implemented for twenty years, the 
policies are still struggling to encourage taishang to shift their investment to South-
east Asian countries. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the broader impli-
cations for TIC and its future. While China is now implementing its grand economic 
strategy, incorporating TIC as part of that strategy is a clear political tactic. Nonethe-
less, taishang’s decisions on whether to invest in China have been driven primarily 
by economic motives, and this is especially the case now, since China has gradually 
withdrawn most of its policies that once favored Taiwanese investors.
GO WEST:  TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN CHINA
In Taiwan, it is commonly believed that in general the Kuomintang (the Nation-
alist Party, KMT) is pro-China and the DPP is anti-China and that the former is 
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more willing to facilitate economic interaction while the latter is reluctant to fos-
ter economic ties with China. Taiwanese society and media have focused on how 
the DPP’s anti-China sentiment has had a spillover effect that has greatly influ-
enced TIC, especially during the Chen administration. However, there is neither 
clear evidence nor statistical data to support this argument. The trend of TIC has 
not necessarily been closely linked to political administrations’ orientation and 
fluctuation and is instead more related to business considerations and economic 
motivations. Statistical data released by the Taiwanese government show little 
clear impact of the turnovers of political power in 2000 and 2008 on the levels of 
TIC approved by the Taiwanese authorities. Contrary to the parties’ orientations 
toward China as these are generally perceived, TIC increased in 2001, one year 
after the DPP took power in 2000, and declined in 2009, one year after the KMT 
took power in 2008. That is to say, the DPP government did not strictly regulate 
Taiwanese investment as it was expected or said to do. In fact, ongoing cross-Strait 
economic integration has thrived under both parties.1
The Taiwanese government lifted the ban on foreign exchange and facili-
tated capital outflow in July 1987; it removed restrictions on visiting China that 
November. These policy shifts initiated TIC. In January 1990, the Taiwanese 
government promulgated “Measures on Indirect Investment and Technical 
Cooperation with the Mainland” to promote TIC conditionally. At this early 
stage, most TIC was from Taiwanese entrepreneurs who owned small and me-
dium-sized enterprises and moved their factories to China to seek competitive 
advantages and low wage costs. Taishang established joint venture enterprises 
and cooperative companies with their Chinese counterparts because wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises were not yet permitted. They used the productive 
pattern of taking orders in Taiwan, producing in China, and then exporting to 
the Western countries. This explains why Taiwanese investors sought to invest in 
sectors where the profit ratio was high instead of in resource-rich areas as their 
Japanese and Korean counterparts did. The initial TIC was small and cautious 
because of restrictions on the Taiwanese side. Figure 3, based on calculations by 
the Republic of China (ROC), shows that the amount of TIC approved by the 
Taiwanese government increased in 1992–93 and 1996–97.2 The former was the 
positive response to Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour and the establishment of a 
socialist market economy system in the Fourteenth National Party Congress in 
1992. The latter trend demonstrates Taiwanese government’s self-contradiction: 
the amount of TIC it approved in 1997 was 30% more than in the previous year, 
when Lee promoted the policy of “No haste, be patient” and imposed many 
new regulations on TIC. Ever since his visit to the United States in 1995, pre-
cipitating a missile crisis and freezing cross-Strait talks, Lee had shown a tough 
attitude toward China, but the Taiwanese authorities remained generous with 
approved TIC. The amount of approved TIC significantly declined in 1998 and 
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1999 because of the Asian financial crisis, and, despite some later, larger fluctua-
tions, its overall tendency has been to rise since 2000. Surprisingly, the trend 
did not reflect the political turbulence evoked by Lee’s assertion, in July 1999, of 
the so-called “two-state theory” (liangguo lun) that Taiwan and China should 
engage in special state-to-state relationships—a controversial move to which 
China soon responded by canceling the third Koo-Wang talk, which had origi-
nally been scheduled in Taipei in the fall. In 2000, Chen won the presidential 
election and the DPP became the ruling party. The DPP government promoted 
an “invest in Taiwan” policy and provided a low-interest loan fund, tax breaks, 
and subsidies to incentivize Taiwanese companies to do so. Nonetheless, dur-
ing Chen’s administration the approved amount of TIC only slightly decreased 
in 2004 and 2005. That is to say, the DPP government did not adopt effective 
policies to prevent taishang from investing in China or convince them to stay in 
Taiwan. Ironically, the amount of TIC dropped radically in 2009, one year after 
Ma took power, and then abruptly rose in 2010. Affected by shrinking demand 
resulting from the global financial crisis and rising labor costs in China, the 
figure 3. Approved TIC, actual TIC, and the rate (million US$).
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, https://www.moeaic.gov.tw.
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approved amount has lessened since 2011.3 Obviously the trend of the approved 
amount of TIC has not generally reflected power shifts in Taiwan.
On the China side, in 1979 the Chinese government released a “Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan” (gao Taiwan tongbao shu) proposing an opening up of 
trade and economic exchanges; this was followed up by the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade’s promulgation of “Interim Provisions Concerning Trade with Taiwan” 
(Guanyu kaizhan dui Taiwan maiyi de zhanshi guiding). Later, China’s State Coun-
cil passed the “Special Preferential Regulations on Taiwanese Patriots’ Investment 
in the Special Economic Zones” (Guanyu Taiwan tongbao dao jingjitequ touzi de 
tebie youhui banfa) to make it easier for Taiwanese entrepreneurs to invest in the 
special economic zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen) that had been es-
tablished in 1979. The first wholly owned Taiwanese enterprise (TE) was estab-
lished in Fuzhou in 1984 with the acquiescence of the local government and later 
received its first approval by the central state’s Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela-
tions and Trade (formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade) in 1986. Two years later, 
the number of TEs grew to eighty with an investment of US$100 million in 1986. 
By the end of 1989, there were two thousand TEs and the amount of TIC was over 
US$1 billion. In general, TIC in the 1980s was initially limited because of China’s 
unclear investment environment and the Taiwanese government’s restrictions. It 
followed the development model of “two ends out” (liangtou zaiwai), referring to a 
pattern in which both the sources of raw materials and the ultimate products were 
nondomestic. The demand in the foreign market had been rocketing up but that 
in local market remained quite low. Obviously, for taishang in the 1980s and early 
1990s political concerns were more important than economic considerations in 
their investment decisions. Once the macroeconomic climate had become stable 
and beneficial to TIC, TIC was less sensitive to political turbulence, and in the 
1990s Taiwan’s investment rapidly became the second highest in China, second 
only to Hong Kong’s.
Figure 4 shows actual TIC as calculated by China’s National Statistical Bureau. 
The amount increased between 1989 and 1996, only slightly decreasing in 1995. 
This trend reflects the friendly investment environment that the Chinese govern-
ment created in order to develop TIC. Actual TIC radically declined between 
1997 and 2000 (figure 4), but the approved amount declined only slightly from 
1997 to 1999 and increased from 1999 to 2000 (figure 3). We find that the de-
teriorating macroeconomic environment, namely the Asian financial crisis, has 
had greater impact on TIC than political fluctuations. Although Lee promoted 
his ideas about jieji yongren, the approved TIC remained relatively stable be-
tween 1996 and 1999. In 2001, China, by entering the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), greatly improved the institutional environment for investment, which 
strengthened taishang confidence in investing in China. This was reflected in the 
radically increased amount invested in 2001 and 2002, even though Chen had 
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won the presidential election and had not yet presented clear mainland policies. 
Nonetheless, the amount of actual TIC declined between 2002 and 2007 while 
the approved amount rose in the same period. This suggests that what restricted 
TIC was neither the Taiwanese authorities nor the Chinese state but taishang 
themselves, who were suspicious of Chen’s mainland policy and became more 
conservative about investing in China even though the door remained open. In 
August 2002, Chen asserted his “one country on each side of the strait” (yibian 
yiguo) stance (that the PRC and the ROC were two different countries rather 
than two political entities within the country of China) and declared that the 
Taiwanese people would consider holding a referendum to decide Taiwan’s fu-
ture. China rapidly responded with tough comments and suspended interaction 
with the Taiwanese government. In 2005 China passed the Anti-Secession Law, 
demonstrating its commitment to unification and adding tension to cross-Strait 
relations. The law proclaims that Taiwan is part of China and that China may take 
nonpeaceful action if Taiwanese proindependence forces push Taiwan to secede 
from China.4 Surprisingly, Hsu Wen-long, an important Taiwanese entrepreneur 
and founder of the Chi Mei Group, whose support for Chen had been crucial 
in the 2000 presidential election, published an open letter to support the law 
and mentioned that the law made him feel confident about investing in China.5 
Although China could retaliate against Taiwan by imposing clear economic sanc-
tions or issuing tougher regulations over TIC, there was no clear evidence of Chi-
na taking substantial actions during Chen’s tenure. Ironically, Chen’s provocative 
figure 4. Taiwan’s actual direct investment in China (million US$).
Source: China’s National Statistical Bureau, “National Data,” multiple years, http://data.stats.gov.cn/.
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political statement did not inspire China’s revenge but instead raised the alarm 
of taishang.
Nonetheless, China’s entry into the WTO brought some challenges to TIC. 
More and more multinational companies started to invest in China. Meanwhile, 
China’s own domestic enterprises gradually developed and became competitive 
after experiencing economic reform for two decades. With greater institutional-
ization and openness, the Chinese government has been pressured to create a level 
playing field in the marketplace. TIC originally benefited from many preferential 
policies exclusively provided to taishang, but these advantages lessened or even 
disappeared because of both WTO regulations and competition from local enter-
prises. Hence, the fluctuation of actual TIC in the 2000s can be attributed more 
to the shifting economic environment than to the changing political landscape.
In general, figures 3 and 4 present very different pictures of TIC in China. The 
amount of TIC approved by the Taiwanese government increased between 1999 and 
2008, but the data of actual TIC gathered from Chinese authorities demonstrate a 
continuing decline between 2002 and 2008 and an increase afterwards. One may 
argue that the Chinese government obstructed TIC in order to pressure the DPP 
administration and promoted it during the KMT administration. But we found no 
clear evidence of this from either China’s policies or interviews with taishang.6
As Taiwan has enhanced its involvement in China’s economy, it has been said 
that Taiwan has been losing its economic autonomy and ceding leverage over its 
continued prosperity to China. With its rapid economic growth in the past two de-
cades, China has surpassed Japan in 2010 to become the second-largest economy in 
the world.7 While China thus has increasing leverage over Taiwan’s economy, and 
more than 50 percent of Taiwanese overseas investment is located in China, taishang 
and TIC have confronted more challenges from both inside and outside China, and 
we cannot simply attribute the fluctuation of TIC to shifting political power. In addi-
tion, the statistical data have exhibited a generally rising amount of TIC, and neither 
Taiwanese and Chinese governments have issued clear economic bans and sanc-
tions on TIC. Economic factors play a key role in influencing TIC trends.
TRENDS CHAR ACTERIZING THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF TIC
At the earliest stage, TIC was concentrated in traditional labor-intensive indus-
tries, such as shoemaking, textiles, and plastic products. Later, it expanded to dif-
ferent industries in the manufacturing sector, such as consumer electronics, chem-
icals, and food and beverages. Over the years TIC evolved from small factories 
to large capital-intensive companies with advanced technology, such as electrical 
appliances, precision instruments, and computer hardware. Since 2008 TIC has 
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increasingly gone into all economic fields, including real estate, finance, tourism, 
media, and various service industries.8 Accordingly, the major Taiwanese investors 
have shifted from small and middle-scale enterprises to large exchange-listed and 
OTC-listed enterprises with investment projects involving amounts over US$10 
million. Unlike their predecessors who exported their products abroad, taishang 
are now targeting China’s huge developing domestic market because they are en-
countering a shrinking global market. Moreover, Taiwanese enterprises have grad-
ually increased their usage of raw materials and semifinished products purchased 
from local companies while reducing imports from Taiwan. Taiwanese companies 
have occupied a position in China’s industrial chain and have closely linked them-
selves to China’s economic development.
In general, TIC has demonstrated a gradual spread from south to north, from 
east to west, and from coastal regions to interior areas. Since the early 1990s, the 
Pearl River Delta area in Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta area in Jiang-
su have attracted the most TIC because of their proximity to Hong Kong and to 
Shanghai respectively.9 In recent years, in order to respond to global financial crisis 
and promote industrial upgrading, Guangdong first promulgated the strategies of 
“clearing the cage and replacing the bird” (tenglong huanniao) and “transferring in-
dustries and labor” (shuang zhuanyi) in 2008. The local government plans to move 
low-margin, low-tech, labor-intensive industries out of the Pearl River Delta region 
and to introduce capital-intensive industry in its place. This desire to change the 
type of economic activities within the province has great impact on TIC because 
many Taiwanese factories were regarded as the “birds” that needed to be replaced. 
Similar policies were adopted in Zhejiang and Shanghai. Some Taiwanese entrepre-
neurs were encouraged to move their labor-intensive factories to Anhui Province, 
where the local government promised them more land.10 Some Taiwanese investors 
bargained to keep one building or a small piece of land in the original location so 
that they could retain a base there even while moving a majority of their assets out.
In figure 5 we see how the approved amount of TIC has increased from the early 
1990s in Central and South China and especially in East China.11 While Jiangsu 
and Guangdong have radically lost TIC since 2010, Shanghai and Fujian have at-
tracted more TIC since 2009. North China and Southwest China have welcomed 
more TIC since 2005. Northwest China and Northeast China have long been left 
behind in periods of economic transition because of a lack of infrastructure, and 
the amount of TIC reflects this situation as well.
BENEFICIAL POLICIES AT CENTR AL AND 
LO CAL LEVELS
The central Chinese government has promulgated several preferential policies to 
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Encouraging the Investments of Taiwan Compatriots” (Guanyu guli Taiwan tong-
bao touzi de guiding).12 This document provided very comprehensive and detailed 
regulations on how Taiwanese entrepreneurs could invest in China. It had been 
less than a decade since China embarked on its economic transition, and the idea 
of regime change remained fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity. As a means 
to promote investment stability, China’s Taiwan investment regulations attempted 
to enhance investor confidence by specifying that “the state will not nationalize 
the investment of Taiwanese investors and other assets” and “the legal benefits the 
Taiwanese investors obtain can be remitted abroad according to relevant law.”13 In 
1994 the Chinese government passed the “Law Regarding the Protection of Invest-
ment by Taiwan Compatriots” (Taiwan tongbao touzi baohu fa) and made it very 
clear that its purpose was to protect and encourage Taiwanese investment in Chi-
na and to promote cross-Strait economic development.14 The law also permitted 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to organize business associations. In the same year, the 
State Council announced the “Decision Concerning Further Development of Eco-
nomic Issues across the Strait” (Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu fazhan haxialiang’an 
jingjiguanxi ruogan wenti de jueding) and promoted the principles of “priority and 
relaxation” (tongdeng youxian, shidang fangkuan).15 After this law had been imple-
mented for five years, the Chinese government approved the “Rules for Implemen-
tation of the Law on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots” (Taiwan 
tongbao touzi baohufa shishi xize) to provide more detailed regulations in 1999. In 
2012, the Jiangsu provincial government passed the “Regulation on the Protection 
and Promotion of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots” (Baohu he cujin Taiwan 
tongbao touzi tiaoli), which is the first and only legal document at the local level.16 
These statutes have never been revised, so some of the articles are outdated. In 
2009 China announced the launch of an amendment process for “Rules for Imple-
mentation of the Law on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots,” but 
it has not made any substantial progress as yet.17
The major functions of Taiwanese business associations (TBAs) include pro-
tecting the legal rights of taishang, managing public relations with and taking care 
of Taiwanese people in China, and improving the local investment environment.18 
The first TBA was registered in Shenzhen in 1990, and there are now 142 TBAs 
across China.19 To better manage TBAs, the Chinese government issued a notice 
entitled “Interim Measures on Administrating Taiwanese Business Associations” 
(Taiwan tongbao touzi qiye xiehui guanli zhanxing banfa) in 2003. Nonetheless, 
TBAs are not official institutions and are not allowed to have national headquar-
ters. Some TBAs worked together to establish a nonprofit organization, the As-
sociation of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM, quanguo 
Taiwan tongbao touzi qiye lianyihui), in 2007. The ATIEM is supervised by both 
the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Ministry of Civil Affairs and is able to commu-
nicate with the central government directly. That is, it acts as a two-way channel 
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between TBAs and the Chinese government. It transmits taishang’s voices to the 
authorities and delivers central directives to the entrepreneurs.20
At the local level, provincial and city governments have offered various forms 
of preferential treatment to attract Taiwanese investment, such as providing a wide 
range of tax incentives and reinvesting profits, facilitating cheap land acquisition, 
and reducing bureaucratic hurdles. For example, one of the most popular pro-
grams is called the Two Free, Three Half (liangmian, sanjianban), meaning that a 
Taiwanese firm scheduled to operate longer than ten years is qualified to enjoy a 
five-year concessionary tax term with two years of exemption and three years of 
paying only half the corporate income tax after its profit-making year.21 Nonethe-
less, in December 2014 the central government announced Notice No. 62, which 
requires ministries and local governments to clean up and regulate preferential 
policies that violate laws.22 Because Taiwanese investing firms have long enjoyed 
more incentives than other foreign companies from local governments in China, 
taishang will bear the brunt of the new requirements. In the press conference 
after the National People’s Congress concluded in March 2015, Premier Li Keqiang 
stressed that China will continue to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of 
Taiwanese-invested enterprises and will sustain appropriate preferential policies 
for them.23
Contrary to this trend, in Taiwanese society the major debate is whether TIC 
is hollowing out Taiwan’s economy. Those who disagree argue that the problem 
is a lack of investment opportunities instead of capital, so that industrial upgrad-
ing is key to reviving the economy. Those who agree contend that the rise of the 
unemployment rate and loss in domestic investment and the proportionate size of 
manufacturing gross domestic product (GDP) are attributable to increasing TIC. 
But there is no consensus yet.
THE ROLE OF TAISHANG :  POLITICAL AGENT S OR 
EC ONOMIC HOSTAGES
While cross-Strait political relations were suspended under the Chen administra-
tion, it was predicted that TIC would be affected and even prohibited by China. 
Theories of economic statecraft proposed that China might implement economic 
sanctions as a coercive political tactic to pressure Taiwan.24 The possibility of eco-
nomic warfare across the Strait is much greater than that of military warfare be-
cause China could not achieve its desired goals through military tactics.25 Hence 
taishang are potential hostages or vulnerable victims if the Chinese government 
decides to launch economic sanctions as political retaliation.26
But such a viewpoint does not take into account the complicated interaction 
between both governments and the commercial interests that Taiwanese busi-
nesspeople have pursued. Instead of wielding a big stick, the Hu administration 
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implemented a “carrots” policy of “counting on the Taiwanese people” to pres-
sure the DPP administration. Nonetheless, this attempt to use taishang as political 
leverage over Taiwan was ineffective and showed that taishang’s political signifi-
cance is rather limited.27 During Chen’s tenure, while official interaction between 
the PRC and the ROC was generally suspended, Taiwanese businesspeople be-
came implicitly a channel of information that helped the Chinese government un-
derstand Taiwan. Taishang had had no impact on the DPP’s mainland polices, nor 
were they able to communicate with the Taiwanese government. When President 
Ma took power in 2008 and cross-Strait relations dramatically improved, the role 
of taishang changed both politically and economically. The KMT administration 
would regularly host gatherings with taishang where President Ma would par-
ticipate, listening to their advice. Taishang have more and more frequently taken 
part in cross-Strait interactions organized by both the Taiwanese government and 
the KMT. But the key officials of TBAs and the ATIEM see these activities as the 
KMT’s lip service and believe there has been no substantial progress in improving 
the taishang’s situation.28 In general, taishang are vulnerable to volatile political 
situations but unable to participate in the policy-making process. In other words, 
they are influenced but not influencing in cross-Strait political interactions.
Voting for the KMT may be regarded as a passive reaction to Taiwanese politics: 
taishang rely on this party for a stable and predictable mainland policy. We should 
not interpret it to mean that taishang support China or further political progress 
toward unification. Ironically, they are the people who know how untrustworthy 
China is. The rising competitiveness of domestic enterprises and a lack of offi-
cial support from the Taiwanese have left taishang struggling to do business in 
China. Quite often the Taiwan Affairs Offices in Beijing are too weak to help when 
dealing with other government bodies such as local governments, the Ministry of 
Commerce, and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce in China.29 
Taishang have played a less important role in cross-Strait relations than the public 
has generally believed. In short, taishang are neither political agents nor economic 
hostages. They are unable to make a positive contribution to policy, but they have 
not seriously suffered from political turbulence. They are businesspeople who look 
for commercial opportunities in China and hope for a stable political environ-
ment, as their counterparts would when investing in any other part of the world.
GO SOUTH:  TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN C OUNTRIES AS AN ALTERNATIVE
The “go south” strategy was initiated in 1993 by former president Lee Teng-hui in 
order to diversify risks faced by Taiwanese investors and lessen their reliance on 
China.30 The Taiwanese government issued its “Guidelines for Strengthening Eco-
nomic and Trade Ties with Southeast Asia,” which are now in their seventh edition. 
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During the Asian financial crisis, the Taiwanese government further promulgated 
the “Measures on Strengthening the Promotion of Economic and Trade Relations 
with Southeast Asia” to help Taiwanese businesspeople with financing problems. 
Unfortunately these policies were not particularly effective, and most Taiwanese 
capital ended up leaving Thailand and Indonesia.31 In 2002 then-president Chen 
reannounced the “go south” strategy, declaring that China was just one part of the 
global market and that Taiwan should not depend on it too heavily. When incum-
bent president Ma took power in 2008, he reconfirmed the necessity for Taiwan to 
participate in regional economic integration in Southeast Asia.
Unlike his predecessors, Ma has considered “go south” (invest in Southeast Asia) 
and “go west” (invest in China) to be not zero-sum games but win-win games, and 
he has encouraged Taiwanese investment flow in both directions. Nonetheless, 
these initiatives have carried no new ideas and concrete plans to benefit Taiwanese 
investment.32 The amount of Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia skyrocketed 
in 1994 when the policy was first initiated. But after the Asian financial crisis it de-
creased to the same levels as 1993 and remained there for the following eight years 
until 2006 (see figure 6). There was huge fluctuation between 2007 and 2009. In 
general, no matter what reasoning the government adopted to promote Taiwanese 
investment moving to Southeast Asian countries, we do not find a clear trend in 
capital flows. Additionally, many Southeast Asian countries set many constraints 
on FDI policies and typically sought out large-scale investments only, preventing 
many Taiwanese from investing in the region.33 Because of the unstable political 
and economic environment, anti-Chinese movements, and fluctuating local poli-
cies, the future of investment in Southeast Asia remains unclear.34 According to 
the Secretariat of ASEAN, Taiwan was not among top ten investor countries in 
ASEAN between 2008 and 2010.35
In recent years, however, confronting rising labor costs, Taiwanese entrepre-
neurs started to move their factories from Shenzhen and Dongguan to Southeast 
Asian countries, especially Vietnam and Cambodia. Obviously, taishang’s profit-
driven considerations do more than government policies to motivate them to “go 
south.” Moreover, in 2012 the Taiwanese government issued the “Measures on 
Promoting Taiwanese Entrepreneurs to Invest in Taiwan,” the so-called “salmon 
returns” policy, which includes a higher quota of foreign laborers and low interest 
rates for bank loans. It has been ineffective, however, because of high land costs 
and a lack of skilled laborers.36 The amount of taishang investment returning to 
Taiwan decreased by 55 percent in 2014.37
C ONCLUSION
The Taiwanese government has been worrying about becoming increasingly ir-
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to divert trade away from China have largely failed. Lower production costs in the 
competitive global economy and similarities in culture and languages have pulled 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs unavoidably into China’s economic orbit. Such cross-
Strait interactions have not demonstrated the capacity of economic liberalization 
to promote peace, and the potential for political conflict remains. Taiwanese have 
accused Beijing of manipulating economic incentives to facilitate unification, but 
we have not found clear evidence of this from either statistical data or China’s poli-
cies. Interestingly, discontent has broken out domestically within Taiwan rather 
than in blunt confrontation between Taiwan and the mainland. Examination of 
cross-Strait interactions over the past two decades shows that economic integra-
tion has promoted peace and helped to constrain certain conflict-heightening 
pressures created by democratization in Taiwan.38
Undoubtedly, TIC is a critical factor in cross-Strait interactions, if not the most 
important one, and is characterized by three prominent trends. First, in terms of 
targeted industry, TIC has shifted from labor-intensive manufacturing of items 
such as consumer goods to high-technology electronics and precision products. 
Second, the scale of TIC has changed from small and medium-sized factories to 
large business conglomerates. Third, geographically speaking, TIC has moved 
from south to north and from east to west within China, and investors who have 
decided to leave China have moved to Southeast Asia.
Economic considerations have played a more important role than political 
concerns in determining approved and actual levels of TIC. Changes in politi-
cal administrations have not resulted in bans on the further advance of TIC, and 
the Chinese government has not announced any concrete policy to prohibit TIC. 
Taishang’s economic motivation and investor confidence, rather than politics, are 
the factors stopping them from pouring more money into China. Southeast Asian 
countries and Taiwan may not be the best investment locations for taishang at 
the moment, but the question of how to fully integrate them into the Chinese 
economy is becoming urgent.
The comparable phenomenon in China is Chinese investment in Taiwan (CIT). 
The Taiwanese government has lifted its ban on CIT and allowed Chinese entre-
preneurs to invest in Taiwan since June 2009. As of 2016, 729 approved projects 
have been recorded and the total amount has been US$1.3 billion.39 Relatively 
speaking, the numbers and investment amounts are small when compared to TIC. 
Moreover, to some companies, especially state-owned enterprises, the scale of the 
Taiwanese market is too small to benefit their business. Unlike their Taiwanese 
counterparts, Chinese businesspeople are investing in order to carry out political 
tasks, such as promoting cross-Strait relations.40
While China has been proposing the grand strategy of “One Belt, One Road” 
(yi dai, yi lu; also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt, the Twenty-First-Cen-
tury Maritime Silk Road, a plan to build economic corridors linking China to 
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Europe—both overland via West Asia and maritime via the South China Sea, the 
Indian Ocean and the Red Sea), the Chinese government seems to be incorporat-
ing TIC as part of the plan in order to prevent it from pulling out of China. The 
Taiwanese government is also trying to lure taishang back.41 It might be a good 
chance for TIC to move inland and reap the benefits of cheap land and low labor 
costs. On the other hand, while the Economic Cooperation Framework Agree-
ment (ECFA) between Taiwan and China may make a positive contribution to 
TIC, Taiwan’s domestic politics make the issue very controversial for the Taiwan-
ese themselves. We still need time to watch how the issue develops before clarify-
ing its impact on TIC.
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Cross–Taiwan Strait economic relations have experienced tremendous shocks 
since 2008. High expectations in the early stage of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration 
were eroded by domestic difficulties and skepticism. Taiwan’s attempts to embrace 
economic globalization through China were weakened within the complex do-
mestic environment. The student-led Sunflower Movement in 2014, protesting the 
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, put that and other cross-Strait economic 
pacts on ice. At the same time, China has adjusted its grand strategies by broaden-
ing economic engagements around the globe. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping 
has also demonstrated his strong will by consolidating political control and con-
centrating his power. The rise of China’s comprehensive power and Taiwan’s hesi-
tation to institutionalize the cross-Strait economic relationship provide unique 
cases for academic exploration.
This chapter will discuss whether Taiwan can still maintain its existing po-
sition in cross-Strait economic relations within the new context of the rise of 
China’s economic power. I will first introduce the current development models 
of Taiwan’s information technology sectors in the context of the cross-Strait di-
vision of labor and then discuss the changes to China’s position in the global 
political and economic arenas. The third section will analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of Taiwan’s IT sector in coping with state-driven pressure coming 
from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Finally, I will provide some policy reflec-
tions on Taiwanese strategies to cope with the rise of China.
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DYNAMICS OF CROSS-STR AIT EC ONOMIC 
REL ATIONS:  TAIWAN’S GLOBALIZED IT INDUSTRY
Taiwan’s IT Industry as the Foundation of Economic Globalization
Taiwan’s economic globalization is based on its ability to be flexible and adjust 
in managing the global supply chain. In the post–developmental state era, Tai-
wanese firms are characterized by their reputation among global brand holders 
for punctual and precise manufacturing. This original equipment manufacturing/
original design manufacturing (OEM/ODM) model of development was founded 
on mutual trust with upstream designers, close interaction with major high-tech 
hubs, and access to the major manufacturing bases of mainland China. In other 
words, Taiwanese firms are the major platforms linking American technologies, 
Taiwanese know-how, and Chinese processing capabilities.1
Taiwan’s industrial structure has increasingly become dominated by the IT and 
electronics sector. As a result, IT and electronics products now account for an 
excessively large share of Taiwan’s overall exports. On the basis of export data com-
piled by Taiwan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT) products consistently account for 
over 30 percent of Taiwan’s total exports. As IT and electronics products are char-
acterized by a high level of income elasticity, consumers will often delay purchase 
of these items. However, fluctuations in the global economic climate can therefore 
have a significant negative impact on Taiwan’s exports and its economic growth 
rate. Taiwan’s ability to implement adjustments in response to global economic 
fluctuations is also affected.2
Traditional wisdom indicates that, thanks to the outsourcing policies of the 
main IT design centers like Silicon Valley, Taiwan is a major beneficiary within 
the global division of labor. Overseas returnees serve as major mediators of cross-
Pacific talent circulation. However, recent studies provide different views of this 
unique pattern of IT globalization. For instance, Martin Kenney, Dan Breznitz, 
and Michael Murphree are skeptical about the importance of overseas returnees 
for Taiwan’s IT development and globalization. They argue that overseas returnees 
established only three of the top ten firms for integrated circuit (IC) design in 
Taiwan; only one of the firms’ founders has a direct connection to Silicon Val-
ley, having worked there, while the other two have founders with Silicon Valley 
educations. Kenney and his colleagues claim that the returnee-centric version of 
Taiwan’s development does not recognize the important role of multinational cor-
porations, indigenous entrepreneurship, and the spin-off policy of the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in creating an environment that would be 
attractive to returnees. In other words, scholars have underestimated the signifi-
cance of the ecosystem that was built before the appearance of the returnee entre-
preneurs, mostly in the 1990s. Such an ecosystem created the conditions within 
which returnees could utilize the education and skills learned abroad to provide 
the Taiwanese node of the structural niche they would fill and later expand.3
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The overseas connection may not have had a substantial impact in terms of 
quantity, but it did improve the quality of Taiwanese IT production capabilities. 
Overseas returnees spread the seeds of cultural change in the IT sector. Instead 
of focusing on the impact of overseas returnees on the globalization of Taiwan’s 
IT industry, Taiwanese companies have been increasing the learning curve to 
accumulate technological know-how in the IT and electronics sectors. The prog-
ress of such a learning model is reflected in the economic links between Taiwan 
and Japan. Expansion of the transnational division of labor and the long-term 
economic downturn in Japan sparked by global capitalism created a crucial stra-
tegic opportunity for dependency management within the Taiwanese thin-film-
transistor liquid-crystal-display (TFT-LCD) industry. The Taiwanese effectively 
imported Japanese human resources, learning their manufacturing technolo-
gies directly from Japanese engineers. Taiwanese TFT-LCD manufacturers sub-
sequently innovated their own next-generation technology without relying on 
Japanese engineers or continuously purchasing Japanese technologies.4
After May 20, 2016, the new government under the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) launched new policy packages to promote innovation and IT devel-
opment. The “Asian Silicon Valley” initiative is one of President Tsai’s five major 
industrial development objectives. This project aims to increase Taiwan’s share 
of the global IT market by creating a robust environment for entrepreneurs and 
start-ups. It also intends to upgrade Taiwan’s IT research and design capacities by 
fostering innovative talent, facilitating the development of capital markets, and re-
vising related laws. Furthermore, the Taiwanese government is going to establish a 
one-stop center to promote the integration of its R&D capabilities with California’s 
Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs around the world.5
Unlike previous policies of IT development over the past two decades, the 
Asian Silicon Valley plan intends to promote Taiwan’s participation in internation-
al standard formulation and certification of IT-related technologies. The policy 
goals include integrating Taiwan’s hardware advantages into software applications 
and commercializing research findings of universities and research institutes. This 
plan also focuses on the consolidation of IT and other high-tech infrastructure. 
For instance, it plans to establish a quality Internet environment, build diversified 
smart test beds, and develop applications based on smart logistics, smart trans-
port, and smart medicine.6
Embracing the Chinese Market in the Global Supply Chain: 
The Hon Hai Model
It has long been argued that the most effective protection against Taiwan’s eco-
nomic dependence on China is to diversify Taiwan’s economic engagements 
around the world. In addition to establishing technological linkages with the 
United States, Taiwan has depended on Japan economically in terms of industrial 
know-how, upstream technological innovation, and enhancement of the service 
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sector. For Taiwan, the main driving force of economic interaction has remained 
OEM and ODM types of investments in China. Major Taiwanese IT manufactur-
ers like the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) concentrate 
on perfecting the manufacturing process rather than the initial design. Because of 
their orientation, Taiwanese firms do not aspire to control the upstream core tech-
nologies. Even though these OEM/ODM firms link US and Japanese technologies, 
Taiwanese know-how, and mainland Chinese manufacturing capacities, the profit 
margin has been shrinking. Companies like Foxconn have had to squeeze their 
manufacturing costs, which results in problems like sweatshop-style factories and 
labor disputes. In response, Foxconn and other OEM manufacturers have tried to 
globalize their operations and make new breakthroughs in international markets. 
But well-known Taiwanese brand names like Acer, Asus, and HTC are still rarities 
in the global marketplace.
Despite all the setbacks surrounding labor disputes and controversies over 
sweatshop factories in China, Hon Hai/Foxconn remains one of the most success-
ful Taiwanese OEM/ODM companies in the world. The major reason for Foxconn’s 
ascendance in the world IT manufacturing arena is its close integration with Apple’s 
global supply chain. Through Apple’s comprehensive supply chain, Foxconn is also 
able to form partnerships with other manufacturers and establish extensive net-
works of mutual cooperation. For instance, Apple’s iconic iPhone brings together 
several increasingly global production networks, one of which comprises one of 
the world’s leading brand-name firms (Apple) and its manufacturing partner and 
the world’s largest provider of electronics manufacturing services (Taiwan’s Hon 
Hai). Another combines three specialized suppliers: the world’s leading integrated 
semiconductor manufacturer (South Korea’s Samsung), a leading fabless smart-
phone chip design firm (Qualcomm from the United States), and a top semicon-
ductor foundry (Taiwan’s TSMC). In these intersections of multiple production 
networks across several segments of the ICT sector, the interfirm partnerships 
creating the market success of one major consumer product are realized.7
The Foxconn/Hon Hai model of globalization is noteworthy in that it does not 
reflect strong state intervention and support. Instead, it demonstrates the dynam-
ics of self-reinforcement and innovative forces at the enterprise level. According 
to Henry Yeung, Hon Hai was not a direct recipient of state support. Its success 
cannot be attributed to the state’s industrial policy. Hon Hai is not a “national 
champion” according to the standards of the developmental state. Instead, its 
emergence is largely due to its strategic coupling with leading global firms in the 
electronics industry. Hon Hai’s competitive advantages are predicated on its abil-
ity to combine discretion with a solid record of quality control and competitive 
pricing. Yeung argues that Hon Hai’s emergence as Taiwan’s largest industrial firm 
owes neither to state-led industrialization efforts nor to indigenous industrial ca-
pabilities derived from the “brain circulation” of transnational technologist elites. 
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Instead, its success as the world’s leading electronics manufacturing service pro-
vider can be explained by the changing industrial dynamics of global production 
networks, which offer critical windows of opportunity for it to serve as a strategic 
manufacturing partner of leading global firms.8
In addition to strengthening its status as a key manufacturer in the Apple sup-
ply chain, Hon Hai has extended its reach to high-tech service sectors and has 
formed various strategic alliances with other ICT vendors and service providers. 
Hon Hai released a plan for the establishment of a intelligent society that incorpo-
rates devices with services, integrating hardware and software. The company is set 
to transform itself into a technology services company to meet consumer demand 
and has no intentions of launching own-branded products.
In the future 5G era, the company will focus on the development of automa-
tion and artificial intelligence, combining hardware/software capabilities, using 
technology to improve human life, and creating greater value for its sharehold-
ers.9 For this reason, Hon Hai/Foxconn is working with Google on robots for use 
in the manufacturing process. It needs Google’s help to step up automation at its 
factories, as the company has the lowest sales per employee among the contract 
makers, given its large workforce.10 Furthermore, the company is looking to trim 
labor costs and diversify its operations, seeking new avenues of growth as revenue 
from contract manufacturing slows. Hon Hai has established multiple relation-
ships with its customers, including a cloud server cooperation agreement signed 
in late April 2013 with the American PC vendor Hewlett Packard.11
Hon Hai has taken steps to reduce its dependence on Apple. In 2014, Apple 
accounted for 25 to 30 percent of Hong Hai’s overall revenue. Since then, Hon Hai 
has acquired controlling shares in Taiwan’s Asia Pacific Telecom and has made 
plans to expand into the automotive industry. In late December 2014 it public-
ly announced that it had taken a 10.5 percent stake in China Harmony, a major 
luxury car dealer in China. Recently, it announced that it has begun partnering 
with Tencent, which operates the Chinese social network WeChat, to build elec-
tric vehicles that will be connected to the Internet. It says it can build electric 
vehicles for under US$15,000—significantly cheaper than the current models of 
major manufacturers.12
Foxconn’s acquisition of the Japanese IT giant Sharp in 2016 demonstrates 
Gou’s ambition to expand in the global arena. According to Gou, Sharp has lots of 
technology but isn’t able to market it; Foxconn plans to accelerate commercializa-
tion of Sharp’s patents, turning them to technology and then turning technology to 
products that will help turn the business profitable. Because Foxconn is now fac-
ing challenging market conditions, including a trend of growing protectionism in 
many countries, new strategic moves are necessary for survival and development.13
The $ 3.5 billion deal, for a 66 percent stake in Sharp, is intended to make Fox-
conn a more attractive partner for Apple. The American technology company uses 
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Sharp screens, which could give Foxconn added leverage in dealings between the 
two. In recent years, Apple has been diversifying its supply chain, giving some 
production contracts to other assemblers and component makers, and Foxconn is 
grappling with China’s rising labor costs and a slowdown in the global smartphone 
market. While Foxconn’s revenue has been padded by a boom in orders for less 
expensive Chinese-branded smartphones, analysts have highlighted the concern 
of increased competition from China-based suppliers. Also, Apple, as part of its 
efforts to diversify its supply chain, has given orders for iPhone assembly to Pega-
tron, another Taiwan-based contract manufacturer, which operates a huge factory 
near Shanghai.14
Attempts to Establish the IT Brand: The Challenges of the HTC Model
Another issue to consider with regard to Taiwan’s global links in the IT industry 
is the transition from an OEM to an own-brand manufacturing (OBM) model of 
production. As profit margins are increasingly squeezed, some Taiwanese OEM 
manufacturers have begun to shift their direction and take on more risks. The es-
tablished smartphone manufacturer HTC provides an example. HTC was founded 
in 1997 and initially produced notebook computers. For years, it was a contract 
manufacturer of hand-held devices for other companies, pioneering phones with 
touch-screen interfaces. In 2006, it started making products under its own name, 
and a year later Google introduced Android, which became the operating system 
of choice for HTC products. By 2011, the company’s market capitalization exceed-
ed that of Nokia, once the Goliath of the industry. In 2011, HTC sold more smart-
phones in the United States than any other maker. Since then, shares of HTC have 
plunged almost 90 percent, shrinking its market cap from $33 billion to $4 billion.
However, the HTC case also demonstrates the competitive weakness of Tai-
wanese IT firms with regard to their own brands. World-class experience in the 
manufacturing process does not easily translate into a capacity for survival in 
the global marketplace. For instance, the HTC One, released in 2013, was named 
“Smartphone of the Year” at the Mobile World Congress held in Barcelona in Feb-
ruary and became only the third phone to earn a five-star review. However, HTC’s 
biggest problem is not a lack of sophistication in its design. Rather, it is HTC’s 
biggest rival, Samsung, which last year spent $14 billion on advertising—about 
the same as the GDP of Iceland. HTC posted its first-ever operating loss in the 
third quarter of 2013, after which ABI Research, a consulting firm, said that once 
such handset companies become unprofitable, only 10 percent can be expected to 
survive the next two years.15
In China, the world’s biggest market of consumer electronics, HTC is being 
squeezed further by global brands and cheap local producers. As a brand-name 
manufacturer, HTC has difficulties in identifying its brand position in the Chi-
nese market. Mainland consumers know relatively little about the Taiwanese 
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brand whose initials once stood for “High Tech Computer.” They navigate toward 
Apple and Samsung plus their own smartphone brands, such as Coolpad, Huawei, 
Lenovo, Xiaomi, and ZTE. Local brands sell for no more than HTC-equivalent 
handsets and in some cases have better specifications, while HTC is set back by 
higher production costs.16
HTC’s downturn and losses indicate how second-tier smartphone makers are 
struggling in a maturing market. HTC’s shares in Taipei sank to a record low of 
NT$71 on June 30, 2015, compared with an all-time high of NT$1,300 in April 
2011. The shares ended flat at NT$73.80, ahead of the company’s announcement. 
According to HTC chair Cher Wang, the company has recently launched a fitness 
band and a virtual reality device.17
In August 2015, HTC’s market value fell below its cash on hand, leading to 
headlines stating that the brand no longer had any value. This company with a 
proud tradition of design seemed to have lost a piece of its soul. If the company is 
going to avoid declining any further, it will need killer hardware, a revamped soft-
ware experience, and a more coherent (and less defensive and negative) marketing 
message.18 In 2016, HTC shifted its strategies to serve as Google Android mobile 
phone Pixel’s OEM manufacturer. Responses from the market are mixed. Experts 
indicate that since Google emphasizes that the new mobile phone is “made by 
Google,” HTC has been relegated to the role of OEM manufacturer rather than 
coengineering the device with Google. This approach is no different from Apple’s 
partnership with IPhone builder Foxconn.19 For HTC, it is a retreat from an OBM 
to an OEM model of development. On the other hand, critics also argue that since 
the market performance of HTC’s own products is sluggish, using safer ways to 
accumulate revenues for the adjustments of the next stage is a rational choice for 
HTC. The potential target for HTC’s niche could be virtual reality devices.20
The Hon Hai and HTC models provide mixed examples of the strengths and 
weaknesses of Taiwanese IT firms in cross-Strait economic relations. Taiwan has 
put cross-Strait economic relations in the global arena. However, China is no lon-
ger an underdeveloped market with low wages and technological know-how. “The 
rise of China” has become a key phrase in academic as well as political debates 
around the world. In other words, China is not just a processing zone for cheap, 
labor-intensive products. China has demonstrated strong ambitions to be the new 
global economic powerhouse on the basis of its newfound power and status in the 
international arena.
The following section will discuss China’s new political and economic grand 
strategies for reorienting itself given its new global position. In terms of cross-
Strait economic relations, Taiwan is coping with a partner that is markedly dif-
ferent from the one circa pre-2000. These political and economic strategies help 
explain whether China will be a competitor, a dominant player, or a partner in 
economic interactions.
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CHALLENGES OF CROSS-STR AIT EC ONOMIC 
REL ATIONS:  THE RISE OF CHINA’S  MACRO POLITICAL 
AND EC ONOMIC INITIATIVES
The Emergence of China’s New Global Political Initiatives
The term grand strategy is heavily influenced by international as well as domes-
tic political calculations. The Chinese leadership has put special emphases on the 
linkages of domestic and external politics. The recent proactive actions of Chinese 
foreign policy are attempts to handle domestic and international situations—the 
“two major situations”—at the same time. In the Third Politburo Studying Meeting 
in January 2013, Xi elaborated upon a theory for integrating the two major situ-
ations. Such integration has become a focus of Chinese foreign policy under Xi’s 
leadership. This policy directive can be seen in the context of integrating domestic 
development with external relations, Chinese development with global develop-
ment, and the interests of the Chinese people with the interests of other countries. 
Guided by the principle of integration, according to Xi, the Chinese government 
should take a more positive and proactive attitude in international affairs and 
search for ways to contribute to global development.21
The policy of “handling the two major situations” reflects increasing Chinese 
confidence in managing foreign affairs. Moreover, maintaining domestic as well 
as international stability will contribute to the continuous development of China 
over the next few decades.
However, the policy still runs up against contradictions in international affairs. 
Wu Xinbo argues that contradiction is a normal situation in international affairs. 
As Chinese society progresses, the Chinese tend to use peaceful solutions instead 
of military solutions for contradictions in international affairs. They are searching 
for “natural ways” to cope with the contradictions. If the timing is not right, the 
best way is to put aside controversies and search for a balancing point where both 
sides’ interests converge.22 Wu Xinbo also argues that the current relations between 
political entities in the Asia Pacific region are driven by a mixture of concerns to 
maintain hegemonic stability, balance of power, and collective security. The Sino-
American relationship is characterized as one of controlled competition and lim-
ited cooperation. The bottom line is the avoidance of direct conflicts.23 From Wu’s 
point of view, China is facing an “unharmonious world” in the Asia Pacific region, 
a situation that is full of conflicts, contradictions, and opportunities. The classic 
balance of power and great-power politics will prevail in high politics. But in the 
sphere of human security, countries in the region tend to cooperate on mutually 
beneficial goals.
Chinese scholars have also studied the shift in China’s attitudes toward interna-
tional order and governance. For instance, Wang Jisi notes that since 2005 the State 
Council white paper has not mentioned a policy of “establishing international po-
litical and economic order.” Instead, the 2011 white paper emphasized the efforts 
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to participate in international affairs and shoulder responsibilities. For Wang, such 
adjustments imply that China recognizes the existing international political and 
economic order and is working to promote further reform. In other words, China 
has shifted its identity into that of a “central nation,” serving as a bridge between 
the North and the South.
The new identity of a central nation is facing new challenges. First, the great-
est security challenges are from countries that have the closest economic interde-
pendence, such as the United States and Japan. China’s economic linkages with 
the United States and Japan reflect the global division of labor, which extends far 
beyond bilateral relations. Second, in order to guarantee the security of neighbor-
ing regions, China has to broaden its horizons and play a more positive role in 
the Middle East, Africa, and Indian Ocean region. Involvement in comprehensive 
security issues will have a major impact on China’s domestic security. The only 
way to enhance the national security of surrounding areas is to develop a security 
policy that extends globally and integrates Chinese interests with global interests. 
Third, with such a new global strategy, China must stabilize relationships with 
major countries including Russia, India, Japan, and United States. It must shoulder 
more global responsibilities but be modest and prudent at the same time.24
The Chinese acknowledge that China’s recent rise is due to its accumulation of 
wealth, not culture. The Chinese need to make their views heard in the interna-
tional arena and upgrade their existing culture into “Chinese culture 2.0,” which 
will handle more complicated domestic challenges such as ethnic autonomy and 
“one country, two systems” arrangements in which distinct Chinese regions re-
tain their own economic, political, and legal systems. This upgraded culture will 
accommodate different religious, cultural, political, and even local subsystems 
within the whole of the Chinese territory. However, as a report by the Institute 
of National Development of Peking University indicates, cultural pluralism must 
operate within the context of the socialist system of the Chinese party state. It is 
the historical precondition for China’s future development.25
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, Chinese leaders and academics are 
searching for a new “grand strategy” to guide the external behavior of their coun-
try. According to Barry Buzan, the functions of a grand strategy might be thought 
of as follows:
 (1)  To establish criteria for foreign and security policy formulation and 
evaluation.
 (2)  To create coherence in foreign and security policy by providing a stable 
overarching framework for policy choices.
 (3)  To embed and legitimize foreign and security policy politically by explain-
ing it to the citizenry in broad terms, and especially to explain difficult 
choices.
 (4) To project an image of the country to the rest of the world.26
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On these four criteria, as Buzan argues, the Chinese policy of “peaceful devel-
opment” qualifies as a grand strategy. It contains a theory about how the world 
works and how China should relate to that world in light of its overriding priority 
of development. It takes military, political, and economic elements into account 
and is sensitive to the kind of image China should project to the world. It thus 
sets a framework for defining China’s national interests and offers a basic principle 
about how to relate means to ends.27
Under the general principle of peaceful development, Chinese leaders and aca-
demics are searching for new ways to balance a traditional low-profile foreign pol-
icy with more proactive diplomatic initiatives. For instance, Wang Jisi argues that 
a more sophisticated grand strategy is needed to serve China’s domestic priorities. 
He introduces four ongoing changes in China’s strategic thinking: (1) China’s new 
comprehensive concept of security that extends beyond power politics to include 
such issues as disaster mitigation and environmental security; (2) a shift from 
country-oriented to more multilateral and issue-oriented policy; (3) more atten-
tion given to economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, the 
creation of a social safety net, and technological innovation; (4) enhancement of 
Chinese cultural soft power and promotion of good governance.28
In contrast to a more prudent and low-profile external strategy, recent Chinese 
foreign policy directives demonstrate China’s desire to adjust to its status as a 
major power in the international arena. Yan Xuetong uses the term striving for 
achievement to describe Xi’s more proactive grand strategy. Yan argues that for 
the sake of a favorable international environment conducive to its national rein-
vigoration, China has to actively shape the external situation instead of adapting 
itself to changes in external conditions. In addition to economic engagements, 
this approach targets regional cooperation in areas including politics, security, 
and culture. It also encourages China to take up international responsibilities 
consistent with China’s interests, capabilities, and status as the second-largest 
power in the world.29
As Yan Xuetong argues, the most remarkable part of Xi’s grand strategy is the 
greater emphasis on China’s relationship with its neighbors. For many years, Chi-
na has regarded Sino-American relations as the top priority. After Xi’s adjustment, 
greater significance is now attached to diplomacy with neighboring countries, and 
particularly to the establishment of cross-regional economic corridors—not only 
a Silk Road Economic Belt (connecting China to Europe via western and cen-
tral Asia) and a Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (connecting China to 
Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe via the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, 
and the Red Sea), but also a China-India-Myanmar-Bangladesh economic cor-
ridor, the goal of which is to promote integration in all three subregions.30
Efforts to reposition China’s standing in the Asia Pacific region and to attend to 
more than great-power politics are reflected in China’s strategies to “regionalize” 
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its power. In an important address on China’s foreign policy principles, Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi reemphasized the “Asia-Pacific Dream” introduced by Xi Jinping 
at the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting. In his remarks, 
Wang indicated that China would work to build consensus on how to advance all-
around cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. He also pointed out the importance 
of promoting common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security in 
Asia and building a community of shared interests and destiny.31
As the previous pages indicate, Chinese leaders are striving for a more positive 
international environment in which to consolidate domestic stability and growth. 
As their comprehensive national power grows, the Chinese are utilizing their 
economic influence to reorient China’s position in international affairs. This new 
policy must serve domestic interests and help allay suspicions of a “China threat.” 
Moreover, the Chinese are searching for new strategies to reshape an international 
economic, political, and security arrangements in ways that will enhance China’s 
leading role in the international arena.
The “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) policy was announced by Chinese presi-
dent Xi Jinping in 2013. According to the plan, China would set up a “Silk Road” 
infrastructure aid fund of US$40 billion to assist nations along the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt. It would resemble the fabled trade network during the Han dynasty 
that connected China with Europe and ran through central and western Asia. The 
Twenty-First-century Maritime Silk Road was also announced as part of OBOR.32
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi has elaborated that OBOR consists of 
projects designed to boost mutually beneficial cooperation between China and 
Eurasian countries in the spirit of mutual learning and harmonious coexistence 
reminiscent of the ancient Silk Road. China’s leadership hopes that OBOR will 
serve as an overarching framework for China’s endeavors in external cooperation 
in the modern era. Moreover, it will serve internal as well as external functions 
for national interests. As Wang indicates:
Internally, this initiative dovetails with China’s development strategy of developing 
our central and western regions while addressing regional imbalances and fits well 
with our “go global” strategy aimed at building all-directional cooperation with the 
outside world.
Internationally, this initiative aims to secure common development and shared 
prosperity in all countries along the routes, as it upholds the vision for a community 
of shared destiny and highlights a win-win approach featuring consultation, joint 
development and sharing. The initiative is bound to bring new life and vigor to the 
ancient land of Eurasia and give this vast continent two strong wings on its journey 
toward prosperity.33
OBOR reflects China’s intention to depart from the previous low-profile, or 
taoguan yanghui, model of foreign policy. Some have viewed OBOR as China’s 
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Marshall Plan, with a long-term goal of gaining geopolitical preeminence on the 
Eurasian continent. In this context, OBOR is also deemed an economic counter-
measure to American rebalancing in Asia Pacific. The baseline is that China will 
tap the opportunity of OBOR to expand investment in its extensive western region 
and attempt to sustain its growth rate, which is declining. China could use this 
strategy to hedge against potential contingencies if its sea routes become threat-
ened. In addition, China could wield more political influence when the region’s 
economy becomes further dependent upon Beijing. Promoting the intercon-
nectedness of Eurasian countries would entail resources beyond those of any one 
country’s own treasury, so it has to be a copaying and cosharing arrangement.34
OBOR also serves domestic interests by providing avenues for Chinese capital 
to “step out.” In 2014, China was the world’s biggest trading country with foreign 
exchange reserves of US$39 trillion. Such reserves can lay the foundation for Chi-
na’s more proactive external strategies. At the same time, appropriate channels are 
needed to guide domestic capital into the international market. Since the launch 
of a stimulus plan in 2008 to cope with global economic stagnation, China’s infra-
structure industries have become economic champions under the state capitalist 
system. Large-scale infrastructure-related projects have helped create China’s iron 
triangle of rail lines, roads, and airports (tiegongji). Equipped with China’s experi-
ences and technologies of infrastructure construction, the OBOR policy provides 
timely channels for these state-owned enterprises to develop new initiatives for 
international markets. Such moves will also be buttressed by new institutional ar-
rangements like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Details of Taiwan’s participation in OBOR and the AIIB are still coming to light. 
However, Taiwanese firms have formed various strategic alliances with this new 
investment initiative. For instance, in 2011, Taiwan’s Asia Vital Components Co., 
a thermal solution provider, acquired a 45 percent stake in a subsidiary company 
formed with China’s China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corp. Local insti-
tutional investors are expecting the company to benefit from expected growth in 
demand for high-margin railway heat dissipation and electrical products includ-
ing power resisters, water-cooled transformers, and rackable connectors. Power 
Mate Technology Co., a power supply company, secured a role in China’s railroad 
equipment supply chain in 2010 after its electronic equipment products received 
EN 50155 standard certification for railway applications. Since its founding, Power 
Mate’s products have been used in a number of demanding industrial applica-
tions including medicine, weaponry, solar power, and automobiles. The company 
is an original design manufacturer and markets products under the brand name 
P-Duke.35
China International Capital Corp., the largest investment banking and re-
search firm in China, said it anticipates that Beijing will pour more than US$1.65 
trillion into its OBOR strategy over the next decade, much of which will flow to 
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neighboring nations in Asia. Meanwhile, the prospects of Taiwanese companies 
such as Asia Vital Components Co. and Power Mate Technology Co. have im-
proved in the eyes of investors as they are deemed to be companies well positioned 
to reap rewards as the Beijing-led initiatives take shape.36
China’s New IT Policies: Challenging Taiwan’s Role in Cross-Strait 
Economic Interaction
As is the case with its more proactive foreign policy initiatives, the Chinese gov-
ernment has demonstrated its strong ambition to rebuild the high-tech and IT 
industry by direct intervention of the state. Such actions reflect a typical devel-
opmental state style of using financial instruments and industrial policy to pick 
winners and support technological breakthroughs. The Chinese government is 
now putting significant funding and efforts into new policies related to the devel-
opment of the semiconductor industry. Chinese officials have convened a unique 
task force charged with setting an aggressive growth strategy. This group helped 
develop a policy framework that is targeting a compound annual growth rate for 
the industry of 20 percent between now and 2020, with potential financial sup-
port from the government of up to RMB 1 trillion (US$170 billion) over the next 
five to ten years. Investments will be made by a national investment vehicle (the 
National Industry Investment Fund) and provincial-level entities. These entities 
will invest across multiple categories, including project finance and domestic and 
foreign acquisitions, as well as traditional research and development subsidies and 
tax credits.
To avoid the fragmentation issues of the past, the Chinese government is focus-
ing on creating national champions—a small set of leaders in each critical segment 
of the semiconductor market (including design, manufacturing, tools, and assem-
bly and testing) and a few provinces in which there is the potential to develop 
industry clusters. What’s different this time, however, is that the task force includes 
the top ten to fifteen leaders in China’s semiconductor industry (convening ex-
ecutives from fabless designers, foundries, and equipment manufacturers), and 
overarching leadership for the project comes from Vice-Premier Ma Kai, one of 
the government’s highest-ranking officials. This committee had a direct influence 
on the State Council during its drafting of the Guidelines of the National IC In-
dustry Development Promotion, the high-level policy framework that was shared 
publicly in June 2014.37
In June 2014, the State Council of China issued the “National Guidelines for the 
Development and Promotion of the IC Industry” to support the domestic semi-
conductor industry. The document addresses development targets, approaches, 
and measures. It has created waves throughout the semiconductor industry and 
attracted global attention because of its ambitious development targets and sizable 
support for a national IC industry investment fund.
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Meanwhile, local IC industry investment funds have been established by the 
cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Hefei. Of these, Beijing took the lead in 
establishing a fund in June 2014, totaling RMB 30 billion (US$4.8 billion). It is 
structured as a “fund of funds” and two subfunds. One subfund, supporting IC 
manufacturing and semiconductor equipment, is managed by CGP Investment 
(the “fund of funds” is also managed by CGP); the other subfund, supporting IC 
design and packaging, is managed by Hua Capital. In addition, Shanghai’s IC in-
dustry fund, which is named the Shanghai Summitview Capital IC Information 
Industry Merger Fund and which totals RMB 10 billion (US$1.6 billion), was es-
tablished in November 2014. The total of all government funds is estimated to 
reach to US$100 billion with the implementation of local industry funds.38
As the majority of Taiwanese IT firms have set up their manufacturing centers 
in the Yangtze River Delta region, the new policy initiatives from the central 
government down to the local governments bring challenges as well as opportu-
nities for the Taiwanese. Among various locations in China, Shanghai emerged 
as the center of IT development in the late 1990s. As Wang Zhan, director of the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, argues, the service sector is just one of 
the key sectors of an economic center. Shanghai’s economic development should 
not be totally reliant on the service sector. The main goal in building Shanghai 
into an economic center is still the establishment of a high-end, globalized, in-
novative manufacturing industry. The current problem in Shanghai is a lack of 
integration of scientific research, technological innovation, and industrial devel-
opment. Private enterprises are mainly in the service sector, such as trading and 
real estate. Foreign enterprises concentrate on low-end technologies, focusing 
on China’s market instead of R&D capacities. State-owned enterprises are facing 
multiple institutional constraints. According to Wang, the most suitable policy 
for Shanghai is to combine market mechanisms and state guidance. The energy 
of innovation will come from small and medium-sized enterprises in the private 
sector. The duty of the government is to create an innovation-friendly environ-
ment, and the private sector does not need extra guidance from the government. 
However, under such policy schemes, the private sector will face uncertainties 
and risks when it encounters global competition.39
Under the scheme of new policy initiatives led by the local state, Taiwanese 
firms are searching for new forms of partnership with local governments. Shang-
hai’s city government announced a ¥50 billion (US$8 billion) funding program 
for new infrastructure in the IC industry, including two production lines of 
twelve-inch wafers. Prior to the funding program, the city had just set up an RMB 
10 billion (US$1.6 billion) fund, Shanghai SummitView IC Information Industry 
Fund, in which Taiwan-based chip designer MediaTek is an investor. MediaTek 
Inc. (Lianfake), the nation’s biggest handset chip maker, signed an agreement 
in November 2014 to invest RMB 300 million (US$48.9 million) in a Chinese 
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government fund in an effort to benefit from China’s fast-growing semiconductor 
industry. MediaTek is currently Taiwan’s largest chip designer and has the largest 
market share for smartphone processors in China. According to MediaTek chair 
Ming-kai Tsai, through investing in the fund MediaTek expects to benefit from a 
closer relationship between high-tech industries in China and Taiwan and to gain 
a better position in the global semiconductor industry. The fund, initiated by the 
Shanghai city government and Chinese venture capital firm SummitView Capital, 
will have ¥3 billion in funding during the initial phase, and that amount will grad-
ually increase to ¥10 billion. Besides MediaTek, Shanghai Jiading Venture Capi-
tal Fund, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC), Tsinghua 
University’s Tsinghua Holdings Co., and Knight Capital of the United States have 
joined as investors in the fund.40
The preceding pages demonstrate the new political and economic initiatives to 
consolidate China’s economic autonomy and strength. The rise of China’s compre-
hensive power creates direct challenges to the cross-Strait economic division of 
labor. The next section will analyze the impacts of the combination of state-driven 
efforts and firm-specific incentives on Taiwan’s attempts to maintain its primacy in 
cross-Strait economic interactions.
THE EMERGENCE OF A “RED SUPPLY CHAIN” 
AND IT S IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-STR AIT 
EC ONOMIC REL ATIONS
New Policies of the Chinese Developmental State That Support the 
Emergence ofa Red Supply Chain
The potential emergence of a mainland Chinese supply chain to supplant Taiwan-
ese firms’ role reflects strong state support of indigenous firms. In 2015 China’s 
State Council unveiled a ten-year national plan, Made in China 2025, designed to 
transform China from a manufacturing giant into a world manufacturing power. 
Nine tasks have been identified as priorities: improving manufacturing innova-
tion, integrating technology and industry, strengthening the industrial base, fos-
tering Chinese brands, enforcing green manufacturing, promoting breakthroughs 
in ten key sectors, advancing restructuring of the manufacturing sector, promot-
ing service-oriented manufacturing and manufacturing-related service indus-
tries, and internationalizing manufacturing.41 The ten key sectors are information 
technology, numerical control tools and robotics, aerospace equipment, oceanic 
engineering equipment and high-tech ships, railway equipment, energy-saving 
and new energy vehicles, power equipment, new materials, medicine and medical 
devices, and agricultural machinery.42
In 2014, the Chinese government launched the “Outline to Promote National 
Integrated Circuit Development” program. The central government is going to 
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establish an investment fund of US$20 billion to foster the development of the 
semiconductor industry. The Chinese government will become a direct player 
by establishing holding companies to boost the indigenous manufacturing of the 
semiconductor industry. Up until 2014, 80 percent of the domestic demand of 
China’s semiconductor industry relied on imports.
In addition, the Chinese government is promoting the merger and acquisition 
of state-owned semiconductor firms. Increasingly, the Chinese government has 
encouraged firms to buy, rather than rent or steal, breakthrough innovation ca-
pabilities through acquisitions of both technology and talent.43 For instance, in 
the past two years, the flagship Qinghua UNIS group acquired the Chinese IC 
company RDA for US$ 1 billion; UNIS also acquired another major IC designer, 
Spreadtrum, for US$1.78 billion. The obvious target, according to UNIS CEO Zhao 
Weiguo, is Taiwan’s No. 2 semiconductor company, MediaTek. According to Zhao, 
his company will invest US$50 billion to surpass MediaTek within five years.44
In 2015, Apple added two more Taiwanese companies in consolidating its list 
of iPhone and iPad supply chain firms. Wistron Corporation was named as an 
iPhone assembler, and Compal Electronics was picked to build iPads. China’s BYD 
was also added as a final assembler of Apple products. They join Hong Hai and 
Taiwan’s Pegatron among the companies that piece together Apply products from 
China to Brazil. In other words, with Quanta making Macs and iPods, and In-
ventec supplying iPods, Taiwanese companies have maintained their dominance 
over Apple’s assembly lines. BYD, which was previously on Apple’s border supplier 
list, and Flextronics, which makes Macs in Austin, Texas, were the major non-
Taiwanese players.45
However, the rise of China’s domestic manufacturers also threatens the posi-
tion of Taiwanese vendors in Apple’s iPhone supply chain. According to the esti-
mates of Taiwanese manufacturers, Apple’s long-term strategy is to foster China’s 
domestic manufactures and enlarge its domestic market share. For instance, Sun-
wonda, a Chinese Li-on battery producer, has become a new partner in the iPhone 
6 supply chain. Chinese newcomers like the electro-acoustic producer GoerTek 
and AAC Technologies have replaced the Taiwanese vendor Merry in the iPhone 
supply chain.46
In a report released in 2014, Barclays Capital Inc. indicated that the rise of the 
Chinese supply chain could be a disruptive force for some second-tier players in 
the Taiwan supply chain that lack differentiating technology, scale, or relation-
ships with Chinese domestic brands. Benefiting from the increase in scale and 
investment in R&D should also cause the Chinese supply chain companies to 
move up the chain and become internationally competitive component makers 
for top-tier brands. Among many factors leading to the decline of Taiwanese firms 
and ascendance of Chinese companies in the IT supply chain, the Barclay report 
indicates two key dimensions of the change. First, succession uncertainty and an 
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aging corporate culture are negatively affecting the Taiwanese IT hardware indus-
try. Only a portion of Taiwanese technology companies have seen control passed 
on by the founders to the second generation of leaders or new professional man-
agement teams. A few Taiwanese companies, however, such as Acer, Asustek, and 
Compal, are currently being comanaged by both founders and professional man-
agers during these firms’ transition periods. Second, China’s high-tech companies 
enjoy a competitive edge of government support that their peers outside China 
do not have. Government support comes in the form of favorable tax conditions, 
local government subsidies, and financial backing. Furthermore, the component 
subsectors where Chinese makers are gaining ground are traditional fiefdoms of 
Taiwanese suppliers, especially in the areas of batteries, casings, camera lenses and 
modules, handset antennas, and LEDs. The Barclays report argues that Chinese 
component makers are seizing market shares from their Taiwanese counterparts 
not only on the basis of price but also on the basis of service intensity and aggres-
sive investment in R&D and capital expenditure, while the Chinese government is 
helping by offering subsidies and tax incentives.47
Shift in Marketing Strategies: The Rise of Localized Chinese IT Firms
As was argued above, the case of Taiwan’s HTC reflects the limitations of a me-
dium-sized Taiwanese firm with aspirations for the global market. As China has 
become a world market instead of a world factory, putting the Chinese market 
first is a natural choice for business leaders. This new situation gives indigenous 
mainland Chinese IT firms a competitive edge over foreign ones.
Five years ago, during the heyday of HTC, Xiaomi was a mere newcomer to the 
Chinese market, which at the time was dominated by famous brand holders such 
as Apple and Samsung. Xiaomi may not currently rank as one of the world’s most 
innovative companies, but it does get points for its slick marketing campaigns, 
rapid growth, and online sales campaigns. It has been touted as an up-and-coming 
Chinese high-tech company that might follow in the footsteps of Alibaba. Xiaomi 
is also actively working to address one of its innovation weaknesses—a relatively 
thin patent portfolio—by working to double the number of patent applications 
that it files every year.48
One of Xiaomi’s marketing strategies is to “gain strength at home first.” The 
company has focused on China, with 97 percent of its shipments being local. It has 
been mentioned that Xiaomi’s future targets will be in Southeast Asia and Brazil, 
Russia, and India. Hugo Barra, a former Google executive who himself hails from 
Brazil, has become new Xiaomi’s international face. The company is not in a rush 
to enter more developed markets dominated by Apply and Samsung and prefers to 
stay focused on its own base, where the market is still booming.49
According to Xiaomi CEO Lei Jun, the company sells smartphones at cost, or 
close to it, and will make money through services. They are selling not so much 
168    Chapter Nine
smartphones as a lifestyle. The service Lei Jun is referring to—MiUI and Mi.com—
sells the products and ties them all together, but they are all Xiaomi products in 
the end. The company does not just want to be a dominant player in smartphones; 
it wants the whole house.50 This strategy is custom-made for the Chinese market 
and is geared especially to young professionals who want to furnish a new living 
space. It could also be applied to developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, and 
India. For the developed world, the house has already been furnished with brand-
name products.
The Enhancement of China’s R&D Capacities
Multinational high-tech firms, including Taiwanese IT companies, have enjoyed 
a technological advantage over Chinese firms for the past two decades. To move 
upstream in the supply chain and establish technological autonomy, the Chinese 
developmental state has endeavored to help consolidate firms’ R&D capacities 
in various ways. In addition to governmental support of innovation, what China 
needs, according to foreign entrepreneurs, is “capable” companies far more than 
innovative companies. Having mastered the skills to assemble relatively simple 
products for foreign multinationals, Chinese companies next need to learn how to 
develop and manufacture more complex products themselves. They must become 
much more proficient at higher-order organizational capabilities, such as strategy 
formulation, multibrand management, relationship marketing, systems integra-
tion, and performance management.51
With foreign exchange reserves close to US$4 trillion, China has the money to 
buy the foreign industrial capacity it thinks it needs. Recent acquisitions support 
the view that a noticeable shift is under way. For example, Lenovo recently bought 
Motorola Mobility, Donfeng Motors made a bid for Peugeot-Citroen, and in the 
best-known case of all, Swedish carmaker Volvo was bought from Ford by Zheji-
ang Geely, an automobile company with enormous ambitions but lacking a strong 
brand and design expertise. In 2014, two-thirds of China’s offshore investments 
were in services, where Chinese firms still have much to learn. Many Chinese 
firms have set up their corporate R&D centers in the United States and Europe 
through direct investment and acquisition. Their motive is to embed their compa-
nies in the innovation ecosystems of the developed world to acquire and develop 
foreign technologies, brands, and marketing know-how.52
Attracting Highly Talented Forces in the IT Sectors
The Chinese government fully understands that to achieve takeoff or leap-frogging 
in the IT sectors it must attract the top technological elite around the world. In 
2010, China released an ambitious talent cultivation plan called the National Me-
dium- and Long-Term Talent Development Plan. In addition to investing in hard-
ware, the plan spells out how China can utilize international financial institutions’ 
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funds and foreign government loans to develop skilled labor programs. The plan 
stipulates that the overall talent pool will increase from its 2010 level of 114 million 
people to 180 million by 2020. The plan also lists six major categories of talent 
that the government will help cultivate: political leaders and officials; business en-
trepreneurs; technical professionals; highly skilled workers in various industries; 
those with practical skills for rural areas and agriculture; and professional social 
workers. Furthermore, to put more pressure on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to 
change, the plan aims to cultivate around one hundred business leaders and CEOs 
who can lead Chinese firms to reach the ranks of the Fortune 500 companies by 
2020. It also aims to have a total of forty thousand international business-savvy 
talented people working for SOEs by 2020, with 50 percent of them hired through 
market competition. This is actually quite an unusual move—in the past, almost 
all of the top managers of SOEs were promoted or hired from within the system.53
Moreover, Chinese companies are more than willing to take shortcuts by 
poaching top talent from Taiwanese competitors to enhance their technological 
capabilities and market presence. Epistar Corp, Taiwan’s top LED chip maker, in-
dicated in early 2015 that if Chinese LED epitaxy maker Sanan Optoelectronics Co. 
continued poaching its talent it would consider requesting that the government 
scrap an investment deal Sanan had proposed in 2013 to buy a 19 percent stake in 
local LED chip supplier Formosa Epitaxy Inc. for US$7.38 million.54 In addition, 
Chinese local governments are copying the model of Taiwan’s ITRI to establish 
public R&D facilities. China offers more than four times the salary of Taiwanese 
companies in recruiting ITRI’s mid- and high-ranking managers. To cope with 
the brain drain to China, ITRI has enhanced its support for its talent to establish 
start-ups on domestic soil. What ITRI intends to do is to foster entrepreneurship 
instead of high salaries.
However, whether the Chinese system of authoritarian control can foster in-
novation and attract top elites is a highly debated issue. As the major agent of po-
litical socialization, the Chinese higher education system has experienced major 
upheavals in ideological indoctrination. In early 2015 China’s Ministry of Educa-
tion released a document of policy guidelines regarding propaganda work in col-
leges. According to the document, the government will promote the following four 
major tasks in colleges: (1) pushing materials of socialism with Chinese character-
istics into the “classrooms and pupils’ brains”; (2) improving the ideological pu-
rity of college teachers; (3) strengthening mainstream thought in colleges; and (4) 
enhancing the management of college ideological work.55 Minister of Education 
Yuan Guiren, in elaborating these guidelines, indicated that China would consoli-
date the control of Western textbooks in colleges. China will never allow materi-
als spreading Western values to penetrate college classrooms. Moreover, speeches 
attacking party leadership, socialism, the Chinese constitution, and legal systems 
will not be tolerated on college campuses.56
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C ONCLUSION
Cross–Taiwan Strait economic relations have entered a new era with the rise of 
China. In the earlier stages of interaction, Taiwan relied on its unique position 
in the global supply chain and benefited from the expansion of mainland China’s 
manufacturing capacities. In most cases, Taiwan’s close technological linkages with 
American and Japanese high-tech firms helped create an economic niche based on 
mutual trust and benefits with upstream brand holders. Such a cross-border divi-
sion of labor was founded in part on the weakness of Chinese domestic vendors 
and the lack of technological know-how of Chinese manufacturers. China was 
regarded as a world factory, instead of a market, for global brand holders.
Today US high-tech firms still retain their technological superiority, but the 
general cross-Strait division of labor is changing. As the preceding pages dem-
onstrate, Taiwan’s OEM model of manufacturing is now facing a dual threat in 
the form of shrinking profit margins and the rise of Chinese domestic manu-
facturers. The OBM model of IT production is constrained by the lack of mar-
keting and global logistics capabilities. Moreover, Taiwan’s domestic politics 
impede the flows of advanced talent between Taiwan and China. The advan-
tage of the “made in China, by Taiwan” model of IT manufacturing is gradually 
diminishing.
In addition to economic connections, Taiwan’s cross-Pacific strategy of IT 
development is closely linked with its security and political dependency on the 
United States. The grand strategy initiated by the Xi administration demonstrates 
a more comprehensive ambition to explore the broader definition of “the West” 
beyond the Sino-American rivalry. By making the Asia Pacific region its priority, 
the Chinese have accumulated the confidence to reshape the rules of the interna-
tional game by combining maritime and land-based economic plans into a grand 
strategy. From the Chinese perspective, the recent “assertiveness” in foreign policy 
is merely appropriate to China’s new status as a major power. OBOR and AIIB also 
exemplify Chinese initiatives to escape from Sino-American entanglement and to 
grasp new opportunities presented by emerging types of geopolitics.
The formation of a new grand strategy in China does not necessarily imply 
an attempted delinking from US-dominated high-tech development. The United 
States still enjoys relative advantages in innovation and entrepreneurship. But the 
deepening engagements between China and the countries of continental Europe 
are making it possible for China to embrace a more comprehensive global coop-
erative mechanism. Taiwan needs to adjust its economic strategies to incorporate 
Southeast Asian and European regions into its global strategies of logistics. One 
of the policy options is to create strategic alliances with Chinese firms to explore 
these booming markets. Such a strategic partnership does not aim to replace the 
Chinese market. The real purpose is to ally with the new engines of global develop-
ment and guarantee economic security at the same time.
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However, political changes in Taiwan may impede such a “strategic move” to 
embrace the global market by cooperating with new Chinese initiatives. As indi-
cated in a recent article in the Economist, Chinese producers of petrochemicals, 
steel, computers, and digital displays have moved into terrain once occupied by 
Taiwan. Taiwanese firms with operations in China are themselves buying more 
materials and machinery from Chinese suppliers. Chinese firms are now trying 
to break into semiconductors, Taiwan’s last big industrial redoubt.57  Enhancing 
integration with the Chinese domestic market in the manufacturing and service 
sectors could be a solution to the economic dilemma. But such a policy shift has 
turned out to be unacceptable in Taiwan’s domestic political climate. The Sun-
flower Movement mobilized against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement in 
the early spring of 2015 proved the political infeasibility of further economic inte-
gration with the other side of the Taiwan Strait.
Whether Taiwanese firms can transform themselves from pure hardware manu-
facturers into IT service providers is still in question. Such weakness will constrain 
these firms’ ability to penetrate China’s domestic market. Furthermore, whether 
the Taiwanese state has the capacity to redirect Taiwanese capital to the South-
east Asian market is uncertain. Past experiences of Taiwan’s “Go South”policy in 
the 1990s proved that state-driven attempts did not have substantial impacts on 
business behaviors. Theories of economic statecraft may partially explain the en-
hanced competitiveness of Chinese IT firms. As the Taiwanese state meets with 
rising economic pressure from the other side of the Taiwan Strait, its bargaining 
power to boost its IT industry is limited.
All in all, China will be a key component in Taiwan’s global strategies of devel-
opment. Understanding the risks and opportunities of the rise of China in global 
instead of bilateral terms will help illuminate how Taiwan can grow and prosper 
in the future. The traditional wisdom of economic statecraft and interdependence 
thus needs further revision. Coping with the rise of China involves hard choices 
on the domestic front in Taiwan. Only by shouldering more risks and perceiving 
the changing world from a more realist perspective will Taiwan be able to reverse 
the inward-looking tendencies of national development.
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In this chapter I use social entrepreneurialism as an analytical tool to under-
stand the changing state-society relationship in Taiwan since the 1990s.1 I adopt 
the usual definition of entrepreneurship, which includes the capacity to iden-
tify and exploit opportunities and resources, endure risks, innovate, and create 
new values. In the expanding literature on social entrepreneurialism, especially 
from the field of business management, much of the debate has focused on what 
social entrepreneurialism is and should be, framed by the role of commercial 
exchange (e.g., should social entrepreneurs worry about profitability?), the goals 
of entrepreneurial activities (e.g., can social entrepreneurs serve nonsocial pur-
poses?), and the hybrid model exemplified by the Grameen Bank in Bangla-
desh and other microcredit agencies that are profit oriented but using profits to 
achieve social goals.
While these works are useful in establishing links between ideals and policy 
formulations, it is equally important to contextualize and politicize the formation 
and transformation of social entrepreneurialism and to examine its connections 
with other types of entrepreneurialism. By doing so, I hope to understand to what 
extent social entrepreneurialism is convergent with and divergent from the logic 
of the state and the market.
While this chapter focuses on Taiwan in the era of the post–martial law, post-
developmental state, I will also discuss the role of the connection between Taiwan 
and mainland China in the development of social entrepreneurialism.
10
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TAIWAN IN THE ER A OF THE POST–MARTIAL L AW, 
POSTDEVELOPMENTAL STATE
The developmental state is usually defined by the interventionist state’s policies 
of industrial restructuring and export upgrading as well as investment in public 
education to produce an upgradable labor force. In Taiwan, the success of micro-
electronics and Hsinchu Science Park has been well recognized as the showcase 
achievement of the developmental state. The developmental state is also frequent-
ly typified by an authoritarian regime. The combination of single-party domina-
tion, legitimized by the threat of Chinese communist invasion from across the 
Taiwan Strait, and successful land reform that effectively removed the landed elite 
in rural areas in the 1950s helped to keep workers and farmers relatively quiet in 
the regime of accumulation, characterized by high investment, low wages, and 
large price scissors, from the 1950s through the 1980s.
These four pillars of the developmental state, namely, state-guided and export-
oriented industrialization, public education, rural land reform, and authoritari-
anism, have been substantially transformed since the early 1990s. In the 1990s, 
Taiwan’s political system evolved from single-party authoritarianism under the 
Nationalist Party (KMT) to multiparty democracy, accompanied by the rise of 
social activism after the lifting of martial law in 1987. Also in the 1990s, while Tai-
wan’s microelectronics companies continued to occupy an important niche in the 
world market, they faced new challenges and began to shift standardized manu-
facturing to mainland China. Public education first took a neoclassical turn in the 
early 1990s, using a supply-side rationale to increase the number of universities, 
hence lowering the threshold to university entrance. It then made a neoliberal turn 
in the early 2000s, adopting quantitative measurements in performance evalua-
tion in higher education and encouraging private investment in education at all 
levels. Traditional agriculture went through crises as a result of urban and indus-
trial expansion, insufficient state protection, and the World Trade Organization. 
Some rural areas survived by shifting to high-value-added agriculture and leisure 
industries, while others deteriorated further. These transformations in the era of 
the postdevelopmental state intertwined with one another, generating dilemmas, 
contentions, and new dynamics among the state, society, and the market.
The transformation of microelectronics showcased the changing state-society 
relationship in Taiwan in the new era. Since the 1990s, microelectronics, along 
with many other export-oriented manufacturing sectors, began to move to main-
land China. As the issue of Taiwan’s growing connection with mainland China 
continued to dominate political debates in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government 
dealt with the challenge of industrial hollowing out by diversifying the high-tech 
sector and by expanding existing science parks and building new ones. New sci-
ence parks were built in agricultural areas, such as Tainan in southern Taiwan, 
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Yilan on the northeast coast, and Houli in central Taiwan. Hsinchu Science Park 
triumphalism has lent much symbolic capital to the new parks. Some of the sci-
ence parks were central government initiatives, but many more were local poli-
ticians’ pet projects. This spatial strategy of decentralizing science parks reflects 
the changing political landscape in Taiwan in the postauthoritarian era. The two 
rival parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Nationalist Party 
(Kuomintang, KMT), competed with each other to consolidate their political sup-
port by allocating public projects in their client counties and cities.
To ensure profitability in projects that involved both public and private inter-
ests, plans of science parks were usually accompanied by real estate development 
projects. A science park that could accommodate both industrial and residential/
commercial development required the conversion of large areas of farmland.
In 2004, a plan to build a science park and develop the surrounding areas for 
real estate projects was prepared by the county government of Miaoli in central 
Taiwan. Given its location to the south of Hsin-chu, the planned park tried to 
borrow the fame of Hsinchu Science Park and was called Chu-nan (South of Hsin-
chu) Science Park. One of the subsidiaries of Foxconn, the iconic Taiwanese firm 
that manufactures 80 percent of the world’s iBooks and iPads and Nokia and Mo-
torola cell phones, was a prospective tenant of the planned park. According to the 
plan, the farmland of a village called Dapu, among others, was earmarked for land 
use conversion. The proposal did not meet much resistance in the beginning, as 
the county governor promised Dapu villagers high compensation rates for their 
farmland, and the villagers’ homes were to be left intact so there was no need for 
relocation.
By 2008, the Foxconn subsidiary requested a much larger area of land in the 
park for its future expansion. To accommodate the request, the Miaoli county 
government decided to expropriate more farmland from Dapu village; further, 
the new expansion plan would involve demolition of villagers’ homes and hence 
villagers’ relocation. Even more controversial, the compensation rates turned 
out to be much lower than the “premium rates” that the governor had originally 
promised. Villagers responded by organizing rallies and protests in front of the 
Executive Yuan and the Control Yuan, the national-level government branches in 
Taipei. On June 9, 2010, before any agreement was reached between farmers and 
the county government, and as the rice crop was almost ready for harvest, the 
county government unexpectedly sent more than twenty excavators into the rice 
fields in the wee hours of the morning. The excavators were accompanied by two 
hundred police officers and an ambulance. In the name of preparing the land for 
construction, the fleet of excavators began a rampage of destruction of the rice 
fields of Dapu village.
As the extractors destroyed richly laden crops, and as anguished old farmers 
and women with young children pleaded with the operators to stop the monster 
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machines and were held back brutally by the police, a local resident videotaped 
the entire incident. A citizen journalist, pen-named Great Tyrannosaurus, edited 
the footage and posted the video on a popular Web platform of citizen journalism 
called PeoPo (or People’s Post). The video, entitled When the Excavators Came to 
the Rice Fields, immediately went viral. It subsequently activated a massive mobi-
lization of local farmers, social activists, media workers, students, public intellec-
tuals, professionals, and artists across Taiwan to protest against the government’s 
brutality in land appropriation. The Dapu incident triggered one of the most im-
portant social movements in Taiwan’s recent memory. At the end, the chief of the 
Executive Yuan apologized to Dapu villagers, and President Ma Ying-jeou of the 
KMT vetoed the expansion plan.
The societal challenge to the expansion of microelectronics and science parks 
in Taiwan also came from other sources. Pollution created by the microelectron-
ics firms in Hsinchu Science Park had been an important target of environmental 
activists and community groups since the mid-1990s. Yet because the park was 
embedded in the state bureaucracy and the sewer and drainage systems were cen-
tralized in the science park, the administration of the science park, rather than in-
dividual polluting firms, became the target of the environmental protesters. Also, 
complaints were lodged mainly by residents in the neighborhoods adjacent to the 
park, where many middle-class employees of the science park lived. The split in-
terests and loyalties between employees of Hsinchu Science Park and nonemploy-
ees in the same community made it difficult for the movement to strengthen its 
solidarity and attract a greater following.
The movement against high-tech pollution started to gather momentum in the 
2000s. The political strategy of building patronage by dispensing high-profiled 
science park projects in greenfield sites began to provoke waves of activism against 
high-tech pollution. As areas affected by high-tech pollution expanded from the 
neighboring middle-class communities to farmers’ croplands, the environmental-
ists’ voice became louder.
Meanwhile, the significance of the legendary Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI) and the Electronics Research and Service Organization (ERSO), 
the star state actors and the base of high-tech research and development in Taiwan 
in the 1980s and 1990s, has been diminishing. Since the late 1990s, most high-tech 
firms have developed worldwide technology sourcing and strategic partnerships; 
many have established in-house research centers as the war over intellectual prop-
erty rights in the microelectronics industry has escalated.2 Taiwan’s anti-high-tech 
pollution activists linked up with activist groups in the United States, especially 
those based in the Silicon Valley. They learned from their Silicon Valley counter-
parts to target individual polluting firms, like Acer and Foxconn, that were located 
outside of park jurisdiction and were not under the protective umbrella of the sci-
ence park administration.3
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Targeting these well-known firms individually was also a way to get media at-
tention and impose greater pressure on the firms. Similar protests against industri-
al pollution were found in other sectors, including another foundational industry 
of the developmental state: the petrochemical industry.4 In April 2011, a persistent 
and well-networked campaign by farmers, students, public intellectuals, profes-
sionals, and environmentalist groups successfully forced the government to halt 
a plan to build a major petrochemical complex in a wetland area in Zhanghua 
County on Taiwan’s southwestern coast, making another headline and bench-
marking the progress of Taiwan’s environmental movement.
Yet not all social mobilizations in Taiwan have brought victorious results. What 
is important about mobilization is the way people are mobilized. The mobilization 
that I briefly sketched above, among many other similar cases, marked a profound 
transformation of Taiwan’s state-society relationship in the era of the postdevel-
opmental state. What had once been the showcase of the developmental state, the 
microelectronics and petrochemical industries, was now as much a political li-
ability as an economic driver. Growth-based legitimacy projects were subjected 
to societal scrutiny on environmental and distributional fronts and became the 
platform of social contestations.
Another related issue in the post–developmental state era is a changing percep-
tion of development that has challenged the idea and ideal of development defined 
by economic growth. Along with expanding social activism over distributional issues 
with regard to labor, the environment, land rights, women, education, and aborigines’ 
rights, the politics of recognition and representation are also on the rise. The devel-
opmental state that once prioritized quantitative growth is now challenged by a new 
socioculture that asks questions about development for whom, and for what.
The question of “development for whom” has driven distributional and rep-
resentational social movements since the 1990s; the question of “development 
for what” has formed the basis of religious and spiritual movements. Both types 
of movements are tightly connected with social actions, social values, and social 
entrepreneurialism.
Before I go into case studies to elaborate on these two types of social entre-
preneurialism, I will first sketch briefly the transformation of Taiwan’s social 
movements from political entrepreneurialism in the 1990s, characterized by its 
dependence on political parties, to the social entrepreneurialism in the 2000s, 
characterized by more diverse and autonomous forms of social mobilization.
FROM POLITICAL TO SO CIAL ENTREPRENEURIALISM
In 2000, the opposition party that grew out of Taiwan’s democracy movement, 
the DPP, won the presidential election. Its victory marked the shift of Taiwan’s 
polity from single-party domination to competitive multiparty democracy. The 
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DPP started out opposing the monopoly of the KMT and came to encompass a 
wide spectrum of political opposition, including agendas for legislature reform, 
labor, ethnic minority rights, aborigines’ rights, and women’s rights. Consolidat-
ing a very diverse array of progressive political movements in the 1990s, Chen 
Shui-bian of the DPP won the presidency in 2000 and stayed in power for two 
four-year terms.
Through the election the DPP developed a symbiotic relationship with grass-
roots activists turned political entrepreneurs. The grassroots organizations gave the 
DPP candidates political credibility and a campaign agenda; the DPP, in return, 
endorsed and sponsored movement leaders’ election campaigns or recruited them 
into the government and party bureaucracy at various levels. While the DPP en-
joyed both political resources and social legitimacy, social movements were made 
highly dependent on the DPP regime throughout the 1990s and a good part of the 
2000s.
But the story of political entrepreneurialism is not just one of co-opted radical-
ism or political opportunism. Since the 2000s, the repertoire of social contestation 
and mobilization started to expand from distributional politics, as in the case of 
labor protection and women’s rights, to the politics of recognition, as in the case 
of the rights of aboriginals, religious groups, and gay men and lesbians. However, 
as the repertoire of social activisms expanded and diversified, not all of them were 
endorsed by the DPP establishment, which had shifted from being an opposition 
party to occupying the center of power.
Along with the diversification and expansion of social movements and agen-
das, there was another wave of cultural change in the 2000s: voicing opinions in 
public forums and protesting and mobilizing were normalized, and networking in 
real and cyber space became a way of life. The various forms of civil organizations 
and social movements as well as the culture of protest through new and old media 
created varied real and virtual spaces jointly occupied by different classes, includ-
ing workers and farmers; community organizers; liberal media workers; student 
groups, teachers, public intellectuals, academics; white-collar workers and profes-
sionals in medicine, law, design, and engineering; spiritual and religious activists; 
parents, housewives, and even woman marriage migrants from Southeast Asia.
The organizational capacity of these groups varied greatly, and not all of them 
were “political” according to narrowly defined party and electoral politics. Some 
specifically labeled themselves as “apolitical.” Nevertheless, all of them engaged 
in social networking, coordinated by active members of the networks, which ex-
panded and overlapped with other networks. The culture of networking has always 
been deeply rooted in Taiwanese society. It was now much expanded and rein-
forced, thanks to the widely available IT infrastructure in the age of information.
These loosely or not-so-loosely organized networkers were socially engaged 
but were not necessarily “political” in the immediate sense. Members were highly 
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aware of the public agenda and possessed a mobilizational capacity that could be 
readily put into action when the need arose.
Several commentators in Taiwan have pointed out that by the end of the 2000s 
Taiwan’s social activism was moving toward a more autonomous arena. The new 
generation of social activists and organizers had looser connections, if any, with 
either the DPP or the KMT party machines. They were politically shrewd and 
were highly aware of the cost of dependency on dominant political parties. They 
were less constrained by the state’s political and policy agendas and were more 
internationally connected. While these activists claimed to be more community 
oriented than “political,” their networks had a strong political implication in that 
they marked the emergence of a nonstate space and remained mobilizable for po-
litical aims. Activists had well-coordinated social networks that they could mo-
bilize politically, even if not for specific political projects like election campaigns. 
In the instance already noted of a recent environmental protest against a plan to 
build a mega petrochemical complex and a new science park in central Taiwan, 
student groups, environmentalists, writers, and artists organized, fought, and won 
the battle.
Growing out of a political mobilization confined by party politics of the 1980s 
and 1990s, social movements in Taiwan have gone through important transforma-
tions and have become increasingly conscious of the need to preserve their own 
autonomy in the volatile environment of party politics. I call this phenomenon 
social entrepreneurialism in the sense that resourceful and creative social activists 
have been able to mobilize for social causes, creating social meanings and defining 
social values.
CITIZEN JOURNALISM AND PEOPLE’S  POST
Social entrepreneurialism in the new millennium has a lot to do with informa-
tional technology. With this in mind, I have identified a citizen journalist network 
called People’s Post (“PeoPo” for short), established in Taiwan in 2007, to examine 
Taiwan’s social entrepreneurialism and its relationship with social media.
In Taiwan in the 1990s and 2000s, as the relatively new democracy encoun-
tered the global trend of deregulation, the number of media outlets increased 
dramatically. Shifting from highly controlled and censored, state-dominant pub-
lic media, by 2011 Taiwan had five terrestrial TV networks, nine twenty-four-hour 
news channels, nineteen national evening newscasts, 120 cable channels, and an 
over 85 percent cable TV penetration rate. There are four thousand magazines, 
2,500 newspapers, and two hundred radio stations—all for a population of 23 mil-
lion. While Taiwan ranked fourth of countries in Asia for freedom of the press, 
it ranked last in media credibility, at only 1 percent.5 In 2007, a survey conducted 
by Taiwan Normal University found that two-thirds of the citizens thought the 
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media was the most important cause of Taiwan’s social disorder.6 Under intense 
competition for advertising, news programs grew increasingly sensational, and 
political parties and politicians bought up slots in news programs in the form 
of product placement. As commodified news programs in the commercial me-
dia generated widespread public distrust, in 2007 Public Television in Taiwan—
a public broadcaster much like the BBC in the United Kingdom–launched the 
multimedia citizen journalism website People’s Post or PeoPo, based on the open-
source operating system Linux.7 The English pronunciation of PeoPo is close to 
that for the word “tips” in Taiwanese slang.
PeoPo is different from personal blogs in the sense that the reports are more 
public affairs oriented, focusing more on local community events; and the stories 
are firsthand reporting instead of commentaries at second hand on news reports.8 
Compared to one of the best-known citizen journalism projects in East Asia, 
OhMyNews of South Korea, Taiwan’s PeoPo emphasizes grassroots autonomy and 
does not interfere with or moderate the materials sent by citizen journalists, as 
long as those journalists are registered with the public TV station by their real 
name to prevent frauds and hoaxes. If someone objects to a report, the objection 
is forwarded to the contributor, who is invited to reconsider and amend it if he or 
she wants to. The TV station reserves the right to remove material, but it has not 
found any case that made the removal necessary. Also, whereas contributors to 
OhMyNews in South Korea are known to have close affiliations with traditionally 
strong political groups like teachers’ associations and labor unions, most PeoPo 
citizen journalists are independent news producers. Of the 5,313 citizen journalists 
in PeoPo as of September 2011, 45 percent were male and 55 percent female. They 
tended to be young (70 percent between ages twenty and forty), and well educated 
(90 percent with college or higher degrees, as compared to the 36 percent of Tai-
wan’s population over age fifteen with college or higher degrees). Compared to the 
BBC, which “welcomes viewers’ contribution of photos and videos” but neverthe-
less treats these contributors as “sources,” and other social news organizations like 
ProPublica of the United States, which is mainly an outlet for elite grant-spon-
sored professional journalists, citizen journalists of PeoPo primarily come from a 
nonmedia background and have great control over their reporting. Between April 
2007 and March 2012, citizen journalists contributed seventy thousand reports, 
and the number of visitors grew from less than two hundred thousand per month 
in 2007 to a million by 2012.9
When Typhoon Morakot hit southern Taiwan in August 2009, killing more 
than seven hundred people and causing widespread devastation, it was a local 
citizen journalist who uploaded the first video report from the disaster zone that 
alerted the political center of Taipei in the north, which was basking in the sun that 
day. With its widespread and persistent team of video reporters, the PeoPo project 
shamed the government into getting much-needed aid to the stricken areas, and 
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Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou came under fire for his slow response to the di-
saster and his belated appeal for international help.
As PeoPo was getting more participating citizen journalists and visitors, the 
Public Television channel began to integrate PeoPo’s output into its news pro-
grams. There was a daily five-minute program on the best stories filed that day. On 
weekends the main news bulletins carried at least four PeoPo reports. And it was 
not just public television that used citizen journalists’ reports. Commercial TV 
stations also covered stories that were first broken by citizen journalists and that 
became too widely circulated for the commercial media to ignore. PeoPo citizen 
journalists did not just report from the grassroots. They began to set the social 
agenda. By covering what the mainstream media shied away from, citizen jour-
nalists gained credibility that most of the commercial media had long lost. And 
as citizen journalists established their social credibility, their political legitimacy 
was also strengthened. During the 2008 presidential election, PeoPo initiated a 
program that selected twelve citizen-produced videos from three hundred sub-
missions, in which each citizen raised a thirty-second question for the presidential 
candidates. These twelve participants were invited to appear at the live broadcast 
of presidential debates, and each had the chance to ask the candidates a follow-up 
question face to face.
The connection between Taiwan’s social entrepreneurialism and PeoPo is about 
intensification and expansion of social networks, and the capability of creating 
richly interwoven and mutually reinforcing relationships among various types of 
networks: social and virtual networks, personal and institutional networks, ex-
isting and expanded networks. In a society that has had a long and rich tradi-
tion of networking among extended families, friends, businesses, neighbors, and 
colleagues, the newly opened political environment, high computer literacy rates, 
and the availability of information technologies have provided the foundation for 
existing personal and business networks to flourish with effective coordination 
and organization.
A good example of the accumulative and expansive nature of networking that 
integrates social and virtual networks is the frequent and regular meetings of citi-
zen journalists. As a way to maintain the quality of reporting, with a strong focus 
on visual stories, the public television station organized an extensive training pro-
gram for member citizen journalists. In addition to producing fifty online train-
ing videos and courses, the station has run more than four hundred face-to-face 
workshops, organized citizen journalist gatherings, field visits, and symposiums, 
given citizen journalist awards, and held summer camps in different regions in 
Taiwan. Also, Taiwan’s nonprofit, non-degree-granting community colleges in 
Taiwan, which have proliferated since the early 2000s and now total seventy-five 
throughout the island, offer journalism courses for aspiring citizen journalists. In 
the training programs, newcomers and experienced citizen journalists meet, and 
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community workers and social activists share their experiences and interact di-
rectly with like-minded citizens. The meetings, workshops, and courses are infor-
mative and fun. They are for professional training in camerawork, interview skills, 
writing, and editing, as well as for socializing and network expansion.
Networking also extends from information production and circulation to ac-
tion. The networks between citizen journalists and social activists constitute an-
other important dimension of social entrepreneurialism.
Generally speaking, about 80 percent of the agenda covered by the sixty-thou-
sand-plus citizen journalist reports between 2007 and 2011 were directly related 
to public affairs. Within that 80 percent, 23 percent concerned social welfare, 
17  percent education, 12 percent the environment, 8 percent politics and the 
economy, 7 percent the media, 6 percent community reform, 6 percent historic 
preservation, 4 percent agriculture, 15 percent daily life and leisure, and 2 percent 
sports and technology.10
Although citizen journalists are mostly independent producers, their concerns 
regarding public affairs bring them close to social movements and organizations. 
Social protests or mobilizational activities are rarely covered by commercial me-
dia, as the most media are entangled with political and corporate interests. Social 
activists consequently count on citizen journalists to spread the word and mobi-
lize support. The connection between PeoPo and social movements has helped 
strengthened both. The mobilization around the Dapu incident in 2010, as pre-
sented earlier in this chapter, was triggered by a citizen journalist’s video report. 
Active social groups in Taiwan, like the Taiwan Agriculture United Front, among 
others, decided to join the Dapu-triggered farmers’ land rights movement after ac-
tivists saw the posting. Activists provided much-needed organizational resources 
and mobilization skills to sustain the movement. The sustained mobilization in 
turn provided more materials for citizen journalists, brought them more visitors, 
and encouraged them to follow the movement in greater depth.11 PeoPo itself is af-
filiated with fifteen college news centers (which are usually affiliated with schools 
of journalism) and more than two hundred nongovernmental and nonprofit or-
ganizations, holding training workshops for them. These training programs have 
turned socially concerned citizens not only into more effective visual and auditory 
communicators but also into regular visitors and active participants of PeoPo. A 
news platform with the idea of sharing and voicing from the bottom up has be-
come an unparalleled example of networking for the production of social mean-
ings and values.
Another example of the synergy created across different types of networks is 
the linkage between interpersonal and mobilizational networks. In the movement 
against the plan to build a petrochemical complex in southern coastal Taiwan, the 
turning point happened when a mainstream news magazine, Business Weekly in 
Taiwan, decided to cover the story, which all other mainstream media had shied 
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away from. According to Zhuang Feng-jia, one of the reasons for Business Weekly 
to cover the story was that a leading activist of the movement, a university profes-
sor, was a close college friend of the executive editor of the magazine.12 The latter 
was convinced by the college friend to do what other mainstream media intention-
ally neglected. The coverage was critical because it was only after reading the story 
in Business Weekly that President Ma decided to veto the project. What is also 
interesting is the cross-fertilizing between citizen journalism and liberal journal-
ism. The report was filed by a woman journalist who had left a mainstream media 
outlet and had become a freelancer and a registered citizen journalist of PeoPo. 
She eventually won the prestigious national journalism award for her persistent 
reporting on the explosive environmental issue.
To sum up, the significance of PeoPo as a critical case of social entrepreneurial-
ism in Taiwan in the era of the postdevelopmental state is as follows.
First, PeoPo has an unusual relationship with the state and market. Like citi-
zen journalism in other parts of the world, PeoPo enjoys the social credibility that 
mainstream commercial media does not. What makes PeoPo particularly interest-
ing is its relationship with the state in the era of the postdevelopmental state. From 
its birth, PeoPo was a part of the Taiwan Public Television Service (TPTS) and has 
enjoyed the privilege of not having to worry about its commercial viability. It could 
also tap into the infrastructure and platform of the public TV station, as one of the 
fruits of Taiwan’s political opening. Unlike some of the North America–based pub-
lic journalist platforms like NowPublic (Vancouver, established in 2005), Newsvine 
(Seattle, 2005), and Reddit (Medford, MA, 2005), which ran like business start-
ups and were subsequently acquired by mainstream media and/or venture capital, 
PeoPo managed to maintain its autonomy from the market.
There is a price to pay for financial autonomy. The leadership of the TPTS has 
been a political appointment. In 2007, when PeoPo was first established at the TPTS, 
the general manager of the TPTS was a student leader turned senior professional 
journalist who was well respected in Taiwan’s media circles. His vision and support 
helped PeoPo stay away from political entanglements during his tenure. After the 
general manager left the TPTS, PeoPo went through several ups and downs, dur-
ing which its budgetary and personnel resources were much limited. According 
to the director of the PeoPo platform, PeoPo’s saving grace came from its claim to 
be a form of “new media,” the magic words at a time when traditional print media 
continued to decline and when, as mentioned before, conventional TV news had 
lost much of its credibility. Moreover, PeoPo has become so successful that it is 
frequently presented at various international conferences on media, democracy, or 
new media. Whenever Taiwan needs to show the world what democracy has done 
for the Taiwanese people, especially when compared to mainland China, PeoPo 
makes a good showcase for Taiwan and for the TPTS. Consequently, as the director 
of PeoPo told me, even though the new TPTS leadership does not always support 
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what PeoPo does, it cannot afford to seriously trim its already humble budget (less 
than 1 percent of the total TPTS budget). The highly resourceful and low-paid staff 
at PeoPo has therefore found its small, yet relatively autonomous space within the 
TPTS and has kept partisan politics at bay.
Second, PeoPo goes beyond elite professionalism. It has maintained the nonelitist 
nature of reporting, while remaining devoted to the provision of technical training 
to grassroots journalists through regular workshops and joint training programs 
with community colleges and social activist groups.13 These training workshops 
have proved to be very effective in both technical training and social networking.
Many active citizen journalists are teachers who took early retirement under 
Taiwan’s generous pension plans in the 1990s. These primary and secondary school 
teachers, with their broad knowledge base, communication skills, and experiences 
in visual presentation, were able to get a handle on news production quickly. With 
the support of state-sponsored pension plans, these middle-aged retirees can af-
ford to devote their time and energy to volunteer work, including citizen journal-
ism. This is yet another link between the state and social entrepreneurialism.
Third, PeoPo and network society reinforce one another. Supported by a well-
developed IT infrastructure in a highly urbanized island of high population 
density, and embedded in a society of high computer literacy and dense social 
networks, PeoPo exemplifies how different types of networks can overlap, con-
nect, and expand into more extensive networks. These multilayered networks are 
simultaneously interpersonal, institutional, and communicational-informational. 
They reinforce one another, creating new synergy in a society that turned into a 
multiparty democracy only twenty years ago (or eleven years ago, if we use the 
successful presidential campaign of the oppositional DPP as the benchmark). 
The extensiveness of social-informational networks and a functioning democracy 
seem to have created a positive feedback loop in this case.
Last but not the least, PeoPo features crucial links between its expansive and 
extensive communication networks and mobilizational actions. PeoPo’s nonparti-
san and noncommercial stance in a highly commercialized and politicized Taiwan 
gave it the rarest commodity of all: public trust and social credibility that turned 
out to be an effective tool for mobilization for the public good.
THE INTERNET AND PUBLIC TRUST IN CHINA
The public trust that PeoPo enjoyed makes an intriguing contrast with the Internet 
culture that James Leibold and Rongbin Han have reported on.14
Leibold used Manuel Castells’s concept of “networked individualism” to elabo-
rate on the fraudulent culture of the Internet generally. In an article entitled “Blog-
ging Alone” he argued that “while the internet has dramatically increased people’s 
access to information, it also threatens to undermine the accuracy and meaning 
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of much of this knowledge.”15 Examples of Internet rumors, misinformation, and 
deception abound in the China of the 2000s. In the wake of the 2003 SARS epi-
demic, online rumors suggested that the virus was a biological weapon invented 
by Taiwan and the United States to destroy China, while stores ran out of vinegar 
once it was suggested as the only antidote to the infection.16
One of the best-known examples of deception and forgery on China’s Internet 
concerns a tiger. The South China tiger, Panthera tigris amoyensis, had not been 
seen in the wild since 1980. But in October 2007, when a farmer and amateur 
photographer in the northwestern Chinese province of Shaanxi claimed he had 
risked his life to shoot thirty-plus digital photographs of a South China tiger in 
the wild, the Provincial Forestry Bureau immediately threw their weight behind 
the authenticity of the farmer’s snapshots. They rushed to hold a press conference 
to announce the “rediscovery” of the extinct tiger under their jurisdiction, in the 
hope that it would boost the fame of the place, get state recognition and funding 
to establish a protection zone for the tiger like the giant panda conservancy in 
Sichuan, and increase tourism. However, the photographs were soon questioned. 
Netizens doubted the pictures and claimed they were fake. Urged by the public 
and wildlife experts, the national Forestry Ministry formed an investigative team 
on October 24, but their report has remained unpublicized. By early 2008, the 
Shaanxi provincial government reprimanded the Forestry Bureau for violating of-
ficial regulations by holding the press conference to support Zhou’s “discovery” 
without further evidence. The Forestry Bureau subsequently issued a public let-
ter apologizing for publicizing the photos, though it refrained from commenting 
about their authenticity. 
What’s interesting is that the embarrassing scandal did not stop others from 
trying their luck with the same hoax. Only one month after the farce of the “paper 
tiger” in Shaanxi subsided, another scandal involving a fake South China tiger was 
exposed. This time, the person who did the forgery was a journalist with a county 
TV station in Hunan Province, another poor and desperate region. The journal-
ist announced that he had “unintentionally videotaped” a suspected South China 
tiger in a mountainous area of Hunan Province. Again, local officials immediately 
jumped to support the claims. High-level provincial and municipal officials paid 
an inspection tour to the site where the tiger had allegedly been videotaped. They 
concluded that the journalist’s videotape was authentic. But just four days later, 
the provincial Forestry Bureau announced that the big cat in the film was in fact 
a Siberian tiger borrowed from a circus from another province that happened to 
be on a performance tour in Hunan. The journalist was subsequently blamed for 
making the forgery to enhance his own fame and commercial interests.17 Neither 
the officials who supported the forgery nor the journalist was punished.
While the case of the South China tiger forgeries was eventually cleared up, 
many other forgeries have remained on the Internet. One immediate consequence 
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of these scandals is that information on the Internet is increasingly considered 
unreliable. Online anonymity protects individuals while also creating space for 
frauds. Leibold cited one Chinese blogger’s statement: “On the Internet, even 
[when] you provide facts about yourself, people won’t believe it. They think that 
you make them up. So it doesn’t matter whether you provide real or fake informa-
tion because nobody trusts the information on the Internet.”18 In the same article 
Leibold cited a survey showing that those who thought the Internet was reliable 
decreased from 52 percent to 26 percent between 2003 and 2007, while those who 
thought it was unreliable more than doubled, from 9 percent to 22 percent.19
The culture of distrust is reinforced by and reflected in the regressive digital 
culture described by Leibold. The new technologies that enable fast-paced, widely 
spread flows of messages excite but also quickly exhaust and disillusion users. The 
culture of suspicion, in turn, comes back to haunt online activism. In Han’s (2012) 
observation, Chinese netizens have been extremely anxious about each other’s 
identity and intentions in their online communication. While netizens could be 
successful in discrediting the Chinese Communist Party regime by exposing the 
state’s manipulation and distortion of public opinions online, they are equally, if 
not more, suspicious of alternative views to the party-state. As the regime chal-
lengers practice pop activism and mock official lines, they are also ready to ques-
tion the intentions and competence of democratic activists. Take the two best-
known leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen student movement, for example: according 
to Rongbin Han Chai Ling was accused of risking other students’ lives for her 
personal ambition, and Wang Dan was accused of betraying China’s national in-
terests by receiving funds from the United States and Taiwan’s proindependence 
DPP administration. Online platforms, therefore, could work to silence as much 
as to encourage public forums.20 Han notes that such suspicion and anxiety over 
others’ identity and intentions has led online communities to isolate themselves 
with highly guarded entrances instead of retaining more inclusive networks in 
cyberspace.
As a result, there has been a strong public outcry for more, rather than less, state 
control of the Internet to maintain social stability. Nearly 84 percent of respon-
dents to a survey thought that content on the Internet should be controlled, with 
83 percent identifying violence, 65 percent malicious speculation, and nearly 30 
percent online chatting as in need of control, and 85 percent looked to the govern-
ment to censor this content. Between 2003 and 2007, there was an over 50 percent 
decline in those who thought that the Internet empowered the people.21
THE POWER OF THE APOLITICAL:  TZU CHI
A more systematic comparison of social media in Taiwan and China is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. But one of the possible directions for further investigation 
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is the paradoxical and multidimensional connections between public trust and 
politics. While Taiwanese netizens have organized alternative forums with great 
potential for political mobilization, they have tended to shy away from outright 
partisan politics. In the Chinese case, as Leibold has pointed out, one consequence 
of the loss of public trust in social media has been increasing popular demand for 
more, not less, state intervention in regulating cyberspace.22
In this final section, I will bring in another case of social entrepreneurialism 
from Taiwan to further illustrate the paradoxical relationship between public trust 
and politics and to show how an allegedly apolitical group has built the most pow-
erful social organization in Taiwan, an organization that has now established itself 
in China as well.
Post–martial law Taiwan has seen a rapid expansion of religious and spiri-
tual institutions. Quite a few Buddhist temples have expanded into large-scale 
and well-financed modern organizations. Buddhist organizations have con-
tributed to the proliferation of welfare institutions, the internationalization 
of the revival movement, and increasing religious links between Taiwan and 
mainland China.
One of the best-known and largest Buddhist organizations active in Taiwan 
and internationally is a religious philanthropy group called Buddhist Compas-
sion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation (hereafter Tzu Chi). Tzu Chi started as a small 
Buddhist charity of fifty-plus members in the impoverished coastal region of 
eastern Taiwan in 1966. By 2009 it boasted five million followers in Taiwan and 
overseas. Tzu Chi is also markedly matriarchal. The leader is a woman, a small-
framed yet highly charismatic Buddhist Dharma nun called Master Cheng Yan. 
Tzu Chi’s thirty founding members were all women, and in 2009 about 80 per-
cent of the most active followers and volunteer charity workers were women, 
particularly middle-class, middle-aged women.23
While the matriarchal nature of Tzu Chi distinguishes it from other religious 
institutions in Taiwan, Tzu Chi has also demonstrated impressive managerial ca-
pability. In three decades, Tzu Chi Foundation grew from a small charity to a large 
international organization with 63 branch operations in Taiwan and another 372 
branches in forty-seven countries, eight hundred full-time staff, and five million 
followers. It is included in the case study bank of Harvard Business School. In ad-
dition to its religious activities and organizations, Tzu Chi operates charity and 
disaster relief agencies, which now run three state-of-the art, nine-hundred-bed 
hospitals, a television channel, a publishing house, and a secular university that 
includes a well-respected medical school, several middle schools, and one of the 
most important bone marrow donation centers in Taiwan. In addition to large in-
vestment projects like hospitals, universities, and schools, Tzu Chi runs five thou-
sand volunteer-based recycling centers with two hundred thousand volunteers all 
over Taiwan, turning millions of recycled PET bottles into clothing and disaster 
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relief blankets. By 2010 the company that was in charge of the recycle-reuse project 
had annual revenue over US$3 million.
An important feature of Tzu Chi is its principle of political neutrality. Master 
Cheng Yan has explicitly required Tzu Chi members to refrain from any kind of 
political activities. Unlike many celebrities in Taiwan, Master Cheng Yan herself 
has never openly supported any presidential candidates or politicians, and mem-
bers of all ranks have to resign from Tzu Chi if they become involved in political 
campaigns, elections, or demonstrations. Master Cheng Yan’s “ten precepts” in-
clude the five Buddhist ones of no killing, no stealing, no sex outside of marriage, 
no lying, and no drinking, as well as five more that she has added to the list: no 
smoking or using narcotics; no betel nuts; no gambling, no violation of traffic laws, 
and no participation in political activities or demonstrations. Tzu Chi’s environ-
mentalism, for instance, remained tied to recycling, for which the government 
also campaigns. Tzu Chi would not, however, protest against nuclear power plants 
or any specific polluting factories. In the name of universal love and harmony, 
and upholding the principle of not taking political sides, Tzu Chi systematically 
avoided any kind of confrontation.
This very explicit principle of political neutrality was not necessarily a “tradi-
tional” Buddhist value, however. Politically charged action has been characteristic 
of a long history of popularizing Buddhist movements in China. These sects often 
attempted to move Buddhism out of the monastery and into the streets, away from 
sophisticated philosophy and toward actions that anyone could perform, with a 
vision of this-worldly, collective salvation.
The case for the Buddhist tradition of political involvement is made even stron-
ger if we look at Buddhist organizations and activities in other parts of Asia, includ-
ing those in Thailand, Japan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Tibet. In these 
societies we find that monks (mostly monks, not nuns) have not shunned either 
modest or aggressive political involvement and have engaged in protests against 
and resistance to secular states or have advocated alternative sources of authority. 
In contrast, Buddhist organizations in Taiwan general, and Tzu Chi in particular, 
have embraced no radical theology and have always adhered to the principle of 
political neutrality. Buddhist organizations were not part of the democracy move-
ment in Taiwan in the 1980s, and they remained politically neutral after the lifting 
of martial law in 1987.24
Tzu Chi’s political neutrality has been a form of moral capital in post–martial 
law Taiwan. As André Laliberté has suggested, the politics of post–martial law Tai-
wan was highly divided. The division was first drawn between those who were born 
in mainland China (mostly military and government personnel and those who 
moved to Taiwan in 1949 when the Nationalists were defeated by the communists), 
and those who identify themselves as genuine Taiwanese (whose ancestors, most 
of them peasants, had migrated to Taiwan from southern China three hundred 
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years earlier). This line between “insiders” and “outsiders” was further reinforced 
by their presumed political stance over the issue of Taiwan-China relations. While 
“outsiders” were generally thought to be supportive of unification with mainland 
China, “insiders” were thought to lean toward Taiwan independence. Politicians 
of the DPP when it was an opposition party exploited this division to consolidate 
opposition energies and defeat the KMT, which had been dominating Taiwanese 
mainstream politics for half a century, in the 2000 presidential election. But this 
identity politics in Taiwan has not led to the type of violent conflicts found in 
many other parts of the world and history.
This is where the “apolitical” Tzu Chi and other Buddhist institutions come in. 
In a strongly politicized society with an active market of ideologies, and under 
increasing competition for resources with other religious and secular nongovern-
mental and nonprofit organizations, Tzu Chi found itself a niche featuring no po-
litical ideologies or claims. Positioned above and beyond secular politics, which 
was thought to be corrupted by money and power, Tzu Chi has attracted members 
from all ideological camps who were looking for a Pure Land in the mind. The 
more apolitical Tzu Chi insisted on being, the more its political influence over the 
state bureaucracy and politicians across different camps has increased. In a place 
where most people are sick and tired of politics and excessive commercialization, 
Tzu Chi and Master Cheng Yan stand on a moral plateau that few politician or 
CEOs can reach. In anthropologist Julia Huang’s account, the secretariat office of 
the premier of the Executive Yuan told her that Tzu Chi’s representative had en-
joyed special treatment by the government.25 Tzu Chi representatives did not have 
to make an appointment with the minister’s secretariat in advance before they met. 
Often the former just called from a mobile phone while they were only minutes 
away from the Executive Yuan. And these representatives reiterated that they were 
“doing good things” when they negotiated with the minister’s secretariat for the 
government’s support. Even high-ranking government officials feel they cannot 
afford to offend Tzu Chi. Unlike other religious leaders in Taiwan, Master Zheng 
Yan has never made a public appearance in presidential election campaigns for 
any candidate. But President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT attended one of Tzu Chi’s 
recycling centers and worked as a volunteer sorting out plastic bottles for a couple 
of hours.
Tzu Chi, on account of its political neutrality, has also turned out to be very 
useful to the Taiwanese government in its attempts to expand its much-contracted 
position in international diplomacy. As the result of China’s diplomatic campaign 
against Taiwan, Taiwan is recognized as an independent sovereignty by only 
twenty-three countries, many of which are island countries of the South Pacific. 
Tzu Chi has become one of the most important venues for the Taiwanese govern-
ment to promote its “People to People” diplomacy, represented by the establishment 
of the Committee of Nongovernmental Organizations under Taiwan’s Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs. And given the political sensitivity of the issue of unification and 
independence, Tzu Chi, by declaring its political neutrality in humanitarian works, 
much like other international aid agencies, has paved the way for Taiwan’s religious 
and social groups to cross the Taiwan Strait and expand their operations and net-
works in China. As mentioned earlier, Tzu Chi’s relief workers have been able to 
enter mainland China despite the PRC’s reputation for being highly cautious of 
accepting foreign aid and relief workers. During the Sichuan earthquake in China 
of 2008, Tzu Chi was the first non-PRC aid team approved by the PRC government 
to enter the quake zone. In 2010, after twenty years of working in various Chinese 
provinces, Tzu Chi became the first and the only international nonprofit organiza-
tion to be approved by the State Department to establish a nationwide operation 
in China.
This chapter has explored Taiwan’s changing state-societal relationship in the 
era of the postdevelopmental state, as well as the interplay of information tech-
nology, oppositional politics, and social activism. What I found most intriguing 
in this triangular dynamic is the paradox that in multiparty-democratic Taiwan, 
social mobilizers have claimed an apolitical stance in order to earn public trust, 
whereas in single-party-dominant China social media participants have turned 
to the state for restoration of public trust. The apolitical yet powerful charity or-
ganization of Tzu Chi further illuminates the power of the apolitical by pushing 
the limits of Taiwan’s otherwise much-constrained diplomatic relationship inter-
nationally and with China. Changing state-society relationships in Taiwan and 
China are inevitably affected by the changing Taiwan-China relationship, and the 
reverse is also true.
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Taiwan is strategically situated between the United States and the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC). It is impossible to understand cross-Strait relations without 
looking into this global strategic context. Although one may not agree with the 
pessimistic prediction of the power transition theory, namely that the closing 
gap between the United States and China will result in a titanic clash between 
the world’s hegemon and its challenger, it is nevertheless undeniable that the two 
strongest nations in today’s world have been locked in tense strategic competition. 
China wants to reclaim its lost central place in the world, a wish that is naturally 
resisted by today’s hegemon, the United States. This is not to deny that Washing-
ton and Beijing collaborate in many aspects of their relationship, such as the fight 
against international terrorism and their joint efforts to deal with climate change. 
However, as the capabilities of the two giants are getting closer and closer, the 
relation is strained, with China understandably striving for an equal say on inter-
national affairs and the United States hesitant to grant such status to its challenger. 
The refusal to give China a voting weight in the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) that reflects its economic clout is one vivid example, and the competition 
between the two over the issue of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is 
another. The main geopolitical fault line for Sino-American competition is found 
in East Asia. Another great strategic conflict in today’s world is between the West 
and Russia over Ukraine. The lesser powers in eastern Europe are in a situation 
similar to that of their counterparts in East Asia: both are caught in a competition 
between two great powers.
Given the strained relation between Beijing and Washington and between Mos-
cow and the West, it is interesting to observe the behaviors of the lesser powers 
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caught between the two giants on both geostrategic fault lines to see if there is 
a common pattern. Before we can do this, we need to consult the existing inter-
national relations (IR) literature. However, there is a theoretical paucity in this 
regard. Traditional IR theories focus on the behaviors of greater powers or treat 
actors as if they have equal capabilities. The international behaviors of small states 
are understudied, to say the least. Asymmetrical interactions between a great pow-
er and a lesser power seldom catch the attention of the theoreticians, let alone the 
behavioral pattern of a lesser power caught between two competing giants. In the 
following pages I first develop an analytical framework that specifically addresses 
this situation and then apply it to the East Asian and eastern European theaters. 
The core of the analysis is to identify the strategic roles that a lesser country can 
play between two competing great powers and then, through critical case analysis 
of Taiwan and Ukraine, to seek to identify the factors that can explain why a spe-
cific role is chosen by the lesser power and how that role may change over time. 
Although the main emphasis is on East Asia, a comparison with eastern Europe is 
made to add to the analytical depth. It is expected that through the development 
of this analytical framework we can better understand cross-Strait relations from 
a theoretical and comparative perspective.
THEORETICAL FORMUL ATION
The starting point is obviously the balance-of-power (BOP) paradigm. When fac-
ing a rising power, BOP theory predicts a balancing strategy that is either internal 
(building up military preparedness) or external (forming an alliance).1 Traditional 
BOP theory is modified by Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory, in which 
perceived threat rather than capability is the criterion for the balancing behav-
ior.2 For weaker states, “bandwagoning” is added to the toolbox, which prescribes 
behaviors that conform or do not challenge the core values of the rising power.3 
However, as both balancing and bandwagoning entail great costs, in the form of 
either budgetary burden, alliance maintenance, or loss of strategic independence, 
yet another option presents itself: hedging. Hedging is a two-pronged strategy by 
which a country both engages and guards against the target country. The “hedger” 
does not simply adopt a balancing or engagement strategy but employs a mixture 
of the two. The engagement serves to enhance a friendly relationship with the tar-
get country, bring about commercial benefits, and hopefully transform the values 
and institutions of the target country so that it may stop posing a threat. The bal-
ancing serves to provide a security guarantee through either military buildup or an 
alliance with another great power. Typically engagement happens in the economic 
realm while balancing happens in the security realm.
Unfortunately, the above theoretical formulations are insufficient to capture the 
situation of a lesser power caught between two strong nations. First of all, not 
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enough attention has been given to small countries and their international behav-
iors, as most IR theories are about great powers and their interactions. Second, 
for the literature on small states in world politics, the tendency is to explore their 
general strategies to survive in a realist world, not to focus on asymmetrical rela-
tions.4 Third, for those studies that have power asymmetry in mind, the emphasis 
is typically on a dyad of nations, not a lesser power caught between two strong 
nations: that is, they focus on the relation between two actors, not three.5 When a 
lesser country finds itself in the middle of great-power competition, it cannot seek 
advice from traditional IR theories that focus on bilateral relations. A trilateral 
theory is needed.
The inadequacies of bilateral IR theories can be demonstrated by the inter-
connectedness of the policies of the lesser power toward the two great powers. 
Assuming G1 and G2 are the two great powers, and L is the lesser power, we find 
that L’s policy toward G1 is not independent of its policy toward G2. If L considers 
G1 more powerful than G2, or more of a threat, then it may do a balancing act 
against G1. Since L is much weaker than G1, L’s balancing act cannot solely consist 
of military buildup: it needs to seek an external ally. G2 as a competitor of G1 is a 
natural choice. However, as L is also much weaker than G2, the alliance between 
L and G2 translates into L’s bandwagoning with its ally. Hence L’s bandwagon-
ing with G2 is concomitant with L’s balancing against G1. In this way, L is both 
balancing and bandwagoning at the same time, incurring the costs of both strate-
gies. If L perceives G2 as the main threat, then the opposite will happen, namely 
L will balance against G2 by bandwagoning with G1. This “coupling of strategies” 
is captured in figure 7 by L’s rightmost and leftmost positions: “Balance against 
G1 and Bandwagon with G2” and “Balance against G2 and Bandwagon with G1” 
respectively.
Another strategy that L can adopt is hedging. Again, if we assume that G1 is 
either more powerful or more threatening, then L may hedge against it. The engage-
ment part of the strategy prescribes building economic ties between L and G1. The 
balancing part consists of military buildup or external alliance. As L is much weaker 
than G1, internal balancing is definitely insufficient, necessitating an alliance with 
G2. This is the second from the rightmost position in figure 7. If G2 is the main 
target, then L will take the second from the leftmost position. Now L does not need 
to choose between balancing and hedging toward G1: it can bandwagon. However, 
since G1 and G2 are locked in fierce competition, bandwagoning with G1 is tanta-
mount to balancing against G2. This leads L to the leftmost position in figure 7. If 
G2 is the main threat, and L decides to bandwagon, then it will take the rightmost 
position and balance against G1. In short, whichever policy taken by L toward G1 
(balancing, hedging, bandwagoning), there is a policy corollary for L toward G2. 
The relations among the G1, G2 and L are thus intertwined. This shows there is a 
keen need to develop a trilateral analytical framework.
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The strategic triangle theory is geared toward analyzing trilateral relations. 
There are four ideal types of strategic triangle: ménage à trois (three amities), 
marriage (two enmities and one amity), romantic triangle (two amities and one 
enmity), and unit veto (three enmities).6 In ménage à trois, all three players are 
“friends.” In marriage, two “partners” act against an “outcast.” In a romantic tri-
angle, two “wings” court a “pivot.” In a unit veto, the players are all “foes” to one 
another. With the four ideal types of strategic triangle (ménage à trois, marriage, 
romantic triangle, unit veto), and six roles (friend, partner, outcast, wing, pivot, 
foe), we can begin analyzing any triangular situation, using the strategic triangle 
types and roles to describe objectively the structure of the triangular game (see 
figure 8).
In a strategic triangle, a player considers its amity with other players to be al-
ways preferable to enmity. However, the player considers the other two players’ 
mutual enmity to be preferable to their amity. Hence, the most preferable position 
is that of a pivot, in which the player has friendly relations with the other two 
players while they are at odds with each other. Interestingly, the pivot’s role is not 
captured in figure 7.
Now we can integrate the perspectives from both figure 7 and figure 8, integrat-
ing the concepts of strategies and triangular roles.7 Again we put L’s choices on a 
continuum, as shown in figure 9. L can tilt toward G1 by bandwagoning with it and 
balancing against G2, which is the leftmost position on the continuum. This would 
make L a “partner” of G1 in a marriage triangle. Or L can tilt toward G2 by band-
wagoning with it and balancing against G1, in the rightmost position on the con-
tinuum, which turns L into a partner of G2. L can also modify its stance by moving 
slightly toward its threat but keeping the principal connection with its ally. L would 
then “hedge against G1” or “hedge against G2.” Either way, L becomes a “hedging 
partner.”8 If we push L’s position to the middle of the continuum, but not so much as 
to tip it over to the other side, then L becomes the “pivot.” A pivot is not principally 
committed to either of the two great powers but is tilting between them. Hence, we 
find three roles that a lesser power can play between two competing great powers: 
partner, hedging partner, and pivot. The three roles are shown in figure 9.
In strategic triangular analysis, pivot is the most desirable position, for it al-
lows L to maintain amicable relations with the other two players while prevent-


















figure 7. Choices of a lesser power placed between two great powers (G1 and G2).
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gain concessions from both “wings.” However, to play pivot between two strategic 
giants is an unenviable task for a lesser power. Tilting by pivot naturally causes 
concern on the part of the wings, eliciting responses that are not necessarily posi-
tive. Thus, when L is tilting between G1 and G2, either or both of the giants may 
attempt to coerce L into their party line instead of courting it. A skillful L may be 
able to elicit positive concessions but always risks inviting the wrath of the giants 
and putting itself in a dangerous position.9 The role of partner is theoretically less 
advantageous than pivot, especially for the junior partner, who may be double-
crossed by its senior partner. It thus makes sense for a lesser power caught between 
two giants to opt for the role of a hedging partner, which entails reasonable secu-
rity through alliance with one giant, while providing some flexibility of movement 
figure 8. Types of strategic triangles.
figure 9. Choices and roles of a lesser power placed between two great powers (G1 and G2).
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to elicit courting by the other giant, and possibly some countercourting by its ally, 
who cannot take the hedging partner for granted.
In the following analysis, I will apply the framework to analyze the relationship 
between the rising China and its East Asian neighbors, with the strategic competi-
tion between Beijing and Washington as the background. I will then use a similar 
analysis for the European theater. I will likewise put the different policy positions 
of East European countries toward Russia on a continuum and compare them with 
their Asian counterparts. The background there is the strategic competition be-
tween the US-led West and Russia. Then I will look into cross-Strait relations and 
the crisis in Ukraine as two critical cases, using the above framework and making 
comparisons.
RESURGENCE OF OPPOSING ALLIANCES AND 
POSTURING ON THE FAULT LINE
During the Cold War, two hierarchically structured alliance systems opposed 
each other in East Asia. They were the continental system, composed of the Soviet 
Union, the PRC, North Korea, and North Vietnam (the communist league), and 
the US-centered, hub-and-spoke maritime system. The power shift in the conti-
nental system disrupted the Sino-Soviet pact, as the PRC rose to challenge Mos-
cow’s supremacy, while hegemonic stability in the maritime system buttressed the 
US-led alliance. The division in the continental system offered Washington op-
portunities to befriend Beijing, and Washington’s allies were prompted to act like-
wise. The tension in competitive rapprochement was absorbed by the hegemonic 
structure of the maritime system. The result was collective hedging (balancing-
with-engagement) against the PRC, with the exception of Taiwan, the Republic of 
China (ROC). Taiwan was the odd man out because it had a unique relation with 
mainland China: they claimed sovereignty over each other. The incompatibility of 
the fundamental goals of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait prevented cross-Strait 
relations from evolving toward the same direction that began to prevail in the 
region, namely collective hedging against the PRC. Taiwan’s failure to join the cho-
rus was not a sign of its being immune from the structural impetus but a reflection 
of domestic factors that acted to thwart systemic forces. Those factors, however, 
proved unable to prevail in the long run.10
In the post–Cold War era, the predominance of the United States caused the re-
vival of the Beijing-Moscow nexus, now constructed as an equal partnership. De-
spite great structural changes, China and Russia are not considered full converts to 
Western values and institutions and thus are viewed suspiciously by the West. The 
two continental powers are seen as alien and threatening to the maritime alliance 
and thus must be guarded against. For Beijing and Moscow, the incessant east-
ward expansion of NATO and the EU threatens Russia, while the strengthening of 
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security ties between Washington and its allies in East Asia puts great pressure on 
the PRC. Beijing and Moscow understand that the West expects nothing short of 
their complete conversion, in the form of regime change and peaceful evolution. 
With China’s astronomical rise and Russia’s recovery from its post-Soviet malaise, 
the two continental powers have clung together to form a semialliance, reviving 
a strategic tie that existed in the 1950s.11 Again one finds the continental and the 
maritime systems confronting each other, just as they did during the Cold War, 
with the only difference being a shift of the United States’ main target from the 
Soviet Union to the PRC.
Cross-system hedging is inevitable, as this increases the payoff for strategic 
players.12 With China rising rapidly, both the tendency to balance against it and 
the need to engage it rise for US allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia 
in the maritime system, causing tension in their domestic politics and their rela-
tion with the United States. The maritime system, however, remains robust, as it 
is sustained by US dominance.13 Of particular interest is Taiwan’s belated joining 
of the chorus, under the same systemic forces that disposed its former allies in the 
maritime system. Because of the issue of overlapping sovereignties, Taiwan was 
the last to adopt the hedging strategy and reach rapprochement with Beijing as late 
as 2008, when the Kuomintang (KMT) regained power and the domestic political 
condition was ready.
From the Cold War to the post–Cold War era, confrontation between the con-
tinental and maritime alliances has waxed and waned. Since the turn of the cen-
tury, it has been on the rise. The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed 
milder tension between the two systems than in the 1990s, as the threat of interna-
tional terrorism rose to prominence and became a primary concern for both the 
maritime and continental alliances. The pledge of support for the United States in 
its war on terror by Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin in the aftermath of 911 was 
not merely an exploitation of that dramatic event to improve relations with Wash-
ington and to reduce pressure from the West but a reflection of shared interests.14 
However, the incessant expansion of NATO and the EU into former Soviet bloc 
coutries and even into the post-Soviet republics, the color revolutions (Georgia 
in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005), the Russo-Georgian War (2008), 
the expediency of amassing political support by whipping up nationalism, and 
Russia’s regained confidence with sustained economic growth led Putin toward 
greater assertiveness against the West.15 For China, territorial disputes with East 
Asian neighbors allied with the United States, disgruntlement over rigidities in the 
decision-making process in major international organizations that fail to reflect 
China’s astronomical rise, and a rapid shift of balance in favor of China since the 
eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008 add to Beijing’s increasingly asser-
tive foreign policy. The responses of the West as led by the United States (such 
as a turn of diplomatic attention “back to Asia,” and sanctions against Russian 
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aggression) further drove the continental powers together and strengthened the 
two alliances. Whenever the West was putting pressure on one continental power, 
the other would never join the chorus but would show “understanding” for the ac-
tions by its continental ally; thus there was no Russian criticism of China on Tibet 
or human rights when Beijing held the 2008 Olympics, a posture that China recip-
rocated when Russia held the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, which were severely 
criticized by the West. China also scratched Russia’s back during and after the 
Russo-Georgian War by not joining Western criticism and declaring with other 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization members its support for “the active role of 
Russia in promoting peace and cooperation in the region” in the Dushanbe Dec-
laration of August 2008. On Syria, neither would endorse sanctions on the Assad 
regime, and the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov brokered a deal to stop 
an imminent Western invasion of the country. On Iran both countries advocated 
negotiations and opposed sanctions in response to Tehran’s nuclear program. On 
Libya both Russia and China resented the West’s military intervention against Qa-
ddafi’s forces that led to the killing of the dictator, a move legitimated by a lib-
eral interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973, which merely stated the 
need for protecting civilians. On Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Putin gave special 
thanks to China for “taking into account the full historical and political context” 
there.16 Under pressure from the West, Russia and China set aside their differences, 
solved border issues, conducted arms deals regarding state-of-the-art weapons, 
and intensified energy cooperation.17 The two countries formed a Eurasian conti-
nental core to resist pressure from the US-led West.
Two geopolitical fault lines thus appeared. They were formed as a result of the 
pressure building up where “political plates” collide. The two fault lines cut across 
East Asia and eastern Europe. Lesser powers along these lines bear the pressure 
of the competing giants: United States plus Europe versus Russia in eastern Eu-
rope, and United States versus China in East Asia. The lesser powers have lim-
ited choices. They can choose among five options, from top to bottom: partner of 
the continental alliance (bandwagon with continental, balance against maritime), 
hedging partner of the continental alliance (bandwagon with continental, hedge 
against maritime), pivot (noncommittal and tilting in between), hedging partner 
of the maritime alliance (bandwagon with maritime, hedge against continental), 
and partner of the maritime alliance (bandwagon with maritime, balance against 
continental). A partner is fully allied with one great power and distanced from the 
other. A hedging partner is committed to one camp but engaged positively with 
the other camp. A pivot holds itself at equal distance from both camps, typically 
tilting between the two to gain benefits from them.
In figure 10 we present both the East Asian and eastern European fault lines and 
detail the choices for the lesser powers on those two lines. An East Asian lesser 
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partner of the PRC, pivot, hedging partner of the United States, and partner of the 
United States. An eastern European lesser power can choose among the following 
positions: partner of Russia, hedging partner of Russia, pivot, hedging partner of 
the United States and Europe, and partner of the United States and Europe.
We can also detect the two fault lines by locating the frontline US Air Force 
operating bases in Eurasia. The bases are located in Asia and Europe in a way to 
contain the PRC and Russia, or the Eurasian continental core. In East Asia the US 
operating locations range across Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Malaysia. In eastern Europe, they range across Germany, Poland, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Arab Peninsula.18 Those countries 
on the border of the American military presence have to make a critical decision 
about their strategic relation with the United States and the maritime alliance ver-
sus their relation with the continental core, particularly when the relation between 
the two alliances is tense.
At times when there is little conflict between the Eurasian core and the US-
led maritime alliance, as in the early 2000s, when international terrorism was the 
common enemy and the major concern for both alliances, the frontline countries 
find themselves in a ménage à trois triangle with the two camps, facing no pres-
sure to take sides. The two fault lines thus look less obvious and relevant. When 
tensions flare up, as they have since the late 2000s, however, frontline countries are 
forced to take positions under the pressure of the two giants. Different factors in 
action tilt a particular frontline country to opt for a promaritime, procontinental, 
or noncommittal position. On the East Asian fault line, Myanmar has been basi-
cally a partner of the PRC, although its recent reform and opening to the West tilt 
it a bit toward being a hedging partner. Cambodia is pro-Beijing in its basic stance. 
However, Phnom Penh appeals to the international community (i.e., the West) 
for subsidies and support to overcome the country’s tragic experience under the 
Pol Pot regime. It is a hedging partner of Beijing. South Korea has moved into a 
pivot position gradually in the East Asian strategic game.19 Although it maintains 
security ties with the United States, its political link with Beijing has been greatly 
strengthened. China’s displeasure with North Korea reduces Pyongyang’s drag on 
PRC–South Korea relations. Beijing and Seoul share historical memories of their 
victimization by Japan before and during World War II. Furthermore, South Korea 
is a significant power to reckon with for Beijing in its strategic competition with 
the United States. Gradually Seoul has become aware of its pivot position and how 
that position may benefit it. Japan’s relation with China has worsened considerably 
since 2010, primarily because of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. 
However, the very close economic ties benefit both sides and act to mitigate ten-
sion in the relationship. Japan remains a hedging partner of the United States, 
although the balancing part of its strategy has become much more prominent. 
The Philippines also got into a territorial dispute with Beijing over the islands in 
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the South China Sea. That provided enough impetus for Manila to welcome back 
American military presence in the country. The Philippines is a partner of the 
United States.20
On the East European fault line, frontline countries take different roles in 
the strategic triangles in which they find themselves. Belarus is a firm partner 
of Russia, partly because its regime type is unacceptable to the West. Bulgaria 
has been traditionally close to Moscow and has treasured the special friendship. 
For Sophia, unlike some of its neighbors, the relation with Moscow is its core 
and EU/NATO status its hedge. This makes Bulgaria a hedging partner of Russia. 
The most famous case of pivoting on the East European front is Ukraine prior to 
the Maidan Revolution, as the country tilted between the EU and the Russia-led 
Eurasian Economic Union for a better accession deal. After 2014, of course, Kyiv’s 
pivoting led to virtual partition of the country. On the maritime side, Romania is 
a staunch NATO/EU member that also wishes to keep manageable relations with 
Russia. Bucharest has been playing the role of a hedging partner of the United 
States and the EU. The Baltic countries are the firmest allies of the West. Estonia, 
for example, worries about possible Russian incursion, especially after Moscow’s 
annexation of Crimea, and clings tightly to NATO and the EU. Tallinn is an out-
right partner of the West.
In the following discussion, two critical cases are examined: Taiwan and 
Ukraine. They are chosen because they are frontline countries under great pres-
sure that stems from their geopolitical positions on the strategic fault lines in East 
Asia and eastern Europe. They made different strategic decisions between the 
competing great powers (the United States and the PRC, the United States/Europe 
and Russia) over time, with different outcomes. The involvement of ethnic factors 
complicates the situation, making the lesser power’s decision that much more dif-
ficult. The continental powers, China and Russia, are more willing to bear costs in 
order to safeguard their core interests in these cases than when ethnic factors are 
absent. Finally, dramatic and simultaneous developments on the ground in both 
cases in the spring of 2014, namely the eruption of the Sunflower Movement in 
Taiwan and the outbreak of a separatist civil war in Ukraine, make them highly 
comparable, as these events happened in the same international context.
TAIWAN: FROM SEMIPARTNER TO HED GING PARTNER
A major change of Taiwan’s frontline position is its shift from semipartner of the 
United States to hedging partner. Taiwan had been a semipartner of the United 
States from the end of the 1970s, when the United States derecognized the ROC 
but committed itself to Taiwan’s defense in case of an assault from the mainland, 
through almost three ensuing decades, during which it was deadlocked in its rela-
tion with the mainland and dislodged as a US ally but still under the hegemon’s 
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protection.21 The shift in Taiwan’s status was caused by a cross-Strait rapproche-
ment and intensified economic integration after the inauguration of President Ma 
Ying-jeou in 2008. As Ma took pains to reassure Washington that Taiwan would 
be firmly on the US side in the strategic game, and cross-Strait rapprochement 
did not suggest any political integration or strategic alliance with the mainland, 
Taiwan turned itself into a hedging partner, doing very much what all the other 
US allies in East Asia had been doing for decades. This shift, however, was brought 
about by the alignment of several critical factors that may not hold in the future. 
It is also more tenuous than it appears, as Taiwan did not change its basic stance 
toward the United States and mainland China. To understand the 2008 shift of 
Taiwan’s mainland policy and explore its sustainability, a look at the basic structure 
is in order.
Conflicting forces bear on the cross-Strait relationship, some pushing the two 
sides together, some pulling them apart. For Taiwan, the former resulted in a “stay” 
strategy, and the latter in an “exit” strategy.22 Those forces are rooted in four struc-
tural factors: divided-nation status, power asymmetry, economic integration, and 
Taiwanese identity.23 They are played out in Taiwan’s competitive democracy and 
are constrained by the external limits set primarily by the United States but also 
partly by Beijing.
Among the four structural factors, divided-nation status and economic integra-
tion work primarily to bind Taiwan and mainland China together. Divided-nation 
status provides a “one-China” constitutional structure and rallies the remnants of 
Chinese nationalism and ROC patriotism in defense of the status quo.24 Economic 
integration of the two societies is so extensive that any serious disruption of the 
status quo would impose unfathomable costs on Taiwan, thus deterring the pur-
suit of “independence.”25 China and Taiwan’s legal and economic ties also make it 
possible to imagine “ultimate unification” when the conditions are ripe.
Power asymmetry and rising Taiwanese identity produce forces that militate 
for a unilateral exit from the “one-China” status quo. The increasing power gap 
between Taiwan and the mainland spells misfortune for Taiwan, the smaller side, 
which sees its international space constricted by the much stronger opponent; 
hence the incentive for exiting the game.26 Taiwanese identity has deep historical 
roots, but its rise has more to do with the PRC’s monopoly on Chinese identity in 
international society and the mounting pressure that China puts on Taiwan. Hence 
power asymmetry and the rise of Taiwanese identity are intrinsically linked. The 
assertion of an exclusively Taiwanese identity drives Taiwan away from mainland 
China, which is considered a hostile foreign country. With a shared national iden-
tity gone, the basis for unification is undermined.27
The two sets of forces are embodied in the two main political camps, “Blue” 
(favoring more integration with the mainland) and “Green” (favoring more in-
dependence), which fight for dominance in Taiwan’s competitive democracy. As 
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the two camps advocate opposite mainland policies, power turnover at elections 
naturally brings about policy shifts that may disrupt cross-Strait relations.28 Here 
international factors come in. The US preference to keep the status quo is a pow-
erful force that contains actions by Taiwan’s election-driven political leaders. It 
also of course constrains, or counters, the mainland’s move to coerce the island 
into subjugation.29 Given this configuration, one can picture cross-Strait relations 
as fluctuating along a spectrum with unification, status quo, and independence 
serving as main marks. Taiwan’s position on the spectrum at any given time is set 
by the result of the last presidential election, which generally reflects the underly-
ing forces of divided-nation status, power asymmetry, economic integration, and 
Taiwanese identity. The range of possible fluctuations in Taiwan’s position over 
time, however, is set by the preference of the United States, a hegemon that tilts the 
balance to keep the status quo that best serves its interest. Under these constraints 
Taiwan’s political leaders can fine-tune the island’s mainland policy and adjust its 
position on the East Asian strategic fault line.
In the 2008 presidential campaign, Ma managed to shut down the ideological 
debate on the identity of the nation (a losing battle for the KMT) and instead di-
rect popular attention to Taiwan’s economy, which had considerably slowed down 
since 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had captured power. 
From 2001 to 2008, Taiwan’s economic growth rate averaged 3.8 percent, compared 
with a 6.2 percent rate in the previous decade, when the KMT was in power. The 
unemployment rate more than doubled from an average of 2.1 percent in the 1990s 
to 4.4 percent from 2001 through 2008. With the identity issue and pursuit of de 
jure Taiwan independence “delegitimated” in public debate and with economic 
issues in the ascendancy, Ma was able to win the 2008 and 2012 presidential elec-
tions by demonstrating to the people that only the KMT could smoothly handle 
cross-Strait relations, which were a prerequisite for the growth and development 
of Taiwan’s economy. Even though Taiwanese identity continued to grow under 
Ma’s watch, and power disparities across the Taiwan Strait widened rapidly, Ma 
was able to play the economic card effectively to win reelection, thus sustaining 
the party’s “stay” strategy. However, the status quo was seriously shaken in 2014.
Given the framework of cross-Strait relations mentioned above, changes can 
be expected if the main pillars of the status quo begin to shake. Following Ma’s 
shift to the economy, the DPP put proindependence rhetoric on the back burner 
and began challenging Ma’s main argument that economic integration with the 
mainland was good for Taiwan. From 2008 to 2014, Taiwan’s economy continued 
to grow slowly at an average of 3.8 percent, while unemployment surged to 4.7 
percent. Distribution has become a serious issue, affecting particularly the young 
generation. The Oshima Index, which gauges the gap between the top 20 percent 
of households’ income and the bottom 20 percent, rose from 6.03 in 2000–2007 
to 6.16 in 2008–14. Part of the economic malaise was obviously caused by the 
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international financial crisis, and part was the result of the inefficiencies of the 
government. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the 
mainland might have helped, but the overall economic picture was bleak. Now 
Ma cannot claim that cross-Strait integration can invigorate Taiwan’s economy. 
His critics have instead pointed to the adverse effect of close economic ties with 
mainland China.
Under these circumstances students and young demonstrators broke into the 
Legislative Yuan and staged a three-week occupation of the parliament in March 
and April of 2014. The event was touched off by the popular uproar against a bill 
that would liberalize service trade across the Taiwan Strait as part of the ECFA 
arrangement. The bill suffered from the DPP’s legislative blockade for several 
months, and the KMT rammed it through the committee stage. The Sunflower 
Movement wanted to torpedo the bill and kill future agreements that would fur-
ther cross-Strait integration. The apparent rationale for the movement was to 
redress procedural injustices, but the bottom line was the anti-China sentiment 
among the most economically vulnerable and politically vocal. Ma’s economic ad-
vantage was turned upside down. Since he had so successfully defused ideological 
debate and concentrated national attention to the economy, his administration 
was ill prepared to fight political opponents who equipped themselves with inci-
sive economic arguments. With Chinese identification (and even dual Chinese-
Taiwanese identification) falling precipitously under his watch, and the economy 
failing to deliver on his promises, Ma found his initiative to improve cross-Strait 
relations balked. The political wind began to blow in the other direction. The KMT 
suffered major losses in both the 2014 local elections and the 2016 presidential-
and-parliamentary elections. The DPP’s presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen won 
a landslide victory in 2016, and the DPP captured for the first time a majority in 
the parliament. Under Tsai, Taiwan swiftly adjusted its relationship with the main-
land. By refusing to recognize the “1992 Consensus” that Taiwan and the mainland 
make up one China while agreeing to differ on which government is its legitimate 
representative, Tsai at one stroke undermined the basis of cross-Strait rapproche-
ment. Beijing began its retaliation, and Taiwan tilted further toward the maritime 
alliance.
With regard to the role that Taiwan plays on the East Asian strategic fault line, 
the crux of the matter is whether Taiwan is able, or willing, to sustain its rap-
prochement with mainland China. With that hedge in place, Taiwan is a hedging 
partner of the United States. Without it, it will simply play the role of a partner, 
though more a semipartner. The KMT and the DPP are representing these two 
roles, based on their positions on the 1992 Consensus and their willingness or 
unwillingness to pay lip service to the “one-China” principle that Beijing uses as a 
litmus test to determine amity or enmity. With the KMT or the DPP in power, a 
Pivot, Hedger, or Partner    211
basic position on the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle will be taken, 
which then determines whether the rapprochement hedge is kept in place. That 
puts Taiwan in the role of either a hedging partner or a semipartner of the United 
States on the East Asian strategic fault line.
UKR AINE:  TR AGIC PIVOT
Many East European countries are like Taiwan in being situated on a strategic 
fault line. The lesser countries in both cases are threatened by a powerful neighbor 
(mainland China and Russia), yet there are very strong economic links between 
them and the behemoth (in the form of trade/investment and energy dependence). 
Both seek a security guarantee from the United States, with varying degrees of suc-
cess. There have been occasions in the two cases when leaders took defiant balanc-
ing acts against the strong power (as did Chen Shui-bian and Georgia’s Mikheil 
Saakashvili). Those acts were often followed by rapprochement gestures (as made 
by Ma Ying-jeou and Bidzina Ivanishvili).
Among the East European countries, Ukraine is the most comparable with Tai-
wan. Both have a well-developed region-based political cleavage (North vs. South 
in Taiwan, North and West vs. South and East in Ukraine) that harks back to the 
(sub)ethnic and linguistic divisions in the population and their different historical 
memories. Taiwan has been plagued by the identity rift between the Chinese and 
dual Chinese-Taiwanese identifiers on one side and exclusively Taiwanese identifi-
ers on the other side. In Ukraine the division is between Ukrainian nationalists on 
one side and ethnic Russians plus Russian speakers on the other side.30 Different 
camps in Ukraine hold diametrically different positions toward Russia and expect 
relations with Russia to evolve in opposite directions. The Chinese identifiers and 
dual identifiers in Taiwan accept the possibility of unification with the mainland 
if the conditions are ripe. The exclusively Taiwanese identifiers regard mainland 
Chinese as an alien nation and China as a foreign country. The same can be said 
of East and West Ukrainians with regard to their affinity for or antagonism toward 
Russia. In both cases certain industries and regions are more integrated with the 
strong neighbor than others, resulting in different degrees of economic vulner-
ability. Language is a touchy issue, starting with whether Taiwanese can be termed 
a southern Fukien dialect and whether Ukrainian and Russian are basically the 
same language. The most telling similarity between the two countries is that their 
different political camps took turns winning elections and governing the nation, 
leading to wide fluctuations in their policies toward the strong neighbor and the 
West.
In Ukraine, as in Taiwan, contending forces advocate diametrically opposite 
policies toward their great-power neighbor. Ukraine was a founding member of 
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the Commonwealth of Independent States and kept close institutional ties with 
Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It was part of the Russian Empire 
and then the Soviet Union for hundreds of years. The ethnic, cultural, and his-
torical bonds between Ukraine and its eastern neighbor are strong, especially 
in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Its modern economy was cre-
ated and institutionalized as an integral and complementary part of the Russian 
Federation’s. Soviet economic plans integrated Ukraine and Russia, the two most 
populous Soviet republics, to an extent beyond the integration between Russia 
and other parts of the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s market and energy dependence 
on Russia is overwhelming, making any disruption of those economic ties an 
unbearable loss to Ukraine.31 On the other hand, ever since the independence 
of Ukraine Kyiv has been building a new nation by inculcating Ukrainian na-
tionalism and targeting Russia as its main “other.” Political competition in this 
nascent democracy necessarily intensified ethnic mobilization. Russia’s rise and 
increasing assertiveness under Putin provided strong impetus for the advance of 
a Ukrainian nationalism that sees Russia as a looming threat to the identity and 
integrity of Ukraine. In short, legal and cultural bonds with Russia and deep-
rooted economic integration act to draw Ukraine to its eastern neighbor, while 
rising Ukrainian nationalism and increasing power asymmetry drive the two 
Slav countries apart.
Since the democratic transition, Taiwan has witnessed power transfers between 
the Blue and Green camps, including a Blue president who changed his political hue 
during and after incumbency (Lee Teng-hui). The same can be said of Ukraine: the 
first popularly elected president Leonid Kravchuk, a vehement Ukrainian nation-
alist, was replaced by the pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma in 1994; Kuchma was suc-
ceeded by the pro-Western Orange Revolution leader Viktor Yushchenko in 2004; 
Yushchenko was defeated by Viktor Yanukovych from the East in the latter’s politi-
cal comeback in 2010; and Yanukovych fled the country and was succeeded by the 
Orange Revolutionary business tycoon Petro Poroshenko after the Russian annexa-
tion of Crimea in 2014.32 With each power turnover, the country’s policy toward its 
huge eastern neighbor changed dramatically.
Yanukovych was deprived of his presidency in the heyday of the Orange 
Revolution, being accused of vote rigging.33 After he won the 2010 presidential 
election, Ukraine embarked on a policy shift toward the East. However, despite 
his pro-Moscow orientation Yanukovych began tilting between Russia and the 
EU in 2013 in an effort to elicit the best terms for Ukraine, which was on the verge 
of an economic crisis.34 He showed willingness to sign an association agreement 
with the EU as a first step toward joining that organization. This unexpected tilt 
caused great concern in Putin, who then applied carrots (a pledge to purchase 
US$15 billion of Ukraine’s government bonds and lower the price for Russian gas 
by one-third) and sticks (disruption of Ukrainian exports to Russia) to change 
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Ukraine’s course. In this way, Russia and the EU found themselves in a bidding 
war for Ukraine.35 Finally Yanukovych backed off from signing the association 
agreement with the EU on November 21 and embraced Putin’s offer. In a sense, 
Yanukovych was successful in turning the country from a partner of Russia to a 
genuine pivot and taking advantage of that position.
However, the president’s successful maneuvering on the international stage was 
not appreciated by the Ukrainian population, especially the western part of the 
country, who saw their rising hopes of joining the EU dashed by Yanukovych’s un-
abashed manipulation. Hence came the Maidan Revolution, in which protracted 
confrontation between the demonstrators and police evolved into a semi-civil war 
in the heart of the capital Kyiv. After the shooting deaths of about one hundred 
demonstrators on February 2014, the situation spiraled out of control. Pressure 
from the West mounted, the Maidan revolutionaries prepared for a showdown, 
and Yanukovych fled for his life. Moscow swiftly declared this a Western-support-
ed coup and moved to annex Crimea, where ethnic Russians constitute a clear 
majority of the population. Then came the separatists’ capture of the cities and 
towns of a major portion of Luhanst and Donetsk, the two easternmost provinces 
of Ukraine that border on Russia with the highest percentage of ethnic Russian 
residents and Russian-speaking population. From Russia’s point of view, the West 
and the pro-Western Ukrainians had changed the rules of game: instead of com-
peting with the pro-Russian East in elections, they now expelled “Moscow’s” presi-
dent and grabbed power in a staged “revolution.” As a result, Russia did not have 
to abide by the broken rules. Hence the annexation of Crimea and the launch of 
people’s republics in Luhansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian civil war has raged on, 
Crimea seems lost forever, and the two people’s republics are becoming areas of 
“frozen conflict,” just like Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia. The alternation of power holders in the past has been replaced by vir-
tual partition of the country.
Ukraine played pivot tragically. The wide swings that Yanukovych made be-
tween Russia and the West proved too much for his countrymen and for the two 
giants. The result was the virtual partition of the country and chronic economic 
crisis. During the process, Russia paid a dear price, and so did some of the Europe-
an countries, at a time of great economic difficulties in Europe. The Russian peo-
ple, however, have shown their willingness to stand by their leader in a showdown 
with the West over Russia’s core interest: strategic areas in Luhansk and Donetsk, 
control of Sevastopol, and protection of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking 
people in East Ukraine.36
At the time when the crisis in Ukraine evolved, Taiwan experienced its Sun-
flower Movement. The two crises were not directly related, but they were rooted 
in similar strategic conditions: a lesser country’s controversial policy amid com-
petition between two great powers on a strategic fault line. A significant portion 
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of the society found the government’s policy toward the huge neighbor unaccept-
able, and they revolted, although in different ways and with different intensity. 
Yanukovych’s turnabout caused greater disturbance, for it was on a fundamental 
issue of Ukraine’s direction and identity—join either the EU or the Russian-led 
EEU—whereas the service trade liberalization agreement was merely a part of a 
comprehensive economic deal between Taiwan and the mainland. The actions of 
the Maidan revolutionaries and the response from Yanukovych’s government were 
much more violent than those of the Sunflower students and the Taipei police. 
Nor did the People’s Liberation Army take any actions like those of the Russian 
military. Nevertheless, the root cause of the two crises is similar: the tension in 
the position of a lesser power caught between competing giants. The fact that in 
Taiwan and Ukraine conflicting national identities were involved added to the ten-
sion. From Taiwan’s point of view, it is imperative to avoid the Ukrainian scenario. 
Many lessons can be learned here.
C ONCLUSION
This chapter starts with the making of a list: strategic choices of a lesser country 
caught in a great-power competition. Partner, hedging partner, and pivot are iden-
tified as the choices. The list is based on traditional IR theories, the notion of pow-
er asymmetry, and the typology of the strategic triangle. A subsequent geopolitical 
analysis asserts the resurgence of the conflict between the maritime alliance and 
the continental alliance in the post–Cold War era. Their conflict brought about 
two strategic fault lines, one cutting across East Asia and the other eastern Europe. 
Taiwan sits on the East Asian fault line, and its relation with mainland China is 
a case of a lesser country caught between competing great powers and choosing 
from a short policy list. The grand policy shift toward rapprochement with the 
Chinese mainland under Ma Ying-jeou was made possible by the president’s strat-
egy of shutting down debate on identity conflict and focusing on the economy. 
Taiwan’s subsequent undesirable economic performance then turned Ma’s greatest 
asset into a crippling liability. Taiwan’s mainland policy is the key to the role it 
plays on the East Asian strategic fault line: hedging partner (with rapprochement) 
or semipartner (without rapprochement). In comparison, Ukraine’s policy toward 
Russia and the EU is presented to show how Yanukovych led the country from the 
role of hedging partner of Russia to the role of pivot, with tragic consequences. The 
swings that Yanukovych and his successor made went beyond the pale of accept-
able maneuvers for the Ukrainians and the great powers. Ukraine’s tilting caused 
the country’s virtual partition. This suggests that pivot is a less safe position than 
hedging partner or partner for a lesser country caught between two competing 
giants and that decisions on fundamental issues (such as the one of joining the 
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core organization of either camp) may act as catalysts for great domestic unrest 
and international intervention. Once the country is forced to make a decision of 
placing itself firmly in the camp of either great power, ambiguity is lost, causing a 
vehement reaction from the losing side. The result may be democratic breakdown, 
domestic revolution, military intervention, territorial partition, and prolonged 
economic crisis. Keeping away from such fundamental choices seems to be a sine 
qua non for a pivot player.
To put cross-Strait relations in the category of lesser powers’ interactions 
with two competing giants on the East Asian and East European strategic fault 
lines serves several purposes. First, it advances IR theories in areas they over-
look: small countries, asymmetrical relations, triangular interaction, and geo-
strategic analysis. Second, it deepens our understanding of cross-Strait relations 
through a theoretical perspective offered by the above analytical framework. 
Third, it makes structural comparison possible between Taiwan and other lesser 
powers along the East Asian fault line, as well as the frontline countries in east-
ern Europe, thus deepening our understanding of all the cases compared. The 
discussion and comparison of cross-Strait relations and crisis in Ukraine are 
thus made possible. In future research, the factors and mechanisms that affect 
the decisions of these lesser powers vis-à-vis two giants can be fully identified 
and tested in multiple case studies with a comparative perspective, thus deep-
ening our understanding of lesser countries’ strategic decisions in great-power 
competition more generally.
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Continued US security ties with Taiwan, and in particular US weapons sales to the 
island, have long been a source of tension in the US-China relationship. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) found it unacceptable that Washington insisted on selling 
weapons to Taiwan even after US-PRC normalization in 1979; the Taiwan Relations 
Act, which contained explicit references to continued US arms sales to Taiwan, 
further angered Chinese leaders.1 Washington agreed in a 1982 communiqué “to 
reduce gradually its sale of arms to Taiwan” and promised that future arms sales 
to Taiwan “would not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms,” those of 
recent years,2 but the record of US arms sales since suggests that the communiqué 
has had little constraining effect on US behavior.3 US arms sales to Taiwan, in turn, 
often provoke an angry Chinese response, which typically includes tough rhetoric 
and symbolic retaliation, such as temporarily suspending US-China military-to-
military dialogues.4 US arms sales to Taiwan have continued to generate frictions 
in US-China relations even though relations between Taipei and Beijing improved 
dramatically after the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as president in Taiwan. In 
early 2010, for instance, PRC officials were “strongly indignant” after an arms sale 
announcement, calling the sale a “gross intervention in China’s internal affairs” that 
would have a “serious negative impact” on bilateral relations.5
As China’s rapid rise as an economic and—increasingly—military power dra-
matically alters the security landscape in East Asia, however, prominent voices 
in both Washington and Beijing have in recent years advocated a shift in their 
respective countries’ approach to the US-Taiwan relationship. In the United States, 
several scholars and former officials have called for a reduced US security com-
mitment to Taiwan and in particular an end to arms sales to Taiwan. Proponents 
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of this view suggest that a scaled-back US commitment would pay dividends in 
terms of an improved US-China relationship. In the PRC, meanwhile, a number 
of voices have called for a tougher Chinese response to US arms sales—including 
the imposition of economic sanctions. Advocates of a tougher approach suggest 
that a willingness to retaliate more strongly would force the United States to recon-
sider its commitment to Taiwan. This chapter critically evaluates both proposed 
policy shifts. In the pages that follow, we present a simple framework for thinking 
through the broader implications of US arms sales for the cross-Strait relationship. 
We use the framework, in turn, to shed light on how changes in US or PRC policy 
on the arms sales issue could affect the prospects for stability in cross-Strait rela-
tions and the nature of bargaining between China and Taiwan. Our key conclusion 
is that both proposed policy shifts—a reduction in US arms sales to Taiwan and 
a tougher PRC response to arms sales—carry with them significant risks (some 
counterintuitive) for the country that would initiate the change.
First, we show that a decision to terminate US arms sales to Taiwan could de-
stabilize cross-Strait relations in ways not fully appreciated in existing studies. In 
particular, a reduced US commitment to Taiwan could help transform the basic 
structure of cross-Strait relations from a deterrence dynamic to a compellence 
dynamic. But we qualify our argument by emphasizing that ending arms sales to 
Taiwan could have other, stabilizing effects and that under the right circumstances 
such a shift in US policy could actually reduce the likelihood of military conflict in 
the Taiwan Strait. Second, we show that a tougher PRC response to US arms sales 
could reveal a stronger US commitment to Taiwan than was previously evident; 
Taiwan, in turn, would have more leeway to pursue nonaccommodating policies 
toward Beijing. In other words, both proposed policy adjustments would carry a 
significant risk of backfiring, as they would risk producing outcomes completely 
antithetical to the original intent of the policy shift. We emphasize throughout that 
these counterintuitive outcomes would not necessarily arise but that they are real 
possibilities that should induce caution in both Washington and Beijing.
The next section gives a brief overview of the recent debate in the United States 
concerning the US security relationship with Taiwan. We then sketch a simple 
model of cross-Strait relations and use the model to evaluate the likely conse-
quences of a US decision to terminate arms sales to Taiwan. Next, we consider 
calls in Beijing to take a tougher stance on US arms sales to Taiwan and how such 
a shift in PRC policy might affect cross-Strait relations. We conclude with some 
brief policy recommendations.
SAYING “GO ODBYE” TO TAIWAN? THE RECENT 
US DEBATE
Given the tensions—and the anger in Beijing—that are generated by US arms sales 
to Taiwan, some in the United States propose that Washington end (or at least 
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scale back) weapons sales to the island. Doing so, proponents suggest, would re-
move a major irritant in the US-China relationship and would increase trust and 
cooperation in bilateral relations.6 More fundamentally, proponents of a reduced 
US commitment to Taiwan suggest that such a policy approach would help lower 
the risk of armed conflict in East Asia. This argument is developed most fully by 
Charles Glaser,7 who suggests that ending the US commitment to defend Taiwan 
would bring with it two significant benefits for the US-China relationship. First, it 
could improve US-China relations because such a shift in US policy would remove 
a key source of mistrust in Beijing concerning US motivations. Second, ending US 
support for Taiwan—by removing the key potential source of military conflict be-
tween China and the United States—would reduce military competition between 
Washington and Beijing. Glaser thus proposes a “grand bargain,” in which the 
United States would end its commitment to Taiwan in return for Chinese willing-
ness to “resolve its maritime disputes on ‘fair’ terms” and to accept a long-term US 
security presence in East Asia. Others argue that the US commitment to Taiwan is 
increasingly untenable as China’s military power continues to grow. For instance, 
Chas Freeman warns that a continued US commitment to Taiwan is incompatible 
with (a) waning US relative power in the region and (b) the importance that the 
PRC places on the issue. A failure to accommodate US policy to new geopolitical 
realities, in turn, risks future military conflict over an issue about which China 
cares deeply.8 John Mearsheimer argues along similar lines that China’s rise as a 
great power, if it continues, will mean that the current US security commitment 
to Taiwan will be increasingly unsustainable. Taiwan will ultimately be forced to 
accommodate growing Chinese power.9
Proposals to scale back US security ties to Taiwan are controversial, how-
ever, and several scholars have written thoughtful critiques of the idea. These 
critiques have generally made a few key points. First, it is not self-evident that 
ending security ties with Taiwan would in fact transform the US-China rela-
tionship: the interests of the two countries arguably clash on many other issues 
(North Korea, maritime disputes in East Asia, economic issues), and it is unclear 
why Beijing would yield on these other issues if only the United States were to 
adopt a policy on arms sales that—from Beijing’s vantage—the United States 
had already committed to follow in the 1982 joint communiqué. Second, the 
United States’ reputation in the region could be at stake. Some worry that walk-
ing away from a commitment to Taiwan would send a troubling signal to other 
US allies in East Asia. Beijing might likewise view US concessions on Taiwan as 
a sign of weakness and conclude that Washington was unlikely to challenge the 
PRC on other issues in the region. Third, ending arms sales—because it would 
add to Taiwan’s sense of insecurity—could actually make Taipei more hesitant 
about entering into sensitive political talks with the PRC; thus it isn’t clear that a 
reduced US commitment to Taiwan would facilitate a peaceful resolution to the 
dispute. Finally, and relatedly, ending arms sales would likely undercut Taiwan’s 
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deterrent capabilities, which in turn could encourage a more coercive PRC ap-
proach to the island.10
While we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic under-
pinning them needs to be teased out at greater length. This is especially so for 
claims about the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, we be-
lieve it is likely that an end to arms sales would indeed lead Taiwanese officials to 
feel less confident about their bargaining power vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not 
obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing: 
it is also plausible that, in such a scenario, Taiwan’s leaders would feel they had no 
other choice but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC. Similarly, while 
a shift in the cross-Strait balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could 
more easily utilize a military option, it isn’t obvious that this would in turn make 
the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that Taiwan would re-
spond with more accommodating policies that would remove Beijing’s incentives 
to consider military force. In short, how a shifting cross-Strait military balance of 
power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward; in the fol-
lowing section, we consider the topic more systematically.
RETHINKING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENDING ARMS 
SALES TO TAIWAN
In this section, we argue that ending the US security commitment to Taiwan—and 
in particular ending US arms sales to Taiwan—could be destabilizing. As others 
have noted, ending US arms sales would likely have a significant effect on the bal-
ance of power in the Taiwan Strait. We suggest that a sharp shift in the balance of 
power could alter the nature of cross-Strait bargaining, potentially transforming 
PRC-Taiwan relations from a deterrence relationship to a compellence relation-
ship. This, in turn, could raise the risk of military conflict, for reasons that we 
detail.
We also emphasize, however, that US arms sales to Taiwan (and the broader 
US-Taiwan relationship) represent only one of many factors that influence Bei-
jing’s expected costs of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. If other factors cause Chinese 
leaders to perceive those costs of conflict to be sufficiently high, then even large 
shifts in the cross-Strait balance of power will not be destabilizing. Indeed, re-
duced arms sales could increase Beijing’s expected costs of conflict. For instance, 
to the extent that proponents of reduced arms sales are right that such a policy 
shift in Washington will lead to improved relations with Beijing, it could give the 
PRC a greater stake in a stable US-China relationship—which would, presumably, 
be undermined by PRC initiation of military conflict against Taiwan.
The implications of ending arms sales to Taiwan for stability in the Taiwan 
Strait, in short, are not straightforward. Rather, drawing conclusions in this regard 
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requires careful identification and analysis of the specific causal processes through 
which arms sales affect stability in the Taiwan Strait. We aim to undertake this 
sort of analysis by constructing a simple model of cross-Strait relations. We then 
consider how US arms sales to Taiwan affect key parameters in the model and how 
ending those sales would affect the likelihood of conflict.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF CROSS-STR AIT REL ATIONS
The key dispute between the PRC and Taiwan concerns Taiwan’s sovereign status. 
The PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan and rejects the notion that the Repub-
lic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan represents an independent, sovereign 
state. For Beijing formal unification with the island remains an important national 
objective. Thus any effort on Taiwan that tries to weaken the political and histori-
cal link between Taiwan and mainland China provokes opposition in Beijing; the 
PRC refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has vowed to fight 
a war to prevent Taiwan’s formal separation from China. Taiwan’s position on the 
sovereignty issue, meanwhile, has evolved considerably over time. For several de-
cades following the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan, the ROC government continued 
to view itself as the legitimate government of all of China; the PRC, in turn, was 
a “bandit” regime that lacked legitimacy. As Taiwan democratized in the 1980s 
and 1990s, however, its government began to distance itself from the notion that 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait were parts of “one China.” Under President Lee 
Teng-hui’s “pragmatic diplomacy,” Taiwan sought greater participation in interna-
tional society as a political entity separated from PRC. Lee floated concepts such as 
“one China, two political entities,” and in 1999 described the cross-Strait relation-
ship as “state-to-state, or at least special state-to-state relations.” President Chen 
Shui-bian (2000–2008) later took numerous symbolic steps to highlight Taiwan’s 
separateness from China. Chen often described Taiwan as an “independent, sov-
ereign country,” and during his presidency he advocated a new constitution more 
“suitable” to the needs of Taiwan than the ROC constitution (which predated the 
Nationalist retreat to the island). Cross-Strait relations were often tense during the 
Lee and Chen presidencies, and Beijing frequently warned that it was willing to 
use force to prevent Taiwan from formalizing its independent status.
The relationship between China and Taiwan stabilized considerably after the 
election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in 2008. Ma articulated a “three nos 
policy” of no independence, no unification, and no use of force while he was presi-
dent, and he pursued (with considerable success) cooperation with the PRC in 
functional areas such as trade, investment, tourism, and extradition. But whereas 
Ma was more accommodating than his predecessors on sovereignty issues, the 
fundamental question of Taiwan’s status remained unresolved. Progress on this 
front appears unlikely in the foreseeable future: Ma’s successor, Tsai Ing-wen of the 
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Democratic Progressive Party, has been less accommodating on sovereignty issues 
than Ma, and the post-2008 détente in cross-Strait relations has largely evapo-
rated. The relationship across the Taiwan Strait, in short, remains untransformed 
at its core, reflecting continuing disagreement over Taiwan’s sovereign status.
We assume, then, that Taiwan’s sovereign status is the principal issue over 
which the PRC and Taiwan are (explicitly or implicitly) bargaining. For simplicity, 
we assume that Taiwan’s status can be represented on a single dimension ranging 
from formal unification with China (U) at one extreme to a formally independent 
Taiwan (I) on the other (see figure 11).11 Assume further that Taiwan’s leadership 
prefers an outcome closer to I and China’s prefers an outcome closer to U, and 
assume that China’s utilities range from 0 for formal independence to 1 for unifi-
cation.12 The preferences of the PRC and Taiwan for unification or independence 
are strictly opposed and linear. In our model, we assume a status quo point lying 
somewhere between U and I, and we assume that Taiwan may at any given time 
propose a different status quo. The PRC can either tolerate the new status quo as 
defined by Taiwan or try to impose its most preferred outcome (U) through force. 
Assume that if the two sides were to fight a war, China would prevail with prob-
ability p and that victory would enable Beijing to impose its preferred outcome of 
unification on Taiwan.13 Finally, assume that the expected utility each side would 
reap from the war outcome would be reduced by the costs of actually fighting 
the war, represented by cc for China. China’s expected utility for war thus is p − 
cc, which is represented by point R in figure 11. R represents the PRC’s reversion 
point: so long as Taiwan chooses a level of sovereign status to the right of R, then 
the PRC prefers to tolerate that status. But if Taiwan chooses a status to the left 
of R, then the PRC prefers to initiate military conflict. War, of course, would be 
tremendously costly for Taiwan, so Taiwanese leaders have strong incentives to 
choose a level of sovereign status to the right of R. R, in other words, defines the 
best outcome Taiwan can hope to achieve.
Regarding the prospects for instability in the Taiwan Strait, the most likely sce-
nario for a cross-Strait conflict typically given by analysts of the China-Taiwan re-
lationship has involved a “revisionist” Taiwan trying to formalize its independent 
status (or taking steps in that direction), thus triggering a PRC military response.14 
A president strongly committed to formalizing Taiwan’s status as an independent 
country might, for instance, engineer a change in the island’s official name (to the 
Republic of Taiwan) or push through a new constitution written specifically for 
Taiwan. In terms of figure 11, war could arise in this scenario if the new status quo 
lay to the left of China’s reversion point, R. Why would Taiwan cross such a red 
line, given the high costs it would undoubtedly pay if war were to erupt with the 
PRC? If Taiwan could know with certainty where R actually lay, it would choose 
a level of sovereign status just to the right of R and leave it at that. Unfortunately, 
Taiwan cannot know with certainty where R actually sits because it cannot know 
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with certainty how China assesses p and cc. Moreover, it is difficult for Beijing to 
reveal this information credibly to Taiwan, since the PRC has clear incentives to 
overstate its power and resolve so as to convince Taiwan’s leadership that R lies 
farther left than might truly be the case. Taiwan, in turn, surely knows that Beijing 
has incentives to bluff.15
In recent decades, then, the cross-Strait relationship has been characterized 
primarily by a problem of deterrence, where the PRC tries to deter Taiwan from 
taking steps toward formal independence but where there may be some uncertain-
ty in Taiwan concerning how credible these deterrent threats are. The centrality of 
deterrence was most clear under the Lee and Chen administrations: both presi-
dents aimed to redefine Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC in a way that was anti-
thetical to Beijing’s ideal point of ultimate reunification. The PRC, in turn, sought 
to deter Taiwan from pushing too far on sovereignty issues by signaling its willing-
ness to use force to stop Taiwan independence. Examples here include the PRC’s 
escalating series of military exercises conducted after Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell 
University in 1995, its 2000 white paper warning that it would not wait indefinitely 
on national unification, frequent assertions during the Chen administration that 
the PRC was prepared to “pay any costs” to prevent Taiwan independence, and 
the passage of the 2005 antisecession law. After the election of Ma Ying-jeou in 
2008, the relationship stabilized greatly: Ma did not push sovereignty issues to the 
same degree as his predecessors, and Chinese leaders consequently did not need to 
signal opposition to Taiwan independence as forcefully as before. But deterrence 
remains central to the relationship. Indeed, the PRC threat to use force appears to 
be the primary reason support for independence is not more widespread among 









figure 11. A model of cross-Strait relations.
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has returned to power in Taiwan, it is quite likely that the PRC deterrent threats 
will again become more frequent and pronounced.
WHY ENDING US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN C OULD BE 
DESTABILIZING
How would a reduced US security commitment to Taiwan affect the likelihood 
of cross-Strait conflict? More concretely, what would happen if the United States 
were to terminate arms sales to the island? Remember that in our simple model 
conflict occurs if Taiwan claims a level of sovereign status to the left of point R 
on the I-U continuum. How, then, might an end to arms sales affect the prob-
ability that Taiwan’s claimed status would lie to the left of point R? Here, we begin 
by considering the most intuitive, direct ways that changing levels of arms sales 
to Taiwan could affect the parameters of the model and the associated implica-
tions. In the following subsection, we consider more indirect and nonintuitive 
effects of ending arms sales, which in turn serve to qualify points made in this 
subsection.
Intuitively, it would seem that US arms sales to Taiwan directly affect both the 
costs (cc) that China would expect to pay in a cross-Strait military conflict and 
the probability (p) that China would win such a conflict. On the margins at least, 
arms sales should improve Taiwan’s military capabilities relative to those of the 
PRC, thereby reducing p and increasing cc. Of course, p and cc are determined not 
simply by the balance of power between China and Taiwan but also by likely US 
behavior in the event of a cross-Strait war: US intervention would at a minimum 
greatly complicate the PRC’s ability to prevail in a cross-Strait war and would cer-
tainly increase China’s expected costs of such a conflict. Thus a higher likelihood 
of US intervention implies a smaller p and a larger cc. Arms sales to Taiwan, in 
turn, may signal some level of US commitment to the island. To the extent that 
arms sales to Taiwan do in fact increase confidence in Beijing and Taipei that the 
United States is likely to intervene in a cross-Strait conflict, continued US arms 
sales to Taiwan imply a smaller p and larger cc than would be the case in the coun-
terfactual world where the United States did not sell weapons to Taiwan.
These direct effects suggest, then, that ending arms sales should reduce China’s 
expected costs of war and increase the probability of PRC victory; R, in turn, should 
shift to the right. This makes intuitive sense: to the extent that the balance of power 
in the Taiwan Strait favors the PRC, we might expect Beijing to be more demand-
ing on sovereignty issues (and less tolerant of outcomes that diverge sharply from 
its ideal point of unification). Were R to shift to the right of Taiwan’s actual status, 
the model suggests that the PRC would prefer to fight a war rather than to accept a 
continuation of that status quo; military conflict would ensue if Taiwan failed to ac-
commodate this new reality by redefining its sovereign status (i.e., to push the status 
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quo back to the right of R). Given the obviously high costs of war for Taiwan—costs 
that would presumably be especially high in the absence of any US security com-
mitment to the island—leaders in Taipei would have strong incentives to avoid this 
outcome by bowing to new power realities and accommodating the PRC on sover-
eignty issues to some degree.
Yet there are some reasons to think that accommodation in this regard would be 
difficult. Recall that in recent decades the primary strategic challenge in cross-Strait 
relations can be characterized as a problem of deterrence, with the PRC trying to 
deter Taiwan efforts to redefine its sovereign status in a way that conflicts with PRC 
hopes for unification. But if R were to shift right of the status quo, the model sug-
gests that the cross-Strait relationship would instead be characterized by a problem 
of compellence. Here, a war could occur, not because the PRC fails to deter unilat-
eral Taiwan changes to the status quo, but rather because the PRC fails to compel 
Taiwan to alter the status quo in a way that is more to Beijing’s liking (remember 
that once R shifts right of the status quo, Beijing’s expected war payoff exceeds its 
utility for a continuation of the status quo). Nevertheless, commitment problems 
could complicate the search for a peaceful accommodation even if Taiwan recog-
nized that R had moved to the right of the status quo and even if Taiwan was in 
principle willing to bargain away some of its sovereignty.17 The reason is that the 
issue being bargained over, Taiwan’s sovereign status, could affect future bargain-
ing power between the two sides: that is, bargaining some of its sovereign status 
to avoid war in the short term could further diminish Taiwan’s future bargaining 
power vis-à-vis Beijing.
Even if the United States were to stop selling arms to Taiwan and renounce 
any security commitment to the island, Taiwan would remain qualitatively differ-
ent from areas under direct PRC control. It would continue to be self-governing 
and democratic, it would continue to maintain armed forces, and it would—for 
all intents and purposes—continue to resemble an independent country on all 
dimensions except international legal recognition. But Taiwan’s continued other-
ness in this regard opens the door to possible US intervention in a cross-Strait 
conflict even after a US decision to end its security commitment to Taiwan. Lead-
ers in Washington, for instance, might revise their view of the PRC, especially in 
the aftermath of an attack on Taiwan, and particularly if renouncing the security 
commitment entailed a quid pro quo PRC pledge. Thus, even after the United 
States ended arms sales to Taiwan and renounced a security commitment to the 
island, the probability of US intervention in a cross-Strait conflict would not drop 
to zero—in contrast to the likelihood of US intervention in other areas of China 
such as Tibet (or, for that matter, Hong Kong). But the more Taiwan accommodat-
ed PRC demands by allowing itself to become something more resembling Hong 
Kong or Tibet than an independent country, then the more the probability of US 
intervention would begin to approach zero as it does for other areas under direct 
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PRC control. Such intervention would increasingly, and unambiguously, represent 
intervention in a civil, rather than an international, conflict.18
Thus any bargain involving a reduction in Taiwan’s sovereignty should inde-
pendently reduce Beijing’s expected costs of war, thus pushing R even further to 
the right. The credibility of Beijing’s commitment to such a bargain would there-
fore be suspect, as once it was implemented Beijing would have incentives to de-
mand an even more favorable bargain (and Taiwan would not be in a position 
where it could refuse). Fearon develops a similar model where states bargain over 
strategic territory and the outcome of the negotiations explicitly shifts the balance 
of power.19 This change in the balance of power happens because the outcome of 
the negotiation transfers territory to a rival state and thereby improves that rival’s 
fighting capacity. When this type of dynamic is at work, reaching a settlement 
becomes difficult because the consequence of the shift in power caused by a settle-
ment may be less desirable than fighting and forgoing any negotiations. Although 
a hypothetical bargain between the PRC and Taiwan is not over strategic territory, 
it is certainly possible that a similar dynamic is at work as the PRC and Taiwan 
negotiate over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Inasmuch as giving up sovereignty to the PRC 
strengthens the PRC’s bargaining leverage, Taiwan may come to the conclusion 
that risking war is preferable to any negotiated settlement with the PRC over uni-
fication. In other words, Taiwan may conclude that it would be better to roll the 
dice in a war with China today than to accept the terms of an obsolescing bargain 
likely to result in a progressively more subordinate status within a unified China. 
Therefore, in the same way that bargaining over strategic territory is complicated 
by the strategic consequences of any deal that might be struck, bargaining over 
unification can be dangerous because it has implications for the future bargaining 
power of the PRC and Taiwan.
In summary, ending arms sales to Taiwan would have the potential to in-
crease instability in the Taiwan Strait. Such a shift in US policy could alter the 
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, which in turn could shift the strategic 
dynamic from deterrence to compellence. In turn, there are reasons to believe 
that a China-Taiwan relationship in which China tried to compel steps toward 
unification would be more conflict prone than one where the PRC tried to de-
ter Taiwan steps toward independence, as credible commitment problems could 
make it difficult for Taiwan to accommodate new power realities.
WHY ENDING US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WOULD 
NOT NECESSARILY BE DESTABILIZING
The analysis above suggests that ending arms sales to Taiwan would be destabiliz-
ing if doing so had enough of an effect on p and cc to push R to the right of the 
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status quo. However, there are reasons to question whether ending sales would 
indeed have such a large effect. On the one hand, as the balance of power in the 
Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China’s favor, it is not obvious that the arms 
themselves have a large impact on that shifting power balance. Whether the sales 
do in fact have a significant effect in this regard, moreover, will likely depend heav-
ily on the types of weapons the United States would be willing to sell to Taiwan 
(and which weapons Taiwan would be willing to buy). For instance, some have 
suggested that Taiwan’s efforts to purchase high-profile and expensive packages 
such as the F-16C/D fighter are counterproductive given their high cost and the 
PRC’s growing air capabilities; according to these analysts, more mundane (and 
cheaper) systems are likely to be more effective at countering PRC capabilities.20 
Whether ending arms sales has a significant effect on p and cc, then, will hinge in 
part on what types of weapons the United States would sell Taiwan if arms sales 
were to continue.
Likewise, it is not self-evident how large of a signaling effect arms sales have. As 
we show in the next section, US arms sales send the clearest signal of US support 
for Taiwan when the sales are costly for the United States to undertake. Yet it is quite 
clear not only that the sales do not appear to be especially costly for Washington 
but also that many in the United States actually benefit economically and politi-
cally from the sales. When the Obama administration was considering the F-16C/D 
package in 2011, for instance, a large number of US senators signed a letter to the 
president urging the sale to go forward; often, the signatories represented states that 
stood to benefit economically from increased demand for the fighter jets.21 In other 
words, so long as Chinese retaliation against the United States for selling weapons 
remains limited, the costs of the policy to Washington do not appear especially 
high. Thus it would not appear to us that arms sales represent an especially strong 
signal of US commitment to Taiwan, meaning that ending the sales would not nec-
essarily lead Taiwan and China to dramatically alter their assessments of likely US 
behavior in the event of a cross-Strait conflict.
It is also worth emphasizing that many factors besides US arms sales to Taiwan 
determine the value of p and cc, including Taiwan’s indigenous military capabili-
ties, the PRC’s capabilities, the level of economic integration across the Taiwan 
Strait, and so forth. The rapid growth in cross-Strait economic integration and co-
operation in recent decades, combined with China’s general integration into global 
markets, for instance, suggests that the costs for China of a cross-Strait military 
confrontation are probably quite high—even if the PRC would likely win such a 
confrontation. Compared to these costs, the dent to cc caused by reduced arms 
sales could actually be quite small.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ending arms sales to Taiwan could actu-
ally increase cc in some ways. While critics sometimes suggest that ending arms 
232    Chapter Twelve
sales might simply whet the appetite of China and encourage further demands on 
the United States, it is also conceivable—as proponents such as Glaser argue—that 
ending arms sales would lead to significant improvement in the US-China rela-
tionship.22 Furthermore, whether the United States sells weapons to Taiwan or not, 
it is hard to imagine a strong and cooperative US-China relationship withstanding 
PRC coercion against the island. Therefore, if the PRC values a stable US-China 
relationship, and if ending arms sales to Taiwan does in fact lead to an improved 
Sino-American relationship, then ending arms sales to Taiwan will also mean that 
the PRC will have more to lose (in terms of a strong US-China relationship) by ini-
tiating conflict in the Taiwan Strait. If this sort of effect outweighs the direct effect 
of ending arms sales on China’s costs of war, then ending arms sales could help to 
reinforce a stable status quo.
SUMMARY
In sum, even in the context of our highly stylized and simplified model of cross-
Strait relations, changes in US policy have complex and uncertain net implications 
for stability in the Taiwan Strait. Analysts should recognize that ending arms sales 
to Taiwan could be highly destabilizing: such a change in US policy could help to tip 
cross-Strait relations from a relatively stable deterrence relationship to an unstable 
compellence relationship. But ending arms sales will not necessarily have this ef-
fect and could actually contribute to stability in the Taiwan Strait by reinforcing 
China’s stake in a stable status quo. It is our hope that our model will help to orga-
nize thinking around this important topic, by showing how different types of effects 
fit together.
WHY A TOUGHER PRC POLICY ON ARMS SALES 
C OULD BACKFIRE
Just as there have been calls in the United States for a changed US policy on Tai-
wan arms sales, so have there been calls in Beijing for a changed PRC policy on 
the issue.23 As noted earlier, arms sales to Taiwan provoke an angry response from 
Beijing. When the United States confirmed a US$5.8 billion weapons package to 
Taiwan in 2011, official Chinese media referred to the sale as a “despicable breach 
of faith in international relations,” while one general wrote that the United States 
was “cheating and making a fool of the Chinese people.”24 This type of response is 
not new; in 1992, for instance, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress issued a statement expressing “extreme indignation over US wanton in-
terference in China’s internal affairs” after the Bush administration announced it 
would sell 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan.25
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Despite the anger that US arms sales to Taiwan typically generate in China, 
the actual policy response to these sales has typically been muted. Beyond the 
tough rhetoric, retaliation has been mostly symbolic. For instance, the PRC of-
ten responds to arms sales by halting dialogue between the two countries. In re-
cent years, the PRC has temporarily frozen military-to-military dialogues after 
arms sales decisions.26 In 1992, the PRC suspended human rights discussions in 
response to the F-16 sale.27 The PRC has at times hinted at the possibility of a 
stronger response: in both 1992 and 2010, Chinese officials suggested that the PRC 
might retaliate with economic sanctions.28 Nevertheless, there is little evidence 
that China has—to date—followed through on these sorts of threats.29
China’s unwillingness to react more vigorously to US arms sales has led to 
some frustrations among Chinese analysts and military officials, who have at 
times advocated a tougher, tit-for-tat response. In early January 2010, Rear 
Admiral Yang Yi (retired), a prominent defense analyst, called for tougher sanc-
tions against US companies involved in arms sales, and high-profile scholar Shi 
Yinhong emphasized that China should impose more significant costs on the 
United States in response to arms sales.30 Shortly thereafter, when the US gov-
ernment announced a new weapons sale package for Taiwan in late January, 
PRC government officials did in fact issue a threat of sanctions (noted above)—
warning that China would retaliate against Taiwan arms sales by sanctioning 
US companies involved in the sales. Chinese media quoted several well-known 
scholars and analysts expressing support for such a policy, including Yang Yi 
and Beijing University’s Wang Yong.31 Media reports also suggested widespread 
support for such a tougher policy among Chinese “netizens.”32 To be clear, these 
sorts of sentiments are not new; there have long been voices in China advocat-
ing for a tougher PRC response to Taiwan arms sales. John Garver notes, for 
instance, that military leaders wanted to see a strong response to the 1992 F-16 
sale, with some advocating economic sanctions on US exports to China (in-
cluding agricultural products like wheat). Garver writes that these voices were 
ultimately overruled by Deng Xiaoping himself.33
The rationale for a tougher approach is ultimately twofold. First, a tougher ap-
proach would impose higher costs on the United States for pursuing the status quo 
policy of arms sales to Taiwan. These increased costs could, in turn, lead Wash-
ington to reevaluate the utility of the status quo and to conclude that the benefits 
associated with arms sales no longer justified the costs. Sanctions, in short, have 
the potential to improve PRC bargaining power in the Taiwan Strait by making it 
more likely that the United States will scale back its commitment to Taiwan. Sec-
ond, even if the United States failed to change policy, a tougher approach would at 
least enable the PRC to signal more clearly—to both domestic and international 
audiences—its own dissatisfaction with the status quo. As Peking University’s Jia 
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Qingguo has written, facing “mounting domestic pressure, the [Chinese Commu-
nist Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its ‘weak’ responses, such 
as verbal protests, to U.S. weapons sales and believes it needs to demonstrate its 
courage with concrete acts of retaliation.”34
But a tougher approach to arms sales also entails significant risks for China. 
Obviously, threatening or imposing sanctions on US companies could further 
harm the Sino-American relationship and perhaps trigger a trade war. But more 
fundamentally, consider what happens if the United States continues to sell the 
weapons even in the face of PRC retaliation. In this case, the weapons sales would 
become more unambiguously costly for Washington to carry out. By continuing 
with the sales despite these increased costs, the United States would essentially be 
signaling a sincere interest in Taiwan’s security; it would be much harder to make 
the argument that US arms sales to Taiwan were motivated by a cynical desire to 
further the interests of US companies and create a few US jobs. Thus the PRC faces 
a significant trade-off in responding to US arms sales. To the extent that Chinese 
policy makers believe that the United States is motivated primarily by cynical eco-
nomic and political motivations in selling weapons to Taiwan, it makes sense to 
get tough: the United States would be more likely to back down in such a scenario, 
and the door would thus open to an end to US arms sales. But to the extent the 
PRC believes that sincere concerns over Taiwan security enter into US calculations 
in selling weapons, a tougher policy response could backfire. The United States 
would be unlikely to back down, and by standing firm in the face of PRC sanctions 
would signal—to both the PRC and Taiwan—a stronger commitment to the island 
than was previously evident. The tougher response, moreover, would likely lead to 
further turbulence in the bilateral Sino-American relationship.
C ONCLUSION
The continuing US commitment to Taiwan’s security, and in particular contin-
ued US arms sales to Taiwan, represents one of the key sources of tension in the 
broader Sino-American relationship. In recent years, analysts in both Washington 
and Beijing have proposed new approaches to the issue. In the United States, some 
have suggested that the United States end weapons sales to Taiwan and consider 
backing away from its commitment to the island more broadly. In the PRC, some 
have suggested that a rising China take a tougher line in response to US arms sales. 
We have argued that both proposed policy alterations carry with them significant 
risks. In the US case, ending arms sales to Taiwan could contribute to an increase 
in the likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait by helping to shift cross-Strait 
relations from a deterrence dynamic to a compellence dynamic. In the Chinese 
case, a tougher approach to US arms sales could backfire by revealing a stronger 
US commitment to Taiwan’s security than might be currently assumed. A revealed 
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stronger US commitment, in turn, could make Taiwan less willing to accommo-
date the PRC on sovereignty issues.
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Cross-Strait relations under Xi Jinping’s leadership remain stable and progressive 
in general, despite growing anti-Beijing sentiment in Taiwan, as highlighted by 
the Sunflower Movement, which protested the passing of the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement between Taiwan and the mainland, and the embarrassing fail-
ure of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, which had emphasized a platform 
of strengthening Taiwan-China economic ties in the 2014 election. Both sides 
have been prevented from making any substantial progress in cross-Strait rela-
tions since Xi came to power in 2012 (coinciding with Ma’s second term)—Taiwan 
by growing anti-Beijing sentiment, especially among young people, and a drop 
in President Ma Ying-jeou’s popularity,1 and China by Xi Jinping’s preoccupation 
with fighting corruption and restructuring the economy amid a substantial eco-
nomic slowdown. But peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait has remained 
the trend since 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou came to power. The 1992 Consensus that 
there is only one China and that Taipei and Beijing agree to disagree on which 
government is its legitimate representative is still the foundation of cross-Strait 
relations. Moreover, the two sides have a better understanding and growing toler-
ance of each other’s differing views of the implications, at home and abroad, of the 
assertion that there is only “one China.” Meanwhile, economic, social, and political 
exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to increase.
With this background, this chapter seeks to address the following questions: 
What is China’s strategy toward Taiwan under Xi Jinping’s leadership? Have there 
been any changes to China’s Taiwan policy since Xi Jinping came to power? Is 
there a departure from Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy? If there is a departure, to what 
extent will such a change affect cross-Strait relations?
13
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Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework
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This chapter will start with a brief review of developments in cross-Strait rela-
tions since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. It will then argue that despite 
substantial developments the status quo remains intact. However, this status quo 
in the long run is in favor of Beijing’s policy goal to eventually reunify the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait into the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this re-
gard, while Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policy continues to follow the fundamental ap-
proach adopted by Hu Jintao, namely to prioritize prevention of Taiwan’s de jure 
independence over promotion of reunification, Xi has increasingly emphasized 
strengthening the strategic framework of the “one-China principle” in cross-Strait 
relations. The aim is to box Taiwan in toward the goal of eventual reunification, 
which has been incorporated into Xi’s grand goals for China that are expressed in 
his “Chinese Dream.” Although Taiwanese people seem to be less and less identify-
ing with mainland China nationally and politically, Taiwan has been deeply drawn 
into China’s economic orbit, while its international status, in terms of both legiti-
macy and influence, continues to decline. Thus Taiwan sees increasing difficulty in 
moving away from mainland China’s influence both economically and politically. 
The dilemma faced by Taiwan is that it will either be drawn deeper into China’s 
orbit or be marginalized in international affairs as well as regional economic inte-
gration. Taiwan does not have much choice but to accept the fact that it will have 
greater interdependence with the mainland. I conclude that although there may be 
a bounce or reaction against mainland China’s Taiwan policy after the presidential 
election in 2016, this will only be a storm in the teacup, which will not alter the 
overall direction of the development.
FROM PREVENTION OF DE JURE INDEPENDENCE TO 
PROMOTION OF “POLITICAL AGREEMENT S”
The turning point of cross-Strait relations took place in 2004 with the May 17 
Statement issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC. In 
this statement, for the first time Beijing made it clear that prevention of Taiwan’s 
de jure independence was the top priority of Beijing’s Taiwan policy.2 With grow-
ing concern and suspicion from the international community over China’s rise 
and a potential “China threat,” Beijing had realized that a policy aimed at reuni-
fication was unrealistic under the current circumstances and would conflict with 
its efforts to build up the image of a peaceful rising power. On March 14, 2005, 
this policy was formalized by the Anti-Secession Law passed by the third confer-
ence of the Tenth National People’s Congress. After that, joint efforts by Beijing 
and Washington kept Taiwan’s then president Chen Shui-bian from going too 
far in his relentless pushing of the envelope for Taiwan’s independence, which 
peaked when Chen won his second term in 2004. The de facto co-management 
between Washington and Beijing to check the movement for Taiwan’s de jure 
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independence has helped advance Beijing’s strategic vision for “one China” in 
cross-Strait relations despite some fundamental differences between the one-
China policy that the United States espouses (which agrees to the existence of 
only one China but allows different interpretations as to which government is the 
legitimate representative of it) and the one-China principle that mainland China 
insists on (which stresses that the government of PRC is the sole legitimate gov-
ernment representing China and consequently entails eventual reunification).3 
The two sides seem to have reached a temporary but fundamental consensus on 
the Taiwan issue, namely that the movement toward Taiwan’s independence does 
not serve the interests of either China or the United States, although the latter 
is by no means supportive of the former’s policy of eventual reunification. Since 
then, both the Bush and Obama administrations have endorsed the policy of 
“peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait” adopted by the Hu Jintao leader-
ship, although a “peaceful resolution”—not necessarily reunification—has been 
the US policy goal versus China’s goal for eventual reunification. Together with 
this newly clarified US position, China’s policy shift from proreunification to anti-
independence enabled President Ma Ying-jeou to accept the 1992 Consensus as 
the foundation for cross-Strait relations immediately after he assumed the office.
As a result, during Ma’s first term, the two sides achieved a long-overdue 
breakthrough in cross-Strait relations, the “three links,” or commencement of di-
rect flights, shipping, and postal service across the Taiwan Strait in 2008, which 
has in turn brought about an irrevocable economic integration between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait through direct transportation, trade, and communica-
tions. Furthermore, the establishment of the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) has institutionalized economic interdependence across the 
Taiwan Strait. It is expected that ECFA will further boost cross-Strait trade and 
economic exchanges, leading to the “one-China market” advocated by Ma Ying-
jeou’s first vice-president, Vincent Siew Wan-chang.4 Thus, in terms of economic 
development, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have already been moving toward 
reunification.
Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, cross-Strait relations have 
remained stable, although there have not been many major achievements so far, 
largely because of Taipei’s reluctance to approve any political agreement or any 
formal or informal measures to build trust between PRC and ROC militaries, 
despite the push from Beijing. Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Indonesia in Bali in October 2013, told 
Vincent Siew that “increasing mutual political trust across the Taiwan Straits 
and jointly building political foundations are crucial for ensuring the peaceful 
development of relations”;5 he also hinted broadly about the importance of a 
cross-Strait framework for mutual military confidence and trust.6 But there has 
been little response from Ma Ying-jeou’s administration to Xi’s requests. Several 
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reasons account for the two sides’ failure to reach any political deals. Ma Ying-
jeou’s rapidly decreasing popularity in Taiwan and his inept management of in-
ternal strife within the KMT have greatly constrained Taipei’s ability to handle 
cross-Strait relations. Given the leadership transition in China and the US policy 
of pivoting toward Asia, it has become unrealistic for Beijing to push any further 
in cross-Strait relations.
However, as Xi Jinping told Lien Chan, the honorary chair of the KMT, Beijing 
has patience and confidence.7 Given the overall situation, especially China’s focus 
on developing, with the United States, a “new type of great-power relations” and 
on t promoting the “One Belt, One Road” initiative that would build overland and 
maritime economic corridors linking China and Europe through central, West, 
and South Asia, Taiwan is no longer a priority for Beijing at the moment. Xi Jin-
ping may not necessarily want to push any further in the cross-Strait relations 
and may wish merely to maintain the stability of the status quo. This is clearly 
suggested by Xi’s speech at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) in March 2015, during which he emphasized that maintaining the 1992 
Consensus as a foundation for cross-Strait relations was indispensable for peace 
and stability between the two sides of the Strait,8 while reunification was a long-
term goal that could be achieved only after substantial development took place 
across the Taiwan Strait.
XI  J INPING TRIES TO B OX TAIWAN IN WITH THE 
ONE-CHINA FR AMEWORK
Xi Jinping has rich experience in handling cross-Strait affairs, for he has been the 
provincial party secretary in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, where the local gov-
ernments have established substantial connections with Taiwan. These provinces 
not only are agents of the central government in Beijing but also have developed 
their own close social, economic, and political ties with their counterparts in 
Taiwan.9 Thus, after Xi became a designated successor at the Seventeenth Party 
Congress in October 2007, he played an increasing role in cross-Strait relations. 
In December 2007 and January 2009, he met visiting former US president Jimmy 
Carter twice as China’s vice-president. Besides emphasizing Hu Jintao’s six propos-
als for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, Xi expressed China’s willing-
ness to cooperate with the United States against Taiwan’s de jure independence, 
which as he said would not only serve mutual interests but also help to maintain 
regional peace and development.10 Among all of his talks on Taiwan during this 
period, the most impressive one is the speech he gave at the opening ceremony of 
the 2010 Chinese Roots-Seeking Tour summer camp in Beijing on July 25, 2010. 
He claimed that for Chinese people inside and outside of China the solidarity and 
unity of the Chinese nation constituted their common root, and Chinese culture 
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their soul. On this basis, he claimed that it was the common dream for all Chinese 
to revitalize the great Chinese nation.11
After Xi came to power, he continued Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy and priori-
tized the prevention of de jure independence rather than promoting immediate 
reunification. In April 2013, Xi met Vincent Siew at the Twelfth Boao Forum. Xi 
called on compatriots from both sides of the Strait to work hard to rejuvenate 
the Chinese nation. He also called for closer economic cooperation between the 
Chinese mainland and Taiwan.12 There was no mention of any development of 
the political relationship in his remarks. Two months later, however, when he met 
Wu Po-hsiung, the honorary chair of the (KMT), he made four new proposals to 
further cross-Strait relations: “First, the two sides should take the overall inter-
ests of the Chinese nation into consideration when assessing the overall situation 
of cross-Strait ties”; “Second, the two sides should clearly recognize development 
trends throughout history in order to gain a better understanding of the future 
prospects for cross-Strait ties”; Third, “The mainland and Taiwan should enhance 
mutual trust, engage in favorable interactions, seek common ground and shelve 
differences, and be pragmatic and enterprising”; and finally, “The two sides should 
steadily promote the overall development of cross-Strait ties.”13 Compared to his 
previous talks on the Taiwan issue, this one more clearly articulated how to pro-
mote political trust between the two sides of the Strait based on peaceful economic 
development. Xi emphasized that the two sides “share the same destiny” and called 
for efforts to inspire them to “strengthen their pride in the Chinese nation as well 
as their shared goal of its rejuvenation.” He also noted that “though the mainland 
and Taiwan are yet to be reunified, they belong to one China and are inseparable 
parts of the country.” Xi added that “safeguarding national territorial integrity and 
sovereignty is at the core of this goal” Xi said, and emphasized that the two sides 
should uphold the one-China framework.14
Now Xi Jinping has put forward some specific political requirements for inter-
actions with Taiwan, including reinforcing confidence building, promoting posi-
tive interactions, optimizing common interests, and being pragmatic. The essence, 
he emphasizes, is to consolidate and protect Beijing’s strategic advancement of 
the “one-China” principle, which should be agreed on in cross-Strait relations. In 
October 2013, when meeting Vincent Siew in Bali ahead of the APEC gathering, 
Xi brought up the notion that “both sides of the Strait are of one family.” As he 
emphasized, the two sides should treasure this historical opportunity, maintain 
the momentum of peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait, and 
strengthen political mutual trust, so as to lay a political foundation. He expressed 
for the first time that in the long term disputes across the Taiwan Strait could and 
should be gradually resolved—“We cannot hand those problems down from gen-
eration to generation.” This remark reflects Xi’s resolve to make substantial prog-
ress under his leadership in pushing cross-Strait relations toward reunification. 
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Xi urged heads of departments in charge of cross-Strait ties to meet and exchange 
views in order to build up cross-Strait political mutual trust.15
Xi’s position on cross-Strait relations was further clarified in February 2014, 
when he met a Taiwanese delegation led by Lien Chan. He made it clear that 
reunification was an essential part of the Chinese Dream. Again he made four 
points in explaining China’s Taiwan policy, but these four points included more 
political elements than the previous four. Reunification, he said, was the common 
wish of compatriots from both sides, and he affirmed that “no power can separate 
us.”16 His speech closely linked the Chinese Dream to Taiwan’s future and again 
emphasized the importance of retaining a one-China framework. He expressed 
optimism over the eventual resolution of disputes across the Strait, even though 
he acknowledged that it might take a long time to achieve. Xi asked “the two 
sides across the Strait to consolidate the basis for adhering to the 1992 Consensus 
and opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ and to foster the common understanding 
of One China.” He stated that “compatriots from both sides have chosen the path 
of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, a correct choice that safeguards 
cross-Strait peace, promotes common development, helps realize the rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation, and brings benefits to people on both sides.” Despite a gen-
eral trend of peaceful development and increasing exchanges and communica-
tion, currently there are disturbances such as the Sunflower Movement, Xi noted. 
“We will try to do our best, as long as what we do can contribute to the well-being 
of our Taiwan compatriots, to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, 
and to the overall interest of the Chinese nation.”17
After carrying forward Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy, Xi shifted his emphasis more 
to establishing and consolidating a strategic framework under the “one China” 
principle. The aim is to box Taiwan in for eventual reunification. In September 
2014, Xi Jinping told a visiting Taiwanese delegation that the basic guideline to 
solve the Taiwan issue is “peaceful reunification; One Country, Two Systems.” 
He added, “No secessionist act will be tolerated. The path of ‘Taiwan indepen-
dence’ is unfeasible.”18 The concept of “one country, two systems” has not been 
part of mainland China’s official language toward Taiwan for quite a while. With 
Ma Ying-jeou’s government being discredited by the Sunflower Movement, and 
with unrest in Hong Kong, Xi seemed to have come to a conclusion that certain 
principles needed to be reemphasized. This idea is reflected in Xi’s remarks while 
he was joining a panel discussion with members of the National Committee of the 
CPPCC in March 2015. He proclaimed, “We should unswervingly pursue peaceful 
development, unswervingly adhere to the common political basis, unswervingly 
bring benefits to the people across the Strait and unswervingly join hands to real-
ize the national revitalization.” It is worth noting that on the same occasion he 
called on compatriots to be vigilant against the “Taiwan independence” forces.19 
It is a good indication that Xi Jinping is fully taking a no-nonsense approach to 
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cross-Strait relations in response to new factors in Taiwan that are unfavorable to 
mainland China.
Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have realized that the United States plays 
an essential role in cross-Strait relations. On the basis of the political heritage from 
his predecessors, Xi Jinping has developed a new strategy. Even before he became 
the top leader in China, he emphasized that the Taiwan issue should not interfere 
with Sino-U.S. bilateral relations.20 Since he came into power, he has been trying to 
isolate the Taiwan issue from the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship while at the same 
time trying to build up what he calls a “new type of great-power relationship.” 
That is why in all of his discussions, communications, and joint statements with 
President Obama one can hardly find any mention of the Taiwan issue, at least not 
in published statements. This clearly indicates Xi’s position on Taiwan when he is 
dealing with the United States: since Taiwan is a core interest of China, China will 
not allow Taiwan to become a bargaining chip while it is making efforts to develop 
a new type of relationships between major powers. The aim is to isolate the Taiwan 
issue from the Sino-US bilateral relationship and cut out any US involvement in 
cross-Strait relations, or at least to make sure there is no direct US involvement. 
Thus it is not surprising that with regard to the US rebalancing policy in Asia, 
Taiwan has been absent from discussion.
Overall, Xi’s strategy can be summarized as follows. First, he has not made any 
dramatic departure from Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy, which focused on the preven-
tion of Taiwan’s de jure independence. Second, he is most concerned to consoli-
date the strategic fulfillment of the “one China” principle in order to box Taiwan 
in. Consequently, he has placed more emphasis on developing a political relation-
ship between the mainland and Taiwan, based on a solid economic foundation in 
cross-Strait relations. Last but not the least, Xi is obviously a tough player on the 
Taiwan issue. His response toward any opposition in Taiwan against eventual re-
unification can be summarized as “If you move one step forwards, I will move two 
steps.” Xi Jinping’s revival of the slogan “One country, two systems,” which has not 
been mentioned since 2005, when the Anti-secession Law was passed, is only one 
example. His tough stance may continue because of domestic and external situa-
tions. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Xi wants to copy a Hong Kong model for 
cross-Strait relations. Rather, it reflects his determinations not to allow any setback 
in cross-Strait relations under his leadership. Xi Jinping believes that as long as 
he can keep institutionalizing the one-China framework in cross-Strait relations, 
Taiwan will eventually come back to the embrace of the mother country.
C ONCLUSION
Though in general Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policy has followed that of Hu Jintao in 
prioritizing the prevention of Taiwan’s de jure independence over the promotion 
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of reunification, Xi, apparently in response to the stability and enhanced devel-
opment of relations across the Taiwan Strait after Ma Ying-jeou came to power, 
has tried to push forward some political agreements between Beijing and Taipei. 
However, this effort has hardly been fruitful, not only because of Ma Ying-jeou’s 
decreasing popularity in Taiwan, but also because Xi’s priority has been the anti-
corruption campaign at home and the crises in East and South China Seas against 
the background of US rebalancing abroad.
As discussed in the previous sections, there are some emerging trends under Xi’s 
leadership. First of all, as China has become increasingly capable of managing the 
situation on its Asian borders, Xi Jinping has tried to insulate the Taiwan issue from 
US-China relations in order to decrease US leverage on this issue in the bilateral 
relationship. Xi’s policy has resulted in an obvious decrease in the influence of the 
United States on cross-Strait relations, to the point that the United States no longer 
plays a decisive role.21
Second, because of the rapid development of economic interdependence across 
the Taiwan Strait and both sides’ acceptance of the 1992 Consensus as a founda-
tion for cross-Strait relations, the topic of reunification is no longer an untouch-
able third rail in Taiwan politics. Despite seemingly growing indifference from 
Beijing, there are increasing discussions on the issue, not only among scholars 
but also in the media and in political discourse. Meanwhile, the issue of Taiwan 
independence has become increasingly difficult to discuss in Taiwanese political 
affairs. Even Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; more proindependence) leaders 
nowadays try to avoid giving an opinion on the issue, not because of any change in 
the DPP’s guidelines or ideology, but because it will deprive them of political sup-
port at home and abroad that is necessary for them to prevail in Taiwan politics.
Third, as Xi Jinping’s leadership is expected to further consolidate, it is inevi-
table that he will put more pressure on achieving “political progress” in cross-Strait 
relations. This is clearly indicated by his recent remarks on Taiwan. While em-
phasizing that the two sides will have to forgo political agreements in the foresee-
able future, Xi unambiguously included the eventual reunification of Taiwan and 
mainland China in his “Chinese dream,” which is centered on the revitalization 
of a great Chinese nation. This shows that Xi Jinping aims to make some achieve-
ments on the Taiwan issue a part of his political legacy.
Given the defeat of the KMT in the midterm election of 2014 and President 
Ma Ying-jeou’s rapidly declining popularity, the DPP entered the 2016 presidential 
and legislative electoral campaign in an advantageous position and indeed won 
a convincing victory. This cannot but amount to a substantial challenge to Xi’s 
leadership on the Taiwan issue. Given Xi’s position and public statements, it will 
not be surprising if Beijing imposes more pressure on Taiwan. From Xi’s perspec-
tive, it is unacceptable for cross-Strait relations to go back to the situation under 
President Chen Shui-bian in the first eight years of the twenty-first century. Given 
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the increasing economic interdependence of the mainland and Taiwan, and more 
importantly the deep interdependence of the United States and China, it is inevi-
table that the focus of Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policy will shift toward political issues. 
The aim of reaching political agreements across the Taiwan Strait is to institution-
alize not only the interdependence of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait but also the 
strategic framework of the one-China principle. Thus the victory of the DPP in the 
2016 presidential campaign may only provoke a stronger reaction from mainland 
China on the Taiwan issue. After all, pushing for political agreements was already 
part of Xi’s policy toward Taiwan. So there will be more challenges in cross-Strait 
relations in the coming years, not just because the proindependence DPP has come 
into power again after eight years since their defeat in the 2008 presidential elec-
tion, but also because Xi has invested much of his political capital in this issue.
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In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established and China 
was politically divided into two parts. This was because in December 1949, be-
cause of the civil war, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated 
to Taiwan. Over the past six decades, cross-Straits relations have undergone tre-
mendous transformations. These changes can be categorized into four stages, 
which have greatly influenced China and Taiwan’s relations throughout South-
east Asia.
The first stage, December 1949 to October 1971, was when the PRC had not yet 
been admitted to the United Nations (UN). There was a military standoff across 
the Taiwan Straits and political confrontation between the PRC and ROC, who 
each maintained to the international community that they were the true Chinese 
representatives. Because of its alliance with the United States, the ROC was able 
to maintain its formal diplomatic relations with Thailand, the Philippines, and 
the former Republic of Vietnam,1 whereas, because of its extensive support for the 
communist movements in Southeast Asia, the PRC was relatively isolated in the 
region.
The second stage, from October 1971 to July 1987, was marked by the ad-
mission of the PRC into the United Nations and the beginning of Taiwan’s 
political isolation. However, the island’s economy continued to grow, branding 
it as one of the four Asian dragons. Under a “one-China” policy that countries 
could officially recognize the PRC or the ROC but not both, the PRC was 
able to block Taiwan from increasing its diplomatic ties. As a result, in 1975, 
the ROC lost all of its diplomatic relationships in Southeast Asia. Although, 
by the mid-1980s, the ROC’s official diplomatic partners worldwide had been 
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reduced to only twenty-three, the number of Taiwan’s representative offices 
in foreign countries continued to increase. Because of so-called “pragmatic 
diplomacy,” by 1987 the number of international representative offices had in-
creased to eighty-five.2
The third stage was from 1987 to 1997. In July 1987, martial law was lifted in 
the ROC, which resulted in great progress for cross-Strait relations. In May 1991, 
the period of mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion was abol-
ished, officially ending the civil war with the communists on the Chinese main-
land.3 Governmental institutions were recognized, and more interactions between 
Taiwan and China were slowly initiated, such as the Straits Exchange Foundation 
(SEF), which was established in Taipei in March 1991, and the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), which was established in Beijing in 
December 1991. However, both sides were unwavering when it came to diplomacy. 
Taiwan’s economic ties with Southeast Asia continued to grow, while China con-
tinued to expand its political influence on the region.
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of the fourth phase 
of cross-Strait relations. China’s economic power increased, whereas Taiwan’s re-
mained relatively unchanged. China was now not only generating its own capital 
but sending financial aid to economies in the region, making it an economic 
giant. This trend continues today and has granted China its increasing regional 
power. China continues to expand its political and economic influence on South-
east Asia, with the intentions of replacing the United States as the regional super-
power.4 This has put Taiwan in the position of no longer competing with China 
but instead having to struggle to survive, not only in Southeast Asia but also 
around the world.
China has developed its expansion goals to build up its political economy in 
Southeast Asia and in doing so has implemented a comprehensive framework for 
expanded political and economic relations with countries throughout the region. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s survival strategy is to continue to prosper economically and 
to try to build an environment that will allow for political and economic linkages 
with Southeast Asian countries.
This chapter takes a comparative perspective in examining China’s expansion 
strategy and Taiwan’s Southeast Asian survival strategy that have been unfolding 
since the turn of the century. It argues that China’s expansion strategy has estab-
lished a relatively solid relationship with most Southeast Asian countries. How-
ever, it faces challenges that could impede further expansion in the region. And 
although Taiwan continues to face the challenges of political isolation and eco-
nomic marginalization, its political resilience may allow for its continued survival 
in the international community: given the recent democratic shift in Southeast 
Asia, Taiwan has won more support and friendship across the region than China 
has been able to keep up with.
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CHINA’S  EXPANSION STR ATEGY IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA:  BUILDING A CHINA-D OMINATED POLITICAL 
EC ONOMY IN THE REGION
China’s Political Expansion: Building a China-Dominated 
Political Environment
During the Cold War era, China was not influential in Southeast Asia, even 
though by 1991 it had formalized diplomatic relations with all the countries in the 
region.5 In 1990, through the implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy, China 
began to make changes regarding its regional diplomatic relations. After the bru-
tal Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, 1989, it tried to reshape its image.6 In 
August 1990, Chinese premier Li Peng (at that time) visited Indonesia, Singapore, 
and Thailand. In December 1990, he visited Malaysia and the Philippines. This 
was the first time that a Chinese leader had, within four months, visited five major 
countries in Southeast Asia. In 1991, the previously isolated Asian giant was then 
invited to attend the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
meeting, and in July 1996 it was accepted as a full dialogue partner. This laid a 
sound foundation for the further development of China’s diplomatic relations 
throughout Southeast Asia.
In 1997, because of its strong currency, the Asian financial crisis gave China 
greater opportunity to expand its engagement with Southeast Asia. While most cur-
rencies in Southeast Asia depreciated after the financial crisis, China’s currency, the 
renminbi (RMB), maintained its value. This helped keep other Southeast Asian cur-
rencies from depreciating further. The United States and Western-dominated inter-
national financial bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) gave the Southeast Asian countries a hard time when they came to 
them for help. China, on the contrary, was quick to assist by issuing huge loans and 
economic assistance to suffering countries in the region.
Since the turn of the century, China has further expanded its political and eco-
nomic relations with Southeast Asia and attempted to replace the United States 
as a dominant power in the region by establishing a China-dominated political 
economy there. Therefore, over the coming century, China’s Southeast Asian ex-
pansion strategy is designed to bring the region completely under its dominance. 
The strategy has three elements:(1) getting more involved in regional political af-
fairs; (2) resolving security issues with Southeast Asian countries; (3) establishing 
a new mechanism over regional affairs.
Getting More Involved in Regional Political Affairs. Before 1990, China had lim-
ited involvement in regional affairs, despite its cordial relations with Burma and 
Laos during the Cold War era. However, things changed for the Asian giant in 
1991, when it was invited to attend the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur and then in July 1996, when it was invited to the Twenty-Ninth 
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ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta and accorded the full status of a dialogue 
partner.
Since the turn of the century, China has continued to strengthen its political 
relationships with the region’s countries. This can be evidenced in the numerous 
agreements and meetings that have occurred between China and the ASEAN 
countries. In October 2003, one of the most significant of these was the joint dec-
laration on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity that was signed at the 
Seventh ASEAN-China Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Around the same time, China 
signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), making it 
the first ASEAN dialogue partner to be included in the agreement.7 China’s entry 
into TAC marked a closer relationship with its southern neighbors.
In October 2010, at the Thirteenth ASEAN-China Summit in Ho Noi, China, 
ASEAN adopted a four-year partnership plan for 2011–15, which again elevated its 
bilateral political and strategic cooperation with the organization. In November 
2011, China established the ASEAN-China Center (ACC) in Beijing, the first and 
only intergovernmental organization between China and ASEAN. The ACC is a 
one-stop information center, designated to promote cooperation in a number of 
areas, such as trade, investment, tourism, education, and culture. In September 
2012, the PRC appointed its first resident ASEAN ambassador to Jakarta and estab-
lished an official mission statement for its role in ASEAN. This again strengthened 
its ties with the regional members.
In October 2013, at the Sixteenth ASEAN-China Summit and tenth anniver-
sary of the ASEAN-China strategic partnership, China and ASEAN issued a joint 
statement on expanding bilateral cooperation in eleven priority areas: agriculture, 
information technology, human resources development, Mekong Basin develop-
ment, investment, energy, transport, culture, public health, tourism, and the en-
vironment. The statement truly exemplified China’s comprehensive cooperation 
with Southeast Asia.
Resolving Security Issues with Southeast Asian Countries. China has a long histo-
ry of territorial disputes with its Southeast Asian neighbors, most notably a dispute 
over a number of islands and reefs in the South China Seas that has been ongoing 
with Vietnam and the Philippines. Previously, China insisted on bilateralism with 
individual Southeast Asian countries over these territorial and security disputes.8 
However, China now seems to be showing a willingness to join multilateral plat-
forms to manage territorial and security issues. In November 2002, after a series of 
discussions and meetings, China and the ASEAN countries signed a Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). In July 2011, at the Four-
teenth ASEAN-China Summit in Bali, Indonesia, guidelines for implementing the 
DOC were adopted. At the summit, China’s then premier Wen Jiabao announced 
that China would provide RMB 3 billion to establish the China-ASEAN Maritime 
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Cooperation Fund, in order to assist ASEAN members in areas such as maritime 
scientific research, connectivity, and navigation safety.
At the Sixteenth ASEAN-China Summit of October 2013, China and ASEAN 
discussed drafting a Code of Conduct (COC). In 2014, two meetings were held, 
in order to discuss the implementation of the DOC and further consult on how 
to develop the COC. These meetings were in March, at the Tenth ASEAN-Chi-
na Joint Working Groups on the DOC, in Singapore and in April, at the Seventh 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the DOC, in Thailand. In May 2014, 
at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Chi-
nese leader Xi Jinping stated, “Matters in Asia ultimately must be taken care of by 
Asians, Asia’s problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians, and Asia’s security 
ultimately must be protected by Asians.”9 This demonstrated China’s attempt to 
engage in closer ties with Asian countries on security issues in the region and to 
strain relations with the United States and its Southeast Asian partners.
Although the DOC and progress on the COC have been criticized for their inef-
ficiency and slow progress, a multilateral platform has been established for China 
and ASEAN to discuss and manage its long-standing disputes in the South China 
Seas. The DOC’s signatories have ten points to be carried out, including respect for 
each other’s positions and the promotion of a peaceful, friendly, and harmonious 
environment in the South China Seas.10 However, it has become questionable if the 
DOC and the COC are considered official documents or if all dispute resolution 
signatories are required to carry them out. Since January 1974, China and Vietnam 
have been engaging in military confrontation over the Paracel Islands (a group of 
islands and reefs). In January 1995, Chinese troops also detained a Filipino fishing 
vessel on Mischief Reef in the East Vietnam Seas. Though tensions in the South 
China Seas have improved a little since the DOC was signed in 2002, in late March 
2014 there were renewed confrontations between China and the Philippines, and 
in May 2014 there were confrontations with Vietnam.
Along with the DOC and the COC, China and ASEAN have made progress 
regarding nontraditional security issues that have become prevalent since the turn 
of the century. In November 2002, at the Sixth ASEAN-China Summit, China and 
ASEAN leaders signed the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Coopera-
tion in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues.11 Since then, Chinese lead-
ers have reiterated China’s intention to cooperate with Southeast Asia on nontra-
ditional security issues. This was exemplified on October 30, 2006, when at the 
Tenth ASEAN-China Summit China’s premier at that time, Wen Jiabao, stated that 
China and ASEAN should expand their already thriving economic networks and 
deepen cooperation on cross-border issues concerning counterterrorism, transna-
tional crimes, maritime security, rescue operations, and disaster relief.
In 2009, China and ASEAN signed a renewed five-year (2010 to 2014) Memo-
randum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security 
254    Chapter Fourteen
Issues.12 Since then, China has provided a series of training workshops for ASEAN 
members to implement a plan of action on such issues, and their scope has ex-
panded to include illegal trafficking of drugs and narcotics.
Establishing a New Mechanism over Regional Affairs. The United States has for 
decades been a dominant power in world politics. Since the turn of the century, 
China has risen as Asia’s economic and political giant. It has been developing new 
mechanisms on international affairs, particularly with regard to the Asia-Pacific 
region. In February 2001, the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) was formally inaugu-
rated. This exemplified China’s intention to establish a platform for handling affairs 
in the Asia-Pacific region. The forum consists of twenty-six Asian countries and 
Australasian states, and the PRC is not only a founding member but also a driving 
force in the international nongovernmental, nonprofit organization.
Permanent headquarters are located in Boao, Hainan, in southern China. Ac-
cording to Article 3 of the BFA Charter, the BFA was designed to promote and 
strengthen economic exchanges, interaction, and cooperation within the region 
and between the region and other parts of the world. Article 3 also stipulates that 
the BFA is to “provide high-level venues for dialogues between government lead-
ers, private enterprises, academia, and regional associations, in order to discuss, 
exchange, and develop ideas in the scope of economic, social, environmental 
and related issues.” The most significant issues are discussed at its annual general 
meetings, and the BFA sponsors other meetings and forums that address other 
Asian-related concerns and issues, such as the Youth Forum in 2010, the Inter-
national Capital Conference in 2011, the Asia Financial Cooperation Conference 
in 2012, the SME Conference (for small and medium-sized enterprises) in 2013, 
and the Energy, Resources and Sustainable Development Conference in 2014.13 
Clearly, the BFA has become a significant platform for Asian leaders, influen-
tial enterprises, and academics to engage in comprehensive dialogue over a wide 
range of issues.
Chinese leaders and government officials regularly participate in BFA annual 
meetings, and numerous other political leaders, business tycoons, and prestigious 
academics are invited as well. In 2008, when the BFA was also celebrating the 
thirtieth anniversary of China’s open-door policy, the twentieth anniversary of 
Hainan Province’s Special Economic Area, and the opening of the 2008 Olympics 
in Beijing, the ROC’s then vice-president Vincent Siew was invited to attend.14 
This resulted in a historic meeting between the ROC vice-president and the then 
PRC president Hu Jintao. It was indeed a significant year for China. Meanwhile 
the number of BFA participants kept increasing: at BFA 2003 there were 1,000 
delegates; at BFA 2008, there were 1,700; and at BFA 2015 there were 2,800. Inter-
national participants have included business tycoons, such as Bill Gates at BFA 
2013 and 2015 and Indian tycoon Ratan Tata at BFA 2014. Tata was the first Indian 
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citizen to be appointed as a BFA board member. This was a unique appointment 
considering the strained relationship between China and India at the time.
Since the BFA’s founding in 2001, it has become quite clear that China intends 
to use it to expand its dominance in Asian-related affairs and to further alien-
ate the United States by blocking it from participating. According to Indonesian 
political analyst Bambang Suryono, “The Boao Forum will strongly push for the 
integration of Asia, as well as the development of a common destiny for a more 
closely-knit Asian community.”15
A China-Dominated Economic Expansion
Throughout the twentieth century, China was not as economically influential in 
Asia as Japan, the United States, or even the four Asian “Dragons” (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan). In 2002, however, China implemented its “go 
global” policy, which has transformed its economic relations in the region. China’s 
economic expansion goals are to establish a China-dominated economy through-
out Southeast Asia by (1) increasing trade with Southeast Asia; (2) expanding in-
vestment in the Southeast Asian region; (3) becoming a major source for tourism 
revenue in the Southeast Asian region; and (4) developing an agenda for increas-
ing geo-economic development.
Increasing Trade with Southeast Asia. The volume of international trade reflects a 
country’s capacity to increase its economic strength. The higher the volume of foreign 
trade a country engages in, the more powerful the economy of that country. Usually 
the bigger and more powerful countries, such as China and the United States, can 
engage in more international trade. Before the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, 
China’s economic role in Southeast Asia was insignificant because of its relatively 
small trade volume with other countries in the region. In 1997, China was ranked as 
ASEAN’s eighth-largest trading partner, after Japan, the United States, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Germany.16
However, because of the sustained growth of the Chinese economy during 
the Asian financial crisis, in 2000 China became ASEAN’s sixth-largest export 
market, taking 3.5 percent of the market share and becoming its fourth-largest 
importer with 5.2 percent of its imports.17 In 2010, China exceeded Japan, the 
United States, and the Europe Union to become ASEAN’s largest export market 
(12.1 percent market share) and import market (15.9 percent market share) (see 
tables 10 and 11). In 2011, Japan exceeded China as ASEAN’s largest export mar-
ket, but China sustained its leading position as ASEAN’s largest importer in that 
year and was ASEAN’s largest export market. In 2012, China further increased its 
trade with Southeast Asia, taking a 12.2 percent share of ASEAN’s total exports and 
16.2 percent of its total imports These trends were generally maintained through-
out 2015 are predicted to continue in the coming years. A burgeoning trade with 
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Southeast Asia has given China a faster growth rate in international trade vol-
ume than its other leading trading partners. As the PRC’s imports have increased 
throughout Southeast Asia, these countries have suffered greater trade deficits and 
have become more economically dependent on the Asian superpower. The PRC 
has become Southeast Asia’s largest trading partner, with a share of exports now 
exceeding, and a share of imports far exceeding, those of Japan, the EU, and the 
United States. With increasing economic integration and regionalization, China 
will continue to maintain its trade dominance in the region.
Expanding Investment in Southeast Asia. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an-
other indicator of the strength of a country’s economy. The stronger a country’s 
economy, the more foreign investment a country is able to deliver. Countries like 
Japan, the United States, and China all exemplify this.
Throughout the twentieth century, because of its weak economy, China invested 
only an insignificant amount in Southeast Asia. According to ASEAN’s statistics, 
before the year 2000 China’s share of FDI in Southeast Asia was less than 1 percent 
(table 12).18 From 1995 to 2003, it was at an average of 0.29 percent per annum, 
Table 10 ASEAN’s leading export markets (% of market share), 2010–15
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ASEAN 25.0 26.4 25.8 26.0 25.5 25.9
China 12.1 11.4 12.2 11.8 9.2 11.3
Japan 9.8 11.7 10 9.7 9.3 9.6
USA 9.5 8.6 8.6 9.0 9.5 10.9
EU 10.9 10.2 10 9.8 10.3 –
Sources: Figures for 2010 and 2011 come from ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secre-
tariat, 2013), 78; figures for 2012 from the ASEAN Economic Community Chart Book 2013 (Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, 
2013), 22; and figures for 2013 to 2015 from ASEAN Statistics, http://asean.org/storage/2016/06/table21_as-of-30-
Aug-2016–2.pdf, accessed October 10, 2016.
Table 11 Leading ASEAN importers (% of market share), 2010–15
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ASEAN 25.9 23.6 22.8 22.4 22.5 21.9
China 15.9 15.5 16.2 17.4.0 17.5 19.4
Japan 10.8 11.2 11.2 9.5 8.8 11.4
USA 9.0 8.1 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.6
EU 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.4 –
Sources: Figures for 2010 and 2011 come from ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012 (Jakarta: ASEAN Sec-
retariat, 2012), 78; figures for 2012 from ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Chart Book 2013 (Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2013), 22; and figures for 2013 to 2015 from ASEAN Statistics, http://asean.org/storage/2016/06/table21_as-
of-30-Aug-2016–2.pdf, accessed October 10, 2016.
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whereas the United States had an average of 16.47 percent at that time and Japan 
came second with 12.90 percent of Southeast Asia’s FDI.19
Since 2010, China has begun to expand its investment in ASEAN. As a result its 
total FDI gradually expanded from 1.4 percent in 2005 to 8.1 percent in 2011. It did 
decline in 2012 to 4.7 percent, but in 2014 it went up to 5.4 percent, and in 2015 it 
increased again to 6.8 percent (table 12). Since 2011, China has become the third-
largest foreign investor in Southeast Asia, a dramatic change from its status in the 
late twentieth century. Given a growing national economy, China will without a 
doubt continue to increase its regional economic significance and investment in 
Southeast Asia.
Becoming a Major Source for Tourism Revenue in Southeast Asia. Tourism is 
another indicator that can exemplify a country’s economic strength. The stron-
ger a country’s economy, the more tourists it will attract, both domestically and 
internationally. The more one country promotes another country’s tourism, the 
more important that country becomes to the country that is hosting the tourists. 
Throughout the twentieth century, Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and residents 
of the four Asian Dragon countries were the largest contributors to the Southeast 
Asian tourist industry. At that time, China was insignificant in ASEAN’s tourism. 
In 1995, Chinese visitors to Southeast Asian countries were only 2.8 percent of the 
market share in the region, compared with Japan’s 11.1 percent, Taiwan’s 7.2 per-
cent, and America’s 4.9 percent.20
Since the turn of the century, the numbers of Chinese tourists have increased 
greatly throughout Southeast Asia. In 2000, China had a market share of 5.9 per-
cent, which increased to 6.3 percent in 2007, 10.4 percent in 2012, and 12.4 percent 
in 2014 (table 13). However, it should be noted that even in 2000 the 5.9 percent 
share meaning that of individual countries it was the second-largest source, after 
Japan, of tourists arriving in Southeast Asia. Since 2007, it has achieved a 6.3 per-
cent share and become the individual country constituting the largest source of 
Table 12 China’s FDI share in ASEAN (%)
1995 2000 2005 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
China 0.49 0.19 1.4 8.1 4.7 5.1 5.4 6.8
Japan 20.12 4.03 15.5 10.0 20.8 19.8 12.1 14.5
USA 15.38 22.79 7.7 9.4 9.7 5.7 11.3 10.2
EU 17.98 35.83 27.5 30.4 15.8 19.6 19.2 16.4
Sources: Figures for 1995 and 2000 come from ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secre-
tariat, 2004), 146; figures for 2005 from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2012); figures 
for 2011, 2012, and 2013 from ASEAN Statistics table 27, “Top ten sources of foreign direct investment inflows in 
ASEAN,” www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2015/January/foreign_direct_investment_statistic/Table%20
27.pdf, accessed February 10, 2015; and figures for 2013–15 from ASEAN Statistics, http://asean.org/storage/2015/09/
Table-272.pdf, accessed October 10, 2016.
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international tourist arrivals in Southeast Asia (ASEAN tourist industry). Since 
2007, the percentage of Chinese tourists in Southeast Asia has increased signifi-
cantly and continues to grow, whereas the percentages of Japanese and American 
tourists in the region have been in decline. This trend, which is expected to con-
tinue for years to come, illustrates another way that China is exerting dominance 
in the region.
Developing an Agenda for Geo-Economic Development. In 1989, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum began. The United States at first domi-
nated this forum. But between 2000 and 2008, because of President Bush’s in-
volvement in antiterrorism diplomacy, American leadership was often absent 
from APEC meetings. Not until July 2009, at the annual ASEAN Regional Forum, 
when former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton announced implementation 
of the “Returning to Asia Policy,” did the United States resume taking interest in 
Asia-Pacific affairs. Since then, high-level officials from the United States have 
reiterated this policy at various international events. In January 2012, US presi-
dent Barack Obama announced that by 2020 the United States would be recon-
sidering its global military strategy by deploying 60 percent of its military in the 
Asia-Pacific.21
During the Bush administration, when American presence in Asia was in 
decline, China was expanding its economic relations and political influence 
in Southeast Asia. In November 2000, at the Fourth ASEAN-China Sum-
mit, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji proposed a free trade area with ASEAN. In 
November 2001, it was officially announced, and on November 4, 2002, it was 
enacted at the Sixth ASEAN-China Summit. In 2010, ASEAN laid the founda-
tion for its senior members to participate in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), and in 2015 newer members gained membership.22 Although AFTA is 
Table 13 Percent share in visitor arrivals to ASEAN countries, by country of origin
1995 2000 2005 2007 2011 2012 2013 2014
China 2.8 5.9 5.9 6.3 9.0 10.4 12.4 12.4
Japan 11.1 9.9 5.9 5.9 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.8
USA 4.9 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.1
EU 14.5 13.6 11.3 12.5 12.1 9.1 8.5 8.8
Sources: Figures for 1995 and 2000 are from ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2004 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 
2004), 228–29; figures for 2005 and 2007 from ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2012 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 
2012), 168; figures for 2011 and 2012 from ASEAN Statistics, table 30, “Top Ten Country/Regional Sources of Visitors to 
ASEAN,” www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/resources/2014/Jan/StatisticUpdate28Jan/Tourism%20Update/
Table%2030.pdf, accessed February 10, 2015; and figures for 2012 to 2014 from ASEAN Statistics, www.asean.org/
storage/2015/11/tourism/Table_30.pdf, accessed October 10, 2016.
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essentially an economically oriented agreement, political influence in the re-
gion came with it. The geo-economic platform allowed China to build a closer 
relationship with ASEAN countries.
In November 2012, Xi Jinping became the secretary general of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), and in March 2013 he became the PRC’s president.23 As 
president he continued China’s expansion policy in neighboring Southeast Asia. 
In September 2013, during his visit to Kazakhstan, he proposed the New Silk Road 
Economic Belt, the land-based component of his “One Belt, One Road” develop-
ment strategy to link China through central and western Asia to Europe. In Oc-
tober 2013, in a speech at the Indonesian parliament, he proposed the maritime 
component of this strategy, the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road, and 
declared his intention to draw on the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund 
in order to accomplish China’s grand development plan.
Xi reiterated this aggressive geo-economic strategy in November 2014 at the 
APEC Summit and then again in 2015 at the BFA. According to him, China would 
be investing US$50 billion into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
and US$40 billion into the Silk Road Fund—signaling Xi’s intentions of making 
rising China the “center of a new Asian order.”24 Despite resistance from the Unit-
ed States, the AIIB got a resounding positive response from Southeast Asian coun-
tries and major European countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, and Italy.25 On April 15, 2015, China announced that fifty-seven countries 
were founding members of the AIIB.
Around the same time, Chinese premier Li Keqiang was also expanding China’s 
financial diplomacy in Southeast Asia. In November 2014, when Li visited Myan-
mar for the Twenty-Fifth ASEAN Summit, the announced that China would pro-
vide ten ASEAN members US$20 billion in soft loans for infrastructure projects.26 
In December 2014, Li attended the fifth summit of the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS) in Bangkok, where he pledged another huge amount, US$11.5 billion, to 
the five GMS neighboring countries,27 including US$1 billion in funding for inter-
connected infrastructure, US$490 million in aid to alleviate poverty, and US$10 
billion in special loans.28 Li also announced that China would help Thailand build 
its first eight-hundred-kilometer standard-gauge railway line, which would cost 
an estimated US$10.6 billion.29 In addition to rail cooperation, the Chinese pre-
mier pledged to help prevent flooding in the area by investing US$16.4 million to 
dredge waterways along the Mekong River.30
In addition to the “One Belt, One Road” geo-economic strategy and increasing 
financial assistance to Southeast Asian countries, there are reports that China is 
proposing to undertake the ambitious strategy of building a megatransportation 
system that will link up China and Southeast Asia.31 This will help the Southeast 
Asian countries improve their local infrastructures and economies and will also 
expand China’s economic and political influence in the region.
260    Chapter Fourteen
Challenges for China’s Expansion Strategy in Southeast Asia
Yet even as China is aggressively increasing its expansion strategy in Southeast 
Asia, it is facing four major challenges.
Southeast Asian Perceptions of a Chinese Threat. China’s expansionist policy to 
Southeast Asia has won friends throughout the region, but the rising hegemonic 
power does not seem to be winning great respect from its southern neighbors. 
This is mainly because of the escalation of China’s territorial disputes with South-
east Asian countries in the South China Sea. Unlike the United States, which is 
generally considered to be a stabilizing power in Southeast Asia, China is often 
regarded as a threat to the countries throughout the region. This is the first chal-
lenge that China must face.
Despite the DOC and the COC that were signed between China and ASEAN, 
conflict continues with Vietnam and the Philippines over the sovereignty of dis-
puted islands and reefs in the South China Seas. On May 2, 2014, China uni-
laterally placed a HD-981 oil rig in Block 143 of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone. China then protected itself by moving in almost eighty ships, including 
People’s Liberation Army navy warships. The situation worsened when Vietnam 
dispatched its Coast Guard to defend its territorial jurisdiction and the Chinese 
commander ordered its ships to use water cannons to deliberately damage the 
Vietnamese vessels. In this case Chinese aggression also caused several injuries to 
the Vietnamese crew.
China and Vietnam held a series of meetings after the incident. However, in 
June 2014, during a press conference, Chinese foreign minister spokesman Hong 
Lei maintained China’s firm position that they had deployed the oil rig within 
China’s traditional territory. ASEAN foreign ministers also issued public state-
ments expressing serious concerns over China’s actions in the South China Seas 
and urged all parties to abide by international laws and regulations, including the 
DOC, the COC, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Al-
though the statement did not mention China by name, it implicitly expressed sup-
port for Vietnam.32 Japan and the United States extended their support to Vietnam 
by characterizing China’s actions as provocative.
The Vietnamese initiated a nationwide anti-China movement, protesting 
against the Chinese “invasion” of Vietnam’s territorial waters. In southern Viet-
nam, violent protesters even took over a number of foreign factories and shops 
and destroyed their doors, windows, and internal equipment.33 Unfortunately, 
the majority of businesses damaged were Taiwanese-owned factories and shops, 
because protesters mistakenly regarded them as Chinese owned. One Taiwanese 
manager working in Vietnam said in an interview that the Vietnamese protests 
were actually aimed at Chinese staff working in Taiwanese-owned factories, mak-
ing the Taiwanese and their properties scapegoats in the incidents.34 Vietnam had 
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held anti-China campaigns earlier in 2012 and again in 2013 over a similar sover-
eignty dispute in the South China Seas. But the May 2014 protest was the largest 
to ever be held in typically Buddhist Vietnam and coincided with the escalation of 
tremendous anti-Chinese sentiment.
China has threatened not only Vietnam but also the Philippines. During their 
annual security talks in 2015, the Philippines’ foreign undersecretary Evan Garcia 
and top US diplomat for East Asia Daniel Russel made a joint statement in a press 
conference that China’s land reclamation in the disputed South China Seas was 
“massive” and “a clear violation” of the 2002 accord. They did however support the 
freedom to navigate seas that were not under any country’s jurisdiction.35 In early 
July 2016, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague made the ruling 
in favor of the Philippines and against China’s South China Seas claims, Filipino 
activists held a protest rally in front of the Chinese Consulate in Manila, calling 
for a “Chexit” and demanding that China pull out of Philippine territorial waters.36
In July 2016, the Philippines’ position changed when President Rodrigo Duterte 
came to power. In late September 2016 in Hanoi he stated that he wanted to sus-
pend ongoing joint military maneuvers with the United States, the Philippines’ 
long-standing ally, in the disputed South China Seas. From his inauguration on, 
he took an aggressive attitude toward then president Barak Obama and US poli-
cies in Asia.37 In September 2016, as a result of these aggressions, Obama, while 
attending the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, canceled meetings with Duterte.38 
This move may change the political relationship between the Philippines and the 
United States and between the Philippines and China. In any case, many South-
east Asian countries seem to be very concerned about the revival of an aggressive 
Chinese Empire.
Confrontation with Major Powers in the Region. China’s second challenge is to 
confront the increasing involvement of other major powers in Southeast Asia, such 
as Japan and the United States. Japan has also recently been engaging in territo-
rial disputes with China over the Diaoyu Islands (in Chinese) or Senkaku Islands 
(in Japanese) in the East China Seas. In December 2012, when Japanese prime 
minister Shinzo Abe took office, he began a counter-China policy, which quickly 
escalated tensions between Japan and China. Over the last three years, Mr. Abe has 
visited most Southeast Asian countries and promised more assistance to the coun-
tries in the region. After the prime minister’s successful visit to the United States 
in late April 2015, Japan also strengthened its military ties with the United States.39 
In early February 2015, Japan’s defense minister, General Nakatani, also stated that 
Japan was “deepening its cooperation with the US” and that the situation in the 
South China Seas had had an impact on their national security.40 General Na-
katani also indicated that Japan was committed to enhancing Vietnam’s and the 
Philippines’ surveillance capabilities.
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Since July 2009, the United States has taken an even stronger position in South-
east Asia, particularly since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the Asia 
rebalancing policy. In July 2010, at the Forty-Third ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting, Secretary Clinton stressed that the United States would stay in Asia be-
cause of its “national interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace 
and stability, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. . . . The US 
shares these interests not only with ASEAN members but with other maritime na-
tions and the broader international community.”41
In November 2011, during his participation in the Sixth East Asia Summit 
(EAS), together with most Southeast Asian leaders, US president Barack Obama 
directly confronted Chinese premier Wen Jiabao over China’s recent expansion 
in the South China Seas. Barack Obama was the first US president to attend the 
EAS.42 In January 2012, President Obama further announced that by 2020 the 
United States would be deploying 60 percent of its military to the Asia-Pacific 
area, a measure that was directly aimed at increased Chinese aggression in the 
region. In April 2014, on his Asian trip, in a discussion of the Philippines’ issues 
involving the resource-rich Spratly Islands, President Obama said, “Our commit-
ment to defend the Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep its com-
mitment, because allies never stand alone. . . . International law must be upheld. 
Freedom of navigation must be preserved. . . . Disputes must be resolved peace-
fully and not by intimidation or by force.”43 In early April 2015, President Obama 
also declared that “where we get concerned with China is when it is not necessarily 
abiding by international norms and rules and is using its sheer size and muscle to 
force countries into subordinate positions.”44
Members of the US congress also expressed a strong opposition toward China’s 
recent land reclamation and expansion in the Spratly Islands. In mid-March 2015, 
four leading US senators (John McCain, Bob Corker, Jack Reed, and Bob Menen-
dez) wrote letters to US secretary of state John Kerry and US secretary of defense 
Ash Carter, indicating that China’s recent actions in the South China Sea were 
“a direct challenge, not only to the interests of the United States and the region, 
but to the entire international community.”45 They also claimed that the United 
States should take “specific actions” to slow down or stop China’s land reclamation 
activities.46
Given the recent stance of Japan and the United States, speculation has risen 
that the partners are developing a containment policy toward China, thus escalat-
ing the possibility of a confrontation between China and major powers in South-
east Asia. This is a true challenge that China has to seriously face.
The Widening Economic Gap between China and Southeast Asia. Since the be-
ginning of the century, China has improved its economic relations with Southeast 
Asian countries. It has also exhibited a more accelerated economic development 
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than its southern neighbors. This has widened the economic gap between China 
and most countries in Southeast Asia. In 2000, as exhibited in table 14, China’s 
GDP per capita was US$949, only slightly higher than that of the four least devel-
oped countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. But 
as China’s economy has continued to grow, its GDP per capita has risen. In 2015, 
China’s GDP per capita reached US$7,925, falling behind only that of the three 
most modern nations in Southeast Asia, Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia. Given 
China’s huge population of 1.3 billion, it is clear that China’s economic strength and 
potential far exceeds that of the entire Southeast Asian region, whose population 
totals only six hundred million people. As the table shows, in 2013, compared with 
all the other Southeast Asian countries, China enjoyed the second-highest eco-
nomic growth rate. Its economy is projected to increase in the near future as the 
economic gap between China and Southeast Asia continues to widen.
Table 14 also shows that while China widens its gap with the economically 
weaker countries, it is narrowing its gap with Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore, 
which are still ahead of the hegemonic power. In 2015, for example, China’s GDP 
per capita was US$7,925, only a little less than Malaysia’s (US$9,657). This greatly 
contrasts with China’s GDP in 2000, which was only US$949, whereas Malaysia’s 
was US$3,844 that same year. Thailand’s GDP per capita in 1996 was US$3,134, 
much higher than China’s US$703 in that same year. However, in 2011, for the first 
time, China’s GDP per capita (US$5,447) exceeded Thailand’s (US$5,116). Since 
then, the GDP per capita gap between the two countries has continued to widen. 
In 2015, China’s GDP per capita was US$7,925, compared with Thailand’s US$5,737 
for the same year. Given China’s massive economy and growth rate, compared 
with that of its neighbors in the South, a feeling of unfairness has been growing in 
the region.
Rising Tensions between New Chinese Immigrants and Local People. Finally, 
tensions between new Chinese immigrants and native people in Southeast Asian 
countries have increasingly become a challenge that the Chinese must face. At 
the turn of the century, when China began expanding its trade and investment 
into Southeast Asia, Chinese immigrants began moving into most of the coun-
tries, bringing with them Chinese products, shops, restaurants, hotels, and casi-
nos. Some of these Chinese investments have been very controversial, considering 
the massive environmental problems that construction projects such as dams and 
highways have caused. These investments have also caused local people to lose 
their land and jobs.
China’s recent increasing investments in Laos exemplify this. One Laotian 
businessman from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic stated he was afraid 
his people were gradually losing their autonomy, since they were gradually los-
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Kong media outlet described China’s recent economic expansion in Laos and sub-
sequent tensions between Chinese immigrants and the Laotian people as “reckless 
nationalism.”48
Different lifestyles and cultures have also caused clashes between new Chinese 
immigrants and local people. For example, since the turn of the century, roughly 
one million Chinese have relocated in Singapore, making it the country that has 
taken on the largest number of Chinese immigrants. However, there is a great gap 
between them and local Singaporeans, mainly because of their ignorance regarding 
the local culture and the strict Singaporean legal system. In the May 2011 general 
election, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) suffered a loss in one of its group’s 
representative constituencies.49 This was mainly because many Singaporeans were 
not satisfied with the perennial PAP government’s immigration policy. When asked 
about the new Chinese immigrants, one local Singaporean said, “Singaporeans look 
down on mainlanders as country bumpkins and they look down on us because we 
don’t speak proper Chinese.”50
Two decades of firsthand field study data collection in all of the Southeast Asian 
countries except East Timor clearly show rising tensions between new Chinese 
immigrants and locals in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Phil-
ippines. Recently anti-immigration sentiment has been increasing in Thailand as 
well. However, currently this seems to be aimed more at cheap migrant labor from 
neighboring Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia than at the Chinese.51
TAIWAN’S SURVIVAL STR ATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
MAINTAINING TAIWAN’S POLITICAL EC ONOMY IN 
THE REGION
Taiwan’s Political Survival: Sustaining Substantial Relations with 
Southeast Asia
In contrast to China, with its aggressive Southeast Asian expansion strategy, the 
comparatively smaller and diplomatically weaker Taiwan has had to develop a 
survival strategy in order to maintain its political economy in the region and to 
develop partnerships with its Southeast Asian neighbors. In the political arena, 
Taiwan’s goal is to sustain the substantial relationships that it already maintains 
with major countries in Southeast Asia. This entails (1) rejecting an antagonistic 
“scorched-earth diplomacy” such as that practiced by former president Chiu Shui-
bian, and adopting the “diplomatic truce” approach developed by President Ma 
Ying-jeou, and (2) increasing Taiwan’s political interactions with major countries 
throughout Southeast Asia.
Transforming “Scorched-Earth Diplomacy” into a “Diplomatic Truce”. Since the 
turn of the century, Taiwan has experienced several transfers of political power. 
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The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected for two terms from 2000 to 
2008, and the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT) was elected 
to serve for the next two terms, from 2008 to 2016. DPP president Chen Shui-bian 
and KMT president Ma Ying-jeou took very different approaches to dealing with 
China. The DPP administration took a more antagonistic political approach that 
negatively affected Taiwan’s relations throughout Southeast Asia.
During his presidency, President Chen initiated his “scorched-earth diploma-
cy,” a zero-sum game in which Taiwan went to great lengths to induce China’s 
diplomatic partners to defect in the hopes of increasing Taiwan’s number of diplo-
matic partners at China’s expense. This strategy was developed with the intention 
of gaining more political-economic ground for Taiwan. Some scholars, such as Ya-
suhiro Matsuda, contend that Chen’s diplomacy was mainly instigated by a change 
in DPP internal politics, while others such as Elizabeth Larus argue that Taiwan was 
using a soft-power approach to win more international recognition.52 In any event 
it backfired, causing contention and deterioration in cross-Straits and Southeast 
Asian relations—and irritating the US government to the point that when Chen 
was on a May 2006 diplomatic visit to Latin America, it refused to allow his air-
craft a refueling stop in San Francisco.53 China already mistrusted President Chen 
because of his promotion of “Taiwanization” policies, which China perceived as 
controversial and as a possible move toward Taiwanese claims of independence, so 
it ramped up its own competitive maneuvers by blocking Taiwan in many interna-
tional arenas and made aggressive diplomatic strides, causing Taiwan to lose nine 
of its diplomatic partnerships and thereby reducing the number of countries with 
which it had official diplomatic relations from thirty to twenty-one.
In 2002, despite his continuing implementation of Taiwan’s “southward policy” 
of cultivating relations with Southeast Asia, Chen’s confrontations with China de-
stabilized Taiwan’s relations with its Southeast Asian allies.54 During the 1990s, 
Taiwan had had frequent exchanges with its Southeast Asian neighbors, with sev-
eral visits from high-level government officials, including former president Lee 
Teng-hui’s visits to three Southeast Asian countries in February 1994. Also from 
1991 to 1996, Indonesia’s former state minister for research and technology, Mr. 
Habibie, visited Taiwan three times. During Chen’s administration, these types of 
exchanges were greatly reduced. In mid-August 2002, when vice-president Annett 
Lu paid an unexpected visit to Indonesia, under duress from China, the Indone-
sian government publicly announced that Taiwan was an integral part of the PRC.
In May 2008, when President Ma Ying-jeou took office, he initiated a diplo-
matic truce with China. This improved relations not only across the Taiwan Straits 
but also with one of Taiwan’s longest political and economic allies, the United 
States. His rationale was that given China’s rising influence around the world, it 
was better to show goodwill toward the mainland, since this would result in a 
more stable and peaceful environment for Taiwan. Ma’s approach greatly reduced 
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Chinese obstruction and allowed Taiwan to operate more freely in international 
arenas. During his administration from 2008 to 2016, Taiwan maintained all but 
one of its diplomatic partnerships and made great strides with its diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia.
On May 20, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen was sworn into office. She immedi-
ately initiated a “new southward policy” aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s overall 
relations in Southeast Asia to an even greater extent than her predecessors had 
done. This may benefit Taiwan’s international relationships, but since the president 
is unwilling to accept the 1992 Consensus, the success of this policy is in a very 
tenuous position. Since her inauguration, relations across the Taiwan Straits have 
deteriorated. Over coming years, China may seriously obstruct Taiwan’s political 
and economic activities in Southeast Asia.
Engaging in More Political Interactions with Southeast Asia. Throughout Pres-
ident Ma’s administration, cross-Strait relations were more peaceful, so Taiwan 
was able to engage in more political interactions with countries of Southeast Asia. 
Taiwan received visits from high-level government officials from Southeast Asia’s 
most significant countries and engaged in high-level bilateral talks and meetings. 
However, these were usually not publicized in the media.
In 2010, for instance, Taiwan and Singapore entered talks on a bilateral eco-
nomic partnership agreement. On November 7, 2013, both parties signed the 
Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP).55 Then on March 
25, 2015, after receiving notice of the death of Singapore’s former prime minister 
Lee Kuan Yew, under a status of special circumstances, President Ma Ying-jeou 
made a private trip to pay his last respects to the Singaporean leader and found-
ing father of the city-state. In early November 2015, Singapore hosted a historical 
meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and his Chinese counterpart, President 
Xi Jinping. However, it did not result in any agreements being signed between the 
two leaders.56 Singapore has been the only country so far to win the trust of both 
of these hostile governments, which indeed exemplifies the special relationship 
they have.
Vietnam has been the Southeast Asian country that has received the largest 
investment from Taiwan. After President Ma came to office, Taiwan’s relation-
ship with Vietnam also greatly improved. In January 2009, Taiwan and Vietnam 
signed the Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement. In September 
2011, Minister of Finance Lee Sush-der visited Vietnam and witnessed the signing 
of Taiwan and Vietnam’s Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Coopera-
tion; and in May 2012, Taiwan and Vietnam signed the Memorandum of Under-
standing on Tourism Cooperation.57 In November 2012 the first Taiwan-Vietnam 
Conference on Tourism Cooperation was held in Taipei. According to Vietnam’s 
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statistics, 409,385 Taiwanese visited Vietnam in 2013, an increase of 13.39 percent 
from 2012, making Taiwan Vietnam’s fifth-largest source of international tourists. 
In 2013, more than ninety thousand Vietnamese visited Taiwan, a 40 percent in-
crease from 2012.58 In 2014, Taiwan held approximately 150,000 Vietnamese mi-
grant workers, ninety thousand Vietnamese wives, and five thousand Vietnamese 
students.59 The two countries are expected to continue building close ties in the 
years to come.
Taiwan’s political relationship with Indonesia is also noteworthy. From 2009 to 
2013 there were several high-level exchanges between the two countries, including 
visits from Indonesia’s minister of education and minister of economics in 2010; 
in 2011 the minister of economics returned to Indonesia. In 2013, the minister of 
finance, the minister of the Economic Development Council, and the minister 
of education visited.60 The chair of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council visited 
in 2009 and 2012, and the chair of the Mainland Affairs Council visited in 2009 
and 2013. Over the same years, high-level Indonesian officials who visited Taiwan 
included the minister of fisheries, Fadel Muhammad, in 2010 and 2011; the min-
ister of labor, Muhaimin Iskandar, in 2011; the deputy minister for coordinating 
economic affairs, Rizal Lukman, in 2013; and the deputy minister of agriculture, 
Rusman Heriawan, in 2013. In 2010 Indonesia and Taiwan signed the “One Vil-
lage, One Product, and Agri-Business Cooperation Plan,” and in 2012 they signed 
a memorandum of understanding on cooperation with regard to immigration af-
fairs, human trafficking, and smuggling prevention, along with an agreement on 
agricultural and technical cooperation .
Because of President Ma’s improvement of political relations, most Southeast 
Asian countries granted Taiwanese citizens either visa-free privileges, as in Sin-
gapore and Malaysia, or arrival visas, as in Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, 
Brunei, and Timor Leste.61 In 2011, Malaysia was the last major country in South-
east Asia to grant a visa-free status to Taiwanese citizens. On account of these 
privileges, the Taiwanese now enjoy easier access, not only to trade and invest in 
Southeast Asia, but also to engage in more social and cultural interactions across 
the region.
Since May 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen hopes to promote a much stronger 
relationship between Taiwan and its Southeast Asian allies. Taiwan expects to en-
gage in more political interactions with its southern neighbors, despite possible 
obstruction from China.
Taiwan’s Economic Survival: Strengthening Taiwan’s Economic Links 
with Southeast Asia
By the 1990s, Taiwan had already established a sound economic foundation in 
Southeast Asia. If Taiwan’s was to continue its economic success in the region was 
to continue, it would need to develop stronger economic links with its southern 
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neighbors and continue signing economically oriented agreements and memo-
randums. In September 2011 Taiwan and Vietnam signed an agreement on cus-
toms administrative cooperation, and in October 2014 Taiwan and the Philippines 
signed a memorandum of understanding on the promotion of trade and invest-
ment. With the signing of these official documents, politically isolated Taiwan 
could possibly do three things to strengthen its economic relations in Southeast 
Asia: (1) strengthen Taiwan’s economic relations with Southeast Asian countries; 
(2) build a platform for regional economic interactions; (3) continue attempts at 
joining regional economic blocs.
Strengthening Taiwan’s Economic Relations in Southeast Asia. As indicated ear-
lier, foreign investment and the volume of foreign trade are two important indica-
tors of a country’s economic strength and relationships with other countries. The 
more foreign trade and investment one country engages in with another country, 
the closer the economic relations of the two countries.
Prior to 1980, Taiwan did not engage much in trade and investment in Southeast 
Asia because of its comparatively low level of economic development. However, 
from the mid-1980s on, Taiwan began strengthening its economic relations with 
Southeast Asia, partly because of the appreciation of Taiwan’s currency against the 
American dollar and partly because of Taiwan’s rapid economic development that 
began in the early 1980s.62
In 1990 Taiwan’s trade with Southeast Asia’s ten ASEAN countries totaled only 
US$11.02 billion, but in 1995 this increased to US$25.54 billion, and in 2000 it in-
creased to US$38.71 billion.63 With the implementation of its southward policy, 
Taiwan has continued to augment its trade throughout Southeast Asia. In 2005, its 
total trade volume was US$48.53 billion. In 2010 it increased to US$70.84 billion 
and in 2014 to US$93.64 billion. However in 2015, there was a noticeable decline 
to US$79.3 billion (table 15). Taiwan’s trade share with Southeast Asia greatly ex-
panded in from 9 percent in 1990 to 13.4 percent in 2000 and 15.6 percent in 2015 
(table 15). Another significant point is that since 2010 Southeast Asia is Taiwan’s 
second-largest trading partner, exceeded only by China.
In September 2014, at the opening ceremony of the 2014 Asian MICE (Meet-
ings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events) Forum, W. S. Chiang (Taiwan’s deputy 
director of the Bureau of International Trade) pointed out that Southeast Asia was 
gradually becoming a great exhibition platform for global enterprises and manu-
facturing industries and that the Taiwanese government would continue to make 
efforts to develop the economy in this part of the world.64 This statement exempli-
fies how Taiwan has been sustaining efforts to strengthen its economic relations 
with countries throughout Southeast Asia.
The concentration of Taiwan’s foreign investment also shows how the island 
is strengthening economic relations with Southeast Asia. Since the early 1990s, 
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Taiwan has gone from not having much foreign investment in Southeast Asia to 
greatly expanding investment throughout the region.65 In 1994, Taiwan’s invest-
ment in Southeast Asia peaked to US$5.1 billion, but after 1998 and the Asian 
financial crisis it went into decline. The 1990s were actually Taiwan’s golden age 
of investment in Southeast Asia, and at that time Taiwan was one of the leading 
foreign investors in the region—especially in Vietnam, where for more than two 
decades Taiwan was been either its largest or its second-largest source of foreign 
investment.
Since the beginning of the century, Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia has 
seen many ups and downs (as exemplified in table 16). It peaked in 2008, when 
Taiwan made a combined regional investment of US$12.4 billion. Three years after 
the global financial meltdown in 2008, Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia went 
into decline, but in 2012 it again expanded to US$5.8 billion. However, from 2013 
to 2015, investment totals fluctuated (table 16). Despite these fluctuations over the 
last two decades, the table demonstrates Taiwan’s continued interest in investing 
in Southeast Asia.
Building a Platform to Connect Taiwan with Southeast Asia. Over the last three 
decades, Taiwan has initiated a series of policies to stimulate economic growth 
and strengthen economic relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Dur-
ing the 1990s, the then ruling KMT government proposed the establishment of 
an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC) to make Taiwan a hub for 
regional economic activities. This proposal, however, was not successful because 
of the democratic transfer of power to the DPP in May 2000, when President 
Chen Shui-bian assumed office. The new government then proposed the “Green 
Silicon Island” as the new plan for Taiwan’s future economic development. Unfor-
tunately, in May 2008, when KMT president Ma Ying-jeou took office, the plan 
was discontinued.
At first President Ma tried to revive the APROC, but in 2012 he proposed the 
Free Economic Pilot Zones (FEPZs). Its main goal was to make Taiwan a free eco-
nomic zone so that it could strengthen economic relations with countries through-
out the Asia-Pacific region. The main FEPZ directives were to implement deregu-
lation, open markets, internationalization, institutional reform, and international 
Table 15 Taiwan’s Southeast Asian trade totals (in US$ billion) and trade share (%), 1988–2015
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
Trade volume 11.02 25.54 38.71 48.53 64.60 70.84 88.07 91.37 93.64 79.3
Share of total trade 9.0 11.8 13.4 12.7 12.9 13.4 15.3 15.8 15.9 15.6
Source: Taiwan’s trade share and totals with Southeast Asia calculated at Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of 
Economics, Republic of China, http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/, accessed October 10, 2016.
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alignment in order to allow the free movement of money, people, and goods. Ma 
claimed that FEPZs would align Taiwan’s open market with other regional econo-
mies, provide tax incentives for land acquisition, promote cross-border industri-
al cooperation, and build a high-quality environment for business. August 2013 
marked the beginning of the FEPZs’ first stage, which included six of Taiwan’s 
harbors. The second stage required several laws to get passed, but a series of dis-
putes between the KMT and its DPP opposition stopped the proposal from going 
any further.
Now President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration is implementing the new south-
ward policy, making an even stronger attempt to expand Taiwan’s overall relations 
throughout Southeast Asia. Although Taiwan’s internal political disputes occa-
sionally affect the implementation of economic development initiatives, Taiwan 
has no other choice but to go forward.
Continuing Attempts to Join Regional Economic Blocs. Southeast Asian countries 
are represented by the ten members of ASEAN.66 This organization has success-
fully accomplished a number of free trade agreements with major neighboring 
countries, including its 10 Plus 1, 10 Plus 3, and 10 Plus 6, and it continues to ex-
pand its economic cooperation and integration.
Recently, the emergence of two more regional economic blocs has attracted a 
great deal of international attention. These are the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The RCEP 
was introduced in November 2011 at the Nineteenth ASEAN Summit and was 
composed of members from the 10 Plus 667. In November 2012, at the Twenty-First 
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, it was endorsed by all sixteen leaders of its member 
countries. Its goal is to build an open trade and investment environment to boost 
economic growth, enhance economic cooperation, and deepen economic integra-
tion throughout the region. In June 2016, the sixteen participating states complet-
ed its thirteenth round of negotiations over related issues, including stipulations 
regarding goods and services, investment, intellectual property, and dispute settle-
ment. Although talks are behind schedule, progress has been going smoothly and 
a final draft is expected soon.
The TPP is essentially an extension of the Pacific Three Closer Economic Part-
nership (P3 CEP), which includes Chile, Singapore and New Zealand. In 2005 it 
Table 16 Taiwan’s 1990–2015 investment in Southeast Asia (in US$ billion)
1959–89 1990 1994 1997 2000 2004 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
5.1 4.1 5.1 4.8 1.6 1.9 12.4 2.3 5.8 1.3 2.7 2.1
Source: “Wǒguó zài dōng xié gèguó tóuzī tǒngjì biǎo” [China’s investment statistics in the ASEAN countries], http://
twbusiness.nat.gov.tw/old/pdf/inv_3.pdf.
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was renamed the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP, or P4) in 
order to include Brunei. In January 2008, The United States showed an interest in 
talking with the P4 countries, and when President Barack Obama assumed office 
in January 2009 he too reaffirmed America’s commitment to the TPP. Since the 
end of 2014, participating countries have held nineteen formal rounds of nego-
tiations over TPP-related issues, such as cooperation and capacity development, 
cross-border services, e-commerce, financial services, government procurement, 
intellectual property, and elimination of tariffs and other trade and investment 
barriers.
Although Taiwan is part of the Asia-Pacific region, it is politically isolated 
and therefore faces a multitude of challenges in joining these regional economic 
blocs. There are at least four ways a country can participate in ASEAN: as a 
full member, an observer, a candidate member, or a dialogue member. Over 
the past three decades, Taiwan has made great efforts to establish a connection 
with ASEAN.68 However these have been derailed by China’s ongoing political 
and economic obstruction,69 which continues to threaten Taiwan’s economic 
development.
In September 2013 the Taiwan government officially announced its interest in 
joining the RECP and the TPP. On February 17, 2014, at an international confer-
ence in Taipei, President Ma Ying-jeou stated that Taiwan had made it an “unshak-
able goal” to join the RCEP and TPP and would be “simultaneously carrying forth” 
a bid to join the two trade blocs as expeditiously as possible.70 Ma also stated that 
in 2013 Taiwan already had a 34.4 percent total trade share with the twelve nations 
that were participating in TPP trade negotiations and a 56.6 percent trade share 
with the sixteen states negotiating the RCEP.71 On March 29, 2015, at the Boao 
Forum 2015, Taiwan’s vice-president Vincent Siew met with China’s president Xi 
Jinping. The then ROC vice-president expressed Taiwan’s willingness to also join 
the AIIB.72 Two days later, on March 31, Taiwan’s government sent an official ap-
plication to join the AIIB, seeking to become a founding member of the PRC-led 
financial body.73
Although Taiwan has encountered many obstacles to gaining entrance into 
regional economic blocs, it has successfully accomplished free trade–like agree-
ments with China, Singapore, and New Zealand. These include the Cross-Straits 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which became effective 
in August 2010; the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Cooperation (AN-
ZTEC), which went into effect on December 1, 2013; and ASTEP, which became 
effective on March 19, 2014. In March 2013, Taiwan resumed negotiations with the 
United States over a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
One study estimates that about 23 percent to 27 percent of foreign enterpris-
es would increase their investment in Taiwan if the island was able to join these 
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emerging economic groups in East Asia.74 Without a doubt, Taiwan must continue 
striving to joining regional economic groups.
Challenges for Taiwan’s Survival
Political Isolation and an Uncertain Future. As previously evidenced, Taiwan 
has successfully established a substantial, stable relationship with major Southeast 
Asian countries. However, a substantial relationship is not equivalent to a formal 
diplomatic relationship. Although for more than three decades Taiwan has coped 
well with this awkward situation, there is still little possibility that it will change in 
the foreseeable future.
In the past, Taiwan’s international survival was primarily due to US support 
and China’s political and economic weaknesses. However, as China develops an 
increasingly robust political economy, its powerful influence over international 
politics, its strategic relationship with the United States, and a possible US alliance 
with China in international affairs make the continued survival of diplomatically 
isolated Taiwan questionable.
Since July 1987, when the ROC government lifted martial law, there has been 
an ongoing debate over whether Taiwan should unify with China, maintain the 
status quo, or seek independence. For decades, China has maintained that it will 
use military force if necessary to “liberate” Taiwan. In 1992, only 17.6 percent of the 
population identified exclusively as Taiwanese. However, this percentage has been 
steadily on the rise, increasing from 36.9 percent in 2000 to 52.7 percent in 2010 
and 60.6 percent in 2014. There was a slight decline in June 2016 to 59.3 percent.75 
The percentage of Taiwan’s population who identify as exclusively Chinese has also 
been in decline from 25.5 percent in 1992 to 3.5 percent in 2014 and 3.0 percent in 
June 2016. The proportion of people who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese 
has also been in decline, from 46.4 percent in 1992 to 32.5 percent in 2014, but with 
a slight increase to 33.6 percent in June 2016.76
According to Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, the percentage of 
Taiwanese in favor of maintaining the status quo but eventually moving toward 
independence has been steadily rising, from 8.0 percent in 1994 to 18.0 percent in 
2014 and to 19 percent in June 2016, whereas the percentage of those in favor of 
maintaining the status quo but moving toward unification has declined from 15.6 
percent in 1994 to 7.9 percent in 2014 and to 8.0 percent in June 2016.77 Therefore, 
despite China’s growing political and economic influence and its diplomatic and 
economic developments, an increase in the numbers of those claiming a Taiwan-
ese identity has psychologically kept the island distant from the mainland.78
China is now Taiwan’s largest economic partner, making up roughly 50 per-
cent of its global trade and 70 percent of its FDI. On the basis of ECFA, which 
Taiwan and China signed in June 2010, it is likely that Taiwan will become increas-
ingly economically dependent on China in the coming years. China intends to 
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use economic means to accomplish its political goal of unification with Taiwan, 
but politically isolated Taiwan continues to focus on achieving economic growth 
without losing its political sovereignty.
Given the changing political economy between Taiwan and China, Taiwan’s 
politicians and citizens face unavoidable serious challenges with regard to Tai-
wan’s future.
Economic Marginalization and Future Development. During the Cold War, Tai-
wan was branded one of the four Asian Dragons because of its great economic 
achievements and its early openness to the world. This chapter has demonstrated 
numerous examples of how the island’s deepening economic relations with South-
east Asia have transcended diplomacy. During a speech at the annual dinner of 
the Asia Society in mid-June 2002, with regard to Taiwan’s dynamic economy and 
vibrant democracy, former US secretary of state Colin Powell stated, “I call Taiwan 
a problem of a success story.” Taiwan’s economic achievements have brought it 
international prestige and have contributed to its democratization.
Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1980s, China and most Southeast 
Asian countries have also begun to open up to the world. These Asian countries 
have been actively engaging in the development of economic regionalization. But 
although Taiwan continues to work toward joining regional economic groups, 
the PRC’s political obstruction keeps it marginalized. Previously, Taiwan’s eco-
nomic achievement was mostly due to the island’s liberalness and openness, 
but now economic marginalization is keeping it from getting fair participation 
in the increasingly free and integrated Asia-Pacific market. Time will tell what 
survival mechanisms Taiwan will use in order to survive despite this economic 
marginalization.
Since the turn of the century, a number of Taiwan’s macroeconomic indicators 
have revealed a decline in its economic development. In 2000, Taiwan’s econom-
ic growth declined from 6.42 percent to 5.62 percent in 2006, to 2.23 percent in 
2013. Since 2011, Taiwan’s economic growth has been less than 5 percent, which is 
particularly striking given that by 2013 most Southeast Asian countries were en-
joying growth rates of above 5 percent. Another concern with regard to Taiwan’s 
declining economic development is that public enterprise contribution to the 
GDP has been below 2 percent since 2004 and government capital contribution 
to the GDP has steadily been in decline from 2000, when it was at 5.44 percent, 
to 4.13 percent in 2008 and 2.86 percent in 2014.79 These figures show that since 
the turn of the century a weakness in Taiwan’s public investment has seriously 
impeded the island’s economic development. This decline has coincided with 
Southeast Asian economic regionalization while Taiwan remains isolated. If 
Taiwan continues to be economically marginalized, sustaining future economic 
development will be a tremendous challenge.
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C ONCLUSION
Taiwan’s economic development has made it an international sensation and has 
certainly been instrumental in improving its diplomatic relations with Southeast 
Asian countries. Although it has enjoyed an improved political economy in the re-
gion, it continues to face serious challenges of diplomatic isolation and economic 
marginalization. This chapter has explored Taiwan’s efforts in developing relations 
with its neighbors to the south. President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration will need to 
continue to expand relations with Southeast Asia. While the new southward policy 
may appear promising, political isolation, economic marginalization, and China’s 
intervention and obstruction are major barriers that Taiwan will have to face in fur-
thering its relations with Southeast Asia. Although Taiwan does not compete against 
China in the international community, it cannot keep China from imposing the one-
China policy that affects Taiwan’s future development politically and economically.
Another noteworthy potential influence on Taiwan’s relations with Southeast 
Asia and its relationship with China is that from the 1950s to the 1980s Asian val-
ues were practiced, promoted, and used to support political authoritarianism. This 
was in stark contrast to Western values, which seem to have become more univer-
sally accepted today. However, China continues to promote a culture and value 
system that advocates Asian values.
Since the late 1980s, many Asian countries have transitioned into democracy. In 
February 1986, when the People’s Power Revolution overthrew former dictator Fer-
dinand Marcos, the Philippines was the first Asian country to adopt a democratic 
political system. In July 1987, after an extensive period of martial law was lifted, 
Taiwan also began to transition into democracy. In February 1988, President Roh 
Tae-woo was democratically elected as the leader of the Republic of Korea, which 
signified great political change. Although Thailand has theoretically been a democ-
racy since 1932, in 1997 it revised its constitution. However, with the riots of May 
1992, Thailand’s democracy is still facing some challenges. Since May 1998 and the 
downfall of former President Suharto, Indonesia has also implemented democracy.
During the past two to three decades, Asia has demonstrated tremendous de-
mocratization. This seems to have become a universal value in the region and in-
cludes the Muslim country of Indonesia, the Catholic state of the Philippines, and 
Buddhist nations such as Taiwan and South Korea. Taiwan may face the difficulty 
of diplomatic isolation, but the island’s democratic transformation has been a role 
model for countries in the region. This is something China and its leaders will also 
have to face in the future.
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China and Taiwan constitute one of the four nations divided by the Cold War.1 
This division was originally intended to be only temporary, but reunification soon 
became impossible as the Cold War polarized in the late 1940s and each “half ” 
became embedded in the front lines of its side. This division has proved especially 
intractable because the international ideological cleavage overlay embittered civil 
wars—in China, the revolutionary civil war. Yet reunification has been incorpo-
rated into the founding visions of national self-realization in China and to some 
extent in Taiwan.
This concluding chapter focuses on why, after the dream was revived along with 
the KMT (Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party) victory in 2008, it now seems to 
be fading. The first part of the chapter outlines the original legitimacy basis for 
reunification as a national goal. The second critically reviews vicissitudes in the 
reunification narrative since 1949. The third attempts to explain the current turn 
away from reunification.
WHY REUNIFICATION?
The appeal of national unification is the quest for collective roots, which are to 
some extent primordial. The Chinese claim to Taiwan is both historical and eth-
nolinguistic. Some mainland historians claim that Taiwan has been part of China 
since the beginning of the Sui dynasty (598–618), though official dynastic histories 
as late as the Ming (1368–1644) make no reference to Taiwan in the section on 
administrative geography (the dilizhi, which comprehensively lists all provinces, 
prefectures, subprefectures, and counties of the Ming state), so we may infer it was 
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then no more than an outlying frontier region. By the thirteenth century, how-
ever, there were a significant number of Chinese settlements on the island, where 
fertile virgin land and mild climate drew economic migrants. The island also at-
tracted early imperialist interests. (In 1622 the Dutch drove out Spanish settlers 
and established a colony.) A rebel named Cheng Chenggong (known in the West 
as Koxinga) established a “pirate” garrison near Tainan in the name of the recently 
defeated Ming, but the Qing dispatched their navy under Admiral Shi Lang to de-
stroy the Zheng fleet in the Battle of Penghu (1683), thereafter annexing the island 
as a prefecture of Fujian Province. In 1887 Taiwan finally became an imperial prov-
ince, only to be annexed by Japan only eight years later, following China’s defeat in 
the Sino-Japanese War. It remained a colony from 1895 to 1945. The Nationalists, 
having brutally reestablished Chinese control in 1945–47, retreated to the island 
upon losing the civil war on the mainland in 1949 with the declared intention of 
reversing that outcome at the first opportunity.
For its part, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fully expected to “liberate” 
the island as soon as they consolidated control of southern China, thereby com-
pleting their revolution and ending “one hundred years of humiliation” (bainian 
guochi) by overthrowing the “unequal treaty” of Shimonoseki that ceded Taiwan 
to Japan. But Chinese intervention on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea in the Korean War in November 1950 precipitated US intervention in 
support of the Nationalists, indefinitely postponing plans to bring the civil war to 
a conclusion. Ethnically, all but some 2 percent of the populace, both natives (ben-
shengren) and migrants from the mainland (waishengren), are Han Chinese, speak 
a local dialect of Mandarin, and observe Chinese ceremonial rituals.
Since the unfinished Second Civil War, the goal of unification has been deeply 
embedded in national identity symbolism on both sides of the Strait. The Chi-
angs both believed to their dying days in “one China,” notoriously declining the 
chance to retain international diplomatic recognition and membership in the 
UN General Assembly as an independent Taiwan if that meant renouncing the 
claim to be part of one China. That claim is written into the constitutions of both 
the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC), and it endures in the flags, coinage, 
postage stamps, and history texts of both sides. Taiwan throughout the Chiang 
dictatorship continued to represent all mainland provinces in the (largely sym-
bolic) National Assembly, just as both the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Congress and the National People’s Congress included (and still include) del-
egates nominally representing Taiwan. Taiwanese, whether native benshengren 
or waishengren, are distinguished from foreigners (waiguoren) on the mainland 
as “compatriots” (tongbao). Despite recent disenchantment with the dream of 
reunification, there is a persisting legacy that insistently, recurrently raises the 
question. Indeed, the spirit of nationalism cannot be evoked on either side with-
out reopening that issue. Ambition for enhanced national power is also relevant: 
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a freely united China would be an even more powerful and prestigious presence 
on the world stage than it already is.
From an international perspective the Taiwan question is a painful diplomatic 
anomaly. During the Cold War it was an unstable point in the structure of global 
bipolarity, as exhibited by refugee flows, inflammatory rhetoric, unilateral threats, 
and red line crossings. And since the Cold War it remains a perennial international 
flash point that could still spark war between two nuclear powers and suck in sur-
rounding states. Thus the international community (such as it is) would in principle 
welcome its orderly, peaceful resolution. Since 172 sovereign states (including the 
United States) have formally acknowledged China’s claim that there is one China 
and that Taiwan is part of China, any objection to such reunification would tech-
nically involve them in self-contradiction. Some American allies (e.g., Australia) 
have even expressed the wish to opt out of their alliance commitments should they 
involve the China-Taiwan dispute. And, as Ping-Kuei Chen, Scott Kastner, and Wil-
liam Reed note above (chapter 12), some analysts urge the United States to aban-
don Taiwan in order to facilitate reunification and improve relations with the more 
strategically relevant PRC. A survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs in 2014 showed that only 26 percent of Americans agree with the idea of 
sending troops to help Taiwan, compared to 47 percent who support South Korea. 
This result has been very consistent over time with other surveys since 1982. While 
no one agrees with China’s threats to use force in the last resort to achieve reunifica-
tion, few are prepared to fight if it does.
The fact that the interest in unification is fundamental on both sides of the Strait 
does not mean that there is agreement on how to get there, who should rule the 
reunified state, or how it should be organized. Nor does it mean that this interest is 
evenly distributed. The pattern has been for the side that is more powerful to have 
the greatest interest in reunification and to be willing to use more forcible means 
to get it, under the premise that it will continue to dominate the unified state. The 
weaker side, drawing on the same premise, in contrast has a propensity to demur 
or procrastinate and to try to prohibit the use of force to achieve unification.
THE PURSUIT OF UNIT Y
If the historical legacy and the international balance of power are so overwhelm-
ingly in favor of reunification, what is holding it back? There have been two Tai-
wanese counterarguments. The first, championed mainly by the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP), is that Taiwan has not been part of China for well over a 
century, that the democratic government of Taiwan fulfills all the requirements of 
statehood, and that its independence should consequently be recognized by a name 
change and a revision of the constitution. The second argument, made mainly by 
the Nationalist Party or KMT, is that the ROC was established and internationally 
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recognized after the Xinhai rebellion in 1911 and that it was never defeated (there 
has been no armistice or peace treaty) but was driven to take refuge in Taiwan, 
where it continues to claim sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. Since the late 
1990s the first argument has proved more electorally persuasive on the island but 
is denounced on the mainland as “splittism.” The second argument, reaffirmed by 
the Ma Ying-jeou regime in 2008, is implicitly accepted by Beijing in the form of 
the “1992 Consensus,” in which each side defines “one China” in its own way.
But this is to get ahead of our story. During the Cold War both “Chinas” ex-
pressed a commitment to reunification, and the means by which this was to be 
achieved were coercive. For the first three decades of Taiwan’s existence, while the 
two respective leaders of the civil war remained at the helm, warlike conditions 
essentially continued: the Nationalists imposed martial law, invoked anticommu-
nism to legitimate their authoritarian rule and the prosecution of political dis-
sent, and promised to “recover the mainland” (huifu dalu), presumably by force, 
supplemented (as in the Bay of Pigs) by a popular anticommunist uprising. Beijing 
precipitated two cross-Strait crises in 1954–55 and 1958 by threatening an invasion 
of the offshore islands still occupied by Taiwan and bombarding the islands with 
deadly artillery, continuing desultory bombardments (mostly propaganda leaflets) 
until January 1979. Yet neither a Chinese invasion of Taiwan nor a Nationalist in-
vasion of the mainland ever took place. The balance of forces was too strong for 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) after formation of the Sino-American security 
alliance in 1954, and the United States refused to “unleash” a Nationalist invasion 
of the mainland during the disastrous aftermath of the Great Leap or during the 
Cultural Revolution. But each side’s plans for reunification were zero-sum, pre-
mised on elimination of the opposing government. The ROC government rep-
resented “China” in the United Nations (including the Security Council) and in 
most foreign embassies, enforcing a “one-China policy” by breaking diplomatic 
relations with any country that recognized the PRC. Since replacing Taiwan in 
the UN in 1971 the PRC has turned the tables, refusing to recognize any state that 
recognizes Taiwan.
The end of the Cold War, which occurred about two decades earlier in Asia 
than in Europe thanks to the Nixon-initiated Sino-American détente, opened 
opportunities for innovative approaches untrammeled by the ideological frame-
works and internal alliance networks that had previously anchored the issue to 
bloc solidarity. Beginning with the advent of “reform and opening” in China and 
the onset of democracy in Taiwan a decade later, both sides explored new ideas 
for breaking the deadlock. Promptly after gaining US diplomatic recognition (and 
derecognition of Taiwan and termination of the Sino-American Alliance), Beijing 
introduced proposals for “three direct links” across the Strait (travel, trade, and 
postal) and the slogan “One country, two systems” to describe a form of reunifica-
tion that would grant a “high degree of autonomy” to Taiwan for a period of fifty 
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years. This was Beijing’s most generous offer to date, for the first time offering 
a reasonably attractive option for peaceful unification. The immediate response 
from Chiang Ching-kuo was “three nos” (“no contact, no compromise, no ne-
gotiation”), but the mainland persisted, and before his death Chiang initiated a 
reciprocal opening to the mainland by permitting retired soldiers to visit their 
home villages on the mainland. The succeeding Lee Teng-hui regime established a 
cabinet-level National Unification Council, which in 1991 issued “National Unifi-
cation Guidelines” that affirmed the ultimate goal of national unification premised 
on prior agreement to preserve Chinese culture and the achievement of political 
democracy, economic liberalization, and social pluralism in the PRC.
These offers were mutually incompatible: the Chinese package educed no reason 
for Taiwan to believe that an otherwise totalitarian government would grant full au-
tonomy to a former enemy, while the Taiwan package imposed demands for trans-
formation of the mainland regime and none for Taiwan. But both offers envisaged 
peaceful reunification and positive-sum postunification governing arrangements 
for the first time, opening the way to further discussion. First Taipei and then Bei-
jing set up quasi-official diplomatic organs, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) respectively, 
and after secret negotiations in Hong Kong (where what became known as the 
1992 Consensus was agreed upon) engaged in a series of meetings in Singapore to 
discuss further steps to facilitate trade, postal, and other exchanges. Although the 
“three direct links” remained off the table, trade, indirect investment, and travel 
grew steadily via Hong Kong.
Meanwhile politics—the intended dependent variable of socioeconom-
ic integration—proceeded erratically, refusing to follow neofunctionalist (or 
Marxist) logic. Both sides hedged, reflecting continuing distrust: Taiwan engaged 
in rapprochement with China but tried to match this with equivalent diplomatic 
steps to the West via “flexible diplomacy” (e.g., dollar diplomacy, vacation di-
plomacy, and other expedients, none having lasting results); Beijing’s hedge was 
to accompany its pledges of peaceful reunification with a refusal to renounce 
the use of force and a continuing military buildup on the Fujian coast. Roughly 
speaking, the period from 1988 to 1995 was one of political “thaw,” followed by 
the 1995–96 missile crisis, which resulted in a “freeze” from 1995 to 2005, fol-
lowed by another, warmer “thaw” from 2005 to 2015. The pattern was initiated by 
the PRC, which placed national reunification at the top of its twentieth-century 
agenda and established a politburo-level Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group in 
1979 to coordinate the effort.
Trade took off dramatically and investment followed, drawing in still more trade; 
some industries were attracted by promised access to the China market, while oth-
ers used China’s cheap labor pool to manufacture for export, exploiting the price 
advantage afforded by China’s cheap currency. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96 
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had a temporary dampening effect (some capital flight and, between July 1995 and 
March 1996, a loss to Taiwan’s stock market of nearly 30 percent of its value), but 
trade continued to thrive, a trend Lee’s government sought to counter with his “go 
south” and “go slow” (jieji yongren) initiatives. But economic headwinds elsewhere 
(the 1997–99 Asian financial crisis, followed in 2000 by the global high-tech reces-
sion) propelled Taiwan capitalists (taishang) back to the mainland. Not even the 
election of former “Taiwan independence” (taidu) firebrand Chen Shui-bian of the 
DPP in 2000 had a noticeable adverse impact on cross-Strait relations. The main-
land of course did not attempt to discourage trade or investment, but it did try to 
extort political concessions by demanding a halt to “splittist” tendencies, most forc-
ibly in 1995–96 but again in 2000 and 2004. There were also some Chinese attempts 
to blackmail prominent proindependence Taiwanese investors like Hsu Wen-long 
into disavowing DPP support. But for the most part China avoided politicizing an 
economic relationship from which it also benefited.
Business thus continued to grow in politically good times and bad. By 2014, 
over 40 percent of Taiwan’s trade was with the mainland, and some 80 percent 
of its foreign direct investment (FDI) went there; Taiwanese businesses operated 
more than one hundred thousand enterprises on the mainland. The trade bal-
ance has consistently been in Taiwan’s favor. The upshot after a decade of anti-
China Taiwanese political leadership was a widening gulf between economic and 
political trajectories. The DPP, deprived of official contacts with the mainland, 
proceeded to “de-Sinify” official political culture and build Taiwanese nationalism 
by invoking Chinese threats and utilizing “soft power”—reorienting educational 
curricula, renaming holidays, constructing museums and monuments—and the 
percentage of Taiwanese who favored reunification either immediately or eventu-
ally reached a historical nadir of around 10 percent in 2012. But meanwhile, Beijing 
demonstrated the power to choke the island’s economic and diplomatic lifelines 
and deter other countries from offering military support. Economic interdepen-
dence continued to grow despite official DPP disfavor.
Beijing learned from its experience. After the narrow reelection of Chen in 
March 2004, Beijing revised its blanket no-contact policy by mixing “harder sticks 
and sweeter carrots.” In his May 17, 2004, statement, Hu Jintao made overtures to 
Taipei on resuming negotiations for the “three links,” reducing misunderstand-
ings, and increasing consultation. In March 2005, the Anti- Secession Law (ASL) 
was unanimously passed by the National People’s Congress, authorizing “non-
peaceful means” in response to a declaration of formal independence in Taiwan. 
Yet the ASL prohibited “secession” rather than demanding reunification and set 
no deadline for talks. It also for the first time authoritatively committed Beijing to 
negotiations on the basis of equal status between the two sides and revised its de-
mand for “one China” as a precondition for talks (quietly disclosing that the 1992 
Consensus would be an acceptable interpretation of “one China”). The Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP) also initiated contacts on a party-to-party basis with the 
opposition, welcoming “pan-Blue” (KMT and People First Party) leaders to the 
mainland in 2005 and convoking the CCP-KMT Forum, an obvious revival of 
the United Front, which had historically worked to facilitate cooperation despite 
ideological contradictions. And when Chen Shui-bian resumed his drive for in-
dependence by “freezing” the National Unification Council and National Unifica-
tion Guidelines in early 2006, Beijing expressed opposition but avoided threats of 
force, inducing the United States to rebuke Chen for violating the “five nos” that 
he had promised after his election in 2000 and again in 2004 (no declaration of 
independence; no change in the ROC’s name; no “state-to-state description in the 
constitution”; no referendum to change the status quo; no abolition of the National 
Unification Council or the Guidelines for National Unification). By thus lower-
ing the temperature of cross-Strait relations and depriving the DPP of a mainland 
threat to inveigh against, Beijing contributed to the KMT’s landslide victory in 
both legislative and presidential elections in 2008.
Ma Ying-jeou’s response to Beijing’s new Taiwan policy was diplomatically 
positive but domestically more low-key, cognizant of the drift since the early 1990s 
of domestic public opinion away from reunification. Ma sought to halt the iden-
tity battle and shift popular attention to the government’s economic performance. 
His strategy was to skirt “future nation preference” issues, court the middle-of-
the-road voter who cared less about the name of the country than concrete per-
formance, and count on the pan-Blues as captive voters. Thus Ma attempted to 
redefine Taiwan’s politics by shifting its main cleavage from national identity to the 
economy. The corruption case against Chen Shui-bian was a late-breaking windfall 
for the KMT that underscored its accusations of DPP managerial incompetence.
After the KMT’s 2008 landslide victory in both legislative and executive elec-
tions, the new Ma administration lost no time pursuing reconciliation with the 
mainland along the lines already anticipated in the 2005 pan-Blue visits to the 
mainland, justifying this departure from his campaign rhetoric by arguing that 
improved cross-Strait relations would dramatically improve the island’s economy. 
In his inaugural speech, Ma issued “three nos”—no unification, no independence, 
no war (butong, budu, buwu)—to reassure the electorate, maintaining a discreet 
silence about the ultimate destination of cross-Strait rapprochement beyond a 
peaceful and prosperous working relationship. He would move from the easy to 
the hard, from economic issues to political issues, anticipating a future (repeat-
edly postponed) discussion of a cross-Strait peace treaty. The cap was lifted on 
Taiwanese trade and investment with the mainland, and Chinese investment on 
Taiwan was for the first time permitted. The SEF-ARATS negotiating forum was 
reconvened, alternating visits between Beijing and Taipei, and by December 15, 
2008, the two sides had formally institutionalized “three direct links,” facilitating 
Chinese tourist visits of nearly two million people in the first two years. The SEF 
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and ARATS were reconvened and held many sessions, resulting in some twenty-
three cross-Strait agreements, culminating in the summer of 2010 in an Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which reduced bilateral trade barri-
ers and cleared the way for Taiwan to negotiate preferential trade agreements with 
various Southeast Asian countries.
After winning a second term in 2012 by a comfortable if less impressive mar-
gin, the Ma administration launched a “re-Sinification” campaign to revive do-
mestic support for the ROC and associated Nationalist symbolism, as Jean-Pierre 
Cabestan describes in chapter 3. Foreign policy continued to prioritize cross-Strait 
relations: Ma negotiated the next stage of economic integration, the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (CSTA), while distancing himself from earlier discus-
sion of a peace treaty or political talks. The CSTA was waylaid by procedural oppo-
sition and apparent intraparty factional opposition to Ma in Taiwan’s legislature, 
and was finally in effect blocked by the student-led Sunflower Movement, which 
occupied the legislature in March 2014. Political talks, Ma stipulated, would be 
contingent on Chinese confidence-building steps, which were not forthcoming. 
By the end of 2014, the PLA had over 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles targeting 
Taiwan, ten times more than in 2000, more accurate and destructive than those 
launched in the Strait crisis. Ma repeatedly called on the PRC to dismantle this 
arsenal, most recently at the December 2015 Singapore summit, to no avail. Mean-
while Taiwan’s own arms spending lagged, and Ma’s election promise to boost it 
to 3 percent of GDP remained unfulfilled—defense expenditures have continued 
to decline as a percentage of Taiwan’s budget. The United States remained the only 
actor with a strategic commitment to defend Taiwan, but that commitment was 
made more “ambiguous” by China’s weapons acquisition program, which focused 
on advanced A2AD (Anti-Access Area Denial) weapons designed to deter US 
forces from approaching the Strait. Beijing also objected to other countries’ sales to 
Taiwan of weapons designed to redress the defense gap as interference in China’s 
internal affairs. And US arms sales to Taiwan have declined over time. Meanwhile, 
though Ma had attempted to change the subject domestically from cross-Strait 
relations to economic growth, the underlying assumption that the former was sure 
to spur the latter proved overoptimistic. After a spectacular growth spurt in 2010, 
Taiwan’s economy stagnated.
In the presidential and legislative elections in 2016, the KMT suffered a com-
prehensive defeat. President Tsai Ing-wen took 56 percent of the vote, and her DPP 
won 68 of 113 seats in the legislature, its first-ever majority. The CSTA and the sub-
sequent Trade in Goods Agreement languished, with only a faint chance of passing 
in the now DPP-controlled legislature. While President Tsai Ing-wen has promised 
to preserve mutually beneficial relations with the mainland, she has refused to 
endorse the 1992 Consensus that Beijing stipulates as prerequisite to talks. Beijing 
is deeply suspicious of Tsai as the rumored author of the “two states” formula that 
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Lee Teng-hui articulated in 1999 (the framing of PRC-ROC relations as “state-to-
state relations”) and as chair of the Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC) at the 
time of Chen’s 2001 formulation of “one country on each side” (of the Strait; that 
is, the idea that Taiwan and mainland China are two different countries rather 
than two political entities within the larger nation of China). Since Tsai’s May 2016 
inauguration diplomatic contacts have been cut and tourist trade has declined 
drastically. But the Chinese leadership has refrained from threats of violence, and 
economic integration continues without political interference.
HEADWAY AND BLOWBACK
Beijing has always preferred reunification on its terms, of course, either by con-
tinuing a civil war to military victory (before Korea) or by making a deal with 
Taiwan’s presumably homesick mainland-exiled KMT elite. When those pros-
pects disappeared with the passing of Taiwan’s first-generation leadership, Beijing 
constructed a path-dependent strategy to assimilate the island peaceably. Taiwan 
would gradually be enveloped in a web of socioeconomic ties; meanwhile Beijing 
would cut off its lifelines to the rest of the world by preconditioning all diplomatic 
relations on denial of the island’s legal existence except as part of “China.” Trade 
relations are less amenable to political control than diplomatic, but by entering the 
expanding regulatory tangle, or “noodle bowl,” of Asian free trade agreements and 
making its own trade contingent on denial of Taiwan’s membership China could 
place Taiwan at an economic disadvantage as well. The three essential components 
of the strategy were (1) contingent use of force, (2) socioeconomic convergence, 
and (3) asymmetry in political power. Why has this strategy failed?
First of all, the division between China and Taiwan was born in war, and force 
has remained an inescapable contingency for resolving the impasse. For many 
years the mainland threatened “armed liberation” (wuli jiefang) of the island, 
and it has never renounced the option of force, while the Nationalist regime has 
launched U-2 surveillance flights and occasional raids in pursuit of its dream to 
“recover the mainland.” In the early 1990s Taiwan renounced the use of force to 
recover the mainland with a statement that it did not actively challenge Chinese 
sovereignty over the mainland but only over Taiwan and adjoining offshore is-
lands. The mainland never reciprocated this acknowledgment, insisting on sov-
ereignty over Taiwan under a one-China principle (that there is only one China, 
that only the PRC represents China, and that Taiwan is a part of that China) and 
on the “right” to use force (including nuclear weapons) to uphold it, ironically 
even persuading Taipei to rescind its own disclaimer of mainland sovereignty in 
2008 to accord with China’s “one-China principle.” Beijing has focused its con-
tingency planning with regard to force on a swift and decapitating fait accompli 
precluding escalation or outside intervention.2 To achieve this would require both 
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amphibious superiority to win a local offensive war and sufficient regional naval 
and air capability to deter great-power intervention. China believes it has pro-
gressed with the former, making US intervention much more costly than in 1996, 
and with the acquisition of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 
MIRV (multiple independently retargeted vehicle) capability and with submarine-
launched missiles (SLBMs), China boasts a credible deterrent against US nuclear 
blackmail. Though Beijing has not been engaged in military operations since 1979, 
it is quite aware of the costs of war, which it would certainly prefer to avoid with 
the United States, but Beijing has a stronger commitment to unification than the 
US commitment to prevent it and could use this to deter US intervention. If it 
comes to a second missile crisis, will the United States send aircraft carriers to 
the Strait if they can be knocked out by Chinese antiship ballistic missiles? If the 
United States calculates that Taiwan’s autonomy is not worth the cost, and if Tai-
wan’s military forces are clearly inferior to those arrayed against them, China can 
impose its will on the island without firing a shot.
Yet this scenario, premised on unquestioned local superiority, contains risks 
China is not yet willing to run. Until then, Beijing’s use of force via coercive di-
plomacy is apt to prove counterproductive because of the democratic blowback 
to the use of insufficient force. Force can be a successful means of reunification 
if it is decisive, as in the 1975 Vietnamese reunification. If force is not decisive, as 
in the Korean War or the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, it merely antagonizes the 
opponent and forfeits credibility. Yet Beijing still deems threats of force essen-
tial to deter movement toward formal independence and to signal its continuing 
commitment to reunification. Otherwise Beijing seems to have erased force from 
its public repertoire, shifting from sticks to carrots and the “boxing in” strategy 
described by Jing Huang in chapter 13 of this book. But Taiwan realizes that the 
public downplaying of threats that might discredit Beijing’s charm offensive does 
not mean the weapons are no longer there. This is a dilemma for Beijing: force 
cannot be used, yet Beijing cannot give up the threat to use it.
Reunification necessarily involves more than the two parts of the divided na-
tion. Even after the end of the Cold War, “great powers” have tended to see their 
interests at stake in any alteration of the status quo and to intervene. Great-power 
intervention by the United States has since 1950 been a perennial obstacle to re-
unification efforts. The United States abandoned Taiwan to embrace China in the 
early 1970s in a “strategic triangular” move against the USSR. Since the latter’s 
dissolution in 1991, Washington, hoping to retain leverage with both sides, has 
attempted to shift its role from supporter to impartial referee, stipulating that the 
two decide the issue either way so long as they disavow the use of force. Hege-
monic intervention, as the United States construes the post–Cold War rules of 
the game, contains two contradictory imperatives. One has been to maintain the 
peace, and the other has been to block changes in the territorial status quo that 
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are adverse to the hegemon’s strategic interests. Preserving the peace is necessary 
in an era of globalization because wars are unpredictable and at best disrupt gain-
ful economic intercourse. On this objective both sides can agree. But unification 
under Beijing’s auspices, even if peaceful, may shift the regional power balance 
against American strategic interests.3 American China policy has striven to resolve 
this contradiction. Having declared its principled commitment to neutrality in the 
three Sino-American communiqués that it signed with the PRC, the United States 
becomes actively engaged in the reunification issue only when the two sides are 
on the verge of hostilities—because if war breaks out it is informally committed to 
fight China, something it would prefer not to do. Thus in the early Strait crises it 
limited its involvement to defensive moves, not following up after blocking China’s 
moves against the offshore islands and refusing to authorize Chiang’s proposal to 
invade the mainland during the post-Leap disaster.
The continuing counterbalancing role of the United States, as symbolized af-
ter derecognition by arms sales to Taiwan, has nonetheless deeply aggrieved the 
PRC, which is convinced that reunification on terms favorable to the mainland 
would otherwise be quickly achieved. Beijing prefers to define the issue in purely 
“domestic” (i.e., bilateral) terms, defining the United States out of the equation. 
Though the US “one-China” policy formally constrains the United States to accept 
peaceful reunification even if that is against the US national interest, Beijing has 
a reasonable suspicion that US support emboldens advocates of the “China threat 
theory” in Taiwan to resist reunification. As Chen, Kastner, and Reed have pointed 
out in this volume, this may well be mistaken, and it would in any event be risky to 
act on such assumptions. Nevertheless, if Beijing and Taiwan both believe that US 
arms sales have this steeling effect they will tend to inhibit reunification based on 
force—at least until the balance of power shifts.
In sum, when it comes to force, China is for the time being powerful but frus-
trated. The PLA at long last is gaining local military superiority over Taiwan. But 
if it tries to use force to take Taiwan or threatens to do so, it risks triggering US 
intervention. Unless China can prevent such intervention, a confrontation would 
result either in asymmetric war or in an embarrassing climb-down and would 
tend to discredit Chinese threats, as in 1996. Thus the United States is key: China 
must have local superiority over intervening US forces, plus a sufficiently robust 
deterrent to inhibit nuclear blackmail if it chooses to use that local capability 
(for example, by sinking an American aircraft carrier). Chinese objections to US 
weapons sales are hence somewhat misplaced. What China really needs from the 
United States is a promise not to intervene in case it uses force across the Strait, but 
for China to request that would discredit its peaceful reunification intentions and 
would incur blowback from Taiwan.
Second, under Mao, China represented a revolutionary rejection of both 
Chinese traditional culture and Western bourgeois values, sharply divergent from 
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a Taiwan that viewed itself as the last bastion of Confucian civilization. After the 
advent of “reform and opening,” the CCP leadership under Deng Xiaoping es-
poused “emancipation of the mind,” a more pragmatic attitude to the capitalist 
world that involved attempting to introduce more efficient economic, techno-
scientific, and cultural practices from more advanced countries. These innovations 
were successful in accelerating economic modernization but were socially and en-
vironmentally disruptive. Tiananmen was just the largest and most celebrated of 
the demonstrations that roiled China through the 1980s. China emerged from the 
Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the communist bloc with its ideological 
confidence severely shaken. The leadership was in a quandary for the next two 
years, as some rose to the defense of prereform ideological formulas blaming the 
Western bourgeoisie for “peaceful evolution,” while surviving reformers came un-
der a cloud for having licensed the protests.
Not until Deng’s 1992 “voyage to the south” in defense of continuing econom-
ic reform was the impasse broken: China would quietly shelve further political 
experimentation and adopt the Singapore compact of political authoritarianism 
and economic eclecticism, bringing Zhu Rongji up from Shanghai (initially as 
vice-premier) to staunch inflation, prepare China for entry into the World Trade 
Organization, and restructure banks and state-owned enterprises in accord with 
international “best practices.” This proved to be a winning formula, and for the 
next two decades China experienced a sustained economic boom rarely seen 
in world history, unavoidably accompanied by a modernizing urban middle-
class subculture increasingly convergent with that of other emerging industrial 
economies—including Taiwan.
Meanwhile Taiwan emerged from the Cold War to dismantle the Nationalist 
martial law regime and organize democratic capitalism. Economically export-
oriented growth was sustained while pushing manufacturing up the value chain 
into computer peripherals and information technology in collaboration with Sili-
con Valley. When Taiwanese entrepreneurs ventured across the Strait in the early 
1990s, they were welcomed by growth-obsessed local elites, a cheap and capable 
labor force that spoke the same language (even the same dialect), and a receptive 
domestic market and/or export opportunities. Taiwan did not join in the post-
Tiananmen sanctions imposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development countries after Tiananmen; it even lobbied the United States 
to end them. As economic growth boomed on both sides of the Strait, the mu-
tual advantages of economic and cultural complementarity became obvious, and 
Taiwan’s economic elites began to set up factories and resettle on the mainland. 
China became Taiwan’s largest trade and investment partner. Over two million 
Taiwanese have settled on the mainland, where they have careers, families, busi-
ness associations, schools, and comfortable lifestyles. A recent survey reported 
that nearly one-third of Taiwanese under age forty hoped to find a job in China 
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because of potentially higher salaries and greater room for career advancement. 
Under ECFA, millions of Chinese tourists, thousands of Chinese permanent resi-
dents (mostly spouses of Taiwanese), and some Chinese business ventures have 
been established on the island. With the mainland’s revival of traditional values 
(“harmonious society”), even cultures have begun to converge.
But social assimilation has had only limited political impact, Shu Keng and 
Emmy Ruihua Lin report (chapter 4), increasing “Blue” and decreasing “Green” 
(DPP coalition) votes and compatible business practices but exerting no notice-
able effect on Taiwanese national identity, which has become firmly established on 
both sides of the Strait. Voting is one thing, but there is as yet no sign of prounifi-
cation advocacy by taishang among the island’s ruling elites. And the ideological 
convergence witnessed under the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping has clearly dimin-
ished under Xi Jinping.
Why does politics remain an outlier? The basic motive force of convergence 
has been economic. For twenty years China’s double-digit growth was irresistible 
to Taiwan business. The global financial crisis that struck in 2008 made Taiwan 
more economically dependent on China by cutting export demand elsewhere, 
which seemed fortuitous at the time, as China introduced a huge stimulus pack-
age in 2009 that helped salvage Taiwan as well. But after a big GDP upsurge to 
10.8 percent in 2010, Taiwan’s growth declined.4 Though there is a widespread 
impression in Taiwan that inequality also increased, careful examination of avail-
able statistics shows this claim to be ill-founded.5 Over 60 percent of Taiwan’s 
economy is dependent on exports, and China and Hong Kong are Taiwan’s biggest 
trade partners, but Taiwan’s exports have been very choppy since plunging deeply 
in 2009, sinking into negative territory again in 2015. Part of this can be attrib-
uted to the steady annual decline of China’s GDP growth since 2010. But why has 
the drop been more precipitous in Taiwan? At least one reason is the effort since 
2009 to move Chinese industry up to a higher value-added, technology-intensive 
niche, in effect squeezing out Taiwan industries (whether in Taiwan or on the 
mainland) in favor of a “red supply chain” of Chinese manufacturers, as Tse-Kang 
Leng makes clear in chapter 9.
Meanwhile the cumulative impact of outsourcing has been a decline of employ-
ment opportunities in Taiwan. Aggregate employment statistics actually show an 
upswing, from 5.2 percent unemployment in 2010 to 3.79 in 2015. But youth un-
employment has been hovering at around 12 to 13 percent, reaching a high of 14.02 
percent in August 2014. Taiwan’s youth thus backed the 2014 Sunflower Movement 
and voted overwhelmingly DPP in 2016. Taiwan has entertained only a fraction of 
Hong Kong’s mainland tourists (3.4 million in 2015 vs. Hong Kong’s 47 million), 
but the sudden influx has been felt: they have high per capita incomes and have in-
jected some US$200 billion per annum into the economy. But they arouse familiar 
complaints: they are described as a loud, uncouth lot whose spendthrift ways drive 
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up prices. The KMT’s attempt in the CSTA to open Taiwan’s economy to mainland 
investment, though a potential economic boom, excited fears of a “Trojan Horse” 
in the form of Chinese purchase of mass media and high-tech firms.
In sum, economic convergence has indeed brought the two sides closer to-
gether, but it has also driven up expectations faster than they could realistically 
be fulfilled and has included unanticipated externalities. Meanwhile, the decisive 
economic variable is not convergence but growth, which has declined on both 
sides of the Strait for the first sustained period since détente took off in the early 
1990s. It turns out to be risky to base reunification so narrowly on an everlasting 
economic boom.
Third, power symmetry across the Strait has changed over time, and this has 
affected the reunification dynamic. The stronger side has greater incentive (and 
resources) to assume a leadership role in the reunification process, assuming it will 
dominate the reunified state. One big problem is that the response of the weaker 
side to asymmetry has been to lose interest in political unification. Thus Ma Ying-
jeou retreated from his early proposal for a cross-Strait peace treaty and repeat-
edly postponed initiation of political talks. The logic of asymmetry implies that 
the stronger state must be exceedingly gentle in order to build the confidence of a 
weaker counterpart facing greater risks. Yet this runs counter to the human ten-
dency for the strong to exploit their advantage and humble the weak. Given this 
human propensity and suspicions of what Mao called “sugar-coated bullets” even 
when terms seem more generous, the best time for plausible reunification propos-
als has been during periods of relative symmetry. The most auspicious of these was 
in the early 1990s, viewed retrospectively by KMT elites as a golden era (dianfeng 
shiqi). On both sides there was a spirit of emancipation: Taiwan from the Chiangs’ 
dictatorship, China from Mao’s fitful tyranny and the Cultural Revolution. The 
Cold War structures had collapsed; it was a new world. On both sides there was 
greater willingness to open-mindedly experiment. “China fever” (dalu re) brought 
renewed human contact and the informal realization of Beijing’s “three links.” De-
spite its small size and population, at the time Taiwan’s economy was nearly half as 
big as China’s and more technologically advanced; from a security perspective the 
island still had a qualitative edge sufficient to deter any threat of invasion without 
US intervention.
Today the power balance has changed momentously. While in 1990 China’s 
GDP was only 2.4 times that of Taiwan, by 2010 it was 13.7 times as large. Trade 
interdependency has become asymmetrical in the sense that Taiwan has propor-
tionately more to lose than the mainland. China is Taiwan’s biggest trade partner, 
but Taiwan is only China’s fifth-largest trade partner. While 80 percent of Taiwan’s 
FDI goes to the mainland (up from 50 percent in 2003), only a tiny fraction of 
China’s FDI goes to Taiwan, because of the latter’s reservations.
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In terms of military power the asymmetry is even more striking, partly because 
even a small proportion of the world’s second-largest economy is a very substantial 
arms budget, partly because the PRC has successfully dissuaded many other coun-
tries from selling arms to Taiwan. Beijing’s military budget has risen eight-fold in 
the last twenty years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, reaching 10 percent of global arms spending in 2012. Beijing has grown 
confident of its ability to defeat Taiwan quickly in a bilateral war. Diplomatically 
Beijing officially granted Taipei equal status in 2005, but this is valid only bilat-
erally; internationally Beijing colludes with others to ostracize Taiwan except as 
“Taipei, China,” or “Chinese Taipei.”
Notwithstanding its growing superiority, the PRC has attempted to maintain 
bilateral noblesse oblige, offering not only a high degree of autonomy in future 
reunification arrangements but generous trade packages and fostering many ex-
change arrangements. During the period of rapprochement Beijing’s generosity 
extended to a sincere (if very limited) diplomatic truce. None of these are more 
than time-bound accommodations, however, as Taiwan’s narrowing diplomatic 
space in the Tsai era has since demonstrated. And the gap between generous bi-
lateral policy and continuing international ostracism, not to mention tightening 
domestic constraints on civic freedom amid a crackdown on dissent, tends to in-
spire skepticism about purpose-rational bilateral concessions. China’s economic 
miracle, taking it far past Taiwan economically and promising to overtake it with 
regard to technology and eventually living standards as well, has made it a proud 
giant reluctant to expand upon the generous “one country, two systems” formula 
offered under Deng in the early 1980s. The only concession since has been the 
“differing interpretations” addendum to “one China” granted in 1992, which Xi 
Jinping would now like to take away. Hong Kong’s recent experience has not en-
couraged faith in Taiwan’s future as part of China.
C ONCLUSION
The China-Taiwan relationship, highly volatile from the beginning, has changed 
greatly since the advent of democracy in Taiwan and reform and opening in China, 
but it remains volatile just the same. For a time it seemed that a troubled relation-
ship that has resisted all military and diplomatic solutions might be resolved by 
mutual interests. But that bubble of hope has now also popped. Whether economic 
interests could have continued to integrate the two sides of the Strait is doubtful 
in any case, but now the economic engine is decelerating. Although it has failed 
to bring about reunion, there is little space for reaction in the other direction. 
Beijing still clings to the dream. Even on the (highly unlikely) chance that Beijing 
will overlook a declaration of formal independence, geographic, sociocultural, and 
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economic ties are now too tightly bound to permit the island to go far from 
Beijing’s embrace.
What are the main reasons for the waning of the dream? Surely the threatened 
use of force remains among them. This is now more or less exclusively wielded by 
Beijing, though reciprocal military exercises and an arms race continue. China re-
serves its right to use force and may in due course feel strong and bold enough to do 
so. Yet some progress has been made. Both sides have agreed that peaceful reunifica-
tion, preceded by economic integration, is a better solution for both than the use of 
force. Beijing has learned that the use of force is politically counterproductive unless 
wielded in a decisive blow, making that option less likely and more risky. Great-
power intervention has diminished over time as the absence of crises has made it 
unnecessary. Neither arms sales to Taiwan nor the military buildup on the Fujian 
coast has ceased, but there seems to have been a tacit understanding since the Strait 
Crisis that as Chinese threats and crises diminish, American arms sales will avoid 
destabilizing the balance: hence no submarines, no fifth-generation stealth fighters. 
It would be better if the threat of force could be completely removed from the pic-
ture, but that would require more trust than is currently at hand. Even without trust, 
given a protracted hiatus in the actual use of force (i.e., no crises), the probability of 
its invocation may tacitly diminish over time.
One of the biggest changes has been socioeconomic convergence. Though to 
some extent inhibited by Taiwanese “self-ghettoization” in homogeneous commu-
nities and mainlander discrimination, there is no language barrier, and there has 
been considerable intermixing on both sides of the Strait. Mutual understand-
ing does not necessarily entail mutual affinity or political agreement, and socio-
economic convergence has not yet led to perceptible progress toward changes of 
national identity. This may have to await future generations, assuming continuing 
intermarriage between Taiwanese and Chinese. National identity may be last to 
change. Before that may come voting patterns, the buildup of vested interests, and 
finally some political concessions on both sides. For attitudes truly to change it 
would also be useful to have honest political discussions, which is difficult at pres-
ent, particularly on the mainland. It will be a long process.
There is also the problem of relative gains. While reunification would be good 
(an absolute gain) for both sides and beneficial to the international community, it 
might be better for one side than the other. Specifically, it is better for the stronger 
power than for the weaker. A rational stronger power tends to minimize conces-
sions and push for simple annexation while making minimal changes in the do-
mestic status quo (as in the German case). This enhances domestic support for the 
process but motivates the weaker power to resist. The Taiwan-China relationship 
has become steeply asymmetrical, and to extrapolate current growth rates this is 
apt to increase, heightening Taiwan’s disincentive to move toward unification. It 
will require great sensitivity on the part of the dominant party to reassure the 
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weaker. Hence China offers “early harvest” and other concessions to Taiwan as 
“loss leaders” to encourage economic integration. The taishang respond as “free 
riders,” gladly accepting all concessions. This leads to increasing economic inte-
gration, but whether the Taiwanese become more politically committed to the 
PRC is unclear. This is frustrating to the giver of the concession, who cannot how-
ever accuse the receiver of bad faith because the political quid pro quo was never 
explicit. To make it explicit would encumber Beijing’s “no-strings-attached” and 
“win-win” trust-building model with political quid pro quos. Thus we have fragile 
sociocultural integration without much political payoff, at least in the short run.
Growing asymmetry has become perhaps the most unexpected obstacle to re-
unification. In itself the Chinese economic miracle is an epochal achievement. One 
of its motives was to surpass Taiwan, on the assumption that once China was in a 
position of undisputed superiority all resistance would surely collapse. Economic 
growth also incentivized “win-win” cross-Strait socioeconomic integration. Yet 
the same economic miracle that boosted the Chinese (aggregate) economy well 
past that of Taiwan and made the PLA Asia’s largest military has also constructed 
a party-state juggernaut that has become a threat to any who stand in its way. To 
be fair, Beijing has since 2005 leaned over backward to court Taiwan with sundry 
concessions. But all this is not enough. The world’s second-largest economy, which 
now aspires to become a global “pole” commanding its own strategic periphery 
and integrating Eurasia with ports and high-speed rail, sees no need to restructure 
its party-state to reassure a reincorporated Taiwan of any real influence in govern-
ing greater China. Taiwan is small and China is big, to parody Yang Jiechi. The 
Taiwanese have been able to descry the difference between economic convergence 
and political assimilation and to accept the former while evading the latter. The Xi 
Jinping leadership looks askance at this and is disinclined to let it continue. What 
they can do to stop it without unacceptable damage to their own economy and 
international reputation remains to be seen.
In sum, in view of recent developments the route to a mutually acceptable ar-
rangement for divided sovereignty may yet be a long and bumpy one. Taiwan may 
never fully break out of Beijing’s comprehensive geo-economic “boxing in” strat-
egy. But Beijing may also not succeed in peacefully integrating the long-separate 
island nation into its vision of an ideologically homogeneous “one China.”
NOTES
1. Actually, Germany and Korea were divided by the victors in the aftermath of World War II, and 
China was divided by a civil war immediately after World War II; only Vietnam was divided during the 
Cold War. But in all cases the basis of cleavage was the ideological split between capitalism and com-
munism that defined the Cold War.
2. See Steve Tsang, If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (New York: 
Routledge, 2006).
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3. There is an interesting ambiguity about this. On the one hand, the United States no longer recog-
nizes or has an alliance with Taiwan, and its declaratory policy is neutral about peaceful reunification. 
China has promised as part of its “one country, two systems” approach not to station troops and to 
permit the island’s continued strategic autonomy. On the other hand, the Chinese have never spelled 
out how Taiwan’s military would continue to function autonomously or what its future relation to 
the PLA would be, and they clearly consider Taiwan a key link in the “first island chain.” See Alan M. 
Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 208n119.
4. In 2008 Taiwan’s GDP was 1.8 percent, plunging to -1.9 percent in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis in 2009, resurging to 10.8 percent in 2010, then declining to 4 percent in 2011, 1.5 percent 
in 2012, 2.1 percent in 2013, 3.5 percent in 2014, 0.7 percent in 2015, and 1.5 percent in 2016. The average 
annual growth rate from 1962 to 2015 was 7.01 percent, so this obviously represented a decline from the 
perceived “normal” and was lower than Taiwan’s “Small Tiger” reference group (South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore).
5. Taiwan’s Gini index of inequality is relatively low among developed economies (and far lower 
than China’s). It has indeed increased along with globalization, from .28 in 2008 to .34 in 2015, but the 
rate of increase is no higher than in previous decades and is not statistically significant.
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